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s C m C A R  Y
Didia and the dominant power# of the West have 
had no territorial diaputes* They have maoh In common in 
their commitment to liberal institution# and individual 
right## English play# a dominant role in India*# intelleotual 
life I it is the link language of %idia. Therefore, their 
relations should have been cordial. But they were rarely 
so. Western global interests clashed with India*# national 
Interests in the subcontinent# This clash of interests was 
taken advantage of by the Soviet Uhion, vhose interests also 
clashed with those of the West, to build friendly relations 
with Didia,
The thesis discusses ind.C**Soviet relation# vis-avi# 
Soviet claims to ideological fidelity and argues that Ideology 
is of secondary ii%K)rtanoe in Soviet foreign policy considerations. 
The very starting and ending points of the thesis belie such 
Soviet claims t In September# 1959, a few days after the first 
shooting ensured on the Sino-Indian border, the Soviet news 
agency# Tkss, issued a statement declaring in effect, the 
neutrality of the Soviet Bhion,^  Such a stand on a dispute 
involving a socialist and a lr>urgeois country hardly speaks 
for either ideological solidarity or proletarian internationalism#
1# This, Jen-min Jlh nao was to say, amounted to "tipping off 
the eneny that the Socialist camp was not a monolithic mhole*'# 
See Peking Review, BC. 55 ( August 50, 1965 ), P. 7
il
la August, 1971» the Dido^Soviet treaty wà» signed* Evidence 
euf^ geat» that this was an Indo**Soviet reaction to Slnc^Amerioan 
detente* Keitlier the Chinese action ( rapprochement with 
oapitaliit America ) nor the Soviet reaotion was in the spirit 
of Marxism*
The thesis discusses Indo^Sovlet relations between 
1959 “ 1971 * It disouaaes only political, economic and military 
relations* Cultural relations are not taken into consideration 
because all the Soviet cultural offensive has not even mads a 
dent into the preponderant cultural influence of the West 
( almost totally British )*
ïlrst in Pakistan and later in China, Indo^Soviet 
interests coincided* Thiafresulted in Soviet support to India 
on issues involving her vital interests# The Soviet (Mion*s 
diplomatic success in India is attributable to this support; 
conversely, the failure of Anglo-American diplomacy in India 
is due to lack of such support* Therefore,all these issues 
and the attitudes taken by both blocs to them receive exhaustive 
discussion in the thesis*
The thesis is divided into eleven chapters; the 
first three give an historical insight into Ihdo-Sovict 
relations before 19591 the last eight discuss their relations 
between 1959 - 1971#
Ill
Convergence of Interests contributed to cordiality In 
Xndo-Soviet relations, as evidence suggests* However, interests 
between two political entities need not necessarily coincide over 
a long period of time. The Soviet Ibiion and India belong to two 
different categories i the former is a global power and the 
latter, a regional power* Sooner or later, Soviet global 
interests are likely to clash with Indians regional Interests.
The cordiality that prevails in Itido-Soviet relations 
now is, among other things, an indirect result of policies 
pursued by the bhited States, China and Pakistan towards India*
India is interested in improving her relations with these 
countries in order to have diplomatic manoeuvrability* There 
are already signs of thaw in the relations between Ihdia and these 
countries* If this happens, Indians need of Soviet support 
will be less* Besides that, there are enough institutional 
differences between &idla and the Soviet Bhion yrhioh have 
caused in the past and will cause in future Irritations in 
their relations* As long as states need each other, such Irritations 
are ignored; once their interests begin to diverge, even small 
issues can then become major problems* However, if Moscow takes 
a realistic view of an improvement in the relations between Ihdia 
and China and does not proceed to take retaliatory steps out of 
pique, Indo*Soviet relations oan still be maintained on correct 
lines; otherwise, tensions are likely to appear in their relations*
CHAPTER I 1
THE EVOLUTION OP SOVIET POLICY TtMARlB 
COLONIAL AND E3MOLONIAL STATES, WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
INHA
The euooees of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia made Lenin 
and his oolleagues not only the temporal rulers of the Soviet Union 
but also spiritual mentors of the international communist movement. 
Inevitably, the question of communist attitude to bourgeois nationalist 
movements in the colonial world, and in the post Vforld War II period, 
to the new nationalist regimes of the ex-colonial states had to be 
decided by the leaders of the international communist movement from 
time to time. This policy naturally changed over the years. The 
chapter seeks to analyse the relative influence of ideology and 
Soviet state interests on the policies enunciated from time to time,
LENIN*# PERIOD
In a letter addressed to the American workers in August, 19I8, 
Lenin said "that circumstances brought our Russian detachment of the 
socialist proletariat to the fore not because of our merits, but 
because of the exceptional backwardness of Russia,,,,," However, he 
felt that the victory of the Russian proletariat "could not be permanent
unless it was followed up by a proletarian revolution in the West..,.
2
or at any rate in several of the main capitalist countries".
1* Lenin on the Poreimi Policy of the Soviet state (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1968 ), P, 115 (hereinaifter referred to as the foreign 
Policy of the Soviet State),
2, Lenin, collected Vol. XXXI (MOSCOW: Progress Publishers, 1966)
P, 411.
2Lenin believed üm l the working class in #ie advanced capitalist 
countries syaçpathised with %viet Russia, though soms of their 
leaders held "a stand point, not of the working class but of the 
b o u r g e o i s i e , H e  felt that the Entente could not fight Soviet 
Russia because the "workers and peasants of the capitalist countries 
c^uld not be forced to fight" it.^ "Domestic conditions have not 
allowed a single pcwerfhl capitalist state to hurl its ersy against 
Russia, this has been due to the revolution having matured within 
such countries#,,«•" Therefore, Lenin was "banking on the inevita­
bility of the world revolution", though not on a definite and 
early date",^
As the spiritual leader of the international ooanunist movement,
Lenin organised the Communist Intemational^ to guide the movement, and,
probably, also to take the best possible advanttige from it. As a
struggling new state, Soviet Russia was hardly in a position openly
to conduct hostile propaganda against the then great powers and
the consequences, Lenin hoped to use the Comlntem to promote ^e
Soviet State interests, conduct Mwxist propaganda and yet take shelter
under the non-state character of the organisation to ward off any
8
retaliatory action on the part of the capitalist states. However, 
revolutionary propaganda apart, Lenin mê opposed to any precipitate 
revolutionary acts on the part of sitîier Soviet Russia or 
the Comlntem,
4. XtaOsM. BP. 412 & 414
5. Ik ld .. P. 412
6. B w  Jteeton A)limr of th» SovUt 115
7. On March 2, 1919, m  International Communist Conference met in Moscow,
It was attended by 52 delegates from 55 organisations of 21 countries, 
#iere was none from Ihdia* On Nhrch 4, 1919, it baoame the Foundation 
Congress of the Communist International, C, Adhikari, ed„ Documents 
of the History of the CH, Yol* I 1919-22 (Kew Dslhii Bsoples Publishing 
House, l Wl),
6, Ih what he called an off the record remark, Lenin said in neice#er,1920, 
that Soviet Russia would maintain that the Comlntem was not a govemr 
mental organisation. See poll^gte^ works, Vol, X3CXI, P, 472
■ 5
He had sound theoretical grounds for oppoaiig the polioy, advocated
by the "Left" Bolsheviks, like Trotsky, of artificially "'inseminating"
revolution from without, for it ignores the internal conditions on the
haste of which revolution matures in each separate country, and makes
the position of the internal revolutionary forces more difficult, because
it allows " reactionaries " to portray revolution as a product of foreign
o
interference and, on that ground, to fan nationalism. He had practical
problems too: The Civil war and foreign intervention, in the wake of
the Revolution in Russia.^^ Lenin was in " no doubt that the most
insignificant concentration of forces by these three powers ( Britain,
France andJapan { would have been quite enough to win a victory over us
11 ■in a few months, if not in a few weeks " Bolshevik control, then,
12confined to the Great Russian interior. The last interventionist
15forces, Japanese, were to be withdrawn not until October, 1922.
9. P-.Ht. ZedoggyjBy^ - ed^ -^LeiilJiiAt Theory^of Social
13ie Conterooorary world (l^ tosoowi Progress Publishers,1975/» P. 226
10. Merle Palnsod, How Russia is Ruled ( Bombay: The Times of India 
Press, 19Ü9 ), KP 90 - 97.
11* Lenin, Gollaoted Works. Vol.XXXI, PP. 412 - 1J.
12, Merle Fainsod, Oc.oit., F. 555 
15. Bld.. P. 560
4
Therefore Lenin not in a position to oonduot military oampaigne,
Ha mn %mking daaparata atta#t# to buy peace with Qer#hy in tîia
Id
teeth of opposition from the "Left" Bolehaviki* Brest Litovak
Tkaaty with Oerawwy m e  finally signed on Mmrdh 5» 1918# this
'15deprived Hueeia of one third of her population#
The eurvival of the Bolshevik regime being the one overriding
consideration, Lanin had to follow a policy of moderation and pregmatism
even in the aoonomio field# i%ila in the first flneh of ttia Bolshevik
16
victory, he introduoed # r  Oommunism, which resulted in a disastrous 
situation, with peasant revolts and further fall in production both 
in sgrioiHtural as well as industrial sectors, he did not hesitate to 
revise the policy and give inoentives to agriculture, small-soale 
industry and private trade in order to improve the economy*^  ^ Lenin 
even confessed that the Kew Kconomio ïbliqy was a 'ketreat",^^
14# BuWmrin was for a "revolutionary war", Tkotsky, for a policy of 
%eit*ier peace nor war"# Tkots^y resided as Commissar of Foreign 
Relations on #%e eve of the talks with Oermany fcnr making a peace 
treaty, after the receipt of a 48-hour ultimatum, issued by Ctermany 
on February 335, 1918, for starting negotiations* See Adam B# 01am, 
mganslon and Ooexistsnoet The History of,
1^77^ 1^7 (Hew York i ïkedriok A# Rmeger, 1968), HP# 64 - 71*
On February 24, 1918# the Masoow Regional Bureau of the HSXLR, 
then under the leadership of BuWmrin and others, passed dissolu­
tion expressing its lack of confidence in the Oen^ml Oowdtteo and 
refusing "to obey unreaervedJy those deoislone*##, connected with 
the implementation of the terms of the peace treaty with Austria 
and Germany". See Lenin, Collected workff. Vol. XXVII (M»soowt 
Ikogress Publishers, 1965), P. 68#
15# Adam B# Ulam, op.pit» P# 71# The Ukraine, Finland, The Bdtio 
st^ t^es were grsuited independence and her polish territories were 
wrested away. In tlie Caucasus, territorial concessions were made 
to Turkey# Ibi^ ^
16# under it, all the surplus grain, sometimes even part of the grain 
tiae peasants required for food# was taken away# On June 28, 1918, 
virtwlly evexy important branch of industry was nationalised#
See ^rle minsod, op.citA# PP. 95 - 98*
17. M k
18. The fo m im  Kilaer of tha Swi.t State. P. 374
■ r-  . . . . , :;y -
s S f ï s  S
Lenln even sought to induoe foreign oapitalists to invest in
Soviet Ruesia by offering them oonoessiona ’•# Tlrie Wkoflt# that
Lenin hoped to secure thrcj^ ûhvarious oonoesalons were; 1* Rehabilitation
of the eoonony through the restoration of trade.with advanced oapiialiet
countries, which would facilitate direct and extensive purchases of ‘ •
20
maohinery and other essentials. 2. An "opportunity to leam, by
21
stipulating that our technicians take part In the work.
5. Ikeolusion of wars with the capitalist countries"because \var oanoele
every thing, and should one bx’eakout we sJiall get possession of all the
W 22
buildings, installa tiona^nd railways" 4* Tvlake "qy sterna tic use of the
dissension between them (capitalist states) so as to hamper their
23
8trua% l^e against us." However, "in all but "a fev/ oases negotiations 
( with foreign capitalists (J failed".
19# See Lenin, collected vnrkffjfr Vol.XXXI, PP. 47S 79 and 493 for 
details on the law on Conoessionsbf November 23, 1920.
20. Ibid.. PP. 471 and 473
21. Ibid.. P. 481
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.„ P. 415# In 1920-21 the Soviet Government conducted negotia­
tions with an American industrialist, V/. Vanderlip, on concessions 
In Kamchatka., whida caused extreme resentment in Japan, although 
there was only a draft agreement. Lenin sought to use this *’dissenr 
sion betv/een them".
In his Report on Concessions to the VIII All-Russia Coingress of 
viets on December 21,1920, Lenin cynically observed: " Today we 
we are giving America Kamchatka, i/diioh in any case is not actually 
ours because it is held by Japanese troops". Ry so doing " we are 
setting American imperialism against Japanese imperialism."
IMd#. P. 467
24# Merle ïhinsod, on.cl t.. P. 98
In his quest foi* security, Lenin tz'ied another strategy; .
" grouping around the Soviet Republic those capitalist countries
25 .:7
vfhioh are being strangled by Imperialism." He v/as encouraged
by Poland's signing of a peace treaty with Soviet Russia in spite
of French opposition. He felt, t h a t " . • Hie minor powers - and
they form the lïiajorl ty of the world's population - are Hi ere fore
26
all inclined to make peace with us." And after Gerrasjsy's defeat 
and humiliation, he thought that"....... her only means of salvation
lies in an alliance with Soviet Russia, ,.27 He was ready to
befriend Germany in " an alliance of the oppressed masses, vhioh is 
a factor in the future proletarian revolution.
Lenin sQ. so sought popularity for Soviet Russia among the small 
and weak states of Europe as well astlie'colonies by exposing the methods 
adopted by the then great powers to pi'omote their interests at the ex­
pense of the small states,-
25* Iienin, Collected i70 cka. Vol. XXXI, P. 470
26. Ibid.. PP. 4 1 3 - 1 4
27. Ibid.. PP. 475 - 76
28. Ibid.. P. 478
Either for ideaXistio reasons or for. embarrassing the great powers
' * . • , ; * 
or for impressing the small and subject nations or for all of these,
Soviet Russia annulled %e secret treaties ooncluded by* the Czarist ,
and Ikovisional governments of Russia.Soviet Russia also called for
30peace without annexations and indemnities,'^ another pronunoiamenta 
sounding idealistio.
It was against this background of constant anxiety for the
security of Soviet Russia# of uncertainties of the outcome of the
Civil War and foreign interventions, and, therefore the need for
ascaution in both domestic as well f-. foreign policies, that Lenin was 
faoed wltli the question of formulating a policy towards the Colonial 
and semi-colonial world.
/
Ho was convinced that In the last analysis, the outcome of the
struggle of the world proletariat would be determined by tlie fact that
Russia, Hidia# China, eto., account for the overwhelming major! of the
population of tlie world. Since thisLajority was drawn Into the >
struggle for emancipation, he was convinced of the complete victory 
31of socialism. •
29. Lenin, Collected Works.. Vol. XXVI (lÆoscow: Progress Publishers, I968), 
P. 251
Over a hundred secret treaties and documents were published ih 
December 1917 and early 1918. Among them were a number of Austro^ 
Hungarian, German, Italian, French, British and other documents.
Hie Foreign Policy of the Soviet State. P. 429
50. Lenin, Golledted Works. Vol XXVI, P. 252
51 • The Foreign Policy of the Soviet State. PP. 416 - 17
\ «
Vilhilo it was "self-evident" that the final victory could be won only
by the proletariat of all the advanced countries, they would " not
be victorious without the aid of the working people of all tlie oppressed
colonial nations, first and foremost of 1:he Eastern n a t i o n s " * For,
the socialist revolution 'Vill not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle
of the revolutionary proletarians in each co\V3itxy against their
bourgeoisie#.... the Civil % r  of tïie working people against tlie
imperialists and exploiters In all the advanced, countries is beginning
35to be combined vd th national wars against international imiieriadlsm".
In playing this auxiliary role in the v/orld revolution, Lenin advised
the lilastern Communists to rely on the general theory and practice of 
communism but, " you must adapt yourself to specific conditions such 
as do not exist in the European countries, you jtiust be able to apply 
tliat theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the popu­
lation are peasants, and in which tJie task is to weige a struggle ' 
against medieval survivals and not against captalism"*^^ Further the 
Eastern Comtïïunists #111 have to base ( Themselves ( on the bourgeois
nationalism which is awakening amug ihose peoples, and v/hloh
has its historical justification".^^
32, Lenin's address to the Second All-Russia Coiigress of Communist 
Organisations of the Peoples of the East, November,22,19I9*
The Forei/m Policy of the Soviet State , P. 163.
33. Ibid.. P. 160 
3A. Ibid.. P. 162 
35. Ibid.. P. 163
At this stage it would be proper to assess tlie Impact of the 
Bolshevik Revolution on India* The Itoxist oonoept of equality of 
all peoples, the hew Soviet government's denunciation of annexations 
and secret treaties, and tJieaooeptanoe of tlie independence, although 
under unavoidable oiroufostances, of Finlsndând theBaltio States, and
the new rulers’ calls for the aooeptEuioe of the.principle of national
56
self-determination ruitutally had some appeal to colonial India.
Hie authors Of the Report on Indian Constitutional forms v/rote 
7'in 1918:
Hie revolution in Russia in its begining was regcirdod in 
India as a triumph oVer despotism, end, notv/itlistanding 
the fact tViat it has since involved tliat; udiappy oounl;xy
in anarchy anddismemberment, it has given Impetus to
' ■ 37Indian political oonoiousneaa.*,,..
Howevet', Lenin wa.s more interested in Concluding a trade . 
agreement with Britain than In exploiting this opportunity* The 
factors which inlilblted him from taking advantage of the opportunity 
have been mentioned earlier* There wa,g no communist party in 
India then eitïier*
36* Manuilsîy was to say at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern tîiat 
Bolshevism " always insists" on the absolute right of nations to 
dispose of Hiemselves", See G* Adliikari, ed..ou.oit.* Vol.II, P.3^4
37# Quoted in Chat tar Singh Sarma, Itjidia and Anglo-Soviet ReTationa 
1917 " 1947 ( ï3ombay; Asia Publishing House, 1939), P. 29
58* See PP. 5 - 7
■■V ; 3' 77 ' ;v7'7
,9 . '. ' 7"'
0
j-\;..';. • Lenin sent Leonid Kraosln- to London in tfey,1920, to
7 V .negotiate with the Bi'itiskVgovernment for concluding a trade
agreement* The Xfecitish govemnient dragged Its feet and the neogotla-
%q
! ' V tion continued until I'tooh, 1921 * In July, 19^0, the British 
7 Government jn^esented a ooir^ ilete text of the trade agi’oement vhioh 
in effect said that Soviet Russia had" to.deolax'e as a iruitter of 
; : ' principle", that she " would not carry on official propaganda or
. do any thing contrary to British interests in the East,.....   ,
■ • • Hiey asked whether we would like to s%n it. We replied we would...., 
\ We are proposing maximum concessions, and we believe it to be in our
«40interest to sign a trade pact
,4haiIt was against this baol<grouniÿ t the Second Congress of the 
(Comintern met in. July-August, 1 920, in ivfosoow anc^ the fa.mou8 debate, 
on the national and colonial questions, between the Indian Couuïiuriis b, 
M,N., Roy, and Lenin took place*
In the Colonial commission of the Comintern, Roy said, that 
masses in India were not infeoted by nationalism, the,t their interest 
lay in questions of socio-economic natui'e, that vdth her five million 
workers, India had elements for the creation of a strong ooimtiunist 
party, that t)ie European oapitalists were in extreme oases, able 
to give all the surplus value to thé workers to win tliem over and 
continue to exploit Asia. '
39* Chat tar Singh Sarriia, op.cit,. P, 56
40. Lenin, Colleoted Works. Vol. m i ,  P. 473
41, C* Adhikari, ed., op.olb.. Voir I, P. 162
..'''7 7 # :
.'.V  ^ 7 ,  :
In View of this, Roy argued, attention ^ ould be paid to th#
\ ■ ■ ■ # : ' - 
development and advancement of the revolutionary movement in the
Bast and to apoept as them^l» thesis the proposition that the fate !
of the world of oommunism depended on the triumph of oommunism in ,
42 ' ■■■■':■ - , , / .
the Bast* This was to become Roy’s motif R>r the duration of hie, 
association with the Comintern*
Lenin maintained that though India had five million proletardMUk 
and thirty seven million landless peassnts, Indian oommunists had 
failed in founding a communist party in the country and for that
45
reason aloiie the views of Roy were largely unsubstatiated*
The differences on the question whether the Comintern ^ ould 
support bourgeois democratic movemente were resolved by the " verbal 
expedient " of oaliing them " national revolutionary" ^  ‘
42* Ibid* '
i V
45. -Xbid**P* 163
44#J^e l^ gra.s, ed*, !Bifi.,g,Qamuniftt,,lttte33aa.tipnal...1.9,1.9, ;r*:-1.9dlL
^cumenta. Vol.I ( London: Frank Caaa and Co* Ltd*, 1971), P. 159
i:::" - : - /  12 :. ' ,
Some of the important of Lenin's theses on the National ejqd 
colonial question, adopted by 1;he Congress, were ; 1, The Comintern 
should bring together the working classes of all nations, for only 
such united action would ensure victory over capitalism, v/ithout 
which it :',ra.s impossible to abolish national oppression end inequality 
of rights. 2, It should bring into beiiri* Q- close alliance of all 
national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia; the 
forms taken by this alliance would be determined by the stage of de­
velopment reached by the ooimnunist movement among tlie proletariat of 
each country. 5. Proletarian internationalism demands Subordination 
of tl'ie interests of the proletarian struggle in one country to the ■ 
interests of the struggle on a world scale; the nation which achieves 
victory over the bourgeoisie shall display the capacity end readiness 
to make the greatest national sacrifice in order to overthrov; 
international capitalism. 4* All communist parties must support 
by action the revolutionary liberation movements in colonies* The 
form which this support shall take should be discussed with the 
oommunist parly of the country in question, if there be one. 5 The 
Comintern shoulr# collaborate provisionally %vith the revolutionary 
movements of the colonies and baokv'/ard countries, and even form an
alliance with it; but it must not amalgamate the proletarian
45movement \#h it, even if it is only in an embryonic stage.
45* G. Adhikari, on.cit.. Vol.I, PP. 198 - 205, I have not quoted 
all the theses; the numbers I have given to the theses I quoted 
are not the ones they get in the text.
7 # , - :  -^WÊêÊÿïMai'm:)! : - i ; ' ; ^ ,:?<
137 ': / ' ' .' ' - . . ■■ 7 : .:- ' : . .:■ ■  ^ j :'7 " " .# % : 7 ' '7 7  7 : / 1f  , ..V.., ■'
77c , - / . - ' : . ' 7' ..;...
Roy submitted supplementary theses, v/hioh were accepted by ;
; the Congress too, Hov;>?ver, Lenin first amended Roy's original theses. 
Some of the important theses of Roy were; 1, One of the main sources .
' " from which European capitalism drew its main strength v/as no longer
to be found in the industrial countries of Europe, but in the colonial
/] 6 '
' possessions, 2* The breaking up of the colonial empix^ e, together 
with the proletarian revolution in the home country, would overthrow • 
the capitalist system in liîux'ope,^  ^ 3* There were two distinct move­
ments in the dependent countries ,s (i) Bourgeois democratic nationalist 
movement with a programme of political independence under I 'lC 'bourgeois 
order* (ii) Mciss action of peasants and wrkers for their liberation 
from all isorta of exploitation,^^ ’ ,
46, BF, 180 — 81. Hoy*a original used tlie words " the foiurfcain-
head " from wlxLoh European capitalism,.*..,..,. Ibid.
47* Ibid, Roy's original \ms : vÂthout the bx'eakitiij; up of the colonial 
empire, the overthrow of the capitalist system in Europe did not 
appear possible.
48* The concept of m ss action by vnrkers etc., must have been
influenced by the a trike '^ the , textile voxkex*s in Bombay between 
1918 - 1920, By 1919, 125,OCX) v/ox?kers were out and practically 
all textile mills were closed. Ibid., P. 206
A resolution passed by the first congress of the Comintern in
I'feroh, 1919, said; "In India the revolutionary movement has not 
subsided for a single day, ondiias lately led to the greatest wrkers 
strike in Asia, i#iich the British government met by ordering its 
armoured oars into tiotlon in Bombay" Ibid.. P. 108
1/'
The .former tried ' to control the latter end often heuQceeded; t. I .'I'-: 
in doing so* .Hie .Comintex'n and the inerties affected must oppose- ' g't; 
suoh control and help develop olo,ss corieciQusnesa among the peasants .. ; 
and workers. However, in the st.ru:"gle egain.st imperialism ond . . -.à;
oapitalism " the co-operation of the 'bourgeois’nationalist révolu- > 
tionary elements is useful^ ' Ihe foremost anc^ecessary. task ms 
the formation of Oommunist parties whioh.would org£uaise the peasants 
an:l workers and lead them to the revolution. " Thus the masses in 
the baokvÆird countries may reach communism, not t>iroU£(h capitalistic
development, but led by the class conscious proletariat of tlie advanced
50 • ‘
capitalist countries." 3# Hie revolution in the colonies \w*s not
going to be communist in its first stage. It would bo"extremely
erroneous" in many of the oriental countries to try to solve the
agrarian problem along pure communist lines. The revolution in the
i
colonies must be carried out with a programme v/hich v/ould include 
many petty bourgeois reform clauses, such as ^ 2^ reforms, etc. It
■V*
did not "at all" mean that the leadership would have to be surrendered
to the bourgeoisie. ' ,7
49. Ibid.. PP. 184 - 85 7
50# Ibid. Ro.v'g orginal the.sie was : Bourgeois nationalist movements were ! 
limited to the small middle class whioli did not reflect the aspira- 
tiona Of the masses. But in many countries, eggecimlly in India, 7% hi:
the mS'Sse i were not with the bourgeois nationalist leaders; they r;;-
were moving towards revolution independently of the bourgeois r -
nationaliat movement. Hoy thought that the co-operation of.the 77 :7.;
bourgeois nationalist movement might be useful - Ibid, 7477
51 * Ibid., PP. 186-87* Roy Vs original thesissaid that it was true that ■ ;.K7\'
y. -::x the revoution in th^bolonles was not going to be communist; 
that it would be " very di. fficult" in many of the oriental countries 777:
to solve the agrarian problem along pure communiât lines; that many 
bourgeois reform clauses, like Ind reforms, would be included in 77-/7&MM
• the programme of the revolution; that it did not necessarrily follow 
that the leadership of the revolution ’would have to be surrendered 
to the bourgeois democrats* Ibid
( 15
Roy’s revolutionary zeal seemed to have been danqiened by 
Lenin’s refusal to indulge in revolutionary rhetoric• He wanted to 
move a resolution at the congress but did not " because I do not 
think tliat the questions oan be discussed here with necessary 
impartiality"^^
M,N, Roy took the initiative and founded the oommunist perty 
of India (CPi) at Tashkent on October 17, 1920#^^ Being very
optimistic about the revolutionary potential of the Indian maases^^
'  ^ . 7
and impatient to carry out a speedy revolution in India, Roy also
set up the Indian Political and Military School at Tashkent in
/ 55 /*/ f
October, 1920. Roy v/snted to oreatmlnuoleua of Indian Liberation
56
Army by enlisting the Indian muliajirs ( self-exiled) In Soviet
57central Asia. Hie Soviet government supplied two train-loads 
' of.arms and deputed instructors to the School. ,
52* Ibid.* P. 194
53. ' 7 4  P. 231
54. See PP. v^-u
55* G. Adhikari, ap.cit., Vol.I, PP. 251 and 24O.
56. bhen' the British government refused to maintain the integrity of 
the Turkish Empire at the end of the v/orld war I, as dsimnded by 
the iviuslims of India, some of the more fanatical among them 
considered tliat British India " >va.s no longer a fit country for 
the lüuallras to live in "; and they left the country, see iviuzaffar 
Ahmad, Mvself and the Communist Party of India 1920-1929 
(Calcutta : National ^ o k  %ency ^t, Ltd., 1970)# PP. 160 - 63#
57. G, Adhikari, on.cit.* Vol.I, P. 240
In the meantime, after protraotod negotiations, ah Anglo-
. 7 ' 7 \  ■ ' 7  ^ 7  7 : ' - ' : ' .  ' 7 ; / .  . i  '}7^-
Soviet trade agreement ■was signed on Mhrch 16, 1921 #. î y
Hie agreement bound each party to refrain from 'hostile actions .
/ ./ 59 ■ '
or undertaking against the other..,.,.," Hie agreement declared,
"more partloularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrain^ from
any attempt, by military or diplomatie or any other form of action
or propaganda, to encourage any of the peoples of Asia, in any form
of hostile action against British interest or the British Entplre^
' 60 • '
especially in India and the Independent State of Afghanistan",
Lenin?is interest in concluding a trade agreement,witli Brite,ih
■ * • 6 l  ■
has already been mentioned, \Vhen it v/as concluded, Kras sin, the
Soviet negotiator of the deol, described it as "a great soocess for
the Soviet Republic, as it equivalent to the recognition d^Taoto of
the Soviet Government by the greatest of the oaplts,liat powers".'
Hie Soviet government did not like to do anything v/hlch vrould put
its relations with Britain in jeopardy, Hierefore vAion the British
government objected to the presence en^otivities of the Muhajlrs
in Soviet Céntxal Asia, the Soviet ^ vemment closed thé Indian
Military and BdoEticàl School ih Tashkent in May, 1921. .
58, Chatter Singh Sarma. on.olt.. P. 56
59. P. 57 7 '
61 ,SeePP. 9 -10
62, His telegram to Moscow, quoted in Chat tar Singh Sarma, on.oit.,
, 58- ’ . ■ .7 7 • ■ :
63, G, Adhikari^ op.cit-i» Vol,I» P, 239# In May, 1921, the Communist ' 
Univsrslty of the Toilers of the Bast was founded in Moscow, H »  
Indians at 'fasïiként were sent to Moscow* P. 24O
"'A 1 ^
f : îhe Coi.;^ réss of the Comintern mot in June-^ Ju]y^  1921 •
■ ■•.= ■,■,■ ■ ■■• . ; . ■■ . ; . ■ ;■■■:/■- , .Â:;:;.:' : Y -
- / %r then the Civil wez ’md. ended* so did the Intervention for all ; ; , •
/ ■ " 65 ' - : . . - 
praotloal pi^rposes# Ebcpeptin^ for the loss of Finla nd and the
îÿ'ir'ï
'
three Baltic States, whose freedom'was recognised by Soviet IbAaaia, .'
the Bolsheviks brought tlie rest of the erstwhile Gaariat empire
66
imder their control# However, the economic position ofthe ooun+ry
' ' ■ ‘ 67 ■ ■
ws-8 frightful; early économie radicalism, besides the wai^having 
contributed its mite to the plight# Bolshevik political control wap 
more or less complete; but there was a lot of mass discontent due 
to economic hf’rahips# In early 1921 the most distinct danger 
àiignal was provided by the rebellion in the great nêval base of 
ICconstadt'*.^ ^ It was suppressed^^? Lenin now turned his attention
■ JQ ■
to eoonomio reconstruction * He considered tliat a "living example,
tackling the job somewhere in one country is imre effective then any
proclame.tions end oonferenoesj this is what inspires working people 
71- 'in all countriesy
;é4. P* • 262 - ; '
Adam B# Ulam, bp.olt#, P# 104* Japan vras to leave only in October, 
1922# See p. ----— ^
66# Ibid#
67# See p. 4
60. Adam B. Ulnmj op.cit#. P. 126. Itaditionally, they were ?'the most
stawart followers of the communists and their me-in support in 1917# * * "
6):). m i u  ' . ■ vU-;.;: ■ _
70, S»a HP, 4-5 for hia new Eoonomio Polloy, ,
71, Lanin.-Collected V/orka, Vol, XXVI, HP, 4/0 - 71,
-;i
-7' -ÿ-
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./y:Cr:
->v ' . ■ ‘ , .Therefore, at ' khe %trd, Coxgrean of the Cqmintorn, he .. ■ ■
; continued hisoppositibn, ; to adventurist pqlioiee. . : He called fgr- .-t '
, ■ putting an. dndt. to the. "Ltuft" illusions that the original. £.•; korrty . ■
u: ■ toinpo of tho.v/orld reyolu.t ion continued uninterrupted ; and -tlm t •■•'•;■ •:
; ■ . the viotory Of the woi'ld royolutibn depended exoluêively on the
v;iil of the ooiTpunist phx‘ties and. their a.otivitiea * A a if to
.■ .dieoburuge oiy .euphoria the impatient' revolutionaries might Itave
about the suooess of tie Bolshevik revolution, Lenin s-àld that:
/: . " ■ • . .73 ■ : : , • \
. "ti siiviill party' ÿ like the Bolshevik, oould of.ucry out the x'eyolu- '
- ; ,tion in Russia because they had, in addition to the. support of the
majority of the Soviets throughout the country, half the nriiiy ; with 
them, which then numbered at least tenmillion men. He asked them 
to Show him a ooimtry where such bohditibns prevailed,
Lehih supported the German CbmmiAriist perty*a call foi' n.'united fL'ont-., ' 
with social dempCrats, issued, on khe eve of the Congress, vdiioh w^ s- ' ,.;;7 vÿ 
opposed by thé "Leftists" He said that in .Bur.ope -where'alymst\all.j;  ^ ^
proletarians v/ere organised, the ooiiiiiumists; " .Must .Win the majority ' , ...iq
of the working olas s and anybne who falls to. under stand tills is -
lost to the Communist movement 75
72,G. Adhikari, Vol,I,. P, 26Ï',
75* In 1917, the total membership of the Bolshevik party .Avas 25,600. 
:. %re Fainsod, ojimoj^ p, 249 ■
74', G. Adhikari, op.cit., Voif I#?#264 :
' ’.'V' -L - ' . . . .7. .
75, im,jL p# %  ; ■ .
V
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% e  Congresa rejeotedthe " theory of going over to the
"■76 -
offen#^Ÿo"# Ihe theseii oh the world situation end the taaka of 
the Comlntern, adopted at the oongreas,, spoke of the "rigorous 
development of oapitalism Iri the Bast, partioularly in India and 
China" \vhloh created " uew social bases there for the revolutionary 
struggle". % e  bourgeoisie of these countries having " tightened 
their bonds with foreign capitai ' had become important Instru-* 
ment of its rule Iheir struggle against foreign imperialism was 
" half-hearted and feeble in charaoter." ihe combination of Military 
oppression by foreign imperialism, of capitalist exploitation by the 
native and tlie foreign bourgeoisie, and the survival of the feudal 
servitude creates favourable conditions for the young proletariat 
of the odlonies to' develop rapidly and to take its plaoe at the head . 
of the revolutionary peasant movement". Che popular revolutionary 
movement in India and in other colonies, thetheslWsald, had become 
as integral a part of the world revolution as the uprising ofthe 
proletariat in the capitalist oountries#^^ Hoimver, no lloehoe.was 
given for precipitate actions; these developments wer^o be used for
building Up oomniunist parties.
Roy was unhappy vAth the vroy the Eastern question was discussed. 
He called it " purely opportunistic and more worthy of the programme 
of the Seoon^IntOm8tional"7S, 7
76. Ibid.. PP. 264 - 65
77. Ibid.. PP. 265 - 66.
78. ibid.. P. 266, Por more of Lenin's conciliator gestures to 
Britain see Ghâttar Singh Sarma, op#oit^, PP. 75 - 85#
Ttiere was famine in Russia in 1921-22. On July 50, 1921, ‘
the Hlxecutive Committee of the Gominterh ( 3GÇM ) called for
international help to provide relief to the affected, peoplei 
Chough the Civil Vfer a-nd the intervention had praotionlly ended, r 
as late as Bioember 21, 1920, Lenin spoke of "Secret" reports 
,according to which the capitalist , countries were about to launch
- ' ■ ;  ' 7 9  ■ ' '
" à new war against Soviet Riiosia in . the spring". Ihus Lenin-s 
fear for the security of Russia v/as still there, the state of the 
economy was bad, and added to these v/a.s the famine, Lenin.-s belief 
in the sympathy of the workirig .class of the capitalist states for
Soviet Russia and his view that the communist oar ties should ivin 1
the support of the organised v/drking class in Europe have been 
mentioned. And no’vihera ’^ s  an additional need to win such support* 
assistance for the fa miners tr ioken people of Russia, Tlie,. labour 
unions in the oaiiitalists could either bring pressure on their 
ogoverninents to give as ai stance to Russia or send some help themselves 
by voluntFiry oonlaributions.
VJha t ever the considérations, the EGG I adopted the thesis on
■ - i j Q.
the tinited Ihront ^ of the Working Class on December 18, 1921, Early 
in 1922, the SOP I took the initiative and called a conference of the ,
representatives of the Second International aridthe Poniintern to consider
■ • ■ ; ; ■ ' . . ’ .
. united action of the working oalass of Europe end America against the ^
jK^ rti-v/or offensiŸj® of the capitalists; retrenchments and wage outs. .
The second International decided to hold a aeperate conference with
the axolus; ion of the oommunists. . Yét the ECO I, at its plenum in
AO
June 7“*11f 1922  ^ called for carrying forward thé united front taotls*
%9«iLenin, Collected Vfarks,. Vol* XXXI, P. 466*
00. See PP. 2 & 17 ■
a n  a. Adhikari, ÛB4SIJU# V6V
X % @  P'ourth Congress of the Cominteim met between November 5 r 
%oember 5, 1922, M..,- . Roy, Wio made the report on the Eastern
:Qm@stlon, a^ ;a.ln ajcpressed hlaunhappiness with the scant attention ;
\ r/\
V paid by the Comintern to, the study of the questions of development »
7-:'' . "'t ' . . .04. :'— ■
■ of the Comintern programme Vin the East, /
Ihe theses on the Eastern question adopted by the Congress 
spoke of the clash between native capitalism an<^world imiierialism, 
and reiterated its support to " all national revolutionary movements 
agoinst Imperialism" Peasant participation in the national liberation 
struggle being necessary for its success, land reforms which " can roUae 
the vast peasant masses" should form part of the onti-imperialiat .
' ■ ' 86 ■■ f'- - ■ -A' ■ V::,.
programme,. , . :
V Tlie Fourth Congress, called upon the communist to adopt thé 
United Labour Front tactics in the West and the United Anti-Imperialist 
Front tactic3 in the colonies and the semi-colonies# "Just as the v 
watchword of the united labour front in the West facilitates the 
exposure of the social democratic betrayal of the interests of the 
proletariat# so the Wtchword of the united en±i-imperiàlist front 
will facilitate the exposure of the waveriiig and hesitation of certain
' ‘ ■ ' / , , 07
- bourgeois nationalist groups in the Eabt".
r
:/ 'I".
1
85. Ibid#, P. 520
84. Ibid... P. 543*.
85. Ibid.., PP. 548 - 49
.86* m i w L  .F. 550.
87. Ibid., P. 555 : ■
21
Cpnwnist partie» in the oolonlee and eeml^olonle#
^^ nuet take part 1# every movement that give» them aooe»» to the 
86meeeelf The refueaX of the oommmlet# "in the ooXonlee to
partioipate againet luperiaXlet oppreeelon on the pretext of
aXXeged "defenoe" of independent oXa»» Intereete le opportnnlm
of the worst kind oaXouXated only to dlsoredlt the proXetarlan
revolution in the Q&etk Re less harmfoX muet he reoognieed the
attest to isolate oneself from the immediate and everyday interests
of the working oXass for the sake of National unity" or "civil peace"
89with bourgeois demeoracy"#
At this stage, there was no unified Communist party in India.
Communist groups ware organised independently of each other at homibay,
Madras, Calcutta and Lahore* In some oases the Comlntem introduced
90
leaders of the groups to one another* On the eve of the Fourth 
Congress# Roy sent Charles AshXei^ of the British Communist Party 
to ihtdla to meet 3 A^, Range#^ then leader of the Bonhay groiqi# and 
Wsaffar Ahmad of the Calcutta gror^, and request them to arrange to 
send delegates to the Congress| none went from India^
#,W - # w w m , . #.w*,,#.,..,.#,,II,'-,..................................      #'"T :
88. Ibid.. P. 554
89. JSiâut p . 555
90. Hwftffiar AhaWd. OP.Olt.. P.78 
9$. 8w  P, 211
92. a. Adhlkavi* oo.oit.. Vol.1, PP. 520 - 21 and 524. Mssbffar Ahn# 
oqouaed iNmge of bp^ips p«alceted e 800 thAt AWilèdÿ* gav# him f«r 
« M  jnwapaaUv. delàgAte#' pa»iw«r*»«Mjr. Qp.olt.. PP. 319 -20.
0. Adhlkart danle» It, on.alt. PP. 522 - 23
•IN
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Boy wrote Range on Reoember 19, 1922, that the Comintern 
thought the time had oome in Badia for the organisation a
93*h?evolutlonary mass party##,*,*# as a part of the Congress",
The revolutionary left wing mass party in the Rational Congress 
"must be under the oontrol and direction of our party which can 
not but be illegal Roy also suggested that a conference of 
the representatives of all the four communist groups should be held 
in Berlin to form a central nucleus of the communist party. Range 
considered it a "mad venture for Indians to go hunting Communism 
in European conférences « Whatever has to be done, must be done in 
India* Moreover, there must be less talk of revolution than what 
Roy indulges in, even when the preliminary ri^ts of labour mre not 
obtained, it is a dream to talk of proletarian revolution,
Renin died in January, 1924# and tlwough a series of
skilful manoeuvres and terror Stalin neutralised and liquidated
influential individuals and groups, like Trotsky, the Zinoviev^
Xhmsnev group and the Bukharinrkykov-Tomsky group, and gained
96
ascendency over the party and the state ty 1930, And thus 
began the Stalin era.
93# Ibldfiai P* 323, The Congress is a reference to the Bidian Rational 
Congress which, under the leadership of M&hatma Gandhi, led the 
Indian struggle for freedom,
94, m d a
95, His letter to Singaravelu Ohettiar, the leader of the Bhdras group, 
Horn Repartment, Bblitioal Hie Ro, 103/IV,PP, 3 ~ 30 - Rational 
Archives of India as quoted in Muzaffar Ahmad, op.cit.* P, 305
96, See Adam B, Clam, op.cit.* P, 128 and also Merle îkinsod, pp.oit., 
BP, 429 * 62, Also see below P, 26
\
m i  s m O T  m
Stalin was as cautious as Lsnin in his leadership of the Comintern*
If Lenin# with a halo round his head# had to he cautious because of 
domestic and international constraints# Stalin# in addition to having 
these constraints# also had to contend for power with brilliant people 
like %ot#ky# BukharijI and others* %fong steps and failures would 
cost him dearly*
In theory# Stalin remained a revolutionary* He thought that t
* * * * the transition A%m capitalism to i^clalism and the liberation 
of the working class from the yoke of oapitalism can not be 
effected by slow Changes# by reforms# but only a qualitative 
diange of the capitalist system# by revolution*
Hence in order not to err in policy# one must be a revolutionary# 
not a reformist.
Hence# we mus^ not cover up ‘ttie contradictions of the 
capitalist system# but disclose and unravel them; we must not 
try to oheok the class struggle but carry it to its conclusion?^
But at the Hfth Congress of the Comintern# the first to be held
without lenin# no revolutionary zeal was exhibited by Stalin* However#
chaises in the style of functioning were evident* The Report on Rational
and Colonial Question was made by Nanuilskÿ# one of"the'^&ost servile
99of Stalin*s followers* " Irrepressible dissenter like Hoy would not 
be acceptable to Stalin*
97# J#V# Stalin# Malectioal and Hstprical MateidWLism (Calcutta# 
national Book Agency Pvt* Ltd*# 1975)# P* 14
98. G* Adhikari, op^oit** Vol* II, P* 551
99. Adam B. Clam* oo.cit*. P. 144
' 'I 24
The resolution adopted at the Congrees called upon the
Oomimnist partie# to win the support of the peasant «aaeee and
the oppressed national minorities and to win over the areVolutlonaxy
mvements for the emancipation of colonial peoples so as to make
them the allies of the revolutionary proletariat of the capitalist 
100
countries, The resolution also called for a furtiier development
of the direct contact of the EOOX with the national movements for 
101
emancipation.
Roy mbved an amendment saying that vdiile keepii^ in touch 
with the movement as a Wiole# direct contact must be maintained with 
the revolutionary element of the same#^^^ Roy’s argument was that 
a movement wlriidi mi#it have had a revolutionary significance in igw 
was not in the same position in 1924* classes which might hays been 
allies of the revolutionary proletariat in 1920 would not be allies 
in 1924.^®^
Roy was not Opposed to the policy of wooing Ihe parties 
leading the national liberation movements either* He had himself 
drafted radical manifestoes and got them distributed at the annual 
sessions of the Indian Rational Congress in 1921# 1922# and 1926^^^ 
to win it over* Rbthing of the sort had happened. Therefore, he 
wanted the Oomlntem to rely on communist groups, even if they were 
in an embryonic stage, while keeping in touch with the nationalist 
movement as a whole# Thi^amendment was rejected as being at variance 
witli Lenin’s thesis adopted at the Second Congress*^^
100. 0 , Adhlka»4i fisusiSiu. V o l* II, F, 550
101. Ibid.. P. 351
102. m â t .
103. M I T  p. 358
104. Kor taxta of til. nHiifastoea« ae« Huaffar Ahmad, an.nlt..
HP. 136 -  51. 267 •  80, 492 *  510.
105. 8. Adhiktvii op.etli., Vol.II, P, 351, See yf 12 fo» l«nlnie ihseea.
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Mke lanln# Stalin v/as opposed to the rigid application 
of the oomàpaisi dogma or tîie Soviet revolutionary oxperienoe in 
all oomtrieO# In hie addrees to the GowmniOt Snivereity of the 
Toilers of the Baéi in May# 1925* Stalin preOO^bed three etategies 
for varying conditional 1# The rapid growth of capital in some 
countries» like India# had engendered a more or lee# numerous 
proletariat as well as the oppression of the workers by the native 
and foreign capitalists* The national bourgeoisie in suoh countries 
had split into a revolutionary section ( the petty bourgeoisie) and 
and a cwTonising section (the big bourgeoisie)» the former oontinued 
the revolutionary struggle» udiile the latter entered into a bloo 
with imperialism* tbider such oondltiens» the workers and the revo# 
lutionary petty bourgeoisie would form an antl^ln^erialist bloo*^^
2* In some countries» like Noroooo# where there was neither a 
proletariat nor a bourgeoisie# a united snii*fimperialist front waS' 
in order* In such cases# communist parties would be formed 
immediately before or just after the giotory over ii#erialiSm*^^^
3* iha countries» like China and %ypt# with little development of 
industry or proletariat» there was a oo%romisin^ section of the 
bourgeoisie whioh had not yet formed a bloo with the i%erialists* 
Under such conditions» the Communist party and the revolutionary 
petty bourgeoisie might be united in "a single party of workers and 
peaeants# like the Khomintahg% This bloc» led by nonf^ommunlsts# 
would preserve the freedom of action of the communists, However# 
this would be a temporary arrangamnti^^^
106, (Quoted, in Bi>>er H, PanaldAon. Soylat itelloy Ibiiagd» Ihdtat 
laflolegy afad 3ia?atwar (CaaWfldge. M m i  HalXvàrd ailvanilly
1974), H V  25 * 24,
107, riitdé 
108* Ibi%
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ihù m m t W e  tHo povmr struggle oontlnuecl in the 
Soviet %W.on,. îfewiwg’. first isolated Troteky^by joining hands wiih 
#e Zinoviev ^  IS%#nov group#in tlie Wee of Lenin’s eloknee» whloh 
taode him on invalid ty .Deoeober# 1922» Stalin later turned egeinet 
the group when it wn^ht to curb the menaoing power of the Oenorul 
Secretary $M 1924 ** 25$^^
Then Tkotoby» Zinoviev wid Xe^mnev united to oppose
Stalin# At the Seventh Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the EOCI held
in l*ovemher*^ Deoe«bej?# 1926# the three eougAt to revive BpoteXor’e
dwmnt concept of *%Mmmnmt revoWtich"# According to » Soviet
publioution» the tlufoe maintained that eociolim could be buiiti in
# w  Soviet Union only if there w e  e revolution in the iMt# end
that ttuoh a revolution lied to be "jogged" by eny neeni# including
tlio unleeehing of a eerl^^ TSiey spoke of the OBSU Ignoring the
world revolution" end accused it ci %etionel nerrcwMSindedness"
end "degeneration"# This atte#t at ohenging the oeuree of the
111
Oemintem warn defeated# If it were euCceseful# Stalin’s political
fortunes would be effected# And Stelin acted swiftly; Zinoviev wee
112
removed from the (Bmirmmhip of the EGGI#
109# Ada# B« me#» 126* Stalin# then# made friends w i#i
the Bukhsrin^^kwv*^ group# #iek ms- In turn destroyed by
1930# WiiCh made hi# the mqueetioned leader# |M4l 
110# .ffle. ( Brief OutlW Prepared %y the
pstituts of mWiemleninism# Omtreal Oomittce of the cpsu) 
(Mew pjlMf Mew Age Printing Rpos« for the CPI* 1969)# F* 53 
' (hereinafter referred to w  the Ccmmmist Ihternationnl}#
112# m S L  m# 34
8?
Thè revival of Trotsky’# oonoept of *ÿemianent
revolution" at the ECCI meeting in Baoember» I926 seemed to have
mostly been politically motivated* This Is borne out by the report
of a Special committee of the politburo of the CPSÜ presided over by
Trotsky to study the question of China» submitted on March 26» 1926#
This# preserved in his archive» did not call for any more revolutionary
policy in China than envisaged by Stalin.^  The Étth of the policy
recommended by was that following the Locarno BaotV^the Soviet
union faced isolation and# perhaps# again a united front of other
115
powers I she was in need of a breathing spell# This called for 
restraint in the Chinese revolution* Any intemperate attack upon 
foreign interests in China might lead to the creation of an anti^
Soviet Coalition* It was especially important not to isolate Japan* 
Thus# both the Kucmintang and the Chinese Communists Should forego 
any move against the prc^Japanese warlord# Chang Tso^lin# who 
controlled MmChurla/^^Ths report also suggested that the question 
of allowing Japanese immigrants into the Siberian mari'WLme provinces 
idiould be considered# thli|^ should be done "carefully and gradually" 
so that the Japanese would not ethnically dominate the region"*^
So# ythm it came^%% crunch# Trotsky was not opposed either to 
Collaboration with the bourgeoisie or appeasement of the imperialists*
113* See ?. 25 for Qtalin’s China strategy*
114# Uhde% the Lsoamo pact of 1923# Ceramny pledged to observe her 
frontiers with France and Belgium* Brllmin andl3ta3y in turn 
guai^teed militarily the status cue in threat* Germany was to 
enter the Legue of #tions andtake a seat in its Council* See 
Adam B* Clam# bp*clt*# P* 15^
115* The Tkotslgr Archive WfO as quoted# Ibidl'*.,i:A% 175
116* à k k  
117* Ibid*» P* 176
Stalin# idio was then in the throes of the struggle 
for absolute power, must have interpreted this about-turn in 
TkotSky’s stand on China in less than nine months as Challenge 
to hiW4 ]^ ker*. Mhile he had defeated and disgraoed most of his 
rivals by this time, they^slill alive* Trotsky was exiled to 
Alma Ata in January 1 9 2 8 but Zinoviev’s and Khmanev’s 
movements were not restrioted thoi#i they were being subjeoted to 
InoMMins mil tuwanti, the *re the *ewex
Stalin had acquired end the mere the rivals he had defeated and 
disgraced, the more insecure he felt# He gave, expression to this 
paranoia in a speech in April, 1928$ " we have internal Ernies*
Ma have ertemsl enemies* This, comrades, must not be forgotten
■ ■ • ■ 120 ■ 
for a single moment"* The plural pronoun "we" in the speech was
probably a euphemism for "1" or Stalin used " we " for " I " the
way monarch# and the%ihpes traditionally did*
Stalin resorted to terror in his relentless drive 
121
for absolute power# However, terror against his rivals un* 
acoompanied by necessary policy shifts would expose his lust for power* 
Besides# the Ccsdntem’e earlier pslioles brought no gains for the 
movement# %% western ^ ®urope, the workers looked to the Sooiallst
    - Y- . — y     r r - r " T T T T i in, ■'.■r-irTlftnul
l i a i  M w el* IW iM odt SgàSââ»# f *  154 
119» M d w  3PP, 153 - 54
180. to 8oh«4,0.3IM«tor, Sw, St#UatW
to* toit-Stalto Chatxtf (londtot (hNNPge Allto awtl W t o  ltd.,
1972), P. 55.
121* See Mtole Shtoaod, a^ËU*', HP. 421-47
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rather then Communist per ties ae their repreeentativee# A%y 
collaboration with the eooieliste was bound to increase ottloeptibillty 
to ideological infection#. Stalinism required that oommniet parties 
everywhere be parties of a truly new kind, with their loyalties due 
exclusively to MosoowP^ In the Far met, the Communist party of 
China, whose interests Moscow always Subordinated tb its interests, 
was decimated by OhiSng %ai*"Shek in April, 19#» in his drive to 
become the political as well as the military master of the udiole 
of qhiw/^^
m  India too Communism made little progress. The
3Dndian Government Report for 1926f27, made in 1923, declared#
"indigenous Communism, as represented by the sooalled Communist
party of India, seems to have made little appreciable head|fy"^^^
Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of the mdian national movement, wrote
as late as Ibvember, 1923# " 1 must confess that I have not yet
been able fdly to understand the meaning of bclrti0vis»"*^^^He
continued "... fsom #mt 1 know of bolshevism it not only does
not preclude the use of foroe but freely Sanctions it*
It is ny firm conviction that nothing enduri%% can be built on 
126
violence". Thus, thç hope of Influencing and winning over the 
bourgeois leaders did not materialise.
126. Adaa;B,N01wv. on.olt.. HP* 187-88
125. a ti.N s H . 176^78,124» Quotod in  Chnttwif StngA Swm. on.oit.* BP. 92-93
125. M,K, to Tbuna 1<i» 1928 ai q,u6t«4 to
Ï4aolomr aoA aattoanccr. aoiawnlat HtoV toilioatton R».9
(itew tolhi# &ïaia3g Heito»; 1976)» HP. 27-28(hewtoafter
tofesvad to M  Id»olo@r and Bncxsanagr).
126.
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The reverse# ia Europe end the ïhr East end the 
pressure of Stalin’s rivals at home called for radical new policies 
in domestic as well a# external fronts
The Sixth Congress of the Comlntem met in Ibicow in 
jUly ^  Sopteaiber, 192Ô* The Congress put emphasis on discipline*
This international communist discipline must find eaQr?easion in 
the subordination of the partial and local interests of the 
movement to its general and lasting interests and in the strict 
fulfilment» by «11 members» of the decisions made by leading 
bodies of the Ccmintem»^^^
The Congress did not essentially differentiate between
social democracy and facism* The leff'-wing of social democracy was
Characterised as the most dangerous faction of the social demeoratic
parties* communists w#e to differentiate the social democratic
leadership from the Social democratic workers and work for the United 
150
Front From Blow*
127* It was in 1928» about the time the Sixth Congress of the Oomlntem 
was going to bhange its tactics» that Stalin began the forced 
collectivisation of agriculture and launched the First Five fear 
Han with emphasis on heavy industry# See Merle Fainsod, cp#cit*«
m* ioo -109*
188# % c  # # m i s t  mterçational# F# 39*
189# JBâgssîP* 40#
130# Ibid#» HP# 58 and 40#
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Ai for India# The CPI, the Comintern ordained# "nwet 
unmaek the national reformiim of the Iidion Rational Congreee and# 
in opposition to all talk of the Swarajists# GandhistS# eto$# about 
passive resistenoe# advance the irreoonoilable slogan of armed 
struggle for the emancipation of the country and|the expulsion of 
the imperialists
The CPI met in Calcutta in December# 1928# after the 
Sixth Cor^ess of the Comintern* It decided to make the party 
active and do propaganda in the name of the CHÈ.Î^iv It swung to 
the left and decided to adopt the SiXth Comlntem theSeS as the 
basis for work* This trend continued until 1934^351 tlie party 
waS banned by the ladion government in 1934p^
In the meantime important Changes occured in the
national ( Soviet ) as well as intemational scenes* %r 1930#
154
Stalin became the unquestioned leader of the Soviet Union*
3h Cfermony Hitler came to power in 1933 end consolidated his 
155
position*
At the Seventeenth Congress of the Comnmnist Forty of 
the Soviet Uhion ( CPSU ) held early in 1934# Bukharin predicted an 
unavoidable Soviet collision with that Irrational foroe ( Hitler’s 
fascism ) J^^But Stalin thought otherwise* He cautioned the Germans
151. Ili-P,.
152. iftdkil tiien there were feuv eomnuniet groups. See P. 21 
155. Mwianli. The gonawksi Bwty of ,I ^ a i A Short HlstoMr
(Bomheori Hjaratlya YldyaIfcawmV 1%7), HP. 21-22 
134* See P. 26
133, miter Iaque*B^ «, A motiwiaraf of ftutlos (londoni %n Books 
Ltd., 1973) HP. 223-25 
136. Hokert 0, Tuoker, eu.6lt.. PH. 73-74
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«tgoinst tWLoMng that the USSR mM tm  o r i m t W  itself W a r #  
Ftnnoe and %%and beoauee fascism had corns, to power, in Germany*;
"Of ooureSf; we are far feom snthuslostio about the lOsoist regime 
in Germany"# he said* " But fosoism is besi# the point# if only 
beosns# fascism Ini Italy# for cxM#LS# has not kept the USSR ùsm 
establishing the best of relations with that ccohtry"# He indicated 
a rapprcoohement with Berlin#, if Soviet intcreets wcnld be served
At this stW-there m s  no reepcns® from- Hitler# m  
the Far %wt tec the dcvelopmsnts since the #pmes# occupation of 
Manchuria in #51 were disq%*i#ting# The Msstem powers did not 
react in any effective wsy# Moscow could not be mmm of Japan’s 
next target* it mW%t be Soviet satellite of Outer Hmgolis or the 
Soviet ^  Boatem territories# The Soviet W c %  therefore# 
significantly strengthened her Far Eastern army# but spared no 
effort to come to m  understanding with Japan# including, m  offer 
to enter into a ncnoggressicn treaty,  ^^
The Seventh Congres# of the Ccmintem met in Jily 
August# 1955# «midst suCh Soviet fears and. uncertainties* It was 
evident Ikom tons and tenor of the Report made by Idmltrov and 
the rosolu^ons adopted at the Gcngrces that m m  while making 
efforts to come to tormo* if possible# with the .fascist powers# 
the Hoviet leaders were Wy$m tc woo the %st si- on insuranos 
against ■ their failure to arrive a;t on uwmrstmding wi# the 
fascists#
n u  M W #  S m  ■
198« Admi S. # %  sOUaSU** % , 200-201
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Dimitrov’s report stressed that the Germans fascism 
was the mailed fist of international eounter*revolutlon| that It 
was the main foroe of world fasoist reaotlon, the Ohlef Instigator
of another imperialist war and the wsom enetgr of the Soviet Uhion*
139FUsolsm was a tremendous step haokwards from bourgeois demooraoy**'^ '^
The Congress rejeoted the thesis of equal responsi*^  
blllty of all oapitalist states for the unleashing of war and 
directed its main blow against the fasoist states l (Wmany# Italy 
and Japan*^^^
The Congress directed the communiât parties to work for 
a Uhited Front with social democrats against fascism at all levels 
The untouchabilityt Imposed against the soqial democrats leadership 
by the Glxth Congress of the Comintern under the united front from, 
below tactibS wastt?;âbolleh«d " Revolutionary " trade unions whiOh 
had not yet become mass organisations were asked to join ’Reformist" 
trade unions* Masi^evolutionary trade unlohs#bre directed to Seek 
unity with mass reformist trade unions on m  equal footi^ subject 
to two conditions# 1* Freedom to wSge a olass struggle in the 
interests of the proletariat* 2* Observance of democracy within 
the unions*^
The Congress called for the formation of popular Foont# 
It was based on the idea that In the struggle for democracy it Is 
possible to defeat fascism, restrict the power of capital and create 
favourable Initial conditions for further struggle fbr socialism*
i39« !ih* domimiimi totèrn&tionà. H» 56
140. Ib id .» P. 62
141. Ib id . P. 58
142. Ibid.
The Congre## drew the oohoXuiion that united motion by proletariat, 
peaeantry# urban petty bourafeolele# artleane and the working 
intelligehteia wa# possible*^ 43
The Commniet .partie# oould pertioipate in popular 
Fwont Government# and par%ament#l^
.In the colonie#,the.creation.of a W t e d  Anti^ lttq^ erialiet 
Fpont.:wae,.the prime ,taik of the oommuniet parties* An, alliance 
between the i^letariat and peasantry in the colonies was of special 
significance# Attadiing great importance to rallying together of 
all revolutionary fO#e# of the world# the Congress directed the 
comnonist parties actively to support the national liberation 
struggle Of the oppressed colonial and semi^lonlal peoples# The 
Congress also Sharply witiOised those who believed that the national 
bourgeoisie was throughly pro**iuperiallitict^^
m  ^  event of fascist aggression the proletariat end 
the oommnist parties most# the congress declared# defend the national 
independence of their countries# This wfi a ^ versai of Lenin’s 
polioyl^^ In order to create the illusion of the autonomy of the
143* # ^  39.
144. F# 60
143# # & #  F# 61 .  ^.
146# :Isi{%'# F# 62# When Lenin said that one of the ,##nt#es cf the
policy p i offering obnceesions to American capitalists was that
I it wo#d#et :A##ibah' imperialism against - JS|Mü^ Se^ --ô
in his audience Observed that a war between the tJBA and Japan 
would only lead to "the \#W#.ng of workers’, bloody Lenin’s 
reaction was that "socialists should think not of defending 
their, respective counlries but of overthrowing the capitalists 
######" See Lenin# Colisoted mr#m Vol#### F# 470# See also 
F#5 foot note 23# ■ ..........
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Oommunlsi parties# the Congress also advised the ECCI to avoid,
as a rule, direOt intervention in internal organisational mtters
147of the Comwnist parties# However, the Congress also deolared
that it was the dudy of the oomnunist parties to help with all their
mi^t and by all mans to strengthen the USSR and to fight her 
148
enemies*
Whng Ming of the Chinese Communist Ibrty who made 
the report on the oolonial oountries, berated the CHC for their 
""left " Sectarian errors", and, for their failure to "partioipate 
in all the demonstrations organised by the Rational Congress 
Since the CFÎ did not have auffioient strength " Independently 
to organise a powerful and mass anti*"imperialist mvement ", it
was " to a oonsidsrable extent isolated iron the mass of the
150 
people****♦"
Thé directive to the CPÎ ws^ that it should " in no 
case disregard work within the Rational Congress and the national 
jWolutionary and national r||ormlst organisations affiliated with 
it, maintaining at the same time their complete political and 
organisational independence"#
147# The Communist Intematlona. PP* 65 ^  64 
148# F* 63
149* Quoted in M*R* Phsani, pp#cj;t„' PF* 40 41#
150# Bid.
151* Ibid#
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At this Stage# At A# proper to dAeouee how beet 
the OFl followed the direotlvee of the OomAntern* It has 
already been mntAoned that the CFI was beoned by the Ihdiiui & > 
government An 1934#^^ In the same year the sooAallst Antelleotuals 
of the Congress party formed a Congress soOlallst parly (OSF) 
within the oongress/^^ Jeya Prakash who was the
Qen#ra3L#Seoretary of the Çoiwess dooiallst Ibrty was very 
enthusAastie; about a united front between the 03F and the 
B  JWiuary, 1936# the 03? deoAded to reepo# favourably to the 
suggestion united ikont #th the CPZ#^^ The oharaoter of 
front was to be two^fold* one, a united front as twtween party 
and party and* two* admission of individual oommnists to 
meWbership of the CSP to pave the 'way for oompXete merger and 
sooialiit bnlty# The CH# taken to task for Its "left" 
seOtarAanism at the Sevwth Congress of the Comintwn# avidly 
seised the opportunity and by 1937^38 the CSP had two oommunists 
as Joint Seoretaries and two others An the Ereoutlve Committee!^
But the CPI’s united Ikont taotios were not in the 
spirit of 0operati«si in a joint anti*i#erialist struggle* but 
were oaloulated to isolate the national leadership ikom the rank 
and filej it the national Ereoutive meting of the OSP in
152* See P#31
153# M.R# msani* P* 37
154# He spearheaded the msvement against Nks# Bdira Gandhi’s 
authwitarianism and was instrumtmtsl in ending her diotato" 
rial regime in iWmh# 1977# 8@e also oWwter Viii* P* 261 
155# M#R# msani* sMâl## F* 49.
1 3 6 * m a # #
157# a u # #  F# 50
i 3 8 # a # s  F# 44
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Batna in 1937 » statement of the GBI was reed whlbh oaueed great 
indignation* It said that the OSP was no soolalist party and 
that it SOS to be used only as a plat formt^^ Zmter in Septesber, 
1938* M#R* Masani# Joint Seoretaky of the CSP, published a seoret 
CKC oiroular dated 9* 1938* whloh laid down in detail the
taotios to b# followed by the oomwnists to oapture the soolalist
160
party* The tensions between the CSP and #%e CPE reached suoh
>
levels that in 1940 the CSP expelled all oommWsts fro* the party
161
and ended the united front#
Row to return to Stalin# he left no stone unturned
to ensure the security of his country# Re m s  not oo#lacent about
162
his far Eastern borders, havit^ made friendly overture to Japan#
He tried to bring about a rapprochement between the Chinese Communist 
Party and Chiang XkHshek in the hope that oolleotive Chinese 
resistance to the Japanese aggression on their country would nake 
it hard for Japan to turn on the Soviet Phr ^ tern territories#
The appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Ibrty of 
China of August 1# 1933* for ending the internecine strife in 
the country and organising Joint military operations against 
Japan, was drafted with the active participation of the
I ■ ' •
Stalinlb attempts for arriving at an agreement with 
Germany broi#%t no results in 1936 and 1937* 8n the contrary,
Hitler would soliloquise about the benefits #%at would aooure to 
Germany if she could have the fertile plains of the Ukraine at 
her disposal,^ ^  The AntiMlomintem ttaot of Ravember 25, 1936,
139* M â a s  FF* 51-32
161. m a *  F# 54 
162# See P# 32
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between Gfermany and Japan hei^tened Moeoow’s fear# %  the 
end of 1936, the situation in the Bar Bast was bleak# Chiang 
Kai'-shek rebuffed the Chinese Communist appeal for joint aotioh 
against Japan; on the contrary, direct negotiations were going on 
between the Chinese and Japanese governments* Any agreement 
between them would be disastrous for the USSR as well as the 
Chinese communists#^
167However, domestic compulsions made Çhiang Kai-^ shek
agreeable to an understandlt^ with the Chinese Communists in
1936^37* tfaide» this agreement the Red Arny was to be subordinated
to Chiang’s command, and he would end fratricidal war and take a
168
stron? anti*^ Japanese stand*
Japan was angry with this development* On July 7, 
1957* Japan attacked Chins*^^^ This turn of events was an 
undoubted triumph for Bsoow* And in August, 1937» China and 
the Soviet tbrLon signed a Treaty of Hbnsggression and friendship# 
|Thus, in the Bar East the Soviet Union got some respite*
j m m w  p* 839 ^
166# m w  %  248
167# This is a reference to the famous "Sian Incident"# Chang Hsuch- 
ling, a former boss of ManChurla, who was to command the campaign 
against the communists then planned by Chiang Kai«*shek, not 
only refuCsd to fight the fellow Chinese but also imprisoned 
Uhiax^ when he flew to Chang’S base in Peoeiaber,1936# Chiang 
was released following Chou Enflai’a InteAentlon# Ibid. #
PP* 248- 49
168# Ibid## P. 249
169# Ibid#, B  June,1937* Japan cootq»ied two Soviet islets in the 
Amur river following a sharp Soviet**Japanese armed clash#
Moscow acquiesced in the ccwgwitiw# Ibid^. P. 250
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B  Europe# however# there were no suoh enoouragi% 
developments# Britain and îkanee were following an appeasement 
policy towards Hitler* This policy could not but have caused 
misgiving# to any normal man in charge of Soviet foreign policy
in view of the state of relations between Bsoow and the Meet#
Hothing need be said about th#H^otien of an abnormally 
inupicious person like Stalin to such a policy*
After the occupation of Austria by Hitler in March# 
1938# the Soviet Bèreign Minister# Htvlnov# issued a statement 
on March 17# 1938# appealii^ to " #11 the state# and the Cbfeat
powers in particular I to I take a firm and unaXblguou# stand "
before it was " too late,**^ ^^  But Britain felt it was undesirable 
to divide Europe into two grotq?s#^ ^^
The Soviet Uhibn was nervous* About #%e same time
that the negotiations with the British were begun to come to an
172
understanding# an approach was made to Germany# The West’s
response was " h#lf*hssrted % and tactics# "dilatory**#
Hitler# at least temporarlly# would prefer to avoid flfditlng on 
174
two fronts* Therefore# on Ai%ust 23# 1939* the Soviet^Qenaan 
Konaggression Fact was signed*^
Hitler’s forces marched into Bland on September 1#
1939* Britain and ITanoe declared war on Germany on September 3# 
176
1939# Thus began #rld Whr #* Stalin also took advantage
17?* S d T ^  a # ,  ». 255
172I m jk * ». 271 
175. ». 274 ,
174. Ib ld ..ro . 267- %
175. Ibid.. ». 276,
176. Tbid., 5*. 278.79
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of his treaty with Germany for territorial aggrandisement#
But Hitler did not wait too long; German foroes attacked the 
Soviet union on June 22, 1941*^^^
Like all oommunist partiee, the OPX had to defend 
all dubious Russian moves* bhlle the Soviet union herself 
behaved like an i^wriallst power by absorbing the three Baltic 
states into the USSR and extracting territorial concessions fkom 
Finland, the CPI, like other oommunist parties, called world m r  II 
as waged by Britain and France an imperialist war* The CPI took 
-Uio Congress party to task for its inactivity* A manifesto 
issued by the CPI on January 26, 1940, deolared i
Bo longer is Britain the master of the situation, 
master of our destüay**,** Hever were we as powerful 
as ws are today* Haver was our enssy so weakl^^
The CPI wanted the congress to intensify the freedom struggle 
to take advantage of Britain’s problems in Europe*
177* Mien the Finns refused to move the frontier on the Karelian 
Isthmus away from Leningrad and grant bases to the USSR on 
Finnish territory, the Soviet forces invaded Finland at the 
end of Hovember, 1959* The Finns fougîit back bravely* Moscow 
stopped the war in MaWi, 1948» for fear of the landing of a 
Franoo^ B^citlsh expeditionary corps* But Moscow did extract 
concessions it wanted* On Jbne 1940, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia were occupied* Ibid** PP* 2 ^  ^  97*
178# 512
179* Quoted in Chattar Singdi Sarma, db^ 'clt., P* 151
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îb» six raonths aftar the <hPemci attadk on the
Soviet Uhion* the GPI oontlnued to oalX the iww? a# fought ty
the Wèet an ** inperlallst **- and# a# wa^d hy the GSSH# a
** people*i war.** Harcy îbXitt» Seo»eta«y of the Steitieh
Communlst j^ty# wrote a letter to the CPI leadere aildng them
to drop thie dlstinotion* 9hle letter wee delivered to the
oonsounlet leader# in their detention om#p at Dsoli Ty oourteiy
of Sir B^inald Ifexeell# the then Horae Seoretary of the
Government of India# Soon thereafter# the imperialiet war
beoSme a "people*# war**^ ^ on July 24» 1942, the Britiah
1S2
government lifted the ban on the CPI*
ihe Congres# Parly alee opposed the war, hut for 
a different reason*^ On August 8, 194&# the oon^s# passed 
the ** Quit 3ûsdia ** resolution* On August 9# 1942» almost all #ie 
oortgress leader# were arrested» and the country hroke out into 
a spontaneous revolt#^ ^
% e  CPI held its Plrst Oongrsss in )#ay» 194)# A
resolution passed on May 23» 194)» oalled the nationalist leaders
"fifth ooluwnists", "traitorsf and "orirainal gangs". Ihe CPÏ
declared that these " must he treated lay every honest Indian as
the worst eneny of the nation and driven out of political life
185
and externdnated
180. Ibid*
181. M.R* Jfesanl, OD&olt^ . P. 62.
182.
183* See chapter IX, Pj>, 72 • 75. 
184* M#R# Ifesani, aaWi, P. 63. 
183. 219
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On the role of the workera, the resolution deolaredi
It Is the patriotic duty of the worker to strengthen
defence ty taking initiative for organising more
production and better transport and against stoppage
of work irrespeotlve of idiàt #ie boas or the bureaucrat
does.***»,,*#.$ Comnmniets take a bold and open
stand against strikes as they Injure the defence of
186the country by holding up productim#
îhe CPI spied on the underground resistance leaderu
187 ‘
and got them arrested whereever possible# .
The British Indian government was happy with the role
of the CPI* It was allowed to establish contact with Nbsoow by
188
sending a goodwill mission there In October, 1942* Ihe Chlted 
front tactics of the CPI between 1936»40 helped strengthen the 
party* by the time the OSP ended the united fTont,^  the CPI 
succeeded in spitting the All«*|ndia Students’ federation, the 
All*^ |ndia Klsan Sabha ( farmers %lon
llhüe parting, the communists carried with them
almost intact three of the beet organised state branches of "Wie
CQPi nkMillnad, Andhra and Kerala*^ ^  lurihg 1942^45 Wien all
nationalist political leaders and workers were either in prison or
underground» the CPI strengthened itself* luring this period
the All India ir^de IMon Congress also became a purely communist 
192organisation* ^
186* Ibid*
187* m & W L P #  64
188* Chatter Singh Sarma, bp*cl$#. P* 1)2* 
189*See P.37
190* «*H* bhsani, ea.clt** P* 60
191*Ibid*.e* 6p#6l
192* Ibid** PP* 67 and 36-37
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Bie Anglo-Soviet allianoa drew heavily on liidlan 
reioureee# Indian troops guarded the supply routes in thé 
Middle East, to the Soviet WLon# Indial's industrial and 
agricultural produots and raw materials formed a considerable 
segment of British shipments to the Soviet IMon# Ihrlng this 
period the Soviet Dhion did not say a word in support of 
Didia’s freedom.^
ïhe cooperation between the Soviet Ühion and the
West did not last long, Stalin’s attempts at the imposition
of communism on fast iSuropean countries caused ai^ ikisty in the
West, At X^ton, Missouri» Churchill advocated an alliance
between tlie ttolted States and the Commonwealth against the
194
growing threat feom the Soviet Uhion# on Stech 5* 1946,
On August 13» 1947# India became independent, Moscow
remained indifferent tO the event# being buay with Bast Buropean
affairs# Stalin preferred the certain benefits that would accrue
to hi^ isountry from turning iSfeiatem Burope into a belt of 
4^ 193satellites to running after the uncertain benefits from 
Wooing the new nations.
193# Chattar Sing Sanaa» op.cit,* PP# 1)2-53 
194# Whiter ïa^ ueur» op,oit»A B. 189
195# See Zbigniew Broealnski» The Sovie:^  Blfio (Cambridge» Moss» 
Harvard Chiversi^ Press# 1967) for the pwess of 
Communlsation of Bnstem Europe,
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One and a half years after Ohurohill’» apeech» Zhdanov delivered
a speeeh at the weti$% which founded Ooalnform in Septeatoer» 19471
he advanced his "two ca*e" conoept in this speech!^ He announced
the end of collahoraticn between the H3SH and the West# Hie attaok on
the AfenCh and Italian cowwniets meant an end to their hopes of
eharing or acquiring governmental power through oonetituticmal
mane; at the same tim* the parties were not given the licence for
full-scale revolutionary action* They were si#ly to disrupt and
197
destroy any prospects for success of the European recovsjy plan*
Zhdanov seemed to have kept open the oommunist camp’s 
options to befriend the emerging nationalist regimes* He thought 
that Zndo-Ohina and Indonesia were not only truly independent of 
the #st but also " associated with " the Soviet camp# he also 
felt that Egypt# #ria and IWia had reached the stage where they 
" a3r*pa«t)laed *tth "
It is possible that Hehru’s admiration for the Soviet %lon»
199
eaMbitad in his pre-independence writings and speeches# gave 
the impression to Zhdanov that Iidia had also reaWied the stage 
where she " sympathised with " the Soviet bloc* At any rate this 
view of Ihdia not last long#
196* Aâm B, m w #  OP.Pit.* ?« 460 
197. m a .
193. QwoW in  Ba'ansn, Bw BSaa Aww the anted #w?ldi CMe
St^die» in  So»la* Bbrpign agblloy (Ca*telteB. Iw a iB i *  H it Bpeas* 
P. 59
199. Sb« Olmptw I I ,  HP, 78 -  84
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Bbt long after Zhdanov’s speech# the Soviet Indian 
expert# %rakov# wrote that the aooeptanoe of the Nnuntbatten 
plan {partition of India Ï by the Congreae " was the result
of a ooapcoalee and deal between the Ihdian bourgeoiiie and
2Ô0
British imperialism ", The deal# he thought was based on 
oonoessions made by the both sides, " The British government 
announoed that it was prepared to grant ladla dominion status* 
Gongress# for its part# renounced the demand for immediate Indian 
independence and consented to tlie partition of the Oountxy#"^
However# lyaJqov averred that as a result of the 
partition# "Hindustan has become a relatively more hi#3ly 
industrial and capitalist country than was preipartition India 
as a whole, The weigi%t and influence of the féudal elements have 
somewhat declined in Hindustan.*.*#, The relative importance Of 
both the native bourgeoisie and the working class in this dominion
If 202
has accordingly been enhanced * Anyway# Stalin did not take
205
interest in developing warm relations with India*
Il his last theoretical work# writt^ in 19)2# Economic 
Beoblems of Socialism in the CSSjR* Stalin elevaSed the two camps < o 
concept to the status of a canon* He wrote that one of the 
Consequences of bbrld IVhr H  was the b irth  o ti
Ai- \.«sswÿbnited and powerful Socialist oan^t confronting the 
oampt of capitalism* The economic consequences of the 
existence of two opposite camps was that the single aii- 
embracing world market disintegrated# so that now we have 
two parallel world markets# also confronting one another*
200* A* lyakov# "Partitioned India"# Hew Times, Ho* 5 (January 14#1948)# 
P* 3
201* M É a
202* .mtk* ?* 6
203* See Ghapter III, HP* 94-101 for mdo*-3oviet relations during 
the Stalin era*
204* Bruce Hraklin# edy The Essential Stailnt Major Theoretic
writings 1905-195^ #n<Wi?&oom W.%'
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Since the eccncWLoe of the new nations were appendages to the 
capitalist economies of the West# it could be inferred that the 
new nations were part of the oaqq) confronting thé Sooialist çamp, 
Whatever adght have been the reason# StalÜ&Wd not develop a 
separate policy towards the emerging world#
Vfe will now briefly discuss how the CPI conducted intself 
in the post**^ tfer and postrindependenoe era* The party carried the 
stig# of following a traitorous policy in furtherance of the 
interests of the USSR* %  the general elections to the Central 
legislative Assembly in 1946» the O H  could not carry a single 
constituency# After the independence# the party# under the 
leadership of P#C, JoShl# followed a moderate policy# It held 
its Second Congress m  Calcutta in February * 1948# after Zhdanov’s 
Speech# The impact of Zhdanov’s speech on the pafty was evident#
A political thesis adopted at the Congress said that the "bourgeois 
leadership" had "betrayed" the freedom struggle and "struck a 
treacherous deeO. behind the back of the starving people#,##.#"
The C H  was purged of all *t»eformists" Xelements# B.T.Bonadive 
was èleoted the General Secretary# He followed a policy of 
reckless tdolence and insur#eotion#^^ *&hy calls for strike were 
given; almost all of them fail## The party was banned in the 
states of bbst Bengal# Madras# %derabad and Travanoore-Cochin 
in 1948* The C H ’S membership divlndled fkom 90#00 in 1943 to 
20#000 in 19)0 and that its trade union# AITOC# from 700,000 
to 100#000 during the same period#^
205# KfH# msani# bP.oit## P# 69 
206# Quoted# Ibid.. P# 72 
207# Siit# P* 75 
208# Ibid## PP# 7>32
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la June, 1950# Amadive was ousted* C# BajsShvar Bss 
became the General Secretary of the party, Ifasoow invited a dele­
gation of the G H  leaders in 19)0# the delegation returned home with 
an important secret document# the Tiactlcal Idtne# in 1951* This 
document emphatically said that without an arn^d revolution the 
Indian government cepld not be replaced# that the armed revolution 
would be a conibination of partisan war in the rural areas end
armed workers’ risirgs in the cities* The entire work of the
party was to lead# Step by step# to this ultimate goal*^^
ah May# 1951 # the party published a policy gjtatement 
lA&iCh was a rehash of the tactical line# which# being a secret 
document# could not be published# The statement celled Ihdia a 
dependent semi-colonial countsy* The keys to naval and military > ,n 
defence were held by the British* The Statement said that in view 
of the Mckwerdnese of the economic development and the weakness of
the mess organisations of the workers# end peasants etc,# the party
did not find it possible to carry out Itssediatsly a socialist 
transformation of the country* It would work for a new government 
of Ibopls’s Bsmotrfacy# created on the basis of a coalition of all
210democratic# anti-feudal and anti-i«5*erialist forces in the country*
In October# 1951# the party unconditionally withdrew the Telangana
211
"struggle"# i*e*# insurrection# an acceptance of its failure*
209* JEÈiâfc* 8§"96 The historians of the GPI published the 
Thctioai Idne at a later stage*
210* Jbiiui î^* 9 5 ^
211* Ibid,* P* 100 See Chapwter III# P* 100.
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Î»D35^ -STAI» POHCÎBS
Stalin died in # W i #  1953» having eWilieed the 
ooaksmlet regime# in Eastern EuSope*
After Stalin’s death» there was a significant change 
in the Soviet attitude to the non-comimmist world# The natural 
urge for change after three decades of terror under Stalin# 
realisation of the dai^ers involved in further communiet expansion
O# o
and# therefore# a desire to consolidate what they had# some
, . .h’ ; ' '
feeling of security induced by the %est:*S unwillingness to intervene 
in the met German workers revolt in the summer of 1953#^^ #en the 
Soviet #ion was in a state of flux following Stalin’s death# the 
possibilily of taking advantage of increasing tehsions in the 
relations of the Vfest and the non-aligned states on account# 
p^ticulariy# of différences on colonial and racial issues^ ^«ust 
have oohtrihuted to this Change in Soviet policy*
212* Bertrend RuSSel’S suggestion# to the USSR and the Uhlted States# 
to "al^don the futile strife and agree to allow to each a 
#phere prçpçrtionate to its present power"# in Ms' open letters 
to Etsenhower and Khrushchev# published in the Hew Statesman on 
RoveWher 23# 1957# was readily accepted by Khrushchev in his 
reply to the open letter# also published in the Hew Statesman 
on ikosmber 21# 1957, KhruShohSv wrote that he was ready to lend 
his name to Russel’s thesis "that East and West Should reCognlse 
$%eir ^ ^Speotive ri#ts.**#" and accept the "Status qisi*. See 
the texts of the letters in Sitematlonal Affaire (Mosoow).
HC*1 ( 1958 )# 1045*
215* mvid J* milin. &nfiel^reign mli^^ Stalin (Londoni 
Methuen and Os* Bid*# 1962) P* 96,
214, See Chapter IV*
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At first there were certain «Ranges in  the domestic
political scene in the Soviet Uhion suggestive of a departure
from the StaliMst legacy# Steps were taken to mitigate terror andi.d
give a more humane look to Soviet administration# An amnesty
decree was issued on MarSh 27# 1955# A Ib?^ vd#i editorial on March 50#
1955# promised that #11 oases of official " highrhandedness and
lawlessness ** would he footed out and that constitutional rights
21 % '
would he safeguarded# ^ On one question different groups in the
party held the same opinion* the need to control the secret police
( MVP ) Beria# whose control of the awosonw MVD was considered a
threat by all other leaders# was accused of seeking to set the MVP
"above the parly and government"# arrested in July# 1955# and shot
216
in ESoember# 1955#
The leadership of the party and the government were
entrusted to Khrushchev and Malenkov respectively# thus dispersing 
217power* This did not finally settle the struggle for power*
Bosidec that# important policy issues seemed to have divided
the new leaders# #lenkov was of the opinion tlmt a nuclear
war would result in " tiie destruotionsof world civilisation"
218and# therefore# called for a detente with the \¥a»t* Khrushchev# 
on the other Ixahd# tlwught that a nuclear war would on3y mean
the end of capitalism rather than of world civilisation#^
215. Mere Bhindod# op#oit» B. 447 
216* Ib l4* See also PB* 162-16)
217# Ibid*# pp* 161-62
218# Rravday l^roh 1 )# 1954» quoted# %bid*^ P* 164 
219. Igveatia* June# 1954» as quoted# 165
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But after Ifclentev’s fall from power on February 3* 19)5#
Ktoishohev did «hat Malenkov proposed to do-work for the 
relaxation of tenelone* Khruehdhev seemed to have opposed 
Malenkov more for reasons of politioal expedienoy than out of 
oonviotion#
w i W n  months of Stalin’s death# Malenkov# the then
221
ib?ime Minister# made friendly referenoes to India# Another
few months# end there was a oOnvorgence of Ihdo-Soviet interests
on the issue of the united State#, supply of arms to ItJciStan In
222retuâpn.for militaipy bases offered by her#
Onoe KhruShohev gained asowdenoy# he made oonoiliatoxy 
gestures to the West# Austrian State Treaty wa# signed on M»y 15#
1955* under which ooovpatlon foroes# including Soviet# were withdrawn
and sovel^ty restored to the oountry subject to the Condition ?k I
223
that Austria would remain neutral# Mosocsr agreed to return the
BarSkala naval base to Finland# during the visit of the country’s
22A
President to M)soow In September# 19)5* Khrushchev and Bulgarin 
attended the Geneva Summit ooiÆerenoe# July 18-23# 1955# with the 
heads of the Uhlted States# British end French governments# thus 
establishing personal oontoots with the Western leaders#
mnwm.fiip.iw»*»
220* Ibid*. P# 166
221# See chapter III# F#101
îfeSât# F* 102 
223# mvid J# Baiiin# oo*oit## F# 260 
224. m & a  %*» 272#
223# Ibi^ai# F# 281 # nothing was achieved at the Summit# Elsenhower 
raised three issues* Germany# Eastern Europe and International 
communism# Bulgarin# on the other hand*wanted discussions on 
disarmament, prohibition of atomic weapons# oolleotivs security 
sto#
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later# KhruahOhev began a policy of assiduously 
courting the non-aligned nations# Suooess with the non-aligned 
nations would serve Soviet interests in some respeots t 1, If the 
Soviet union oould oonvinoe the nonNtligned about her peaceful 
intentions and if this would resulted. In more adherents being 
won for the non-aligned movement# Soviet interests would be served 
to an extent* In those days the United States was feverishly 
building [military alliances against the USSR and aoquirlng bases.
The more the non-alignment gained momentum# the less would be 
Amerioan opportunities to acquire > bases* ^ 2, Soviet image*
badly tarnished during Stalin’s stewardship o f the, oountny» would 
improve if Moscow suooeeded in winning tlie trust of the non-aligned.
3, The ^ eet \70uld have to take into ooneideration not only MasQow"8 
growing power but also its new influence and respeotdbility in dealing 
w3.th it*
Haturally# Ihdia, as the biggest of the non-aligned 
states# received due importance from Moscow# The genuineness of 
India’s m«-allgh5flent and her eagerness to i%sprove relations with 
the Sooialist countries were demonstrated by the fact that even 
yhen Stalin remained indifferent to Hew lelhl, Kehru stuck to the 
policy# and where possible* improved relations witti Sooialist 
Countries?^
Moscow began its new diplomacy. Khrushchev and 
Bulganin exchanged visits with the leaders of %idla* Burma and
poo
Af^ianistan,
226, See Chapter II# P, 89 for Anold defers’ view.
227# See Chapter# VIIBB*! 99^ 0QTor Kehru’s successful initial efforts 
to develop friendly relations with China,
228, See Chapter III# PB#y for their visit to Ihdia,
103 - 106
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It is oustomoxy for the Soviet leadership to 
interpret anew the Nbrxiet dogma, to suit the state interests 
of the Soviet Ublon* and# thus, oontinue to olaia ideologiool 
exaotitude* The needs of the Soviet State in the wid-1950s 
called for suoh on exercise t and the XXth Congress of the OPSïï 
waé utilised for the purpose*
THE XXTH COHORSSS OF THE OFSU
The Congress was used ty KhrushChev and his colleagues 
to demolish the Stalin mythf^^ In his Report to the Cox^ sress# 
Khrushchev also called for unity between oonmmists w d  sooialistsP
He gave due importance to the new nations in his Report, He
\ . !
mentioned the exchange of visits by the Soviet leaders with the 
leaders of Ihdia# Burma and Afghanistan as a proof of growing 
friendship between Eastern peoples and the Socialist bloo?^ ^
229» See Merle Wnscd» pp,cit„ PP# 124-12),
250* l^vda# February 15» 1956, Coaylete text in Currcmt Digest 
of the Soviet l^ss, Yol, VIII, Ho,4, F# 8 ( hereinafter 
referred to as CRSP), This call was repeated by the 
Conference of Itorld Communist Parties in HoVeaber I960, It 
called for joint action by communist and socialist parties 
on a national and international scale* ^vda. Isoember6,
1960*
251* geavjft,* February 15, 1956* Coagilete text in CDS?, Vol VIII,
HO* 4*# F* 8,
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The most important part of hio Report was the thesee 
on international development»» 1# Beaoeful oo-’èxistenoe was not 
a mere tactical expedient but a fundamental principle of Soviet 
foreign policy* based on the certainty of the victory of oommunimm 
in peaceful ocmpetitlon* Hie rc^onale for the new policy wa#»
" either peaceful coetietence or the moat deetructive war in 
history I there is no thqird way", 2, The Nhrxist-Ieninlst 
Concept of wars being inevitable as long as imperialism exists 
remains valid* " But war Is not a fatalistic inevitability 
This new evaluation stemmed from the exlstenoe of " mighty social 
and political forces ” idaioh possessed formidable means to prevent 
the " ii^ perialists " unleashing war* 3* There are increasing 
possibilities of noirvoilent transformations to socialism in a 
number of capitalist countries* However# he did not rule cut 
" sharp revolutionary class struggle ” #iere " reaction^ fo#Ss- " 
offer serious resistanoe*^^^
There was nothing new about the new theses# They wore 
said before either by communist stalwart# or in the resolutions 
adopted at the oongresaes# Vhlle asserting the inevitability of the 
triuEQdi of oommuniim, lénin adopted the policy of peaoeful coexistence 
and opposed the export of revolution by Soviet Russia?^^ Even at 
the height of tensions in the raid -1930s# the Vllth Congress of the 
Comintern rejected the fatalistic notion that war was in evitable# 
and noted the new possibilities of siruggle for peace because of 
the otoanged balance of class forces in the world, Karl Iferx felt
232» #4"* FF* 9^ 11 
235» See m  2 - 5
234* The Communist Wernatlonal# F* 62,
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that in  ooutitries like the Iftiited States# tJhited Kingdom and 
Holland " the working people may achieve their goal j[ socialism ( 
by peaceful mans "#
As a natural Corollary to W.s policy of ^ iteration 
of peaceful intentions, Khrushchev developed a separate policy 
towards the non-aligned world* %  the mid-1950s, the non-aligned 
countries had attained some importance in international politics; 
they represented a significant part of the worlds’ population; 
they were also frequently at odds with the west on colonial and 
racial issues# Khrushchev had also established rapport with some 
non-aligned leaders through exchange of visits* He sought to 
consolidate the relationship with the new non-aligned states of 
AITo-Asia as well as wi'Mi the neutral states of %rope througji a 
doctrinal inncvation-the concept of " peace Zone %
Khrueh#%ev said in his Repwt lhat the Sooialiat states 
and the ** peace loving " European and Asian States, idiich proolaimd 
** mn-partloipaticn in blocs ” as a principle of their foreign 
policy constituted a " Bsaoe Zone
let us now examine the reaction of the CFI to the
post-Stalin developments. The increasing %4^mth in ]&ido-Soviet
relations left the OPl in a quandary* As late as January, 1954»
the OFX, at its Third Congress at Madurai, described 3Mia as
" the biggest seml-ooloniaX country yet to win freedom"*
A| :------------------------------ - ------ ---- --------
255* Quoted In P,H* fC^seyev* m S È W  F# 152
256# February 15, 1956
257* Quoted in M*H* Hhsani, oo#bit** F* 171
n
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tet Soviet appreciation of IhdlalcforeJgn policy was something
that the CFl oould not Ignore* There were also squabbles within
the party on the stand that the party should take in the light of
new developments* It was probably to seek guidance that
Ajsy Ohosh# the then General Secretary of the CPl# visited Ifosoow
and returned to India in December# 1954»^^^ At a press conference
on December 7t 1954, he said that the internal policy of the Kehru
government did not Suit the interests of the masses, but the foreign 
241
policy did* During the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin, the 
CPI was practically ignored; even the party’s electoral interests 
were sacrificed by the Soviet press*
After the Xlth Corgrese of the OPStf, the O H  held its
IV Congrese in April# 1956 and decided to support the national
bourgeoisie against foreign ooirpetition and in idiatever effort
it might make to overcomes economic dependence*^^^ On April 15#
1957, the party formed government in the state of Kerala# after
its victory in tJie state in 3Didiais second general election?^
In Jhly# 1957, the CPI politbureau asserted that the central and
state legislatures " have become the most important forums for
fighting for the cause of the people and the country# for
245
uniting the domooratle masses on policy issues*******#"
238» 3«e Ch*p4«f I I I ,  94P.IOI - IO6
239* Ibrmhal "Indian Conumnlan and the Kew Soviet Line",
R w ifio  A ffa ire . Vol» XXIX, «o»4 (ZeoezAen, 1956) EP. 349-52 
240. Jhid»» V. 355 
241 » iP>id»
242. See Chapter # 1 ,1 ? »  112 -  113
243* IWrehal M ndm ilier, "Conetitutional Coaounie# in  Bidia", 
Eftel#o A fiaiy*., Vol. # # ,  Kd.1 (Wwoh, 1958), P, 26.
244. # id .. P» 22. See alao Chapter XXI, P. 113
245. a w w  %  33
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Either its enoouragihg victory in Kerala or the Soviet 
government’s unwillingness to let the CPI frustrate its diplo­
matic move» in India or both made it a reeponsible party#
By the time the XXlat Qongreis of the CPSU met#
KhruthOhev was at the plimaole of power having defeated the 
"anti-T«rty" groupA# attempts to overtlirow His opponents 
Müenkôv# Kaganovich# Molotov and Qhepllov lost their positions 
in the party and govemment*^^ He was emboldened by the freedom 
he had got with the departure of his rivals# On îferoh#27# 1958» 
Khrushchev aseumed the office of the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers# thus becoming tlie head of party as well as the 
government#
That Khrushchev exercised this freedom Is evident fTom 
the XXXst Congress thesis that " there will arise a real possibility 
of excluding world war from thé life of society even before the 
complete triumph of socialism# even with capitalism existing in 
part of the world "#^ 48 more hamstrung by rivals to
necessitate concessions# as he was at the time of the XXth 
Congress* That Khrushchev had to make i oonoessions to his rivals
at the XKth Congress is clear by the way the second and third
SL4q
theses on international developments were worded#
Khrusheohev was even oonfldent enough to declare
that the " capitalist enolrolemsnt no longer exists for our 
250
country"# This conftdonoo was probably fostered by the
246# Mei# îhinàôd# BP# I7I-73
247# Ibii^  .P#,.i2p
248. Eravda# JbhudrV '29#:' >1^ 59  ^ Complete text in CDQP#Vol.XI# 
KoS# 4 and )
249# See the theses on 55
2^# Report to the XXIst Congress# Ryavda. January 28# 1959
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Inoreasing Soviet military might a# manifested by the putting
of the first artifioial satellite into the spmoe in October#
1957 * $Ws overtaking the Uhited States in the field at that
tims.^ ^^  It is possible that the Soviet belief that thanks to
Afro-Aslan support it had beoome possible to defeat the American
252atteapts to impose a diktat on other countries also contributed 
to this confidence.
THE CONOgPT OF HATIONAL BEMOCRiVHG STATE
And the Soviet loaders tried to further cement their 
relations with the Afro-Asian oountries* (Die increasing co­
operation between the Soviet U&iion and the new nations, and the 
fact that socialism of sorts was being adopted by nany of them, 
seemed to have encou4?agecl the leaders of the international 
communist movomont to make further doctrinal innovations# The 
result was the oonoept of national democratic state evolved at 
the fonferenoe of #rld Communist Barties in Kbvember# 1)60
Acoordiig to the etatemnt issued at tlie end of the 
conference, a national democratic state is one Wiioh consistently 
defends its politioal and economic independence, etiniggles against 
i#orialism and its military blooss, against military bases on its 
territoty, against new forms of colonialism and the penetration of 
imperialist capital, rejects dictatorial and despotic mthods Of
 -
251. Adam B. Ulam# op.cit.. P. 60)
252. Sea Chapter V, F.170
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government, and assures to its people broad democratio rights
'
and freedoms and the opportunity to work for agrarian reforms
255and partioipafca in the determination of state polloy."^ '^
Dodonesia# Mali# Guinea and CKiana were said to have
created the prerequisitè# for the creation of national democracies#
254Of these# IKli# Guinea and CRiana liad no communist parties. In
his Report to the KKXIlkd Congress of the CPStF* Beesshnev spoke of
" serious social transformationu " in the T3AR# Algeria# Mall#
Guinea# the Congo (Brassaville) and He dropped
Indonesia and (Rmna fÿora tho Hot obviously because of coups in 
256
those countries and the emergence of pro-¥eetem governments.
Hone of the countries «^ere "serious social trans­
formations" were said to have occured# as certified by Brezhnev# 
had allowed coiamunist party to function in its territory# They 
are national diotatorsIii.p!5!# with varying degrees of radicalism.
It was tîie nationalism of the new nations wîiich was at odds with
25). jg^ yga# December 6# I960. Coiaplete text in CDBR# Vol.XXI#
Ko.43# Ft4. The Conference also declared* "American iaperi- 
allsm is the main bulwark of world reaction". Ibid.
2)4. William T* Shim Jk., " Tho Rational Democratic State; A
Communist R:ogramme for leas Dsveloped Areas’’# Mbrld Folltlos. 
Voi.xv# m.) (April# 1963)# Fr 384
8)5. March 30# 1966. Complete text in CDSP# Vol.XVIII#
Kb. 12# F. 10.
256. Hiere waa a covq» in Indonesia In September# 196)# and (Diana# 
in February 1966* See waiter laqueur# on#cit.. FF* 246 and 20)
, 5 9
the ¥eat« There were olaahes of intereeia between the new 
nations and the West because of the letter’s association with 
colonialism and racialim for oentmries. The Soviet tiuion Mà 
no suoh clashes with the new nations’ nationalism# Hence the 
XXIW. Congress tried to reconcile the diplomatic need to support 
the new states’ nationalism with ideology#
The resolution adopted at the XXIXnd Congress of the 
CFSV declared that» in many countries# the liberation movement 
of the peoples that have awakened proceeds under the flag of 
nationalism; and that MumdLsts-Xisntttists draw a distinction 
between the nationalism of the oppressed and that Of the oppressor i
The nationalism of an oppressed nation contains a 
general dmooratic element directed against oppression# 
and oornmmists support it because they consider it 
historically justified at a given stage* That element 
finds expression in the striving of the oppressed peoples 
to free themselves from imperialist oppression# to gain 
national independence and bring about a national 
renasoenoe* But the nationalism of an oppressed nation 
has yet another aspect# one expressing the ideology 
and interests of th^aotionary exploiting top 
stratum*^^^
and interests of th^aotionary exploiting top 
stratum*^^^ _ 1 or
former colonial states is not oonneoted with the imperialist
circles# the resolution continued# it "is objectively interested
2)7# goanMnliBi o f the X K IW  Ocnmre#*
K  ,%yykt.
Ciiosoowt Foreign languages Publishing House# 19c1)# P# 493# 
(hereinafter referred to as the Hoad to Communism)
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in aoooiàplishlng the haeio task# of an antl-lmpcriallet and 
anil-feudal revolution* It» progressive role and its ability 
to partioipate in the solution of pressing national problems 
are, therefore, not yet spent*^^®
In the mid-l gSOs, the Soviet leadership turned its 
attention to developing oontaots with the parties runnlang non- 
oomamist one-party diotatorehips# the late 1940s, Stalin 
realised that fealty to M»soow oould not be ekpeoted from ruling 
oommuniet parties for all time# Itgoslavia revolted against him 
as early as 1948# By early 1960s there was an irreoonoilable 
split in the international oommunlst movement. China began 
ohallengi%% the Soviet leadership of the movement; there were
260
serious olashés of interests between the two oommmist giants*
After the XXth Congress the Italian oommunist leaders, Tkgliatti,
declared in Jhne»19)6, that instead of depending on a single
guiding centre as in the past, the world communist movement was in
261
fact becoming polyoentrio* Even some of the big parties out of
power were not willing to bopHaM# tools in the hands of Moscow
/ . -
to further Soviet interests* Therefore, developing contacts with 
non-communist parties, where possible, was considered as one of the 
means of incrsasing Moscow’s influence and furthering its interests* 
And the concept of Khtional Democratic Bar ties was evolved*
858* tttd.
259* Saa anC Oia^Sovimt *  Itteoalav
Contgovargy 1946*19581 A Baomaniajy Kaaogd ( Saw Xorki 
ScoSpeota Bookt* 1959) for an aooount of the disputa*
260. 3ae Ohaptan V II , EP.209 -  16
261 « Vblten Laqueur, onott.. EP, 592-95
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ïh may# 1966ê%ve#^ia published an artiole «hioh 
defined National DeWoratic Bartles. Aooording to the article#
The National DemoortlC Far ties are closely linked with the 
labouring strata# take revolutionary positions in the struggles
' '  ' ■ ' ■ ■ ■  ' - ■ \ o  .
against colonialism and ingxerialism# and are led ty revolutionary- 
democratic figures from amongst patriotic-minded circles of the 
national intelligentsia*
bhen in power# the National Democratic Ructiea are not 
contant with^^rmal independence^ but advance along tlie path of 
ecohomic liberation. %ey promote the development of ffriendly 
economic and culturel relations with the countries of socialism* 
They work for the iaotlvé ooppèratiôn wiih the SoViét Dhion and 
other sooialist oomtries in thé struggle for peace and against
the aggressive intrigues of International imperialism# headed by
263 ' -the united Stat#a#-
The article also mentioned that the XKIIIrd Congress of
the CFSU was attended t>y the national democratic parties of the
264 '
UAH# the Congo (B*ozztyille)#(WJnea# Nali^  and TUnzWa#^
%  his speech to the Conference of International 
Oommunist parties in JUne# 1969# Brezhnev sli^tly changed the 
designation of ttie parties and called them BeVolutionary Democratic
265
Farties* He said that the Soviet ^ o n  regarded contacts
262* V* MLdtsev# " On National Democratic Forties "* Izvostia*
1 ^  17# 1966. Complete text in  GmF#yol*%yilI,Nb*20*F* 21*
269* Ibid*
264# m & L
26)4 Fravda* Jane 8# 1969* Consiste text in CD8F,Vol*XXI# No*2)# F# 9*
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b # W m  mmsmist parties and the revolutlonaxy démocratie parties
as important"! they "are our wmsades-ii^mm# in the
étrug^e against imperialism and for socialism and for social
progress"# HO also said that the CP3U had oontaOts with 18 
2ÉÊsuoh parties#
Thus# the #$to%y of the deveiopmmt of Soviet polity to­
wards t!i# oolonies and em?oolonies was one of a «seriem of altera­
tions of the oomsnist dogma to suit Soviet state interests#
Even #ie relations between ooanwnist oountries were oonduoted on 
tîie basis of national mtsrests ratiier than proletarian inter­
nationalism# ty the begining of the 1970# the Soviet leaders 
themselves began advancing nattoal interests as the oriteriü» 
of their polioies even towards fellow socialist states* Bar 
instanoe, referring to 8ino-3oviet relations in his Report to 
XXX7th Gongrsss of the QPSU# Breshnev observed» " wo are not 
foregoirg the national interests of the Soviet State*"^ ^^  This 
was just an honest confession of a policy followed all along#
266* lJ»i%  See also %fszhoe#*s Report to the XXIVth G&asress of 
the 0F3U# Brav## mroh 21# 1971#
267*J6tii.
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The above suaayils shows that ideology plays a 
secondary role in the making of Soviet foreign pllcy* like 
the foreign policies of all couhtries, national interests,; 
personal predilections of the powers that be and Internal and 
external political conditions influence in the making of Soviet 
foreign policy; ^<4 as with all foreign policies# natlor^ 
interest is the lodestar of Soviet foreign policy, \tetever 
may be the tall claims of her leaders, the Soviet Uhion is not 
a different type of state | it is only a different politico- 
economic system* As with all states# the USSR’s primary concern 
is with its security} and# like all political leaders in charge 
of states# Soviet leaders also always made loftyjideologloal 
declarations but never i^oibated to make unjprinoipled compromises^ 
and opportunist alliances to further the security interests 
of the USSR.
But in what sense are the terms "ideology" and 
"natitmal interests" used in this discussion^
Since the topic under discussion# 3Endo-Soviei relations 
1959 7^1# falls within tîie purview of international relations# the 
part of MhrSist ideology #iat Is relevant in the context is the 
much-vaunted proletarian internationalism* The communists claim 
that thty HaVe ^  nationality and recognise no national borders# 
they stand for tîie promotion of the interests of the working
 . .   I I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I ,
26## See F?. 10 & 16 
269* See Ff. 57 43
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class all over W  world* At least that ïms been their claim until 
Brezhnev advanced national interest as the criterion of Soviet 
policy at the XOTth Congress^^
National interest is not an easy Conoept to define*
In pluralist societies-and (HI modem societies are pluralist 
ij^  var^n® degrees-different groups are likely to 
national interests in different ways* Then# how and by #om 
is national interest assessed? The fact is that even in coun­
tries where there is freedom of expression# people take very 
moh lose interest in foreign policy# unless an emotive issue 
is involved^ than In domestic policy* Therefore# in demooratic 
countries too those at tlie helm of affairs have freedom to examine 
the alternatives and decide on a courSe of action they consider 
to be in tlie best interest of the country in a given situation*
In tctalitarisn countries like the Soviet Uhion# the rulers 
enjoy nesaHabsolute power to decide what constitutes national 
in^West*
Is# #ien# Soviet foreign policy ideologically 
motivated or motivated by national interests?
The Soviet record of eaorifioec J*n the spirit of
proletarian intematiomltsn has been dismal* Of course# in
tiieory# the Soviet leaders always maintain that particular
interests have to be subordinated to the general interests of 
271
of ^e mvement* But# being the leMera of %e movement#,
270* See P. 62 
271# See FF* 12 & 50.
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the Soviet leader# would decide what conetitutee general 
interest and what, perticuler#^^^* The USSR# being "the 
baie of #ie world revolutionary movement "# unqualified 
defence of " the bate " donetltutee the general intereet of the 
movement# iehin thougjit that iuOh support wa# voluntarily 
forthcomii^&d Stalin demanded itf^^ He aleo ear to it that 
the cell for the defence of the Soviet jPhlon beosme binding on 
communiste in the sWape of a Gomlntem directive i international 
oommunist disciplined^
This is not to deny that as tactics the series of 
doctrinal retreats was superb# lenin was aware of the fact 
that " circumstances " and not "merits" brought the Russian 
Communist detachment to the fore?^^ He was conscious of the 
precarious existence of the Soviet stateF^ Therefore, there 
was need for pragmatism and caution# He exhibited his 
pragmatism in entering into a trade agreement with Britain and 
closure of the mdlan Political and Military 3chcel at Thshkent#^^
The School could have only served one purpose» bei% 
a constant source of swdety to the British IhdiSn government#
It could not have hastened the revolution in India where there 
was a strong and efficient government* There was no communist 
party in %dia and the messes definitely accepted the oharismstic
272# Stalin said on August 1# 1927» "He la an internationalist who 
unreservedly, unhesitatingly and unconditionally is prepared 
to defend the USSR, because the USSR is the base of the world 
revolutionary movement####" Quoted in Billot R.Gbodmsn, Thf 
SiQiyiet Design for a Vterld State (Hew torki OoWbla university 
Ew*8,196oy p. 65
275. S«« P. 2
974. 8e« P, 33
275. 88« ?* 30
876. 8e«'#, 1
277. PP. 2 - 7
879, 988 m  16
leadeâeshlp o f Gfmdhl emd the Congre#» Party# If the
School proved to he too inuOh of an anxiety for Britt#h India# 
the 5rltl#A government wa# certainly in a poiitlon to take 
effective military action andthe Soviet government va# vnanre 
of its capacity to vithiftand Britleh preitnre## Ihe continuance 
of the School çculd only have aerved the aynWllc Value of 
deiying the then mo#t powerful country in the vorld* ihe coate 
would have heen unàoceptàhlet loeihg hoth the d^aCto recognition 
a# veil a# the commercial benefit# from the trade agreement, 
licnln va# not ps^ apared to aacrlflce the certain benefit# Aeom 
the Anglo**Sovlet trade agreement for the #ake of a dictant and 
uncertain revolution in India, Anyvay^  revolution# are conceived 
and WaPturod Underground until it i# moat opportune to etage them# 
they are never prepared under the glare of publicity* It i# ale© 
bad atrategy to locate the bace of operation# oloae to the border# 
of the enemy# a# Roy did in Whkent* |«enln^ # clocure of the School 
in deference to the wiahe# of the Srltiih government need not 
have meant to the end of ^ e  training of Indian Communist# I that 
work could a# veil be done in bbeoov#. in the (communiât ttodvereity 
of the Ibiler# of the #a#t* Politic# i« the art of the 
pciiible} it va# i#po##ible for bénin to take on thé iritlah 
Empire, ^ d  io# he did not hesitate to close thé SChoôl* '
Beside## the succe## Of Roy*# plan va# contingent tfp^ the 
cooperation of the Afÿdxàn government | and Kabul refused to let 
% y #  army orp»# over to Rritiéh Indiaf®^
,mm#,  .--------------------------------
Z(9. See B, 16
m  a, A#ikari, cp,cit*h ?ol,|# % %\ \^
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A# taotic#! the calls for different types of united 
fronts issued at different time# were flawless tpo*^ If in the 
process of working United fronts# the national bourgeoisie of 
the colonial and semi*^olonlal countries or the bourgeois trade 
unions in the West were won ovw to comamien# it would have been 
a great boost to the movement# Simüariy# if the calls for ootmanvLsb* 
socialist unity issued at the XKth Congress of the CPSU and the 
Conference of %rld Comownist Parties in 1960#^ had materialised# 
there would have been a split in the Western world# the Cnited 
States# where there is no socialist party# and western Europe# 
where there are strong socialist parties# would have fallen apart*
5his would have served Soviet interests well.
As tactics# Stalin*# Konaggreiiion Bact witli Germany# 
the oocupation of the Baltic States and tiie extraction of terri*- 
torial conoesslon# f^om Hnland^®^ would have been brilliant if 
they were temporary and pfefentlve steps in defenoe of ** the base 
of the world revolutionary movement***
But were they all tactics adopted with ideologioal 
motivest It is hard to say So* Even the votarieS of *^ permanent 
revolution**# like Trotsky, were prepared to sacrifice the interests 
of the Chinese revolution for the sake of Soviet State interests# 
Tsotslgr did not hesitate to eacpreeS racialist apprehensions either^ 
It is evident that these Soviet moves ware inspired more by 
nationalist considerations than ideological motives* Soviet
am* See H*. 19, 30 & 53
202* See B* 52 
285* see 59 - 40 
284* See BP# 27
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foreign policy oould be oOneldered m  ldeologioal3y4mtivàted 
one if it would take ooneoioue and rieky step» to eetablith 
ÎWB3?3det regime» in the world* %ie Soviet tht<ni had hardly ever 
done it; instead# her leader» altered their dogma wheneviWf 
diplomatic expendiency demanded it, %e eatabliahment of o 
oowmniat regime» in Baetem Europe wa» not a riaby step -becauie 
oiroumatanoea in the wake of the defeat of Hitler were oonduoiye 
to ttie iapoeition of oomwmiem on Baetorn Ew^pe* $kitain wa# 
incapable of phyeloally reeiating Stalin»# Oommniaation of Bast 
Europe; and the TJhited States was unwilling to oommit herself to 
another war* The oleariy nationalist outlook of Stalin wa# 
evident from the way ** their European ooimtrie# Ï
weal#i was being extraoted in varibW way## most frequently 
throU(d% joint^atook oo%anie# in which the Russians barely 
invested any thing except German oapltal# which they had simply 
declared a prise of war**#^ ®^  %at wa# lATdly in the spirit of 
proletarian internationalism* Even after #ie Oomamist regimes 
were stabilised in Eastern Europe#: Stalin or his successors never 
thou^t of returning the territories wrested from Rumania# Bcland# 
East Germany and Biïaand^^or making the Baltic republic# 
independent communiât states, Stalin»# policy in Eastern Europe 
smacked of irredentism and imperialism*
285* Hilovatt BjilaSi (?onver#a;^ oh» with Stalin (liondoni R%ert 
^brpàvis, 19^2)1 B* 12#* The Ohinose had to pay the PSSR 
for the arm# used in the Korean lÀiCh was ^^ essentially 
Russlal# war” Adam B* m # %  0P*0iti*, B* 550
286, See Ghspter B*214
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Stalin did not trust oommist# like Mao and Tito# 
who asserted their independence# He would not permit # o  to 
carry out a revolution; he would alwaye advise the Chinese to 
imke up with the Kucminta^^^ He would judge when the revolution 
was to 1>e started and when it wa# to he wound xq?* Ih deciding 
the fate of the revolutions* what St^ ilin took into consideration 
m s  the effects of the revolution on Soviet interests# If the 
risks were unacceptable# he wuld ask for its folding dp*
207* Ibid.. ?* "«niiilKW!# Pjp. 37 - 38
In April# 1949# when the Kuois|htang t^ime was in the 
throes of death (Biiang haviïig te#Qr«œily retired* acting 
Bcesidentf Id Tsung#j## having sued for peace with the 
oomiimda'ti^S^ev#^ ambassador was, negotiating with the 
nationalist gover^nt for the renewal of air agreement 
relating' tC'''Sink0 # # The Çoviet ^ vcmmant was even reported 
to have akded for agreement regarding mining concessions in 
Sinkiang# See Banlkkar# In Two Chinas ilondon# George 
Allen and Ifaiwin, 1955)# B#45
2B8# Talking to Khrdelj# a Itgoslave commmist# Stalin referred 
to ttic connmmiat uprising in Greeoo after typrld War IX and 
said that It Had to fold up# lb you believe in the success 
of the uprising in Greeoo? ,
tf
What do you think that Great Britain and the Bhited 
States The tSilted States# the most powerful state in the 
world/» will permit you to break their line of commmioation 
in the Ksditerranean? HonSenSe# And we hâve no naVy# The 
uprising in Greece must be stopped# and as quickly as 
possibleJf miovan IQiias# aRghijg^ B* I64
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He did not oare louoh for Ideology or the interests 
of the movement. For Instance# his expert on India# lyakov# 
felt that as a result of the partition# India had heoome a 
relatively more Industrial and capitalist country”. Aocordlng 
to Marxist beliefs# there was a possibility of revolution marturlng 
in Ihdla early because of the "relative Inçportance" of the native 
bourgeoisie and the working class. But Stalin was hardly Interested
in suoh dialectics. All that he was Interested in was power.
290
Therefore he hardly took any interest in India, neither Stalin 
had time# being busy in sorting out the affairs in Eastern Europe# 
to court the emerging nations# nor were tliey likely to fall under 
his control# nor were they powerful enough to threaten his interests; 
therefore# he could ingnore them# which he did*
This is not to suggest that the Soviet leaders have lost
faith in the ultimate triuogph of communism all over the world.
They always speak of the general crisis of capitalism or the
291Inter^imperiallst contradictions which would lead to the 
inevitable destruction of capitalism and the consequent birth 
of a socialist world.
289, See P.45—
290, See PP, 94 “• 101
291 ♦ See The Communist Internationa P,5S# The Road to Communism*
P, A9Q, irayd^:ite 30, I960, Wvda, April# 25, i960,
Pcavda and Izveetla, June 8# 1969. Ecàvda. Nhroh 21# 1971 # "29th 
GP3H Congress t Report of the QPSÏÏ Central Committee", Soviet 
Haviw Vol. 10 & 11 PP. 24-25 and
% r  Peace. Security. Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe, 
(îtooiiment Adopted ly thé Gonfeÿenoe Of Cbmwmlst and Workers » 
lUrtles of Europe# Berlin# JWe 29*30# l9?6) (Hew Belhli 
Hew Age Peinting Pcess# 1976)ÿvB, 10,
69a
The poet-Staiin leadership oreatsd a more humane
292
oomnwnist society in the USSR* But tliey W d  not put the interests 
of the movement before those of the USSR either* The Uhlted States 
was named the main bulwark of&orld reaction*There were serious 
olashes of interests between the USSR and Ifeilted States, Ttie latter 
had been aoquring bases around the former* Moscow had to strive 
hard to deny the UhitSd States tlic basas or limit tWm, The one 
way of trying to achieve this purpose ivas to oourt the nonraligned 
nations* They were also frequently at odds with the united States 
Whose patronage of colonial powers for reasons of Western alliance 
management affooted the interests of the Tliird IVOrld* Therefore# 
further aggravation of tensions between the United States and the 
Third Vbrld would be diplomatioally expedient* And so# Moscow 
began courting the new nations*
Since it is their vA?nt to expound their policies in 
ideological interms# thé Soviet leaders found ideologioal 
cutplanations for their rapport with the new states. But even in these 
attempts to find ideological explanations for their new enthusiasm 
for friendship with the Third #rld countries# their concern for 
their national interests clearly stands out* Three of the four 
states which were said to have created the prerequisites for the
OQA
creation of national demoracies did not allow communist p^ti^s 
to function in their countries* This was violative of the concept
292* See ?* 49 
295# See ?* 58 
294# JMAfrI
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national demooratio state one of the oharaoterstios of whloh
was that it should assure to its people broad desnooratic rights
and tl%e opportunity to work for agrarian reform#traditional
ooDummist way of demanding rights for tiiSir prtyMsen, A little
later# the CPSÜ extended support to the nationalism of tlie oppresset,^
%en the Soviet Wion turned its attention to developing oontaots
with the 80*called Rational Bemooratlo or Revolutionary Bbmooratio 
997parties. The Soviet leaders must have either entertained the 
hopes of winning them over to oonmunism or of ensuring tlie suoocasion 
of friendly people to power when the time is ripe by using their 
multi-level contaots with the ruling oligarchy of the one party 
states.
However# the Soviet leaders» support to bourgeois nation* 
alism was made to sound as though it was f -tactical B»ve, Their 
resolutions extencl^ ysg support to bourgeois nationalism speak of 
its progressive role bein^ î ” not yet spent their friendship
with it being tengwrary*^^^
295# SMEt
296, See P, 59
297. See ,
298, See P* 60
299. See P, 25
WO îiava the oft-quoted oomment of Stalin# made in 
1927# tiiat the Kttomintang had ♦* to be utilised to the end# 
squeezed out like a lempn end then thrown away ”, Quoted 
in Robert 0,Forth# Hosoow and the Chinese Gommunists 
(Standferd# Standford University Press# 1955)# 3^* ^
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Soviet interest has not been oonfined to national 
demomzatlo states alone, Neither Didla was a national demooraoy# 
nor her ruling party# the present or the past, a revolutionary
democratic party* Yet the Soviet %&iloh invested heavily In India's
300development# developed best of relations with her on a durable
301basis# and in tlie proceos# ignored the interests of the CPI*
The new vigour in Soviet diplomacy was also facilitated by 
the encouraging rates of economic growth. This enabled Moscow 
to give# in addition to diplomatic support on colonial and racial 
issues# some economic aid to the Third World* I|y the late 1930s
even Western economists agreed that the rate of the growth of the
302
Soviet econony had "exceeded that of the United States***'^  And
the confident Soviet leaders have been proudly speaking of the
305
faster economic growth of the USSR and the communist bloc*
Khrushchev was even optimistic about overtaking the United States
304
in the economic field possibly ty 1967 but definitely by 1970.
The Soviet leaders used ;all these favourable factors to their country*© 
advantage and# perf<»||^^thôy found ideological sanction for their 
diplomatic moves ny suitable alteration in the Marxist dogma.
500, See Chapter ^
301. See Chapter III# 112 - 113*
302* Alec Novo# Communist Economie Strategy t Soviet Growth and
O*asi%ington% National; Planni*:^  Association# 1959)# P*16
303# See Janua^ 28# 1959# The Road to Communism. PP* 41-43#
and 269-70# Ecavda and Isvestla# 8# 1969. "23th Cî^U Cnry^PHat
^port of the CPSÜ Central Comaittee”. Soviet Review* Vol. XIII#
Ig  & 11 (Ibrch 4, 1976), P.8. \
304. Khrushchev s speech at a reception giVen by the Central Committee 
of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the 
gradates of military academies# on Jipy 8# 196I, R.S.Khrushchev, 
^fli^|i»%,^ d  Cqnpnmiw^^ Selected Besides 1936*63 (Moscow*
Foreign languages Publishing House 1963). P* 43,
c h a p t e r II
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THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
The Indian National Congress began taking sustained 
interest in international affairs after 1920;^ Nehru was 
responsible for this interest.
In a resolution passed in 1Ç28 the Congress 
declared that "The struggle of the Indian people for
freedom is part of the world struggle against imperialism;
2
with which contact should be established”, The Congress
was naturally sympathetic to and expressed its solidarity 
with similar movements in China and Spain, In 1936 the
party created a foreign department.^
In 1939 Britain declared India a belligerent without 
even consulting the Indian leadership though, by then, 
responsible ministries were functioning in the States,
The Congress resented it. In a resolution passed on 
September 15, 1939? the party declared that it "has seen 
in Fascism and Nazism the intensification of the principle 
of Imperialism against which the Indian people have 
struggled for many years”; that "the issue of war and peace 
for India must be decided by the Indian people and no 
outside authority can impose this decision upon them”; that 
”their sympathy is entirely on the side of democracy and 
freedom”; that India could not ”associate hei^self in a 
war said to be for democratic freedom when that freedom is
Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-allignment (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1966), p, 27,
^Quoted, Ibid, p,27,
^Ibld. p.28.
tbid.
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denied to her” ; that the Congress was aware of the 
British and French declarations to the effect that they 
were fighting for democracy, but "the history of the 
recent past is full of examples showing the constant 
divergence between the spoken word, the ideals proclaimed, 
and the real motives and objectives”; that during the war 
of I914-I918 slogans like ”the preservation of democracy, 
self-determination, and the freedom of small nations” 
were raised ”and yet the very Governments which proclaimed 
these aims entered into secret treaties embodying 
imperialist designs for the carving up of the Ottoman 
Empire”; that ”the interests of Indian democracy do not 
conflict with the interests of British democracy or of 
world democracy”; that "there is an inherent and
i
ineradicable conflict between democracy for India or 
elsewhere and Imperialism and Fascism"; and that India, 
with her vast resources, must play "an important part in 
any scheme of world reorganisation”•^
That resolution contained, in an embryonic form, 
independent India * s foreign policy: her refusal to be
bamboozled into action by the pompous declarations of 
dominant powers; her insistence on taking her own 
decisions; and her demand for the extension of the 
principles of democracy and national self-determination to 
the colonial world.
By the time India attained independence in August 
1947? the Cold War divisions were already visible;
The text cited in Jawaharlal Nehru, The Unity of 
India; Collected Writings, 1937-1940 (London; Lindsay 
Drummond, I941)? pp,410-412,
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Churchill*s "Iron Curtain" speech was nearly one and a 
half years old; and shortly after India's independence, 
Zhdanov was to unfold his two-camp concept. Nehru's 
response to these developments was non-alignment.
In fact, even before the attainment of full 
independence, Nehru unfolded his policy of non-alignment. 
Speaking on radio on September 7, 1946, after the 
formation of the interim government, he said that India 
would take full part in international conferences as a 
free nation with her own foreign policy and not merely as 
a satellite of another nation; she would keep away, as 
far as possible, from power politics of groups which had 
led to wars in the past and in future, would lead to wars 
on a much greater scale.^
' A reading of some of Nehru's important speeches and 
works shows that idealistic, ideological and nationalistic 
considerations helped evolve the concept of non-alignment,
IDEALISTIC CONSIDERATIONS
Before realities of power mellowed him, Nehru was
n
an impatient idealist and an admirer of Soviet Russia.
He was opposed to old concepts of international 
relations on which he blamed many wars. Balance of 
power was, for him, "mobilised antagonisms" whose
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy; Selected 
Speeches, September 1Q46-April 1Q6i, (New Delhi; 
Government of India, Publications Division, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, I961), p.2. (hereinafter 
referred to as India's Foreign Policy)•
^See pp. 78 - 85
f;?
"impotence” to "rid the world of war” stands "proven".  ^
Since the birth of nation states, he thought, nations 
relied for survival on this concept, and all these years 
they "have been engaged in wars with brief intervals 
during the greater part of which war clouds gathered on 
the horizon”.  ^ Therefore, the efforts of the blocs to 
balance each other did not appeal to him because of the 
consequences he feared.
But in late I96O he said to Patterson "maybe”, 
immediately after the last war, conditions were such that 
alliances became to some extent "inevitable"» "But an 
alliance inevitably is an alliance against somebody, not 
an alliance in the air. Some danger is apprehended from 
some other country. Now, that really means attracting 
first of all that country's hostility", Instead, he 
pleaded for more contacts with the USSR and China,
Arthur Stein interprets this as an attempt at binding them 
to international obligations and responsibilities from
11which it would become increasingly difficult to withdraw, 
Nehru believed that the Communist monolith would 
mellow with the passage of time because history shows that 
a"proselytising creed" is gradually "toned down" and
Q
Quoted in Inis L, Claude Jr,, Power and 
International Relations (New York; Random House, 19^5)?
P" S5.
^Ibid,
^^George N, Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi (London; 
Faber and Faber, 1 9 6 3 p. 284*
^^Arthur Stein, "India's Relations With the USSR 
1953-1963"? Orbis, Vol. VIII, No, 2, p. 36I,
12eventually learns to co-exist peacefully. He told
President Eisenhower in December 1956 that because the 
natural attitude of the Soviet Union was a suspicious one 
and because they felt themselves "looked doim upon" by 
the West, the West might make conciliatory moves on a
j o
unilateral basis and thereafter examine Soviet reactions, 
Because of this belief, Nehru wanted both super­
powers to avoid threatening postures and miscalculations 
which could result in a major war. He thought that by 
j oining one bloc or the other new nations would only 
increase areas of tensions; they could contribute their 
mite towards peace by being non-aligned.
Nor was Nehru ready to yield his judgment to great 
powers because they were great. He once said in the 
Indian Parliament; "I just do not see why the possession 
of great armed might or great financial power should 
necessarily lead to right decisions or a right mental 
outlook"•
He also thought that by being non-aligned he would
12Quoted in Ernest W, Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and 
Nkrumah on Neutralism", in Laurence W, Martin ed,, 
Neutralism and Non-alignment: The New States in World
Affairs, (New York: Frederick A, Praeger, I962), p. IO8.
11Dwight D, Eisenhower, The White House Years: 
Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (London: Heinemann, 1966), p,113.
Khrushchev referred to derisions like the Soviet 
Union being described as a "colossus on feet of clay" by 
Churchill and others in his memoirs: see Strobe Talbott,
transi, and ed,, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last
Testament (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974)? p. 355.
^^In his reply to the debate on foreign affairs in 
the Lok Sabha (Lower House), on December 9? 1958? in 
India's Foreign Policy, p. 80.
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retain freedom to take an independent stand on issues
unhampered by alliance restraints. At an early stage in
India's freedom, when he did not yet realise the impact of
pulls and pressures of the Cold War on India's interests,
Nehru told the United States House of Representatives on
October 13? 1949: "Where freedom is menaced, or justice
threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot
l<r
be and sha'll not be neutral".
However, it was not all idealism; there was a
streak of realism in this idealist approach to the Cold
War, He was fearful of the effects of war on India's
interests. For instance, replying to the debate on
foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha on September 2, 1957?
Nehru referred to the effects of the Suez Crisis in 1956
on India's 5-year plan. He said that India was too
humble to follow a crusading policy; she was aware of
her limitations. However, he continued, where world
peace was concerned, India wanted to have her say; where
India's interests were directly threatened, whether in
Goa or in Pakistan, she wanted to have a loud say, a 
16positive say.
While he was opposed to alliances because of his 
belief that they contributed to tensions, he was not 
totally opposed to all alliances under all conditions. 
Speaking in the Lok Sabha on September 29? 1954? he said 
that to him the original NATO seemed to be a justifiable
Pandit Nehru's Discovery of America (Madras: 
Indian Press Publications, (n.d, )), p, 24 (hereinafter 
referred to as Pandit Nehru's Discovery of America,)
^^India's Foreign Policy, pp.69-71.
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reaction for certain countries who were afraid of certain
developments. However, later NATO gave protective cover
to the colonies of some member-states; Portugal claimed
this protection for Goa, He wondered why the Manila
Conference was convened to form SEATO so soon after the
Geneva Conference of 1954 ended the conflict in Indo- 
17China, In the case of the Baghdad Pact (later known as
CENTO) and SEATO, his opposition was due to his belief 
that they would create fear in the minds of Communist 
States and revive pre-Geneva conference tensions in South 
East Asia, Besides that, Pakistan joined these pacts 
with an eye on I n d i a , N e h r u  could not have ignored this 
either,
IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
During India's struggle for freedom, Nehru's
dislike for a familiar imperialist Britain turned him into
an admirer of an unfamiliar Soviet Russia. He wrote in
his autobiography:
As between the Labour worlds of the Second
International and the Third International, my
sympathies were with the latter. The whole
record of the Second International from the
War onwards filled me with distaste, and we in
India had had sufficient personal experience of
the methods of one of its strongest supports -
the British Labour Party, So I turned
inevitably with good-will towards Communism,
for, whatever its faults, it was at least not
19hypocritical and not imperialistic,-
^^Ibid,, pp.88-90.
^^See Chapter III, p.102
Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (London: John 
Lane the Bodley Head, 1947)? p,I63.
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However, his was an emotional liking for Communist
goals and not for Communist methods and system. He wrote
in his Autobiography:
It was not a doctrinal adherence, as I did
not know much about the fine points of
Communism, my acquaintance being limited at
the time to its broad features. These
attracted me as also the tremendous changes
taking place in Russia, But Communists often
irritated me by their dictatorial ways, their
aggressive and rather vulgar methods, their
habit of denouncing everybody who did not agree
with them. This reaction was no doubt due, as
they would say, to my own bourgeois education
20and upbringing.
This dichotomous attitude to Communism was to remain a
part of his mental make-up all through his life,
Nehru attended the Brussels Congress of Oppressed
Nationalities in February 1927 ? and was elected to the
Presidium and the 9-man Executive Committee of the League
21Against Imperialism which was founded at the Congress .
Nehru wrote about the Brussels Congress : ",,, There is no
doubt that the gathering was friendly towards the 
22Communists ,,," He also recorded that it "was curious 
how, in our League Against Imperialism Committee meetings, 
I would usually be on the side of the Anglo-American 
members on petty matters of argument. There was a 
certain similarity in our outlook in regard to method at
20Ibid, For more conflicting views on Communism, 
see pp.591-592,
21Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography
(London: Oxford University Press, 1959)? pp,110-11,
22Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, p. 1Ô2,
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21least". His cautious attitude to this Marxist-oriented
body was evident from the confidential report he made to 
the Indian National Congress. In that, he mentioned the 
disadvantages of the Congress party affiliating itself" with 
the League Against Imperialism: 1, the Socialist
character of the League and 2, the possibility that 
Russian foreign policy might use it.
Nehru and his family were invited to attend the 
10th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1927.
Nehru spent four days in Moscow and called on Kalinin, the 
President of the Soviet Union, Kalinin lived in 3 small 
rooms in the Kremlin, Nehru thought how different were 
the Soviet rulers from the British o f f i c i a l s , T h e  
invitation and what he was shown in Moscow naturally 
impressed him. On return home, he wrote and spoke a 
number of times on Soviet achievements. He thought that 
the contrast between extreme luxury and poverty was not 
visible in Russia, nor was the hierarchy of class or caste 
noticeable; that j ails were liberal; that nationalities 
problems seemed to have been solved. But he was cautious 
again; he thought that it was difficult -to draw any final
conclusions about anything about Soviet Russia at that
, 26 stage.
From then onwards, Nehru kept up his praise of the 
Soviet Union for a long time. Addressing the Bengal 
Students* Conference on September 22, 1928, he called the
^^Ibid., p. 163.
Michael Brecher, op.cit., p. 113.
^^Ibid., p.117.
26Ibid.. pp.117-118.
Soviet Union "the greatest opponent of imperialism" and
reaffirmed his faith in Communism as an ideal of society,
"For essentially it is Socialism, and Socialism ,,,, is the
27only way if the world is to escape disaster". He said
at the same conference that Russia was an "outcaste like 
us from nations and much slandered ,,, Russia goes to the
28
East as equal, not as a conqueror or a race proud superior".
He continued that the "continual friction that we see to-day
is between England and Russia, not between India and Russia.
Is there any reason why we in India should inherit the
age-long rivalry of England against Russia? That is based
20on the greed and covetousness of British imperialism".
In his presidential address to the Indian National
Congress in 1936, he said :
If the future is full of hope, it is largely 
.because of Soviet Russia and what it does, and 
I am convinced that, if some world catastrophe 
does not intervene, this new civilisation will 
spread to other lands and put an end to the
30wars and conflicts which capitalism feeds.
He continued,
Russia is not supposed to be a democratic
country after the Western pattern, and yet we
find the essentials of democracy present in far
greater degree amongst the masses there than
31anywhere else.
^^Ibid., p. 126.
28Quoted in Hemen Ray, "Changing Soviet Views on 
Mahatma Gandhi", The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XXIX, 
No, 1 (November I969), p. 95,
^^Ibid,, p,96.
30Quoted in Anj an Kumar Banerji, Nehru and Soviet 
Russia (Calcutta: Bensons, I965)? part II p,6,
^^Ibid,
82
He had a practical reason too for trying to be
friendly to Russia, He thought that Russia could not be
ignored by India because she was her powerful neighbour;
she could be friendly to India and co-operate with her or
be a thorn in her side. In either case, India had to
know her and understand her and shape her policy 
32accordingly.
The Soviet Union had another attraction for Nehru; 
planning for economic development. Addressing the 
National Academy of Sciences on March 5, 1938, he said that 
the Soviet example has proved "how a consciously held 
objective, backed by co-ordinated effort, can change a 
backward country into an advanced industrial state with an 
ever-rising standard of living. Some such method we
; n n
have to pursue if we are to make rapid progress",
Because of such admiration for Soviet Russia, he
lashed out at Britain for perpetuating a policy of creating
a Cordon Sanitaire against the Soviet Union and for trying
to destroy her,
When Britain rejected the Soviet offer for a joint
front against Nazi Germany, before the Soviet-German pact
of 1939? Nehru attributed this to their "class feelings
3 "ïand hatred of the new order in Russia And when
Ghandi expressed pain at the Hitler-Stalin pact of 19 39? 
Nehru wrote him a letter in January 1940 asking him to be 
cautious in his talks with the British and avoid taking an
32Quoted in Michael Brecher, op,cit., p.119»
^^Jawaharlal Nehru, Unity of India, p,l8l,
^^Michael Brecher, op.cit,, p,119»
3 ^Jawaharlal Nehru, op.cit., p.296,
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anti-Russian stand. He wrote that the success of the 
Western powers in their attempts to "break up" Soviet 
Russia would be a "calamity from every point of view,
^  o A
quite apart from our agreement with Russian policy or not".
To avoid this "calamity" Nehru was very considerate in
understanding even some of the Soviet Union * s most dubious
acts like the annexation of eastern Poland in the wake of
the Soviet-German Pact of 1939. He wrote that the Soviet
march into Poland was a "shock". He continued:
But it is yet difficult to say whether this
was to counter the German army or to weaken the
Poles or merely to take advantage of a particular
situation from the nationalist point of view.
From the meagre information that we possess it
seems, however, that Russia's advance into
Poland has certainly come in the way of German 
37designs.
However, this zeal for Russia on Nehru's part must
be put in perspective: all his praise for the Soviet
Union must be understood in the context in which it was
said. It was a natural response to anti-colonial and
anti-imperialist slogans emanating from Moscow from a
socialistically-minded leader of a colonial India. But
that he would not submit to alien control of any type was
made clear by him as early as 1930, The League Against 
3 RImperialism passed a resolution at Frankfurt in July 
1929 criticising Mahatma Gandhi's agreement with Lord 
Irwin, the then Governor-General of India, under which he 
agreed to drop civil disobedience movement for dominion
36Quoted in Hemen Ray, op.cit., p.96,
37Jawaharlal Nehru, op.cit,, p.309,
2^See p. 79.
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status. The General-Secretary of the League wrote to 
Nehru describing the agreement as betrayal of the masses 
and asked him to admit his mistake and take the right
-tv\atr
course, Nehru replied^he was not prepared to brook 
interference in the affairs of the Congress party by an 
international organisation; and the League expelled Nehru, 
This decision of the League reflected the new unfriendly 
line towards the national bourgeoisie adopted by the 
Comintern at its sixth congress,
With the passage of time Nehru began showing signs 
of disillusionment with Soviet Russia, By 1946 he wrote 
that Russia was already "showing an expansionist tendency 
and is extending to territories more or less on the basis 
of the Tsar's Empire", He also wrote in the same book;
"All the evils of a purely political democracy are present 
in the USA; the evils of a lack of political democracy 
are present in the USSR",
By 1952, he declared; "Marx is out of date to-day. 
To talk about Marxism to-day, if I may say so, is reaction, 
I think Communists with all their fire and fury are in 
some ways utterly reactionary in outlook",
However, as A,P, Rana wrote,Nehru "glossed over 
minutae and saw the Russian Revolution in the larger
39Michael Brecher, op.cit,, pp,114-115,
^^See Chapter I, pp. go _
^^Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India (London; 
Meridian Books Ltd,, I960), p,575# It was first published
in 1946,
^h b l d . . pp. 582-584.
a press conference on February 28, 1952,
quoted in Michael Brecher, op.cit., p,604#
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perspective of History, Mi at he saw Russia achieving 
for the common man in terms of his basic human needs moved 
him enormously and induced him to make many excuses for 
Russia. "
Once Nehru wrote that Russian power was necessary
to control Western power; should Russia succumb, it
would be enormously more difficult for colonial people to
4- 3struggle out of their fetters. Thus, for Nehru, Soviet
power was necessary as a pressure for wringing concessions 
from colonial powers; as is evident from this, he did not 
totally reject the concept of balance of power,
NATIONALIST CONSIDERATIONS
As a leader of a large country with a long history 
it was not unnatural for Nehru to be proud of his country. 
His strong nationalist emotions are discernible in some 
of his speeches and writings.
In September 1939 he wrote that if India had been 
free she might have even succeeded in preventing the war,
A free India, with her vast resources, can 
be of great service to the world and to 
humanity, India will always make a difference 
to the world; fate has marked us for big 
things. When we fall, we fall low; when we 
rise, inevitably we play our part in the world 
drama,
A,P. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of 
India's Non-alignment", The Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. XXVIII, No, 2 (November 1968-August 1969), p,304.
^^As quoted in ibid,
Jawaharlal Nehru, Unity of India, p.307,
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On January 22, 1947? he s\poke of India having become the 
leader of the freedom movement of Asia. On March 8,
1948, he said that India was "potentially a great nation 
and a big power, and possibly it is not liked by some 
people that anything should happen to strengthen us".
On October 13? 1949? he told the United States House of 
Representatives that India did not "seek any material 
advantage in exchange for any part of our hard-won freedom". 
On May 15? 1954? he described China as the third great 
power and added, "if you peep into the future and if nothing 
goes wrong - war and the like - the obvious fourth country 
in the world is India".
Because of such hopes, ambitions and fears, Nehru 
was not ready to let India lose her distinct personality^^
i
and independent role by becoming a part of an alliance.
In another speech in the Lok Sabha on February 25? 1955? 
he said that in an alliance between unequals, only the big
r 2
powers count and the small become just their dependents.
In yet another speech in the Lok Sabha on March 25? 
1957? while speaking on the Eisenhower Doctrine, he
In his reply to the debate on Objectives 
Resolution in the Constituent Assembly of India, India's 
Foreign Policy, p,12.
Speech in the Constituent Assembly, ibid., pp,36-37,
^^Pandit Nehru's Discovery of America, p.22,
^^Speech in the Lok Sabha. India's Foreign Policy
p,305,
C 1
In his article, "Changing India", Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. XLI, No, 3 (April, I963) Nehru wrote : "We believed 
that India had, by virtue of long history and traditions, 
an individuality of her own and we should retain this 
without adhering to outworn ideas and traditions," p.455,
r 2
India's Foreign Policy* p.66.
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rejected the concept of power vacuums, "It is an unreal
approach to say that every country which has insufficient
c J
armaments is a vacuum". He continued, every time an
imperial power was compelled to withdraw, there was a 
vacuum and somebody else had to fill it. It was the same 
old story, "It can only be filled by the people of that 
country growing and developing themselves economically, 
politically and otherwise",
Nehru was convinced that India's interests would be 
better served by non-alignment, As a leader responsible
for his country's interests, he could not disregard them. 
Sometimes he gave frank expression to this part of his 
foreign policy. In a speech in the Constituent Assembly 
on December 4? 1947 ? he said; "We are not going to join 
a War if we can help it ; and we are going to join the 
side which is to our interest when the time comes to make 
the choice. There the matter ends", At another time, 
also in a speech in the Constituent Assembly of India on 
March 8, 1948, he said that his instructions to India's
delegates to international conferences were to consider 
questions at issue first in terms of India's interests 
and secondly, merits. He added that when India's interests 
were not involved, then they were to consider them only on 
the basis of merits,
To further his country's interests, Nehru kept 
sufficient elbow-room in implementing his foreign policy.
In the speech mentioned above, he said; "It may be that
^^Ibid.. p.195.
^^Ibid.
^^India's Foreign Policy. p. 24. 
 ^Ibid., p.33.
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sometimes we are forced to side with this power or that 
power, I can quite conceive of our siding even with an 
imperialist power - 1 do not mind saying that ; in a 
certain set of circumstances that may be the lesser of the 
two evils"• Realities of power convinced him that it
was not possible to take a forthright stand at all times.
In the speech just quoted, he also said; "Naturally, we 
cannot as a government go as far as we might have done as 
a non-official organisation in which we can express our 
opinions as frankly and as aggressively as possible,
r Q
Speaking as a government we have to moderate our language", 
Again, in a speech in the Lok Sabha on September 30, 
1954? he said; "Many things happen in the world which we 
do not like and which we would wish were rather different, 
but we do not go like Don Quixote with lance in hand 
against everything we dislike; we put up with these 
things because we would be, without making any difference, 
merely getting into trouble,
WESTERN MISGIVINGS AND NEHRU'S RESPONSE
Caught, as it was, in the fear of Soviet expansion, 
the West was not in a mood to take non-alignment kindly.
Some British Conservatives could hardly relish the idea 
of former colonials charting an independent course of 
action, "In view of their low opinion of the new states' 
capacity to handle their own affairs. Conservatives 
naturally regard them as frequently incompetent to offer
^^ibid., p.35.
 ^Ibid., p.31.
^^Ibid,, (1971 edition), p.304
«9
an opinion even on the affairs of other underdeveloped 
countries.” As late as the early I96OS, an American 
writer, Arnold Wolfefs, was expressing the view "that 
every increase in the area outside the alliance system 
narrows the opportunities for United States military 
deployment overseas. The liquidation of European,colonial 
empires has already cut deeply into the territory once 
available for American and allied overseas bases and staging 
areas, which were indispensable for effective local 
deterrent and limited war",^^ Such self-righteous and 
self-centred attitudes, which were not merely confined to 
private individuals but influenced western government 
policies,were hardly conducive to promoting goodwill 
between the West and newly-independent states.
i Despite all good things he said about Soviet Russia,
Nehru, as also other important leaders, was sincerely
interested in maintaining a harmonious relationship with 
the west, India decided to remain in the Commonwealth, 
and, as an act of goodwill, requested Lord Mountbatten to 
continue as the Governor-General after independence, and 
adopted, with necessary changes, British parliamentary 
institutions, Nehru proved his devotion to democracy 
and therefore his affinity with Western liberal traditions 
by not falling in line with the common phenomenon in Afro- 
Asia: personal and one-party dictatorships. During his
^^Laurence W, Martin, "A Conservative view of the
New States", in the book edited by him, op.cit. , p.71,
^^Arnold Wolfers, "Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists 
in the Context of U.S. Defence Policy", ibid,, pp.156-157* 
Wolfers was The Director, Washington Centre of Foreign 
Policy Research, when he wrote the article.
visit to the United States in 1949, Nehru acknowledged 
the influence of the United States Constitution on the
62making of the Indian Constitution,
During his second visit to the United States, in
December, 1956, he acknowledged that during India’s
struggle for freedom "we received from your country (the
United States) a full measure of sympathy and support.
Our two Republics share common faith in democratic
institutions and the democratic way of life and are
6 5dedicated to the cause of peace and freedom",
Nehru’s socialism was a means to liberate the 
individual from want and not to subject him to authoritarian 
control. He wrote to Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, another 
veteran of the freedom movement, in April 1939: "1 suppose
I am temperamentally and by training an individualist and 
intellectually a Socialist; 1 hope that Socialism does 
not kill or suppress individuality; indeed I am attracted 
to it because it will release innumerable individuals from 
economic and cultural bondage".
There were no perceptible factors like territorial 
disputes militating against harmony in relations between 
India and the dominant Western powers; there was identity 
' of beliefs in free institutions and respect for individual 
freedoms. However, identity of beliefs is no guarantee 
against tensions.
62In his address to the House of Representatives 
on October 13, 1949. Pandit Nehru’s Discovery of 
America, p.22,
^^India’s Foreign Policy (1971 edition), p.599.
^^Quoted in Pradip R. Sarbadhikari, India and the 
Great Powers (The Hague: J.C. Baan, I962), p,83.
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Nehru doubted if, in big power rivalry, ideologies 
came into the picture at all,although there was a great 
deal of talk about t h e m . N o r  could India accept that 
the West was all light and truth, and the Soviet Union all 
darkness and falsehood. In an article in Foreign Affairs 
in 1963, Nehru wrote that non-alignment • implied, 
basically, a conviction that good and evil are mixed up 
in this world, that nations cannot be divided into sheep 
and goats to be condemned or approved accordingly, and that 
if we were to join one military group rather than the 
other it was liable to increase and not diminish the risk 
of a major clash between them",^^ While Anglo-American 
devotion to democracy is recognised in and shared by India, 
Indians were sceptical about their claim that the Cold War 
was all about democracy and human dignity versus tyranny 
and authoritarianism. While the United States and the 
United Kingdom have been democracies for a long time, their 
passion for democracy was confined to their borders,
American recipes for fighting communism were not 
appealing to liberal intellectuals in India. This was 
evident from the proceedings of the India-America 
Conference held in December, 1949, in New Delhi, The 
American speakers at the conference drew attention to 
Communist guerilla activity in South I n d i a , a n d  declared 
that the world had a simple choice between ballot and 
bullet; that no compromise was possible; and that India
^^Speech in the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 
1948, India’s Foreign Policy, (I961 edition ), p, S3.
Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India", p.457.
67See Chapter III, p,IOO
ÿi;
6 8must align herself with the United States, The Indian
speakers responded that the bullet-ballot dichotomy was
an over-simplification; that Communism has a real moral
force which has an appeal to the masses; that American
fear of Communism was overdone; that the basic need was
to raise the standard of living rather than approach
communism with force; that in its preoccupation with
Communism, America strengthened reactionary regimes abroad
instead of aligning itself with progressive forces; and
that the then state of Russo-American relations was
suppressing liberal opinion in the United States,
One American speaker declared that in the American
foreign policy priorities Western Europe came first because
of its industry, the Middle East came second because of
its oil, the Arctic third because of its strategic location;
70the Far East ranking below all these.
Thus neither official nor non-official India was 
ready to accept the Western point of view in toto; nor, 
as an American at the India-America Conference implied, was 
India important in the American diplomatic priorities.
Not surprisingly, therefore, India refused to become a 
member of the Western bloc.
Nehru sought to serve India’s interests by being 
non-aligned rather than by becoming an active but minor 
actor in the Cold War; this resulted in active resistance
6 8Indian-A.merican Relations, Proceedings of the 
India-America Conference held in New Delhi in December 
1Q4Q, Indian Council of World Affairs, (Bombay: Oxford
University Press, 1950), pp.2-4.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. See also Chapter VIIIp.273
from the United States and the United Kingdom as manifested
in their unsympathetic attitude towards issues affecting
7 1India’s interests. This further stiffened India’s
attitude to the West, Here was an opportunity which -Russia 
was late in seizing, for it was not until after Stalin’s 
death that Russia was prepared to take note of non- 
alignment free, in effect, from her ideological shibbo­
leths.?^
See Chapters V, Viand IX,
7 2See Chapter III, pp, 101 - 105,
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CHAPTER III
THE BACKGROUND 
INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1947-I959
THE STALIN ERA
On assumption of power, after the general elections
in 1945, the Labour Government led by Attlee declared its
intention of granting independence to India. In India,
Nehru was asked to form an interim government in September
1946. Nehru, who was in charge of the Department of
External Affairs, lost no time in initiating talks with
the Soviet side for the establishment of diplomatic
relations. On April 13, 1947, an agreement was made to
establish diplomatic relations,^
; Mrs, Vijaya Laxmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister, was
appointed the first Indian ambassador to Moscow; she
reported in Moscow on August 13, 1947; the first Soviet
ambassador, Novikov, presented his credentials in New
' 2Delhi on January 1, 1948,
At this time, Stalin was more interested in 
stabilising his control over Eastern Europe than in 
winning the emerging nations’ friendship; Soviet Indian 
experts were convinced of collaboration between the 
Indian national bourgeoisie and British "imperialism"; 
nor did the Indian leadership go out of the way to please
1
Jagdish Vibhakar, A Model Relationship; 25 Years 
of Indo-Soviet Diplomatic Ties (New Delhi: Punjabi
Publishers, 1972), pp,5-7.
^Ibid.. p.7.
See Chapter I, p.45
7J
Moscow; they retained Commonwealth and many other 
connections with Britain, Therefore, Indo-Soviet 
relations during this period were so cold that Stalin 
did not receive the first Indian ambassador even once " 
during her entire tenure.^
Tensions between India and the West on many counts 
provided many opportunities^ which could be exploited by 
Moscow, if it so desired; but it remained apathetic.
One such issue which remained live for a long time and 
which both blocs exploited for their diplomatic benefit 
in the subcontinent during the Cold War was Kashmir,
KASHMIR; Undivided Kashmir had an area of 84,471 square 
miles, and, according to the 1941 census, a population of 
4,002,000 of whom 77 per cent were Muslims, and the rest 
Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs,^
Like all the rulers of large native states, the 
Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir, Hari Singh, entertained hopes
^J,A, Naik, Soviet Policy Towards India From Stalin
to Brezhnev (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1970), p,67,
c
Some large native states like Hyderabad, which 
accepted British Suzerainty during the colonial era, 
entertained hopes of remaining independent after India 
became independent. This was unacceptable to the new 
nationalist government of India, Therefore, in 
September 1948, India used force to integrate Hyderabad 
with the Indian Union, There was bitter criticism of 
India for this action in the British Parliament and 
press. This was resented in India, See The Times,
September 14, l6, 18 and 21, 1948.
The ruler of Hyderabad referred the issue to the 
Security Council in September 1948, The Soviet Union 
hardly took any interest in the issue. See The Times, 
September 17, 1948.
6W, Norman Brown, The United States, India and 
Pakistan (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press,
1963), p.180.
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7of remaining independent. But Pakistan subjected him 
to pressure, by an economic blockade, to merge his State 
with herself; this was bound to be inconvenient since in 
those days all of Kashmir’s communications ran through the 
territories that became Pakistan, Closely on the heels 
of this pressure followed the Pakistani tribal invasion 
on October 22, 1947.^ The Maharajah’s small army could 
not defend the State; he appealed to New Delhi for help. 
On October 24, 1947, New Delhi told him that the Indian 
Army would be sent in only if he decided the future of 
his state. On October 26, 1947, the Maharajah signed the 
Instrument of Accession and acceded to India,^
The Government of India declared that "as soon as
law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil
cleared of the invaders the question of the State’s
accession should be settled by a reference to the people", 
India then sent her army to clear Kashmir of 
invaders. In December 1947, New Delhi appealed to the 
United Nations. A cease-fire was arranged by the United 
Nations on January 1, 1949*^^ This left about one third
7The Indian Independence Act declared that with the 
grant of independence to India the suzerainty of His 
Majesty over native states would lapse and with it all 
power exercised by the Emperor over them would return to 
the rulers. See Acts of Parliament, 1947, Public, Vol. I , 
PCH 30.
g
Sisir Gupta, Kashmir; A Study in India-Pakistan 
Relations (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs,
1967), p.llO, Pakistan infiltrated armed tribesmen into 
Kashmir to occupy the state,
^Ibid,
^^Quoted in Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, "Kashmir India 
and Pakistan", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No, 3 (April
1965), p.529.
W. Norman Brown, on,cit,, p*191.
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of Kashmir under Pakistani control,
,  ..
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ATTITUDE
Dulles, who was to become Secretary of State in,
Eisenhower’s administration in due course, felt as early
as 1947 that "Soviet Conmiunism exercises a strong
12influence through the interim Hindu government".
Such pre-conceived notions and the Cold War fears must
have influenced the Western stand on Kashmir; they took
a consistently pro-Pakistani stand on Kashmir in the
Security Council,
In the debate, in the Security Council, on Kashmir
in January 1948, the British delegate, Noel-Baker, wanted
the question of a plebiscite to be discussed first and the
1 3stopping of the war next.
The United States’delegate, Austin, said that the 
tribesmen could not be induced to leave unless they were 
"satisfied that there is to be a fair plebiscite assured 
through an interim government that is in fact, and that 
has the appearance of being non-partisan",
SOVIET APATHY
The Western stand on Kashmir was bound to cause
tensions in the relations between India and the West,
Moscow, however, did not show any interest in these
"'Quoted in William J, Barnds, India, Pakistan and 
the Great Powers (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972), p,121,
1 3United Nations Security Council Official Records, 
236th Meeting, January 28, 1948, pp,282-283. The President 
of the Council disagreed with this suggestion and so Noel- 
Baker relented at the 2 37th Meeting on January 29, 1948, 
Ibid., p.290, (hereinafter referred to as UNSCOR),
^^UNSCOR, 240th Meeting, February 4, 1948, p.369.
developments.
Wlien the Indian delegate was called home for 
consultations, and consequently an adjournment of the 
Security Council meeting was asked for, Noel-Baker opposed 
it saying: "There is nothing irrevocable about an air­
craft ticket. There may be something irrevocable in the 
departure of the Indian d e l e g a t i o n " . A t  this stage, 
the Soviet Union did a favour to India: the Ukrainian
delegate, Tarasenko, intervened to say that "I have no 
doubt that it is essential to adjourn the question to 
enable the Indian delegation to proceed to India for 
consultations with its Government".
The Security Council passed a resolution on April 
21, 1948, mentioning plebiscite as the means of settlement 
of the dispute contingent upon "the withdrawal from the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani 
nationals, not normally resident therein, who have entered 
the State for the purpose of fighting, and to prevent any 
intrusion into the state of such elements and any 
furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State". 
On the other hand, the Government of India was to reduce 
her forces" progressively to the minimum strength required 
for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of 
law and order", The Soviet Union and the Ukraine
^^Ibid., 244th Meeting, February 11, 1948, p.109.
^^Ibid,, 245th Meeting, February 11, 1948, p*119. 
In 1946 too the Soviet Union supported the Indian 
resolutions against apartheid in South Africa, See 
M.C. Chagia, Roses in December: An Autobiography
(Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1974), pp.235-240.
Britain and the United States opposed these resolutions. 
Ibid,
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Indian Kashmir elected a Constituent Assembly which
18met on October 31, 1951. Pakistan challenged, in the
Security Council in 1952, the right of the Constituent 
Assembly to decide the future of the state. The United 
States and Britain introduced a resolution saying that 
the decision of the Constituent Assembly would not 
constitute a disposition of Kashmir, After four years 
of virtual silence, the Soviet delegate, Malik, said on 
January 17, 1952, that the Kashmir question remained 
unsettled because the Anglo-American plans were of 
"annexationist, imperialist nature". They were interfering 
"in the internal affairs of Kashmir" to turn it into a 
"protectorate" of the United States and Britain under the 
pretext of rendering it "assistance" through the United 
Nations and finally introduce into it Anglo-American 
troops and turn it into a "colony and a military and 
strategic base". He pleaded for the people of Kastimir 
to be given an opportunity to decide the question them­
selves without outside interference. "This can be 
achieved if that status is determined by a Constituent 
Assembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people",
By then Eastern Europe was firmly under the grip of 
Stalin; he found time to take note of developments in
1?UNSC0R, 268th Meeting, April 21, 1948, pp.8-15. 
^^Sisir Gupta, on.cit.  ^ p.366.
^^Quoted in Frank D, Collins, "Recent Developments 
in Kashmir Dispute", The Department of State Bulletin, 
Vol. XXVII, No, 696 (October 27, 1952), p.665."
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other parts of the world, Kashmir’s strategic importance
and the rival camps’ increasing interest in the state must
have caused some rethinking in Stalin, However, this
first sign of Soviet interest in developments in the
Kashmir dispute did not in any way amount to supporting
Indian interests, Malik spoke of Anglo-American
interference "in the internal affairs of Kashmir" and not
of India. Mille he pleaded for the fate of Kashmir
being decided by "a Constituent Assembly democratically
elected", he shrewdly avoided expressing any opinion
whether the Constituent Assembly then elected in Indian
Kashmir, which prompted the discussion in the Security
Council, was democratically elected or not. Without
saying it in so many words, Malik seemed to have been
pleading for Kashmir being left alone to let it develop
into another Afghanistan-type state.
Thus, Indo-Soviet relations had frigid beginnings
in the Stalin era. However, Stalin did not do anything
which would have introduced tensions into Indo-Soviet
relations. He did not make his displeasure known with 
20
Sardar Patel’s firmness in dealing with the Communist
21uprising in Telangana, Soviet propaganda treated this
'With as much reticence as possible so that it would not 
suffer more than necessary from the anti-Communist 
o n
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, 1875-1950, was the 
Deputy Prime Minister of India, He was to India what 
Bismarck was to Germany, See D,V, Tahmankar, Sardar 
Patel (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970),
? 1The Communists tried an uprising between 1946-1950 
in the Telangana region of erstwhile Hyderabad State,
This received due attention from Soviet commentators.
See A, Dyakov, "The situation in India", New Times, No,23 
(June 2, 1948), pp,15-16,
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2 2atmosphere which the rebellion provoked", Stalin also
made small gestures of goodwill. In November 1950, he
2 3sent birthday greetings to Nehru; in 1951, while the 
debates in the U.S. Congress held up the wheat-to-India 
bill, the Kremlin sent 50 thousand tonnes of wheat and 
announced that it would not haggle about money while the 
Indian people were starving,
Had Stalin lived longer, he would probably have 
revised his policy towards India, since by 1950 he had 
stabilised the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe; 
death intervened in March 1953. It was left to his 
successors to revise the policy towards India,
THE THAW IN INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Shortly after Stalin’s death, the new leadership
made conciliatory gestures towards the world, both Western
2 Sas well as non-aligned, India received due attention
from the new leadership. In his speech to the Supreme 
Soviet on August 8, 1953, Malenkov said that the "position 
of such a considerable state as India is of great 
importance for the strengthening of peace in the East".
He spoke of India’s contribution to peace in Korea and 
expressed the hope that friendly relations between India
26and the USSR would grow. India received her first
22Peter Sager, Moscow’s Hand in India: An Analysis 
of Soviet Propaganda (Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 
1967), p.34.
^^The Hindu, November 16, 1950.
24Chester Bowles, Ambassador’s Report (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1954), p.220,
^^See David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After 
Stalin (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 19&2) pp.125-138.
^^Quoted in K.P.S, Menon, The Flying Troika 
(Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 57.
Ootober RavoXutlmt «logan In 1954»
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27
uhlXe Mosqow growing warm tawardm Indüa» 
the United State# intredaoed new tensien# int# mdr^Amerioan 
reXatlene by making nlXltary aXXitmoe# with Bakletan* $i#appelnted
20
with the Arab# did net give unreserved support te her on Kashmir# 
Mcistan turned to the West# It wa# easy for any~en# to understand 
that Pakistan -wm buiXding up her strength against Ihdia* Indloatiens 
to this effeot were net Xaoking#^^
Htiiru ebjeotod to the Uhited States*Baklstan
military aXXianoe# 3h a letter to Rèhru in ?ebru#ry 1954»
%eeident Msehhower assured that should Pakistan use the weapons
beit^ supplied by the Uhited States against Xhdia# mshington would
immedlateiy undertake appr^iate aotion both within and outside
the Uhited Rations to step it, 3he Amerioan Reesident also offered
«0
to give military aid to India if she so desired# Kehru did not 
aooept any military aid in those days#
Ihe Soviet Uhion# naturally# denounoed the new 
military allianoes between Turkey and Bskistan and Ihrkey and 
Iraq#^ Thus# both Ihdia as well as the USSR sww a threat in 
these military allianoes# This oolnoidenoe of
27# J*A# Haik# ppafllt»!» I*» 79 .
28# Tears later# Qeneral Ayub Khan expressed his disappointment 
with the Arabs on this oount# See Ikiende and Met Jüstttcâi 
A, ftdiUOftl. AalmhJjb^lte (l#ndon$ Oxford diversity Rress# 
1967)# P» 155 
29# See % o  Rew York Times# November 22# 1955#
30# i fflm m p w t# n t t»x# xxxii# sb# m e
lî|bruary 20# 1955)#
31# %avda# January 25# 1954 and April 17» 1955# and l^esti^ 
February 27# 1954#
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interests and the change in the attitude of the Soviet
Union towards the new nations contributed to warmth in
Indo-Soviet relations.
The Soviet Union then began espousing the causes
dear to Afro-Asia and adopting their slogans. The Supreme
o 2
Soviet of the USSR supported the concept of Panchsheel
3 3on February 9, 1955. While the United States Government
rejected a suggestion by a black Congressman to send 
greetings to the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, 
held in April 1955, the Soviet Union warmly greeted it.^^
EXCHANGE OF VISITS
Up until this time, the Soviet leaders were not 
welcome beyond the borders of the Communist world. Having 
decided to break out of these limits, the new Soviet leaders 
turned to the non-aligned countries from whom they could 
expect a favourable response.
An invitation was extended to Nehru to visit the 
Soviet Union, He visited the Soviet Union in June 1955.
At the end of the visit, the drafting of the joint 
statement was left to the Indian side. However the 
Soviet government suggested that both governments condemn 
the creation of military blocs and state that neither
3 2This was part of the Sino-Indian agreement on 
Tibet signed on April 29, 1954. The five principles are: 
1, Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, 2, Mutual non-aggression, 3. Mutual 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,
4e Equality and mutual benefit, 5. Peaceful co-existence; 
see India’s Foreign Policy, p. 99.
^^David J, Dallin, op.cit., p.297. See also E, 
Korovin, "Five Principles" International Affairs (Moscow) 
No. 5 (1956),
^^See G.H, Jansen, op,cit., pp.192-193. See also 
E, Zhukov, "The Bandung Conference of Asian and African 
Countries and Its Historic Significance", International 
Affairs (Moscow) No. 5 (1955).
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would participate in any coalitions or actions directed 
against the other. The Indian side felt that such a 
wording would amount to "a negative military alliance".
When this was explained to the Soviet side, it did noi 
insist on its inclusion,
Bulganin and Khrushchev paid a three-week return 
visit to India in November-December 1955*
During this visit, they played up to India’s national 
ego. Speaking at a Parliamentary Association meeting on 
December 13, 1955, Khrushchev referred to India’s then 
population of 370 millions and said that this made her 
"one of the most powerful States on earth". He blamed 
the "colonialists" for not counting India among the great 
powers and declared that India is a great power and that
36she ought to rank among the great powers of the world.
Since there was something in common between Nehru
and Soviet philosophy, i.e., preference for heavy industry,
Khrushchev emphasised the need for heavy industry in some
37of his speeches. They also removed a sore point in
Indo-Soviet relations - the ridiculous estimate of Mahatma
Gandhi during the Stalin era. Both leaders paid tributes
3 8to the Mahatma,
On their return home, the Soviet leaders reported to 
a special session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; it 
passed a resolution on December 29, 1955, which described
3 3K.P.S, Menon, op.cit.» p,119« For a reversal of 
this stand by India, see Chapter VIIi*
^^International Affairs (Moscow) No. 1 (1956) 
Supplement, p.215 (hereinafter referred to as Supplement). 
See also Bulganin’s press conference on December 14, 1955, 
ibid., p.216.
, pp.175-176. ■
See Hemen Ray, op,cit., p,99-
3Qthe visit as "a major political event".
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KASHMIR
Realising, as the Soviet leaders did, the emotive 
value of Kashmir in India,' and aware of tensions in Indo- 
Anierican and Indo-British relations because of Anglo- 
American support for Pakistan on the issue, Khrushchev 
and Bulganin seized«the opportunity of their visit to India 
to extend Soviet support to her, for the first time, on 
Kashmir, According to Tyson, a visit to Kashmir was not 
included in the original programme; it was later added 
at the Soviet request.
Speaking in Srinagar, Kashmir, on December 10, 1955, 
Khrushchev "grieved that the imperialist forces succeeded 
in dividing India,,,"; but hastened to add that partition 
was "a decided i s s u e " , H e  also declared: "That
Kashmir is one of the States of the Republic of India has 
been decided by the people of Kashmir, It is a question 
that the people themselves have decided,
Khrushchev also explained, by inference, as to why 
the Soviet Union supported India, "It is obvious to all", 
he said, "that the Baghdad pact is spearheaded against the 
Soviet Union and other peaceful countries. It is, 
therefore, our task to weaken this belligerent alliance,
He also told his audience that the Pakistani
3Q^Supplement, p,251.
^^Geoffrey Tyson, "India and the Russian visitors" , 
International Affairs (London), Vol. XXXII, No, 2 (April 
1956), p,174.
Supplement, p,209.
^^Ibid., p.210.
43lbid.
lüb
government had told the Soviet ambassador in that country
that the Soviet leaders "should give up" their "visit to
K a s h m i r " , H o w e v e r ,  in the same speech he extended an
olive branch to Pakistan, He said; "We should very "much
like to have similar relations with Pakistan, and it is
not our fault that such relations have so far not developed.
But we shall persistently strive to improve these relations
A c
in the interest of peace"•
THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE IN 1957
In April 1956, Nehru offered to make the cease-fire 
line the international border and settle the dispute on 
the basis of the status quo,^^ In November 1956, the 
Constituent Assembly of Indian Kashmir adopted a 
constitution; its preamble declared that the State is and 
shall remain an integral part of I n d i a , P a k i s t a n ,  
therefore, raised the issue in the Security Council,
A draft resolution was circulated by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia and others, even 
before India’s delegate, Menon, completed his speech.
The resolution said that the decision of the Constituent 
Assembly of Kashmir would not amount to making the 
disposition of the State, and that a plebiscite under the 
United Nations supervision would decide the issue,
44lbid. 
45lbid. , p,211.
^^Russel Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (London
Pall Mall Press, I968, p,151.
47
48
^?Sisir Gupta, on,cit,, p.374.
UNSCOR, 765th Meeting, January 24, 1957, p.4.
'Vf
Intervening in the debate, the Soviet delegate, 
Sobolev, said that "certain powers" were guided by their 
own interests which Were aimed at "penetration into this 
region as one of great strategic importance". He 
defended the action of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly as 
one of ending the "uncertainty of their position", and 
said that the draft resolution failed to take "the real 
situation" into consideration. He also declared that 
"the Kashmir question has already been settled in 
accordance with the expressed wishes of the Kashmir people 
themselves" ,
This spirited defence of India’s case notwithstanding, 
the Soviet delegate abstained when the draft resolution 
was put to vote,^^
Probably encouraged by this Soviet vote, the United 
States, United Kingdom and others introduced another 
resolution in February 1957 calling for the induction of 
United Nation troops into Kashmir, Sobolev, repeating 
his argument that Kashmir is an integral part of India, 
said that, under the Charter, UN forces could be used 
only for repelling aggression, "It goes without saying 
that the Charter does not provide for the use of United 
Nations forces to impose by force a plebiscite in any 
country". He, however, pleaded for direct negotiations 
between India and Pakistan, He did not oppose sending 
Jarring to. the subcontinent, as proposed in the 
resolution under discussion, but did not want any deadline 
for the report; he proposed deletion of the deadline for
49lbid., p.16.
Russel Brines, ojd.cit., p. 153.
SI ■'°®the Report,
The Australian and British delegates criticised the
Soviet policy on Kashmir for its inconsistency; of
regarding it an integral part of India, and yet, asking
India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations for
settlement of the dispute, and, accepting the proposal to
send Jarring to the subcontinent to find ways for
settlement of the dispute,
Sobolev replied that there was no inconsistency in
the policy. He repeated the argument that Kashmir is
an integral part of India, But it is complicated by the
fact that Kashmir lies on the border between India and
Pakistan and part of it is under Pakistani control; there
are, therefore, bound to be differences of opinion on
account of these factors. It is these factors that must
52be discussed by the parties to the dispute. The Soviet
delegate seemed to be suggesting that the cease-fire 
line be made a permanent border through direct negotiations 
a proposal Nehru had made in 1956,
IVhen his amendments to delete the reference to UN 
forces and drop the deadline for the Jarring report were 
not accepted by the sponsors of the resolution, Sobolev
C Q
vetoed it.
Immediately, the United States, United Kingdom and 
Australia submitted another resolution without reference
UNSCOR, 770th Meeting, February l8, 1957, pp, 
39-40. The Western resolution wanted Jarring to submit 
his report by April 15j 1957. Ibid,
^^Ibid,, 773rd Meeting, February 20, 1957, p.4.
^^Ibid., p,29. The United States’ delegate charged 
the Soviet Union with the abuse of veto "to perpetuate 
international conflict". Ibid,, p.30.
ivy
to UN forces. The resolution directed Jarring to go to 
the subcontinent and examine with the governments of India 
and Pakistan any proposals which would contribute to the 
settlement of the dispute "having regard to the previous 
resolutions of the Security Council"; this was an indirect 
reference to the plebiscite as a means of settlement. 
Jarring was to report by April 15, 1957. The Soviet 
Union abstained again,
GOA
This was another irritant in the relations between 
India and the West, A few months before the arrival of 
the two Russian leaders in India, Goa became a live issue. 
In August 1955, Portuguese soldiers shot dead 20 
satyagrahis (volunteers offering passive resistance),
As always, Portugal refused to talk on the transfer of 
Goa and other pockets on India’s western coast to India, 
clinging to the myth that they were Portuguese overseas 
provinces.
This was another emotive issue that Khrushchev used 
to impress Indian public opinion during his visit to India, 
Speaking at a rally in Calcutta on November 30, 1955, 
Khrushchev said: "There are countries which fasten them­
selves like ticks to a healthy body, I mean Portugal, 
which refuses, to leave Goa, to relinquish its hold on that 
territory which legitimately belongs to India, (Applause),
^^Ibid,, 774th Meeting, February 21, 1957, p.14.
5 5Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography,
p.563.
•^ S^uiDpl ement, p,204.
110
In an unimaginative reaction to this Soviet gesture,
Dulles issued a joint communique with Dr, Paulo Cunha,
the Portuguese Foreign Minister, on December 2, 1955, which
57called Goa an overseas Portuguese province.
Asked if the United States* government regarded Goa 
as a Portuguese province, Dulles said at a press conference: 
"As far as I know, all the world regards it as a 
Portuguese province. It has been Portuguese, I think, for 
about 400 years", To a further question whether he said 
a province or a colony, he replied "province". He also 
said that the United States did not take any position on 
the merits of the case; he thought that the Indian 
government did not question the status of these Portuguese 
pockets as being, under Portuguese law, provinces; he 
declared that that part of the world was definitely outside 
of NATO,^^
Asked if he considered the tempest it would stir up 
in India, he said that the United States had given it very 
careful consideration; the Communique was not lightly 
issued, "But we did feel that it was appropriate and 
right to indicate our attitude towards the emotionalism 
which was sought to be created by the Soviet rulers when 
' they were in India ,•, But the creation and fomenting of
The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII,
No, 859, (December 12, 1955), p.966, While the Soviet 
Union was coming to terms with non-alignment, Dulles also 
said on June 9, 1956, that it was "an obsolete conception
and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is 
an inmioral and short-sighted conception" , See The New 
York Times, June 10, 1956*
 ^Ibid., Vol. XXXIII, No. 86o (December 19, 1955)j 
p. 1007.
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that atmosphere of hatred was something we felt we should 
express ourselves against,"
Khrushchev seized this opportunity provided by Dulles 
to make more pro-Indian statements. In his address to 
the Parliamentary Association for the Promotion of Hindi 
Language on December 13, 1955, Khrushchev referred to the 
criticism in the United States against his and Bulganin’s 
speeches in India as being inflammatory and said: "If
some people do not like what we said, that is purely a 
matter for their own conscience, but we are against 
colonialims and we shall continue to say so always and 
everywhere,"
He said that the Soviet leaders did not want to
incite anybody against the United States and United Kingdom.
"We speak of colonialism as an historical fact, I am
surprised that our statements against colonialism,
especially against the continuation of the colonial
domination by Portugal of Goa and other Portuguese
possessions on Indian territory have prompted certain
statesmen in the United States to come out in support of
the Portuguese colonialists, on the grounds that these
possessions have been held by Portugal for nearly 400 years.
No matter how many years have passed, stolen property
remains stolen property and should be returned to its
61rightful owner,"
^^Supplement, p.215.
I^bid, After this demonstrative support by Soviet 
leaders, Soviet journals sometimes carried articles on 
Goa. See,for example, L. Alexandrova, "The Last of the 
Colonies of India", International Affairs (Moscow) No, 7 
(1956).
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Thus, in the post-Stalin era, there was a thaw in
Indo-Soviet relations. It was evident that the new
Soviet leadership tried to take advantage of the tensions
in Indo-Ainericaii relations in the wake of the United States
military supplies to Pakistan under treaty commitments to
gain influence in India by making proposals likely to
appeal to India,
Moscow suggested the inclusion of India in the UN
Disarmament Subcommission in 1954; the United States,
6 2Britain and France opposed it. During the Middle East
crisis in 1958, when the United States landed troops in
Lebanon and Britain in Jordan, Khrushchev proposed, on
July 19, 1958, a summit meeting of the Big Four, India
6 3and the UN Secretary-General, This did not meet with
Western approval either. If the West had accepted 
Soviet proposals, Moscow would have got the credit for 
adding to India’s stature; and if they rejected, they 
would have had to bear the blame,
Khrushchev also exhibited a remarkable flair for 
public relations in pursuit of his diplomatic goal of 
gaining strong influence in India, He even ignored the 
interests of the CPI,^^ At a time when there were mid­
term elections to the Andhra State Legislative Assembly
Arthur Stein, India and the Soviet Union; the 
Nehru Era (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 19^9),
p,41,
^^See New Times, No, 3 (Supplement, 1958),
^^The CPI has the stigma of co-operating with the 
British government in furtherance of Soviet interests 
during World War II and opposing the Congress’ "Quit India" 
movement in August 1942« See Chattar Singh Sarma, India 
and Anglo-Soviet Relations, IQ 17-1947, (Bomb ay : Asia 
Publishing House, 1959), p.152.
» • J
in 1955 and the CPI was a serious challenger to the Congress,
Pravda wrote an editorial praising the progress made by
6SIndia in various fields since independence. According
to Fic, when the Communist Chief Minister of Kerala had 
visited Moscow in 1959 to attend the XXIst Congress of 
the CPI, Moscow had advised him to play cool and avoid a 
collision course with the Central Government.^^ When the
Indian Government dismissed the Communist Government of
67Kerala in July 1959, Pravda factually reported the event,
Khrushchev also replied to Rajaji’s^^ letters in
which he suggested that Russia unilaterally renounce the
use of nuclear weapons in w a r f a r e . W h i l e  Khrushchev
did not accept the proposal, his replies would influence
liberal public opinion in India because Rajaji, in spite
of being a private citizen and an uncompromising critic 
70of Communism, received courteous replies from the Soviet 
leader.
Notwithstanding all these attempts to please India, 
Indo-Soviet relations were strictly business-like. The
6 5See Pravda, January 26, 1955, The Congress 
election machinery got thousands of copies of this 
editorial printed and distributed them among the voters. 
See Marshall Windmiller, "Indian Communism and the New 
Soviet Line", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXIX, No, 4 (December
1956, p.354.
^^Victor M, Fic, Kerala; Yenan of India (Bombay: 
Nachikcta Publications Ltd., 1970), p,110,
Pravda, August 1, 1959.
6 8C. Rajagopala Chari, known as Rajaji or CoRo in 
India, was one of the veterans of India’s nationalist 
movement. He was the first Indian to become the last 
Governor-General of India to be appointed by the British 
Government, He retired from politics in 1953 and died 
in 1972,
^^See the texts of letters in International Affairs 
(Moscow) No, 2 (1958).
70See Chapter VIII footnote 59,
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failure of the Soviet Union to use her veto on the first
and third resolutions on Kashmir in the Security Council
71debates in 1957 suggests that. It is probable that
Moscow did not exercise its veto because of its
unhappiness with Nehru*s persistent criticism of the
Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and his calls for the
withdrawal of her forces therefrom, after having been
7 2reticent in the beginning of the crisis. By her votes
in the United Nations, the Soviet Union reminded India 
that she needed her support, too, and that a quid pro quo 
would be strictly followed in mutual dealings; this was 
also a hint to Pakistan that Soviet support for India was 
not irrevocable.
While Nehru got a resolution adopted by the Congress
in' 1954 making progressive realisation of a socialistic
' h(
74
7 1pattern of society its goal, e did not tone down his
criticism of Communism either.
By 1959? which is the starting point of this thesis, 
Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations, both of which had 
become increasingly strained since 1954? took a turn for
71See above pp, The veto on the second
resolution might have been due to the clause in it for 
the induction of UN forces into Kashmir which would be 
a precedent elsewhere, say in Hungary,
7 2For Nehru*s statements, see The Hindu, November 
6, 1956, and India*s Foreign Policy, pp,555-559.
7 ?Marshall Windmiller, op,cit,, p,353.
^^See the World Marxist Review, Vol. I, No. 4 
(December 1958) which printed Nehru*s criticism of 
Communism, in his article "The Basic Approach", originally 
printed in the Congress Party*s journal. Economic Review, 
and Pavel Yudin*s reply to it, "Can We Accept Pandit 
Nehru*s Approach?" See also K.P.S, Menon, op,cit,, 
for the then Vice-President of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan*s 
speeches in the Soviet Union in defence of individual 
freedom.
7the worse. It is possible that the warmth towards
India, besides beihg a part of its new policy towards the 
new nations, was suggestive of Moscow*s desire to keep 
its options open to build up India as a countervailing 
force to China in South Asia should conditions so require.
^%ee Chapter VII pp. 200 - 216
CHAPTER IV _ ^
COLONIALISM AND RACIALISM
In view of her past experiences, India is sensitive
to colonialism and racial discrimination. This has been.
one of the factors contributing to friction between India
and the West, which the Soviet Union skillfully exploited
to her diplomatic advantage. The West * s equivocal stand
on colonial and racial issues cannot appeal to India,
This dissatisfaction with the West is not confined to
Indian government circles alone; it is shared by the
cojmnon man, intellectuals and the press.
These differences between India and the West
manifested themselves as early as 1949 at a gathering of
Indian and American intellectuals held in New Delhi in the
month of December of that year. An Indian delegate to
the conference said that between 1946-1948, the United
States hindered the United Nations from acting against
racial discrimination in South Africa; and that she did
not give whole-hearted support to the Indian efforts to
tighten up the trusteeship system, especially with regard
to South West Africa.^ An American delegate replied that
it would have been politically embarrassing for the United
States had it taken a forthright stand on South Africa in
view of certain similarities between her and parts of
2
United States territory. This was likely to create an
I^ndian-American Relations; Proceedings of the 
India-Amerlca Conference held in New Delhi in December, 
p.7. "
^Ibid.
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impression in India and other Afro-Asian states that the 
Western camp, ostensibly organised for universal freedom 
and human dignity, meant to apply these concepts only to 
white nations.
Since the Russian pressure was mainly directed 
against the West, and since she supported all calls for 
liquidation of colonialism and ending of racial 
discrimination, Soviet cliches like national liberation 
and human equality sounded more appealing to Afro-Asians 
than identical Western slogans which did not seem to apply 
to them.
The Soviet Union earned a good deal of credit in 
India for her stand on these emotional issues. This 
becomes clear in what Mrs, Gandhi told Sulzberger 
(correspondent of The New York Times) in March 1969,
Asked to conmient on the American charge that India is too 
close to the Soviet Union and votes too often with her in 
the United Nations, she said: "We happen to see things
similarly on issues involving colonialism and racialism* 
Moscow has shown greater understanding than Washington of 
the mentality and needs of newly freed peoples. We are 
touchy because we are so close to pre-independence times 
and attitudes",
To understand this Soviet success in India, it is 
necessary to discuss the impact of white racism on her and 
the attitudes adopted by the West and the Soviet Union to 
colonial and racial issues.
^The New York Times  ^ March 16, 19&9
INDIA AND RACISM AND COLONIALISM
Political subjection and racial humiliations left a
scar on Indians memories; Indians deeply resent political
and racial domination. Almost all great Indian leaders
gave expression to their painful feelings about racial
discrimination under colonial masters.
Writing on South Africa in The Times of India in
June 1918? Mahatma Gandhi wrote: "Prejudices cannot be
removed by legislation.,. They yield only to patient toil
and education". His quarrel with South Africa was "for
feeding the prejudice by legalising it",^ Speaking in
Madras in October 1936, on South African treatment of
c
Indians, he said, "They treat us as beasts".
The Indian National Congress opposed racialism in all 
its manifestations, A resolution passed by the Congress 
denounced Nazism, particularly the "organised terrorism 
against the people of Jewish race",^
Commenting on Hitler*s racial myths, Nehru wrote:
"But we in India have known racialism in all its forms 
ever since the commencement of the British rule •,, 
Generation after generation and year after year, India as 
a nation and Indians as individuals were subjected to 
insults, humiliation and contemptuous treatment ,,, As an 
Indian, I am ashamed to write all this, for the memory of 
it hurts, and what hurts still more is the fact that we
Quoted in Louis Fischer, Gandhi; His Life and 
Message for the World, (New York: Signet Key Book, New
American Library, 1954)? p,25,
^Ibid,
^Quoted in Pradip R, Sarbadhikari, op,cib,, p.22,
11
7submitted for so long to this degradation",
Referring to the exclusive English clubs in India,
during the British Raj, he wrote; "For my part I have
no objection to exclusive English or European clubs,
and very few Indians care to join them; but when this
social exclusiveness is clearly based on racialism and on
a ruling class always exhibiting its superiority and
unapproachability, it bears another aspect ,,,
"Racialism in India is not so much English versus
Indian, it is European as opposed to Asiatic, In India
every European, be he German, or Pole or Rumanian, is
automatically a member of the ruling race. Railway
carriages, station retiring rooms, benches in parks, etc,,
are marked 'For Europeans only*. This is bad enough in
South Africa or elsewhere, but to have to put up with it
in one's own country is a humiliating and exasperating
o
reminder of one's enslaved condition",
He also wrote that "racial discrimination and 
treatment of Indians in some of the British dominions and 
colonies were powerful factors in our determination to 
break from that group",^
Nehru's feeling of revulsion against European racism 
becomes evident from his reaction to the Japanese victories 
in World War II, "China went up in peoples' estimation, 
and though Japan was not liked, there was a feeling of 
satisfaction at the collapse of old-established European
7
Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, n.327, 
^Ibid,, p,2 9 3c 
^Ibidc, p.428.
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colonial powers before the armed strength of an Asiatic
,, 10 power".
Sardar Patel spoke of "a monstrous order under which
Indians had to get down from the carriages, dismount if
they were riding a horse, and lower their umbrellas if
they were carrying any, and salute any Britisher who
11happened to pass by",
After forming the provisional government, Nehru
broadcast to the nation on September 7? 1946. In this
speech, he rejected the Nazi doctrine of racialism
wheresoever and in whatever form it might be practised.
He said that India would work for the emancipation of
12colonies and recognition of racial equality.
This was reiterated in a resolution passed by the
11Congress in December 1948, Nehru continued to give
vent to India's views on the issues after independence.
In his speech to the Canadian Parliament in October 1949? 
he said; "The so-called revolt of Asia is a legitimate 
striving of an ancient and proud peoples against the 
racial arrogance of certain western nations. Racial 
discrimination is still in evidence in some countries and 
there is still not enough realisation of the importance of 
Asia in the councils of the world",
G,D, Birla, the owner of one of the two great
^°Ibid.. p.385.
1 1Quoted in D,V, Tahmankar, op,cit,, p,80,
12India's Foreign Policy, p, 2,
13 - "
See Pradip R, Sarbadhikari, op,cit,, p,23*
"^^ The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 
Vol. XI, (1962), pp.436-437o
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industrial empires of India, spoke of Englishmen's 
superiority in business methods, their organising capacity 
and their many other virtues, "But their racial 
arrogance could not be concealed, I was not allowed "to 
use the lift to go up to their offices, nor their benches 
while waiting to see them, I smarted under,these 
insults".
Sensitivity to colonial and racial issues is so
deep rooted in India's national psyche that even a liberal
like K,M, Panikkar said in New Delhi in October 1951 that
MacArthur's "crushing defeat" at the Chinese hands, in his
"offensive towards the Yalu", was "hailed all over Asia as
a fitting reply to the humiliations suffered by the Asian
peoples at the hands of the Western Powers for the last
few decades",
Commenting on the British softness towards South
Africa, The Hindustan Times wrote on December 14? 1951:
"Britain, may lack the courage to face a moral issue of
vital importance to the vast majority of the people of the
Commonwealth, but the United Nations cannot degenerate
into an assemblage of white nations, without committing 
17suicide". Such, therefore, is the sensitivity of all
^^Quoted in K,S, Ramanujam, "G,D„ Birla is 81", 
Bhavan's Journal, Vol. XX, No, 18, (March 31? 1974)? p,33*
^Quoted in Karunakar Gupta, Indian Foreign Policy 
in Defence of National Interest (Calcutta: The World
Press Pvt, Ltd,, 1956), p,49- 
17Quoted in India and the United Nations (Report of 
a study Group Set up by the Indian Council of World 
Affairs)(New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957)?
p,ll8.
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sections of Indian society to colonial and racial issues.
However, past grudges do not shape the events all 
the time. Past experiences would not have been a source 
of friction between India and the West but for the 
occasional unhappy experiences of some Indian iimnigrants 
in the United Kingdom and the attitude of the West to 
South African racism and Portuguese colonialism.
Indian immigrants were admitted into Britain in the 
1950s and 1960s on a large scale. Increasing racial 
tensions in the country resulted in the practical stoppage 
of non-white immigration. Reacting to this, The Times of 
India commented: "Without exception, every legislative
measure it has passed in the last 10 years has sought to 
reduce, not the general flow of immigrants, but only of 
those whose complexion isn't white. Yet, it pretends 
that its immigration policy isn't racialist. What is 
it then?"^^
Instances like the British passport holders of 
Indian descent in East Africa being denied the freedom to 
enter the United Kingdom at will naturally cannot appeal 
to India.
Indian immigrants in Britain represent all strata 
of Indian society, from semi-literate rural folks to highly 
educated sections. Once they arrive in Britain, they 
even lose their separate identity; they become a part of 
an indistinguishable lump: the coloured. The not
infrequent racial outbursts and sporadic acts of indignity
1 R
The Times of India, February 7? 1973*
^^See the editorial in The Guardian, January 26,
1973.
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against them have, therefore, an impact on all sections 
of India.
Then, there are differences arising out of the
Anglo-American attitude to South African racism, Portuguese
colonialism also contributed to tensions in the relations
between India and the West before that country decided to
divest herself of her colonial empire.
There are 700,000 people of Indian origin in South
Africa. Indian immigration to South Africa took place
between I86O-I9IO at the initiative of the government of
9 nNatal which felt the need for labour. While the United
States and the United Kingdom try to remove racial
barriers in their own countries to the extent their people
are ready to accept, they have been steadfast in their
support of South Africa, notwithstanding proforma criticism
of her segregation policies.
In former British Guiana where 48 per cent of the
21people are of Indian origin, the then Prime Minister,
Dr. Cheddi lagan, of Indian descent, was manoeuvred out
of power through changes in the electoral system because
of the United States fears that his Marxist leanings
would make him a protege of the Soviet Union.
. discuss the Anglo-American attitude
2 2to Portuguese colonial claim to Goa. Their attitude to 
her African colonies was not different until Portugal
20India and the United Nations, p.107.
21The percentage of other racial groups is: 33 per 
cent blacks, 4 per cent American Indians, and 3 per cent 
whites. The Columbia Encyclopedia (New York and London, 
Third Edition, 1963)? p.883,
9 9
See Chapter VI
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herself changed after the coup in 1974* Alluding to this
western softness to Portuguese colonialism, Nehru said
in the Rajya Sabha in August 1954: "We talk about the
crisis of our time and many people do it in different ways.
Probably in the United States the crisis of the time is
supposed to be Communism versus anti-Communism. Maybe to
some extent. Well, the crisis of the time in Asia is
2 3colonialism versus anti-colonialism". For the West,
Portuguese colonialism was not a problem to be bothered 
about; for India and other Afro-Asian states this was 
unacceptable. This temperamental incompatibility between 
the West and newly independent states gave an opportunity 
to the Soviet Union to reinforce her anti-colonial and 
anti-racial image.
It is, therefore, logical to discuss the Anglo- 
American attitude to colonialism and racialism which 
improved Soviet image in India,
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS 
COLONIAL AND RACIAL ISSUES
The United States and the United Kingdom did not 
bother much to respect Afro-Asian sensitivities on colonial 
and racial issues even when the Cold War was at its height. 
The Anglo-American policy towards South Africa gives 
the impression to Afro-Asia that for them a single white- 
dominated state is more important than a large number of 
Third World countries. For India, South Africa has a
2 Q
Quoted in Norman D, Palmer, The Indian Political 
System (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University 
Press, 1961), pp,257-258,
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particularly poignant memory; it was there that the 
Mahatma began his political career and experimented his 
non-violent techniques against apartheid, which has since 
been perfected with more oppressive laws. Mention has 
already been made to Anglo-American opposition to Indian 
resolution against South African segregation policies.
Afro-Asians rightly feel that the flow of investments 
and weapons into South Africa can only add strength to the 
regime. Therefore, they plead for an end to the flow; 
the West ignores it. For instance, the United States 
investment in South Africa was of the order of 0 1 billion 
by 1971 and the rate of return was over 20 per cent or 
double the rate of return the United States investments
2 5get all over the world. In the recent past the United
States and the United Kingdom have been demonstratively 
exhibiting their preference for South Africa. They 
voted against a draft convention in the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, making apartheid a crime against
26international law in April 197 3; they also boycotted
the Oslo Conference in the same month at which a call was
made for a boycott of trade with South Africa in "an
27
attempt to cripple apartheid", and both simultaneously 
exercised vetoes in May 1973 to block a resolution in 
the Security Council that would have extended sanctions to
^^See Chapter III p,98 and also p,128 in this Chapter 
2 <Larry W, Bowman, "South Africa's Southern Strategy 
and Its Implications for the U.S,", International Affairs 
(London) Vol. XLCII, No, 1, (January I971), p,27,
o A
The limes, April 3? 1973* It was approved by 21 
to 2 with 5 abstentions.
'^^ The Times, April I6, 1973» It was attended by 
more than 50 countries; the Nordic countries met the cost 
of the conference.
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South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and 
Mozambique; this blocking of the resolution on Southern 
Africa was the fourth occasion on which the United States
28 ^had used her veto, and the ninth for Britain,
Britain's Rhodesia policy would not appeal to 
Afro-Asia either. Eleven days before the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence, Prime Minister Wilson ruled 
out, on October 31? 19^5? the use of force against the
2 Q
white minority regime on "Kith and Kin" grounds. The
United States did not even respect the United Nations 
sanctions against Rhodesia fully. In November 1971? a 
Congress Conference Committee decided to permit the 
importation of Rhodesian chrome on grounds of national 
defence,
Some of the American policies are likely to give the 
impression that the United States exliibits more concern 
for the suffering of whites than non-whites. For instance, 
in his letters to the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives on April 22, 1953? 
President Eisenhower pointed to the countless thousands of 
homeless refugees in Europe, the steady flow of persons 
escaping from Communist oppression, and problems of 
population pressure, and recommended the admission of
28The Times, May 23? 1973.
2 QQuoted in Thomas M, Franck and Nigel S, Rodley, 
"After Bangladesh; The Law of Humanitarian Intervention 
by Military Force", American Journal of International Law 
Vol, LXVXI, No. 2, (April 1973)* p.298.
^^The New York Times, November 5? 1971* There are 
moves in the Congress to reimpose the restrictions. The 
Guardian, July 7 ? 1975.
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31240,000 into the United States. Similar suffering in
the overcrowded subcontinent in the wake of partition in 
1947 or during the recent Bangladesh crisis did not 
evoke such a gesture. In fact, under the United States 
exclusion law, Indians were prohibited from immigrating 
to the United States until 1946, when the law was 
revoked,
On colonial issues too this discrimination was
evident. The United States Congress passed a resolution
for the liberation of Eastern Europe, Baltic Republics,
3 3Ukraine, and Central Asian Republics, but no such 
concern was exhibited for the fate of Portuguese colonies, 
Rhodesia and South West Africa,
In the words of Schlesinger, since "the time of 
Franklin Roosevelt American policy had had a nominal 
commitment to anti-colonialism. But the State Department 
had been dominated by men, who, regarding NATO as our top 
priority, flinched from anything which might bruise the 
sensibilities of our European allies, some of whom still 
had colonial possessions",^^ Sometimes, Britain and the 
United States played into Khrushchev's hands by opposing 
his symbolic anti-colonial resolutions, TVheii the Soviet
The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, 
Noc 729?ldune isl 195 3)? p. 8571 In a statement, the 
acting Secretary, Smith, also said: "Indonesian
independence closed a traditional outlet for Dutch 
immigration". He pleaded for admission of immigrants 
from "Netherlands, a country badly devastated by the war 
and already seriously overcrowded". Ibid,* p.859»
32W. Norman Brown, The United States India and 
Pakistan (Cambridge, Massachussets; Harvard University 
Press, 1963)? p.365.
3 3‘^Quoted in N.So Khrushchev, on, cit, , pp,6-7, 
^Arthur Schlesinger Jr., on, cit. , p. 446,
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leader proposed, on October, 12, iç60, a resolution asking 
that the question of colonialism be debated in the 
plenary session of the General Assembly and not in its 
Political Cojmnittee, these two countries opposed it in 
the beginning. On December 14? 19^0, they also
abstained on an Afro-Asian resolution calling for an end
36to colonialism, although, unlike Khrushchev's resolution,
37it did not fix any date-line for ending it. According
to Schlesinger, when the Afro-Asian resolution was to be
voted upon, Harold Macmillan made a transatlantic telephone
call and urged President Eisenhower to direct the United
States delegation to abstain from voting, which the 
3RPresident did.
On his part, Salazar appealed to Anglo-American
sensibilities to retain their support for his colonial
empire. For instance, he wrote " ... in the attack on
Angola, it is not only Portugal that is being attacked
but that it is sought to weaken the positions - and not
only the strategic positions - of the entire western 
3 9world", And he met with a positive response from them
3 3Keesing's Contemporary Archives I96I-I962 , p.17931.
3^See pp.129 - 130.
37
Keesing's Contemporary Archives I96I-I962, pp 
17992-17993. It was adopted by 89 to nil with 9 abstentions, 
Lord Home, then Foreign Secretary, commented that "such a 
resolution and others like it, reveal an almost total lack 
of responsibility and certainly pay no heed to the main 
purpose of the United Nations which is to insure order 
and security of peace". The New York Times, December 29? 
1961, as quoted in Francis 0. Wilcox, "The Non-aligned 
States and the United Nations" in Laurence W, Martin, ed,, 
ojlÆ-Cit,, p.133.
■38Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., on.cit,, p.446.
39Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, "Realities and 
Trends of Portuguese Policies", International Affairs 
(London) Vol, XXXIX, No. (April I963), p.I83.
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in view of their need for bases in Azores and Cape Verde 
Islands,
Even a liberal American paper like The New York 
Times found fault with Afro-Asia for its excessive 
"anti-colonial" drive against South Africa and Portugal to 
the point of putting itself in open opposition to the 
West".40
THE SOVIET ATTITUDE
The Soviet Union has an advantage over the United 
States and the United Kingdom; even in the past the 
Russian empire did not elevate Kipling's philosophy to the 
level of official creed as her adversaries in the Cold War 
did for a long time. The present Russian creed, Marxism, 
has the reputation of having rejected all inequalities.
The Soviet Union would naturally like to maintain this 
image. Besides that, the friction between Afro-Asia and 
the West on account of colonial and racial issues was an 
additional reason to support all anti-colonial and anti- 
racial resolutions to win friends in the Cold War,
Therefore, even when Ihdo-Soviet relations were cold 
during the Stalin era, Moscow did not fail to support 
Indian resolutions against apartheid in South A f r i c a ,
There was no let up in this support to Afro-Asia on 
colonial and racial issues, T\Iien he attended the United 
Nations sessions in i960, Khrushchev presented a 
"declaration on granting independence to colonial countries
4^See its editorial on July 14* I963» 
4^See Chapter III, p.98 ^
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and peoples" in the General Assembly on September 23?
I96O; this demanded independence to all colonies not 
later than 1961,4^
The Soviet leaders and press also focused on 
instances of racial discrimination in the United States 
against blacks and American Indians,48 September i960,
Khrushchev proposed that the United Nations should 
"consider" choosing another state for its h e a d q u a r t e r s , 44 
One of the reasons cited for the proposal was "scandalous" 
racial discrimination against non-whites, especially 
Africans, around New York, Should the Soviet Union be 
selected, he assured, she would gladly "guarantee the 
best conditions for (the United Nations) work, full freedom, 
and security for the representatives of all states, 
irrespective of their political or religious convictions 
or the colour of their skin",45
The Soviet leaders also made it a point to speak out 
against colonialism and racialism at every opportune time. 
Thus, Brezhnev supported the struggle against racialism in 
South Africa and colonialism in Angola, Mozambique,
Guinea and Rhodesia in his report to the XXIII Congress of 
the CPSU in March 1966,4^
4^ICeesing's Contemporary Archives 1961-1962, pp. 
17873 and 17992-17993.
48see, for instance, Khrushchev-Russel correspon­
dence in International Affairs (Moscow) No, 4? 1958, p.9*
44Keesing's Contemporary Archives I961-I962, p.17873
4^Quoted in Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at 
the United Nations, op,cit,? p,l63,
4^Pravda, March 30, 1966, Complete text in CUSP, 
Vol, XVIII, No, 12, p,9.
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The Soviet Union cannot be unaware of the strong 
feelings in India on colonial and racial issues. The 
stronger the stand she takes on these issues, the greater 
the possibility of the Soviet Union influencing Indian 
public opinion. In the mid-1960s the Soviet Union 
changed her Kashmir p o l i c y , But Moscow would not write 
off India, Unlike Kashmir, strong support on colonial 
and racial issues would not cost her any Afro-Asian 
country's friendship. Therefore, the Soviet Union would 
take a forthright stand against colonial and racial 
issues; this would create an impression in the Third 
World that the Soviet Union identified herself with its 
aspirations.
The Basic Document adopted by the international 
conference of Communist parties in June I969, said that 
the "imperialists" support the fascist and racist regimes 
in South Africa and Rhodesia, It also spoke of the 
"barbarous" persecution of American negroes, and appealed 
to all people of the world to fight against the 
"misanthropic ideology and practices of r a c i s m " ,
The Soviet Union is also sensitive to occasional 
Western allegations of racial discrimination in her own 
territory. Every time such a charge is made, her 
spokesmen and press give explanations to deny it; more 
often, they get black students to deny such charges.
4^See Chapter V, PP * 1 5 3  ™  55
4^Pravda, June 18, I969, Complete text in CDSP,, 
VoloXXI, No, 28, pp,l6 , 20 and 2 3.
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For instance, in February I963? Izvestia published an 
open letter from an African student, Akem Fondem, denying 
western charges of racism in the Soviet Union. He said 
in his letter: " We Africans know who our enemies
and who our friends are. We know in which universities 
students with a black skin must enter under the protection 
of soldiers armed to teeth. It is enough to remember
James Meredith",49
In response to The Daily Telegraph's allegation that 
inter-racial marriage ceremonies in the Soviet Union were 
meant for political propaganda, Izvestia published in 
August 1963 the addresses of Soviet girls who married 
Africans for the benefit of those who wanted to write to 
them and find out the truth,
In view of the highly emotive value of race, the 
USSR and China also use it against each other, Pravda 
reported in September 19&3 that at the Afro-Asian solidarity 
meeting in Moshi, the Chinese delegate said, pointing to 
the presence of the Soviet Union, that the "whites have
51nothing to do here". In its turn, the Soviet press
quoted foreign press reports to establish China's
52commercial deals with South Africa and Rhodesia,
49j2vestia, February 24, I963. Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol. XV, No, 8, p.32,
^^Izvestia, August 22, 1963. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol, XV, No. 34? p.39. See also Pravda, December 21, 1963? 
for the Ghanian ambassador's denial of Western char'ges of 
maltreatment of African students in the USSR and Pravda's 
comment, in the wake of tensions between Ghanian students 
in Moscow and the Soviet government after the death of a 
Ghanian student, under "intoxication", by the roadside. For 
more defensive postures on charges of racial discrimination 
in the USSR, see Izvestia, January 7 ? I964.
^^Pravda, September I9? 1963* Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol, XV, No. 38, p,21,
8^See Izvestia, December 22, I966 and Pravda, June 23? 
1969. See also Soviet Weekly, London, March 17? 1973? ic 
which Tursun Rahimov alleged", in his article, the "Racialism 
of the Maoists", that the minority races in China, who con­
stitute 6 per cent of the total population, are being 
discriminated against.
1THE SOVIET UNION AND SOUTH AFRICA
Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union would adopt an 
uncompromising attitude to South Africa since she happens 
to be a very contentious issue between the West and Afro- 
Asia.
The Liberian and Ethiopian complaints against
continued South African rule over South West Africa was
rejected by the International Court of Justice on July l8,
1966, Commenting on this judgment, a correspondent
wrote in Pravda that one half of the judges, including
the representative of the USSR, opposed the present
arrangement, but the deciding vote was cast by the
Chairman, an Austrian judge, Spender. The correspondent
also said that the fate of South West Africa would
ultimately be decided by the courage of her people and
the support they get from friends rather than by juridicial 
5 3decisions. This was an indirect call for direct action
which would be more appealing to Africans in the wake of 
their disillusionment with the Court.
The judgment was made on yet another occasion to 
call for revision of the Charter, In an article in 
Izvestia Prof. M. Lazarev and 1, Yakolev said that the 
composition of the International Court of Justice failed 
altogether to reflect the new balance of forces in the 
world and in the United Nations, The article mentioned 
that 8 out of 15 judges of the Court represented the 
Western world. Contrasting this position with article 9
Pravda > July 21, 19660 Complete text in CDSP,
Vol. XVlil, No. 29? p.7,
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of the Charter, which says that the composition of the 
Court must ensure the representation of major forms of 
civilisation and of major legal systems of the world, the 
writers said that the time had come for the revision of 
this state of a f f a i r s . %f a revision along the lines 
suggested by the article were effected, the Soviet camp 
would control one-third of the judges of the Court since 
one-third of the world is Communist; this would be 
unacceptable to the West, but acceptable to Afro-Asia 
since their representation would go up too.
A Tass statement on the judgement said that it was 
authorised to state that the Soviet government condemned 
the judgment. The statement said it was a challenge to 
the world community; it was "an outrage against 
international law"; and that it was in the interests of
South African "racists" and "their imperialist patrons".
It also said that the judgment all the more made the need 
for a change in the Court's membership clear,
Any military co-operation between Britain and South 
Africa causes a furore in the non-white world. So 
articles in the Soviet press denounce Anglo-South African 
naval exercises and arms supplies to South Africa.
There is a strong feeling among Afro-Asians that but 
for Western investments, Anglo-American in particular the 
South African system would not survive to defy world 
public opinion. Soviet journals sometimes focus on
^^Xzvestia) July 24, 1966, Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XVIÏI, No. 29, p.8,
^^Pravda, July 29, I966, Complete text in CDSP,
Vol. XVI1Ï, No. 30, p.28,
■^ S^ee, for example, Pravda, October 8, 1971*
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western investments. An article in Int e rn at i on a1 
Affairs (Moscow) in 1971 estimated British, American and 
West German investments in South Africa at 05,300 million. 
The British share alone being 0 3000 million. It also 
mentioned that l6 per cent of all earnings on British 
overseas investments come from South Africa, The 
article went on to mention that seven ministers of the 
then Conservative government held directorships in the 
companies which have subsidiaries in South Africa, It 
quoted from a report to the General Assembly, made by a 
special committee on apartheid, which said that economic 
sanctions against South Africa could not succeed without 
the co-operation of the United States, United Kingdom,
West Germany, and Japan which accounted for 57 per cent
57of South Africa's exports and 6o per cent of her imports. 
Almost all Afro-Asian countries press for economic 
sanctions against and cultural boycott of South Africa 
to end apartheid. Economic boycott is unacceptable to 
the West because of high profitability of investments 
there; sports boycott, even when Western governments want 
to observe, cannot be enforced in view of the presence of 
powerful groups, particularly in the United States and 
United Kingdom, sympathetic to South Africa and legal 
difficulties. On the other hand, the Soviet Union can 
and does effectively boycott South Africa and get her 
excluded from international competitions by threatening to
57V, Kunin, "South Africa; Imperialist and 
Neocolonialist Bridgehead", International Affairs (Moscow) 
No, 1, (1971), pp.42-43» See also A, Butlintsky, "Knot
of Apartheid contradictions", International Affairs 
(Moscow), No, 2, (1973)*
withdraw herself in the event of the former participating,
'20
58
THE SOVIET UNION AND RHODESIA
When the talk of Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by Rhodesia was in the air, Tass issued a 
statement saying that "imperialist-colonialist" forces 
were preparing for a new crime against the people of Africa 
"to turn Southern Rhodesia ... into a racist state on the 
order of the South African R e p u b l i c " . I t  continued 
that notwithstanding her protestations to the contrary, 
Britain, in essence, "was giving its sanction to the 
creation of an anti-African alliance of Southern Rhodesian 
racists with the Portuguese colonialists and the inhuman 
regime in the South African Republic, an alliance that 
now serves as the main bulwark of colonialism in the 
southern part of A f r i c a " . A g a i n s t  the background of 
Wilson's "kith-and-kin" speech, this Tass statement would 
sound credible for Afro-Asians, After the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia on November 11, 
1965? the Soviet government issued a statement saying that 
that would not have been possible without the colonialist 
"collusion" and without the blessing of the NATO countries, 
particularly the United States of America, The British 
government statements, it said, were attempts "to white­
wash its actual policy". The statement said that back in
See The Times, June 25, 1973? for successful Soviet 
attempts to keep South Africa out of the Nottinghamshire 
International Regatta and Henley Royal Regatta.
^^Pravda, October 26, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XVII, No, 43, p.27.
^°Ibid.. p.28.
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1961, the constitution drafted by the British for Rhodesia, 
laid the foundation for the "racist state". The Soviet 
statement condemned the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence and declared its full solidarity with the 
people of Zimbabwe".Thereafter, every visit to 
Rhodesia by a British government representative was 
interpreted by the Soviet press as an attempt by "imperial­
ists" and "monopolists" to strengthen their base in
62Africa, A Tass statement on the Smith-Home agreement
for the settlement of the Rhodesian question, which fell
through, called it a "disgraceful deal" which would
63consolidate indefinitely the regime in Rhodesia,
THE SOVIET UNION AND BRITISH GUIANA
i In the former British Guiana, Indo-Soviet interests 
converged. India's sympathy for Dr, Cheddi Jagan, former 
Prime Minister of that country when it was still a colony, 
was not only because of her opposition to colonialism but 
also because he is of Indian origin and people of Indian 
origin constitute the largest racial group t h e r e , H e  
also happens to be a Socialist leaning towards Moscow; 
hence the Soviet interest in him, Soviet journals
^^Pravda, November 16, I965. Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol, XVII, No, 46, pp,22-23.
^“See, for example, Mikhail Zenovich's comment on 
Lord Allport's visit to Rhodesia in Pravda, June 25, I967
See also the comment on the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs, George Thomson's visit to Rhodesia 
in Pravda, October 30, I967.
^^Pravda, December 4, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol, XXIII, No. 49? p.37.
°4see p.123 .
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published a number of articles on Guiana from time to 
time*^^ When Jagan was manoeuvred out of power, the 
Soviet press, quoting the western press, wrote how 
ultimately the United States prevailed upon Britain to 
remove Jagan from power. Commenting on the elections in 
Guiana in December 1964? a correspondent wrote in 
International Affairs (Moscow) that Jagan*s Peoples 
Progressive Party had won the elections in 1953? 1957 and 
1961; that the United States and the United Kingdom did 
not like Jagan*s policies; and so, the electoral system 
was amended making an absolute majority of popular votes 
necessary for forming a government,
A nation of 700,000 people, divided along racial 
lines could not have been a threat to the United States; 
and, after her Caribbean experience in 1962, the Soviet 
Union would not have made Guiana a base. Therefore, from 
the Indian point of view, the United States fears of Jagan 
looked exaggerated,
EVALUATION
India's and other Afro-Asian nations' touchiness on 
colonialism and racialism could not have been unknown to 
the United States and the United Kingdom, It was evident 
from the repeated references to these issues in the joint 
communiques issued by India and other Afro-Asian states. 
Almost all the Indo-Soviet, non-aligned states, and Afro-
See 1, World Events, International Affairs 
(Moscow), No, 10, (1957)? p,119, 2, Izvestia, July 11,
1963, 3* Pravda a April 17? 1965*
^^N, Yegorova, "International Commentary", 
International Affairs (Moscow) No, 3? (1965)? pp.79-80,
159
Asian conferences* communiques I have read as a part of 
my work for this Chapter, contained critical references 
to colonialism and racialism and calls for their 
extirpation. In spite of such clear evidence of Afro- 
Asian feelings, the United States and United Kingdom 
never really took a firm stand against South Africa and 
Portugal. The feeling that these outdated systems would 
not survive but for the British and American support adds 
insult to Afro-Asian injuries, for by their policies the 
United States and United Kingdom made their preference 
for two anachronistic states over a large number of newly- 
independent states clear even during the time when they 
were supposed to be waging a war to win the minds of 
people against Communismc
I have found no such references to colonialism and
67racialism in the Indo-American communiques 1 read. It
is difficult to establish whether the United States 
resisted the inclusion of such references or India 
refrained from asking for such references to be included, 
knowing as she did their attitude. However, Nehru once 
made his disappointment with the Anglo-American attitude 
known in his speech in Indian Parliament, though not by 
direct reference to the countries. He said that it was 
surprising that countries devoted to democratic traditions.
See Appendix. Ill,
67For example: 1. The Indo-American Communique
issued on December 14, 1959? at the end of President 
Eisenhower's visit to India. 2, The Indo-American 
Communique issued on November 9? 1901, at the end of Nehru's
visit to Washington. Foreign Policy of India, Texts of 
Documents 194-7-1964-, pp. 47 3 and 479 respectively.
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the U.N. Charter, and human rights expressed themselves
moderately, or did not express themselves at all, about
68racial policy in South Africa.
This Anglo-American policy could be either due to 
their unhappiness with the new nations' non-alignment 
policy, or susceptibility to pressure by their multi­
national corporations whose handsome contributions through 
repatriation of their huge profits from South Africa, to 
the balance of payments could not be o v e r l o o k e d , o r 
their need for bases in Portuguese colonies and South 
Africa, or sympathy for fellow whites, or a mixture of all 
these. Ml atever may be the reason, Indian and other 
Afro-Asian states' aspirations and those of the United 
States and the United Kingdom were irreconcilable in this 
field.
The loud Soviet support to Afro-Asia on racial and 
colonial issues resulted in these states taking a realistic 
attitude to issues involving Soviet interests. Almost 
all of Afro-Asian states are authoritarian regimes; they 
do not, therefore, worry about another variation of 
authoritarianism prevalent in the Soviet Union, In the 
case of India and other democracies human ingenuity plays 
its role in shaping their inconsistent policies; we all 
have the capacity to see what we want to, and not to see 
what we do not want. The West did not want to see the
^^Speech in Lok Sabha on December 9? 1958; India's 
E o r^gn_PçLl i , p.543.
^^See Anthony Thomas' report on ITT affair in 
Chile, "How Tight a Grip do Multi-Nationals have on the 
U.S. Policy", in The Times, March 22, 1973.
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suppression of human dignity and freedom in South Africa 
and Portugal; likewise, India did not want to see the 
same thing in the Soviet bloc.
In assessing the success of Soviet diplomacy in 'this 
context, i.e. the skilful handling of Afro-Asia*s emotions 
on colonial and racial issues, the suppression of 
freedom in the Soviet bloc is irrelevant: the point at
issue between Afro-Asia and the West, which Moscow turned 
to its diplomatic advantage, was colonialism and 
racialism. The West gave succour to colonialism and 
racialism by its ambivalent stand; the Soviet Union 
identified herself with Afro-Asia. The West exhibited 
concern for national independence and freedom in Eastern 
Europe while propping up regimes which want to perpetuate 
colonialism and racial indignity in Africa; Afro-Asians, 
on the other hand, exhibited concern for Africa and 
ignored Eastern Europe. Politics rarely upholds moral 
absolutes.
It was easy for the Soviet Union to identify herself 
with Afro-Asia on these issues because she has similar 
grudges against the West, Except for the duration of the 
Second World War, she was treated by the West as a political 
pariah until very recently. If Afro-Asia was racially 
humiliated, Russia was politically humiliated; and in both 
cases it was the West which did that.
The Soviet Union was also happy with non-alignment, 
particularly Afro-Asia*s equivocal stand on issues vitally 
affecting her interests, like the Soviet military 
intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It was not 
surprising if the Soviet Union gave unstinted support to
142
new nations on colonial and racial issues,
Russian press and journals liberally publish anti­
colonial and anti-racial comments and articles. Some 
liberal newspapers in the West do publish articles 
critical of colonialism and racialism. But Western 
governments* stand on the issues, and occasional unhappy 
experiences of Afro-Asians in some of the Western 
countries offset the work of western liberal papers. 
Besides that, unlike the comments in western journals, 
what appears in Soviet journals has a semi-official status, 
Therefore, the Soviet Union gets more credit from the 
comments in her journals, sympathetic to Afro-Asia, than 
the West,
There is no group in India loyally holding a brief
for the West, as the CPI does for Moscow, In view of
politically conscious Indians* awareness of the Western
stand on the issues, the United States Information Service
and the British Information Service propaganda on liberty
and human dignity did not carry much conviction in India.
On the other hand, the CPI and its "largest chain 
7 0of newspapers" boost up the anti-colonialist and anti­
racialist image of the Soviet Union, Against the
background of the Indian leaders* public appreciation of
7 1the Soviet stand on these issues, the CPI's portrayal 
of the Soviet Union as a state opposed to colonialism and 
racialism would not lack credibility.
The West cannot have a receptive audience in India
7 0Ram Swarup, Communism in India in the Post-Nehru
Period, Or bis, Vol. IX, No, 4f Wintei’ 1966) p. 996*
7 ^See p.^py , See also Tass* interview with Mrs,
Gandhi in Jagdish Vibliakar, op, cit, , p.ii, and Mrs,
Gandhi, op„cit., p* 7 3*
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and other Afro-Asian countries until they take a firm
stand against extant colonialism in South West Africa and
racial tyranny in South Africa and Rhodesia, In the
meantime, the Soviet Union continues to cultivate Indian
public opinion.
In article 3 of the Indo-Soviet treaty, the two
countries declared: "Guided by their loyalty to the
lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and Nations,
irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting
Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and
manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive
7 2for their final and complete elimination", This loud
commitment to work for ending colonialism and racial
discrimination from a predominantly white power ].ike the
7 3Soviet Union makes a deep impression on India and other 
Asian-African States.
7 2See Appendix I ?
7 3Commenting on the emphasis that the Soviet policy 
lays on anti-colonial and anti-racial themes, Werner Levi 
wrote: "The net effect of this cleverly contrived policy
was to create the impression in India that Russia was 
fighting colonialism and imperialism on humane grounds as 
a racist system, on social grounds as a reactionary system, 
and on economic grounds as an exploiting system. All 
major colonial grievances were thus taken care of". See 
his Free India in Asia, p.142.
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KASHMIR
The year 1959 saw the coming into the open of Sino- 
Indian conflict on border alignments. The dispute which 
was simmering since 1954 turned bloody with frequent armed 
clashes in 1959* It was in 1959 that yet another 
Agreement of Co-operation was signed between Pakistan and 
the United States, thus making the former "America's 
most allied ally in Asia".  ^ As we know now, Sino-Soviet 
relations were equally troublesome by then.
In the same year, Khrushchev had launched his
peace offensive to the chagrin of China, In an article
in Foreign Affairs in 1959? he wrote: "Whether you like
your neighbour or not, nothing can be done about it, you
have to find some way of getting on with him, for you both
2
live on one and the same planet". He also wrote that it 
"is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made to 
order",^
This was likely to appeal to Nehru who had made 
peaceful co-existence one of the fundamental principles of 
his foreign policy. It was, however, not this identity 
of views on a philosophical question which further 
cemented Indo-Soviet links; it was, probably, the 
coincidence of their interests in China which brought this
Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: 
Stresses and Strains", Foreign Affairs Vol. XIII, No, 2 
(January 1964) p. 195.
2N.S, Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Co-existence", 
Foreign Affairs Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (October 1959)? p.l,
^Ibid., p. 5.
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about. Hereafter, Soviet policy in the subcontinent would 
be influenced by her perceptions of Chinese danger to her 
interests,
THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON KASHMIR 
IN 1962^
The Kashmir dispute was again taken up by the 
Security Council in'February 1962, at Pakistan's initiative. 
Intervening in the dCbate, the Soviet delegate, Zorin, said 
that an urgent convening of the Security Council to 
consider the dispute was "unnecessary and uncalled for"; 
he objected to the meeting being held,^ It was postponed.
In May I962, the Security Council returned to the 
issue. The statements made by the Soviet delegate,
Morozov, were more pro-Indian than any made before on the 
issue. He began with the "so-called question of Kashmir", 
and went on to say that the main, the basic fact is
the continuing occupation of one third of the territory 
of Kashmir by Pakistani forces", He thought that there 
was a "connection between the new and bellicose statements 
(of the Pakistani delegate to start a "liberation battle")^,, 
and these feverish military preparations and the flow of 
foreign arms into countries which are members of •••
(CENTO and SEATO)",^
He spoke of "India's rights in respect of one third 
of Kashmir" under Pakistan's occupation and contrasted
^For a history of the dispute and the attitude of 
the two blocs to it in the early stages, see Chapter III 
pp, 95«-i 00 and 105 109
^U.N.S.C.O.R,,990th Meeting, February 1, 1962, p.25. 
^Ibid, 1010th Meeting, May 4? 19^2, pp.1-5*
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Pakistan's "war-like sabre-rattling" with the "extreme
restraint, patience and a love of peace in keeping with
the general line of the neutral and peaceful policy
7followed by India", He also said that a plebiscite" 
could have been held if the invading forces had been 
withdrawn in 1948 as demanded by the Security Council
g
resolution adopted that year.
On June 22, 19^2, Ireland introduced a resolution.
It made reference to earlier Security Council resolutions
and urged India and Pakistan to enter into direct
negotiations at the earliest convenient time with a view
to the settlement of the dispute in accordance with the
0
principles of the C h a r t e r . M o r o z o v  took objection to 
mention being made to earlier resolution calling for - a  
plebiscite and vetoed the Irish resolution,
In February 19&4? Pakistan raised the issue again 
in the Security Council, In the ensuing debate, 7 members 
of the Council suggested a consensus statement which would 
require the UN Secretary-General to join the talks between 
India and Pakistan as "a good offices officer", India 
opposed the intervention of a third party and pleaded for 
bilateral settlement. The USSR and Czechoslovakia 
opposed the consensus statement. The result was that the 
Security Council left the question to be settled 
bilaterally,^^
?Ibid.Q
Ibid. See Chapter III p, 93 for the said 
resolution,
^UNSCOR, 1016th Meeting, June 22, I962, p.2.
, pp.16-17.
MoC. Chagla, op.cit., p.391 and 400.
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When Nehru died in May 1964, Khrushchev sent three
messages, one each to the President of India, Acting Prime
Minister, and Mrs. Gandhi, and spoke on radio and
12television expressing his condolences. Not long after,
came the news of his ouster and the Chinese nuclear
explosion; both events occurred on the same day, October
16, 1964. There was an undisguised feeling of regret
in non-communist circles in India about Khrushchev's
ouster. Prime Minister Shastri also expressed his fear
of the Chinese nuclear explosion; he called it "a danger
13and a menace to mankind",
India's weakness, as demonstrated by her defeat 
at the Chinese hands in I962, Sino-Pakistani entente, and 
the Chinese nuclear explosion were weighty enough reasons 
for India to fear the consequences of a possible
shift of policies under the new Soviet leadership. To 
add to that anxiety was the Chinese leaders' unusual warmth, 
exhibited in their greetings to the new Soviet leaders,
On October 17? 19&4? the National Secretariat of 
the CPI expressed the hope that the new Soviet leadership 
would "put an end to the wishful thinking of reactionaries" 
that change in Soviet leadership "is a concession to the
^^The Hindu, May 28, I964,
^^The ^ ndu?' October 17? 1964.
^^Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai sent "warm greetings" 
to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mikoyan. The message expressed 
joy "at every progress made by the great Soviet Union and 
the Soviet people on their road to advance", and spoke of 
the unity of "the Chinese and Soviet parties and our two 
countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and 
proletarian internationalism". The message ended: "May
the fraternal, unbreakable friendship between the Chinese 
and Soviet peoples continue to develop". The Hindu,
October I8, I964*
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dogmatist, adventurist and chauvinist line of the Chinese 
Government".
On the same day, the Soviet Charge d'affaires met 
Shastri and assured him that the change in Soviet 
leadership did not mean any departure from the Leninist 
policies of the Soviet U n i o n . T h a t  was a very vague 
commitment indeed]
MOSCOW'S NEW COURSE
By then Sino-Soviet relations were tense. China
managed to exclude the Soviet Union from the proposed
Second Afro-Asian Conference, which in the end was never
to be held, at the Preparatory Committee meeting in Jakarta
in April I964* India proposed that the Soviet Union be
invited; China threatened to walk out in the event of such
a decision and got the issue shelved. In June 1964? yet
another Preparatory Committee meeting was held in Geneva,
As the controversy over Soviet participation continued
at this meeting, too, the Soviet Union voluntarily withdrew
her demand to participate in the projected Afro-Asian 
17Conference,
It is natural for any new team to blame all failures 
on the former rulers and to hope to work miracles. The 
new leadership could not have hoped to achieve anjt-hing 
better than improvement of relations with China. Moscow, 
therefore, held an olive branch to China, The initial 
Chinese response was encouraging, Chou En-lai attended
l^ Ibid.
l^Ibid.
^^William E, Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations 1964- 
1965 (Cambridge, Massachusetts; MIT, I967), pp.57-58.
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the October Revolution celebrations in I964, But
this warmth did not last long. The Chinese demand for
reconciliation with Moscow was nothing short of rejection
of XX-ti^ and XXII-m CPSU Congresses' approach to some
fundamental ideological and political p r o b l e m s , T h i s
was an unacceptable proposition for Moscow, for even
while announcing Khrushchev's "resignation", the Central
Committee of the CPSU reaffirmed the validity of the theses
20of these Congresses, It was not long before Peking
described the new team's ideology as "Khrushchevism
21without Khrushchev",
The new Soviet leadership took up the gauntlet,
Moscow expressed, in June I965, its desire to participate
in the Afro-Asian meeting because "forces have emerged
within the Afro-Asian movement that are trying to split,
and chiefly, isolate it from the Socialist countries and
22the international workers movements", Chou En-lai
replied in kind. He said it was "a question of principle"
for China not to participate in any Afro Asian conference
2 3at which the Soviet Union was present. The Moscow-
Peking truce was over.
Digression is in order at this stage to trace 
the history of Sino-Pakistani entente which called for a 
reappraisal of Soviet policy in the subcontinent.
p.62.
I^Ibid.. p.95.
^°Ibid.. p.60,
Ibid., p.90,
9 9
Quoted, Ibid., pp.124-125 
^h b i d . , p. 127.
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SINO-PAKISTANI ENTENTE
Pakistan recognised China in 1950, abstained on
the U.N. General Assembly resolution branding China as
aggressor in the Korean War, ^ v o t e d  for the resolution
for Seating China in the U.N, in September 1950, but
thereafter supported resolutions for postponing the
2 5question of her representation until I961. At the Bandung
Conference in 1955? Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, 
met Chou En-lai twice and assured him that China need not 
feel embarrassed about the Pakistani resolution against 
Soviet imperialism since China was not imperialist, and, 
as a result, Chou En-lai declared himself satisfied with 
Pakistan's peacefulness and her desire to be friendly with
26"her neighbours.
In 1963, Chou told the Associated Press of Pakistan: 
"After the formation of SEATO in 1954? the Pakistani 
Government often declared to the Chinese Government that 
its participation in that organisation was not for the 
purpose of being hostile to China and would not prejudice 
Pakistan's friendship for China",
Therefore, there was no compelling reason for China 
to be irrevocably committed to upholding Indian interests 
in Kashmir; she followed an equivocal policy. Thus, at 
a time when Sino-Indian relations were apparently cordial,
^^Werner Levi, "Pakistan, Soviet Union, and China", 
Pacific Affairs Vol. XXXV, No, 3 (Fall I962), p.219,
2 5W.M, Dobeuj "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan 
Border Treaty", Pacific Affairs Vol. XXXVII, No, 3 (Fall
1964), p.284,
^^Werner Levi, op,cit,, pp.219-220,
27Q.uoted in W.M. Dobeu, op. cit. , p,284*
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chou En-lai declared in March 1956 that the Kashmiris had
already decided to be an integral part of India; when
border tensions between the two countries reached an acute
stage, China repeated in July 1961 her stand on Kashmir,
though indirectly, when she told India that she had never
stated in any document that Kashmir was not a part of
India; but, a few months before the border war between the
two countries, China told the Indian Embassy in Peking in
May 1962 that she had never accepted without reservation
2 8the position that Kashmir was under Indian sovereignty.
When shooting started on the Sino-Indian border in 
1959? Ayub Khan proposed that India and Pakistan co-operate 
"without having pacts or treaties" in the defence of the
29subcontinent. The quiet Sino-Pakistani understandings
since the Bandung days being unknown then, and unwilling 
to give the impression of entering into an alliance 
against China and giving up the possibility of peacefully 
composing the differences with her, Nehru did not accept 
Ayub Khan's suggestion. There were also two compelling 
reasons for Nehru's rejection of the proposal: 1) An
alliance with Pakistan, then still suspect in the Soviet 
eyes, would introduce complications into India's relations 
with the latter, 2) There was always the probability of 
the Pakistani offer being made contingent upon the solution 
of the Kashmir dispute on Pakistani terms. Therefore, 
Nehru rhetorically asked the question: "defence against
whom?" He even said that "the real motive was not joint
^^Ibid., p.285.
29Quoted by Norman D* Palmer, "Defence of South 
Asia", Orbis, Vol. IX, No, 4. (Winter 1966), pp,922-923
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30defence but Kashmir", And in December I961, Ayub
Khan confirmed Nehru's fear by saying that "Pakistan
would offer joint defence to India in case of foreign
aggression on the subcontinent provided India comes with
31clean hands to solve the Kashmir issue".
Simultaneously, Pakistan tried to put her relations
with China on a more secure basis, Pakistan-held
Kashmir has common border with Sinkiang* After shooting
incidents started on the Sino-Indian border, Ayub Khan
got a memorandum prepared in 1959 proposing to China to
demarcate the border between the two countries. There
was no response from Peking, In December 1961, the
Chinese ambassador met Ayub Khan and asked for Pakistan's
support for the proposition that the question of Chinese
entry into the United Nations be decided by simple majority
in the General Assembly instead of a two-thirds majority.
Ayub Khan asked him about his proposal for border
demarcation. The ambassador replied that it was a
complicated matter, Ayub Khan told him that "if border
demarcation was a complicated matter, China's admission
to the United Nations was even more complicated". Soon
after this, the Chinese agreed for talks on border 
3 2demarcation,
Nehru's request for weapons during the Sino- 
Indian border war and the ready response from the West
3°Ibid.
31lbid.
32
A y u h  Khan, Friends, Not Masters, p, 162,
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was resented in Pakistan,
On tefestern insistence at this time, India agreed 
to have talks with Pakistan on K a s h m i r , " T h e  Pakistanis 
ushered in the negotiations by announcing they had 
reached a border settlement with the Chinese",
SOVIET REAPPRAISAL OF KASHMIR POLICY
The growing Sino-Pakistani cordiality was not to 
Soviet liking. But Pakistan could not be appeased unless 
the Soviet Union changed her, what was then, India- 
oriented Kashmir policy, Moscow, therefore, decided to 
reappraise its South Asia policy.
When the brief war on the Rann of Kutch issue began 
on April 9? 1965? with the occupation of a few Indian
3 3The New York Times, November 24? I962, See also 
Ayub Khan, op,cit.< pp,133-134? and his article "The 
Pakistan-American Alliance: Stresses and Strains", p,200.
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan 
agreed on December 29? I962, at Nassau to give 0120 
million worth of military aid to India, The Hindu, 
December 3o? I962.
P a k i s t a n  r e c e i v e d  0 1 , 7  b i l l i o n  w o r t h  of m i l i t a r y  
a i d  f r o m  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  b e t w e e n  1954-1965, S y d n e y  H, 
S c h a n b e r g ,  " P a k i s t a n  D i v i d e d " ,  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  V o l ,  L?
No, 1, (October 1971) p.133.
^^W,F,V, Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the 
Border Dispute with China, (The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff,
1964) p.205.
3 5John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal:
A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, i960) p.523. According to a statement made 
by Nehru in the Indian Parliament on March 5? I963? under
the Sino-Pakistani border treatyof March 2, I963?
Pakistan surrendered to China nearly 2500 square miles 
of Kashmir held by her, to which India maintains a 
judicial claim, G,V, Ambekar and V.D. Divekar ed,, 
Documents on China's Relations with South and South East 
Asia 1Q49-1Q62, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, I964)?
pp", 217-223.
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posts by P a k i s t a n , t h e  Soviet Union maintained strict
neutrality. The Tass statement on the developments in
Kutch said: "According to reports in the foreign press,
the formal pretext for the conflict has been the differing
interpretations by India and Pakistan of the location of
the borders in the uninhabited region of the Rann of
Kutch". It advised the parties that the military way of
solving the problem would "drain the strength" of both,
and expressed the hope that they would "display the
37necessary restraint and patience".
An invitation to Ayub Khan to visit the Soviet
Union, extended while Khrushchev was in power, was renewed
o o
by the new leaders. During Ayub's visit to the Soviet
Union - the first ever by a Pakistani head of State and
government - an agreement was signed on April 7, 1965,
to double or treble the volume of their trade by 1967 in
3Qcomparison with 1964,
The Soviet-Pakistani Communique neither mentioned 
Kaslimir nor Kutch, But two points in the communique were 
significant: 1) "They declared resolute support for
3 6Pakistan claimed that the Indo-Pakistani border 
in the Rann of Kutch area was not delimited and laid 
claim to 9065 square kilometres out of the total area of 
20,720 square kilometres of the Rann, The dispute was 
referred to an international tribunal after the cease­
fire, It awarded 906,5 square kilometres to Pakistan,
See B.L* Sukhwal, India: A Political Geography, (New
Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971), pp,216-217.
^^Pravda, May 9? 1965. Complete text in CDSP,
Vol.XVII,No. 19, p.25»
38Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations 
Among China, India, Pakistan, and USSR (New York: Pegasus,
1970), p.262.
Pravda, April 8, 19&5. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol.XVII,No. 14, pp. 18-19.
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peoples who are engaged in a struggle for their national 
liberation and independence and for peoples fighting for 
the right to determine their own future in accordance 
with their own will", 2) "They also stated that 
international agreements must be fulfilled to promote 
universal peace and co-operation",^^ The first could be 
interpreted by Moscow as a reference to Vietnam, a very 
sensitive issue to the United States then; Pakistan 
could also consider it as a reference to Kashmir, The 
second could be interpreted by Pakistan as a reminder to 
India about her agreement to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, 
a hypersensitive issue to her.
This is how Ayub Khan explained his diplomatic 
overtures to Moscow in his memoirs: "By joining SEATO
and CENTO we had alienated her (the Soviet Union) and lost 
her sympathy. Since we had never been a party to any 
design against her and our membership of the Pacts was 
dictated solely by the requirements of our security, it 
should be possible to come to an understanding with the 
Soviet Union by removing her doubts and misgivings,"
While in the Soviet Union, Ayub Khan also told 
Kosygin that American and Soviet military aid to India 
"was encouraging her to perpetuate her forcible occupation 
of a large part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to 
flout the United Nations resolutions with impunity",
Lai Bahadur Shastri visited the Soviet Union close 
on the heels of Ayub Khan, At a Soviet-Indian friendship 
rally, Kosygin said that there was nothing in the
^^Pravda, April 11, I965, Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol.XVII, No, 15? pp. 21-22.
'^^Ayub Khan, Friends and Not Masters, p. 117.
4^Ibid.. p.171.
'156
development of Soviet-Indian ties that could be directed 
against other peace-loving countries; and when the 
Soviet Union strove to improve her relations with other 
countries, she did not do so at the expense of Soviet- 
Indian friendship. He alleged that the West revelled in 
disputes while the Soviet Union wanted friendship and 
co-operation between the liberated states. He continued 
that his country would like these states to solve border 
and other disputes between themselves by peaceful 
means,
While the USSR remained silent on Kashmir and 
Kutch, Shastri agreed to include a reference to Vietnam 
in the Indo-Soviet joint coimnunique; it called for an 
end to the United States bombing of North Vietnam,
THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF I965 AND THE 
TASHKENT CONFERENCE
Pakistan repeated the 1947 pattern by infiltrating 
guerillas into Indian Kashmir in August 1965, In response 
Indian forces occupied a number of points in Pakistan-held 
Kashmir from August 16, 1965, onwards by crossing the 
cease-fire line at Kargil where Pakistani forces tried 
to cut the Srinagar-Leh road. On September 1, I965?
Pakistan attacked Jammu; and on September 6, 1965, Indian
forces crossed the international border towards Lahore,
On September 5? 1965? the UN Secretary-General, U
^^Pravda, May I6, I965.
^^Izvestia, May 21, I965.
^^Dr, K, Raman Pillai, op.cit., pp,115-116.
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Thant, made public a report by the United Nations 
Cease-fire observers in Kashmir which put the blame on 
Pakistan for the series of cease-fire violations leading 
to the war.^^
On September 6, I965? the Secretary-General of 
SEATO told Pakistan that Kashmir was not covered by the
t r e a t y ; o n  September 7? 1965, Pakistan invoked CENTO,
4-8and it rejected the request too.
The Soviet press ignored the United Nations report 
and other factors and took a strictly neutral line,
Pravda wrote that^Indian and Pakistani press gave different 
versions, "We will not go into a discussion here of 
which of these versions more precisely reflects the course 
of events. The main thing is to find a way to stop the 
bloodshed immediately and to liquidate the conflict". It 
wrote further that the masses of India and Pakistan 
wanted peace. "Our country has a long-standing 
traditional friendship with India and the Soviet
Union's "relations with Pakistan are improving",
In identical letters sent to Shastri and Ayub Khan, 
on September 4, I965, Kosygin wrote that India and 
Pakistan, two major Asian States, sponsors of the 
Bandung Conference, "have in fact taken the path of 
conducting military operations"; that the Soviet 
government was all the more concerned because the conflict 
"has broken out in an area directly contiguous to the
^^The Hindu, September 6, I965,
^^Ibid., September 8, I965.
^^Ibid,, September 9, 1965.
^^Pravda, August 24, I965. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol.XVII, No. 34, p. 15.
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borders of the Soviet Union"; that "in the present
grave situation the main emphasis should not be placed
on the question of the causes of the conflict or of
50ascertaining who is right or wrong". He called for
"halting the tanks and silencing the guns" and with­
drawal of forces by both sides to the cease-fire lines; 
he also offered Soviet good offices for composing the 
differences between the two countries. He ended his 
letter by stating the Soviet conviction, which "the 
experience of history confirms", that "all disputed 
questions, including questions connected with Kashmir, can 
be most effectively resolved only by peaceful means".
A Tass statement referred to "forces trying to 
derive advantages for themselves" through "their 
inflammatory statements"; and commented that they were 
adding "fuel to the fire". If the drift continued, the
statement warned, "many states, one after another, may
5 2find themselves drawn into the conflict".
This was an obvious reference to China which sided 
with Pakistan in the conflict, A few days after this 
Soviet statement, Pekinghanded a note to the Indian Charge 
d'Affaires, on September 17? 19&5? alleging that India 
was maintaining 56 military installations on the Tibetan 
side of the Sikkim-Tibetan border and demanded that they 
be demolished within three days; otherwise, the Indian
^^Pravda, September 12, I965, Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol,XVII,No, 37? p.27.
^^Ibid.
52Pravda, September 14, 1965. Complete text In 
CDSP, Vol.XVII,No. 37, p.28.
igovernment would bear full responsibility for all the
5 3grave consequences arising therefrom. The crisis,
however, passed without any incident.
The Soviet Union supported the cease-fire resolutions
passed in the Security Council on September 4 and
September 6, 1965.^^ Kosygin also invited Shastri and
Ayub Khan to meet in Tashkent to resolve the differences 
5 5between them. The Soviet Union also supported a third
Security Council resolution passed on September 20, 1965?
which demanded a cease-fire by 7.00 a.m. (G.M.T.) on
September 21, 1965,^^
The war ended and the Indian and Pakistani leaders
agreed to meet in Tashkent, The conference opened on
January 4? I966, and ended on January 11, I966, Excepting
the issues incidental to the war, no substantive problems
57were settled at Tashkent,
Shastri died in Tashkent at the end of the Conference, 
Kosygin attended Shastri's funeral in New D e l h i . T h e  
Russians seemed to have preferred Mrs. Gandhi to Morarji 
Desai in the contest for the leadership of the
59Parliamentary Congress party, as the latter was a rightist.
 ^The Hindu, September I8, I965. See also Russel 
Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict, (London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1968), p. 371.
^^See The Sunday Times, September 5? I965? and The 
Times, September 7? I965.
^^Pravda, September 20, I965. Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol,XVII,No. 38, p.19.
^^The Times, September 21, I965.
57See The Hindu, January 12, I966; for an analysis 
of the significance of Tashkent see below pp. 87-88.
^^The Hindu, January 13? I966.
^^See for instance Maslennikov's comment, sympathetic 
to Mrs. Gandhi and disparaging to Desai, in Pravda, January 
20, 1966, Complete text in CDSP, V0I.XVHI,No. 3? p*22.
The Soviet Union continued the efforts to improve
relations with Pakistan. Until I965, India received some
preferential treatment in the May Day slogans; she used
to follow Yugoslavia in the list. In the May Day slogans
in 1965? India had 30th place in the list; her slogan was:
"Warm greetings to the great Indian People Pakistan,
Iran and Turkey were lumped together in the 47th place in
* 6 0the list of slogans. In the May Day slogans in I966,
on the other hand, India was preceded by the UÂR (27th 
place), Algeria (28th), Syria (29th), Burma (30th) and 
Guinea, Congo (Brazzville) and Mali (31st); India had 
32nd place in the list, with her old slogan: "Warm
greetings to the great Indian people.,."; Pakistan 
followed India with a slogan of her own: "Warm greetings
■61to the Pakistani people,,,",
India also continued her efforts not to disturb her 
relations with Moscow in spite of clear signs of change in
62Soviet attitude to her. At the 50th anniversary of the
October Revolution, Mrs. Gandhi personally represented 
India.
Kosygin visited Pakistan in April 1968. The joint- 
statement issued at the end of the visit did not refer to
^^Pravda, April 22, I965. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol.XVIÎ, No. 16, p. 4.
^^Pravda, April 17, I966, Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol.Xm3,No, 15? p.21.
62„See
The Hindu, November 7? I967. China and Albania 
did not care to send delegations to the ceremony, Vernon 
V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy", in Roy C» Macridis 
ed,, Foreign Policy in World Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey, Prentice Hall, Inc., 197 2), p.283*
Kashmir, It called for the settlement of the Vietnam 
problem on the basis of the Geneva Conference proposals 
of 1954, The two sides also "reaffirmed their 
conviction that any increase in the number of nuclear" 
powers would damage the cause of world peace 
This was subtle Soviet pressure on I n d i a , I n d i a ' s  
nuclear programme was by then in a technologically very 
advanced state of development. While India signed the 
Moscow treaty of I963 banning nuclear explosions in the 
atmosphere, she refused to sign the nuclear non­
proliferation treaty of I968,
SOVIET ARMS FOR PAKISTAN
The Soviet Union administered another shock to India
in 1968, After the visit of General Yahya Khan, then
Conimander-in-Chief of the Pakistani army, to Moscow in
June-July I968, it became known that the Soviet Union had
decided to sell arms to P a k i s t a n , A  posture of even-
handedness between India and Pakistan, which was part of
the new Soviet policy, called for such sales; Moscow
could not have forgotten General Ayub Khan's complaints to
6 7the Soviet leaders on their arms supply to India,
Moscow's desire for securing a stronger presence in 
Islamabad, in pursuit of her interests, was such that it
^^Pravda, April 22, I968, Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XX, No. 16, p.22.
^^See Chapter Pi362 for the Soviet government 
view on nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
^^Kuldip Nayar, Between the Lines, (New Delhi: 
Allied Publishers, I969), p.103*
See p. 155.
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seemed to have ignored the possibility of strong reaction 
in India,
REACTION IN INDIA
Naturally, there was a lot of resentment in India.
The press and the opposition reacted angrily.
The Statesman editorially commented, under the 
caption, "Let Down by Moscow" that the Soviet action was 
no different "from the familiar but fallacious Anglo- 
American doctrine of parity between the two countries 
(Pakistan and India)." The paper drew attention to "the 
Russian willingness to give military hardware and fighting 
material to Pakistan and the latter*s notice to the United 
States of America to wind up the Peshawar (air) base", and 
said that they were not unconnected. Advising the 
government of India to understand the virtues of flexibility 
in international relations and stop taking friendship for 
granted, the editorial ended: "Obviously, the rigidity of
India's relationship with China is doing it little good 
because it practically deprives it of all leverage with 
Moscow and Washington", The country should ponder over 
this, it added,
Mrs. Gandhi conveyed her concern about the reports 
of Soviet arms to Pakistan to the Soviet Charge d'Affaires 
on July 8, 1968,^^ She also declared on July 9? I968,
The Statesman, July 9? 1968. The United States 
acquired the Peshawar air base in Pakistan under her 
military alliance with the latter. The U-2 plane shot 
down by the Soviet Union in May I960 took off from 
Peshawar, See Adam B, Ulam, op.cit., pp.626 and 633.
^^The Statesman, July 9? 1968,
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that non-alignment would not undergo any change. Any
country could give arms to any country. "It is none of
70our business", she said.
President Hussain conveyed his concern to the Soviet
\
7 ]leaders in his talks with them in Kremlin, ' At a lunch
given in honour of Dr. Hussain on July 10, I968, Kosygin
assured him that his country would do nothing which could
7 2go against the interests of Soviet-Indian friendship,
Mrs, Gandhi addressed a letter to Kosygin on the 
7 3issue, Kosygin's reply was in general terms. He
spoke of the "continuing warm and cordial friendship".
It was understood that he made no direct reference to the
7 4-issue of military sales to Pakistan,
The Hindu editorially commented that "the United
States and other democratic countries, whose political and
economic thinking is similar to our own, are more likely
to have the same approach to India's problems as our
Government's and this itself is a special reason to
establish close ties with them". Referring to Mrs,
Gandhi's assertion that non-alignment would continue. The
Hindu said that this showed "how obsolete, negative, and
purposeless a concept non-alignment is", and pleaded for
"a positive, activist policy which will win the friends it
75can rely on,.,",
^°Ibid.. July 10, I968.
71Ibid, The Indian President was on a State visit 
to the USSR,
k^bid.
^^ibid,, July 12, 1968.
^^July 21, 1968.
roc^
The Swatanbra party moved an adjournment motion in
the Indian Parliament on July 22, 1968, to censure the
government "on the failure of its foreign policy as is
evidenced by the Soviet Union*s decision to supply arms
76to Pakistan". It was defeated.
The Soviet government remained unmoved by all this;
77it invited Ayub Khan to visit the Soviet Union again.
The reaction of the CPI and others friendly to the 
USSR was predictable. The CPI weekly. New Age, wrote 
that Soviet military sales to Pakistan would help her 
"move away from the SEATO and CENTO alliances" and would 
come in the way of Peking*s anti-Indian machinations.
The inspiration for the "right reaction" was not defence
considerations but political, the real target being "the
' 78forces of progress within the country" « V.K.Ko Menon,
who so eloquently used to speak against similar United
States moves, said: "The Soviet Union is in no way
7 9obligated to us and so is free to sell arms to Pakistan",
INDO-SOVIET MINISTERIAL TALKS
At the talks between Bhagat, a member of the Indian 
Council of Ministers, and Firyubin, Deputy Foreign 
Minister of the USSR, in New Delhi in September 1968, the 
former raised the question of Soviet arms supply to
^^Ibid,, July 23, I968, Both the pro-Moscow CPI 
and the parallel CPI (Marxist) opposed the resolution,
^^The Statesman, July 22, 1968,
7 8New Age, July 19? 1968, as quoted in The Statesman, 
July 20, 1968.
^^Ibid,
Pakistan, Firyubin said that it was strange that India 
was not objecting to the influence of America and China 
in Pakistan, but was-asking the Soviet Union, a friendly
80country, to stand aloof. When the Indian minister"
asked for Russian views on Kashmir, the Soviet minister
said that his country wanted direct talks between India
and Pakistan, Pressed to state as to how the Soviet
Union would vote in the Security Council if Pakistan
raised the issue there again, Firyubin simply repeated
that his country wanted direct talks between the parties.
Then Bhagat raised the question of Radio Peace and
Progress, a Russian radio station beaming highly
tendentious and objectionable reports on Indian politics
and personalities, except those whom Moscow considered
"progressives". There were heated debates in Indian
Parliament many times on this issue, Firyubin replied
that the Indian papers and parties abused and defamed the
Soviet Union and the system obtaining there; some reply
had to be given to rebut these lies , When Bhagat said
that the station was a Soviet government institution,
Firyubin curtly replied that it was started to give fitting
81replies to the abuse of the Soviet Union in India,
The joint communique on the Bhagat-Firyubin talks 
described them as "friendly and cordial", Kuldip Nayar, 
then editor of The Statesman, managed to get the gist
of inside happenings at the meeting and published it in 
his paper. On September 24? I968, the Soviet ambassador
80Kuldip Nayar, on*cit., p.103, 
^^Ibid,. pp,103-106 and 108-109»
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complained to the Indian government about the leakage
to The Statesman* Earlier, the Soviet representatives Had
warned that they had to reconsider the question of Soviet
arms supplies to India if the news about them continued
to appear in the press, which Pakistan quoted to Soviet
embarrassment. Therefore, the Indian Cabinet issued
instructions under the Defence of India Rules to prevent
the news about foreign arms supply to India being
published in papers. But in spite of that Pakistan
managed to get all details about Soviet arms supply to
India. The Soviet Union then asked India as to how it
was that what they gave Pakistan remained a secret while
82what they supplied India became the talk of the town.
In March I969, Marshal Grechko visited Pakistan and 
said, during his stay there, that the Soviet Union was 
giving arms to Pakistan to make her strong against her 
"enemies". The Russians denied the report in private but
Q
did not respond to Indian request for a public denial.
Q 0
Kuldip Nayar, on*cit,, pp.99-100, A few days later, 
Nayar was reproached by a Soviet journalist for carrying 
the dispatch mentioned above. The Indian editor was told 
that such write-ups would create "unbridgeable gulf" 
between the two countries; that India would lose by "alien­
ating the Soviet Union", He was reminded of "the military 
and economic assistance" the Soviet Union was giving India, 
and told that such "attitude made us (the Soviet Union) 
befriend Pakistan", Ibid., pp.109-110,
8 3Pran Chopra, Before and After the Indo-Soviet 
Treaty (New Delhi: S, Chand and Co., 1971)? p.45.
It is interesting to recall what Suslov said on 
Sino-Pakistani entente in his report to the Central 
Committee, on February 14? 1964, He asked if any one could 
believe that the rapprochement with Pakistan was prompted 
by the interests of the development of the revolutionary 
struggle of the Asian peoples against imperialism about 
which the Chinese leaders made so much noise, Pravda?
April 3? 1964,
I6f
e v al ua tio n
There is nothing permanent about foreign
policies; they are a series of shifts to serve
immediate diplomatic needs* The Soviet Kashmir policy
was never a firm commitment to uphold India's point of
view; nor was Pakistan ever totally shunned by Moscow,
Undoubtedly, the support that the Soviet Union
gave India in the Security Council debate on Kashmir in
1962 was the strongest ever,^^ The explanation lies in
many developments: 1) Sino-Soviet differences, which in
the words of Griffith, reached the "point of no return"
8 6in the summer of 1959? came into the open at the
87Rumanian Party Congress in June I96O* 2) Relations
between the Soviet and American blocs were not warm either, 
the Berlin crisis of 1961 having chilled the relations,
3) Pakistan still clung to Western alliances and was also 
developing cordial relations with Peking, 4) Sino-Indian 
relations also had reached the point of no return in 1959 
and continued to worsen. It is possible that these 
considerations prompted the Soviet Union to extend strong 
diplomatic support to India and keep her influence there.
It is possible that the change in India's
stand on Germany in September I96I also influenced the 
Soviet decision to give strong support to India in the
^^For earlier Soviet wavering on Kashmir, see 
Chapter III pp. .,q^
145-146
William E, Griffith, op.cit., p.3.
87Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow vs
Peking (Harmondsworth, Middlesex; Penguin Books, 1963)? 
pp.97-108.
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Security Council in May 1962.
Until September I96I? India used to express her
"sympathy" with the German national aspiration for the
88unification of their country. In September 1961 Nehru
agreed "that the facts on the existence of the two German
Q Q
States" could not be ignored,
Nehru probably considered this concession to the 
Soviet Union necessary in view of his desire to be non- 
aligned, in Spite of the border trouble with China,
IVhatever might have prompted Nehru's decision, this was a 
welcome shift from the Soviet point of view. There was 
nothing for Moscow to lose by extending strong support to 
India on Kashmir; Pakistan was anyway in the rival bloc.
By the early I96OS, inter-bloc and intra-bloc politics 
underwent a great change; France defied America; China 
challenged Russia; Rumania began showing signs of adopting 
an independent course in foreign relations; and Pakistan
8 8See, for example, India-Germany Joint Communique 
of July 16, 1956, India-Germany Joint Statement of March
31? 1957 and India-Poland Joint Statement of September 
27? i960. Foreign Policy of India; Texts of Documents,
1947-1964 (New Delhi; Lok Sabha Secretariat, I966), pp. 
306-309 and 426, (Hereinafter referred to as Foreign 
Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1964).
Q  Q
See the Indo-Soviet Joint Communique, September 
11, 1961, ibid,, p, 506, Nehru did not subscribe to 
Khrushchev's plan to turn West Berlin into a demilitarised 
free city. Ibid,
See Pravda, November 28, 1958, for Khrushchev's 
plan for West Berlin, See also John K, Galbraith, p-p. 
cit,4 pp.194-197? for tensions between India and the 
United States caused by an inadvertent statement by 
Nehru, which questioned the West's right of access to 
West Berlin,
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turned to Peking,
The Soviet writ ceased to run throughout the camp 
and the movement as was evident from the failure of 
Khrushchev in September 1963 to call an international 
conference to isolate China,
For some time after the assumption of power, the 
post-Khrushchev leadership seemed to have entertained 
hopes of repairing relations with China, Therefore, they 
made friendly gestures to Peking, A Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement, besides restoring the bloc unity, would 
also have facilitated a speedier and more effective Soviet 
aid to North Vietnam through the Chinese overland routes 
which would have gone a long way in neutralising the 
increasing American involvement in Vietnam, However, it 
did not work that way; there was no improvement in Sino- 
Soviet relations. Therefore, the Soviet leadership must 
have realised that, as an instrument of Soviet foreign 
policy, the world communist movement was, in the context 
of the mid-1960s, "of considerably diminished utility, and 
in some respects may even be a handicap to Moscow's 
posture as a global power",
Failing in their attempts to repair relations with 
China, the new Soviet leadership began an attempt to 
scuttle Peking's efforts to increase its influence in 
Afro-Asia, The Soviet Union's attempts to placate 
Pakistan in the mid-1960s was a part of this attempt. It 
was evident that Pakistan's ire was with India and not
^^William E, Griffith, op,cit,, p, 38, See also
pp,36-37•
^^Vernon V, Aspaturian, op.cit., p,283*
92with Communism or the USSR, If any proof was
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necessary, the increasing warmth between Pakistan and 
China was enough. Strong Soviet influence in Pakistan 
would have had the advantage of neutralising the inflûence 
of two of Moscow's chief rivals there, the United States 
and China,
As early as 1958, the Soviet Union began claiming
that thanks to Afro-Asian support it had become possible
to stem the tide by which the West had striven to "impose
9 3an American diktat on other countries," This process
of undermining the United States' hold on the United 
Nations could be sustained and accelerated if more 
countries could be weaned away from Washington, Pakistan's 
loosening ties with the West and increasing warmth towards 
Peking called for an attempt to improve relations with 
Islamabad,
The Soviet Union had, by the early I96OS, built up 
a better image of herself among the Afro-Asian countries 
banking upon their anti-colonial and anti-racialist 
sentiments. It had close contacts with most of the Arab 
States, If the Arabs could be won over, Pakistan could 
be too. This was necessary to contain growing Chinese 
influence in Islamabad, There were no intractable problems 
between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, The price that 
Moscow had to pay to please Pakistan was to readjust its 
Kashmir policy; this was not a great price for it. In 
pursuit of its new diplomatic strategy, Moscow tactfully
92cSee '
^^Alexander Üallin. The Soviet Union at the United 
Nations (London: Methuen and. Co, Ltd,, 1962) , p,128.
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adopted a neutral stand on Kashmir,
This was to India's disadvantage. But lacking both 
economic and military strength, India's capacity to 
influence Moscow's South Asia policy was very limited,"
This was evident from the outcome of Shastri's visit to 
Moscow in May 1965# While the Soviet side was silent on 
Kashmir and Kutch, Shastri not only spoke against the 
American involvement in Vietnam^^ but also agreed to a 
mention being made to Vietnam in the Indo-Soviet joint 
c ommuni qu e,  ^^
However, it would be stretching the point too far 
to suggest that the Soviet Union was prepared to alienate 
India to win Pakistan's support. It would make no sense 
to alienate a big country like India to win the friendship 
of Pakistan, comparatively small as well as used to 
frequently changing sides,
tha<^
Moscow would appease India to the extent^this 
appeasement did not come in the way of readjustment of 
her South Asia policy in pursuit of its new strategy.
Lacking either the capacity or the will to dispense with 
foreign aid, as China did when necessary, India had to 
accept the new Soviet policy. After some vacillation
^^See Pravda, May I6, I965.
95oSee p » "j
^^This becomes evident from Brezhnev's Report to 
the XXIII CPSU Congress in March I966, wherein he said: 
"In the period under review our traditional friendship 
with India and with her great people, a friendship that 
has withstood the test of time has grown even stronger. 
There has been a certain improvement with our relations 
with Pakistan", Pravda, March 30, I966, Complete 
text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No.12, p.13.
1/*
during and after the Sino-Indian war, the Soviet Union 
finally decided to build the plant for the manufacture 
of MÏG 21 planes in I n d i a , I n d i a  would not jeopardise 
the deal by any precipitate action as a protest against 
the new Soviet policy on Kashmir, Therefore, Moscow 
could safely revise its South Asia policy without the 
fear of diplomatic loss in India.
In so revising her South Asia policy, Moscow made 
sure to give the appearance of doing it with the lofty aim 
of composing differences between India and Pakistan and 
working for peace in the subcontinent. Against the 
background of Peking's ultimatum to India during the Indo- 
Pakistani war of 1965^^ and the pro-Pakistani western 
policies, the USSR could hope to reap diplomatic benefits 
from her neutrality on the dispute and efforts to make 
peace between the parties to the dispute.
The new policy had its advantages for Moscow in its 
polemics with China, In the debates within the world 
movement, the Soviet policy of working for peace between 
India and Pakistan was likely to be juxtaposed with the 
Chinese policy of inflaming the situation with its threats 
and ultimata to India during the war.
If Pakistan could be weaned away from China, Moscow 
would also have had the satisfaction of breaking what in 
those days looked like^China-Pakistan-Indonesia axis.^^
^^See Chapter VI I p.2$0 
^^See p. 1.58
^^Indonesia was very friendly to Peking in those 
days. She even pulled out of the United Nations, See 
Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., pp*717-7l8. See also William E, 
Griffiths, op.cit,, p.57.
17)
It was undoubtedly a diplomatic triumph for the 
Soviet Union, She achieved something which the United 
States and the United Kingdom could not. In the 
Declaration issued at the end of the Tashkent meeting",
Ayub Khan and Shastri expressed their "deep thankfulness 
and gratitude" to the leaders of the Soviet Union "for 
their constructive, friendly and noble role in 
organising the present meeting ... ",
Moscow earned this respect because from Pakistan's 
point of view, there was a welcome change in Russian 
attitude: Moscow ceased to consider Pakistan a Trojan
horse for imperialism and Kashmir, a part of India; the 
new policy equated India and Pakistan and recognised 
Kashmir as a disputed question. • Pakistan resented also 
the gifts of Western arms to India in the wake of the Sino- 
Indian war of 1962. An improvement in Islamabad's 
relations with Moscow, while maintaining cordial relations 
with Peking, would strengthen Pakistan's bargaining position 
vis-a-vis the West and India, Not surprisingly, therefore, 
the Soviet Union's neutrality in the Indo-Pakistani 
dispute earned much respect for Moscow in Pakistan.
From India's point of view, there was a substantial 
change in the Soviet Kashmir policy. But India's 
capacity for diplomatic manoeuvres was very limited: her
relations with Britain and the United States were not 
particularly cordial. President Johnson curtly asked 
Prime Minister Shastri, as also Ayub Khan, to postpone his
Pravda, January 11, I966, Complete text, in 
CDSP, Vol.XVIII, No, 2, p.4* See also Adam B, Ulam 
on. cit. , pp.715-716' for a comment on Tashkent.
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visit to Washington, apparently on grounds of
Congressional w o r k l o a d , T h e  British Prime Minister,
Wilson, issued a statement on September 6, I965, saying
that he was "deeply concerned" at the news that India'’
102"attacked Pakistan territory". Britain and the United
States also banned military supplies to India, including
those agreed to under emergency military aid in the wake
10 3 'of the Chinese invasion.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued arms 
shipments to I n d i a . a n d  there was wide-ranging 
co-operation between India and the Soviet Union in the 
field of India's industrial development, India would 
not forego all this because of her ire with the new Soviet 
policy. In addition to all these considerations, India 
has always been in a position to meet the Pakistani 
challenge all by herself; she cannot be that confident 
vis-a-vis China, In view of her weakness in comparison 
with China, India could not overlook the importance of the 
Soviet Union as a countervailing force for China. 
Therefore, India considered it necessary not to disturb 
her relations with Moscow in spite of the change in its 
Kashmir policy.
The New York Times, April 28, 19^5. Shastri
w^ as to visit the United States in June 1965. It was
widely interpreted as a snub to Shastri because of his 
opposition to the escalation of the war in Vietnam. 
Shastri resented it and cancelled the visit instead,
1 fi 9
The Times, September 7, 1965.
^^^The Times, September 9, I965.
^^^The Hindu, September 18, I965*
^^^See Chapter X,
17)
The post-Nehru leadership did not seem to command 
the same respect from Moscow that Nehru did, until Mrs, 
Gandhi consolidated her position and demonstrated her 
strength by her victory over her rightist rivals in 
1971* Consequently, the Soviet Union became less 
discreet in the expression of her views on Indian politics 
and personalities^^^ until she revised her South Asia 
policy again in the wake of Sino-American detente.
The increasingly pragmatic economic policies of Mrs, 
107Gandhi, before she adopted radicalism for reasons of 
political expediency in I969, and the increasing rightist 
pressure within her party until I969, seemed to have 
given the impression in Moscow that the Indian government 
yielded to the pressure of monopolies, both domestic as
-1-1 ^  . 108well as foreign.
By the time the Soviet Union decided to sell arms to 
Pakistan in the face of strong opposition in India,
See, for example, O.V, Martyshin, Toward a 
Definition of the Social Ideals of Gandhism, Voprosy 
Filosofii, No, 1, January 1965. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XVII, No, 19, pp.15-19. See also Pravda, March 
5, 1966, for a critical comment on the arrest of 
Communists in India,
107See Chapter X, pp. " 64
 ^ There were instances like Russia's friend in 
India, V.K.K. Menon, being denied a Congress ticket to 
contest elections in I967. N. Savelyev considered this 
"an episode in the stubborn struggle between the reaction­
ary and progressive forces"« See "Monopoly Drive in 
India", International Affairs, (Moscow), No. 4> (1967),
p.40, See also Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p.258 for the 
Moscow Radio broadcast on November 29, 1967, calling for
resistance when the Central Government dismissed the 
Communist-led government of West Bengal and compare this 
with Moscow's attitude to the dismissal of the first 
Communist government in Kerala in 1959, mentioned in 
Chapter III, p,.-j^ ^
^^^See pp. 161 64
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political conditions in India appeared dangerously unstable.
In the fourth general elections in 1967, the Congress party
lost power in 9 states; coalition governments in these
states were being formed and dissolved frequently; at the
centre, Mrs, Gandhi held a bare majority in Parliament;
labour unrest manifested itself in strikes; peasant unrest
made its appearance in the Mao-style guerilla movement
known as Naxalbari movement in West Bengal, There was a
famine in the State of Bihar in 1966-1967,^^^ India
devalued her currency by 57•5% iu June, I966; it was
assumed that this was done under the pressure of the World
Bank and the United States,
Wliatever little ideological attraction that the
Soviet Union had in the Congress Party's socialism seemed
to be fast disappearing with Mrs. Gandhi's government
112revising the Industrial Policy Resolution whenever
economic considerations necessitated it. This was taken
113notice of in the Soviet press and journals.
Obviously the Soviet Union considered that in the
See Izvestia, June 13, 1967, for a report on the 
famine. It said that most writers conclude that you cannot 
explain the crisis without considering social factors: 
incomplete agrarian reform; feudal remnants in the villages; 
and technical backwardness, a legacy of British colonial 
domination.
IllKosygin was reported to have described the 
devaluation as a blunder to the then Indian Minister for 
Commerce in July I966, See Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., pp.71-85.
, ^^^See Chapter ..X, p.^lô '
^^^See Pravda, December 15, 19&5 and April 20, I966. 
See also N. Savelyev, op.cit., for a Soviet assessment of 
the growth of monopolies in India which "are now persis­
tently reaching out towards the levers of government power 
in an effort to change the domestic and foreign policies", 
pp.35-36,
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circumstances prevailing then, India was not a good bet.
In comparison with India, which was beset by political 
instability and economic maladies, Pakistan looked a 
haven of stability with Ayub Khan firmly in the saddle.
India once served the Soviet Union's purpose well; 
Her willingness to have friendly relations with Moscow, 
when the post-Stalin leadership was trying to break out 
of international ostracism in the mid-1950s was helpful 
to Soviet diplomacy. But Moscow's interests in the mid 
and late 19&0s demanded new tactics; India would not be a 
stumbling-block in her way. True, there was a furore in 
India in the wake of the Soviet decision to supply arms 
to Pakistan; some newspapers suggested making up with 
America, others, with C h i n a , T h e  Soviet Government's 
assessment of the world situation and India's strength, 
political, economic and military, must not have given any 
hints at the danger of its interests being affected by 
any diplomatic manoeuvres by India. The fact that India 
quietly accepted the change in Soviet Kashmir policy and 
abrasive comments in the Soviet media without any retal­
iatory steps must have convinced it of the correctness of 
its assessment.
The future Soviet policy on Kashmir has to be 
considered in the light of the developments in the recent 
past ; the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in August 
1971,^^^ Under article 10 of the treaty each high 
contracting party declared that "no obligation exists, 
nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself
^^^See pp.162 ” 65
ll^See Chapter VII^
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and any other State or States, which might cause
military damage to the other p a r t y " , T h i s  obviously
precludes Soviet military sales to Pakistan, Moscow
cannot ignore Indian objections to future military supplies
to Pakistan as it did in I968 without damaging its present
high standing in India.; it makes no sense to do that.
On the other hand there is strong evidence to suggest that
the Indo-Soviet treaty was induced by the fear of growing
Chinese might, increasing importance of Peking in
international affairs, and the existence of unresolved
territorial disputes between the Soviet Union and China
and India and China, Therefore, the Soviet Union must
still be interested in weaning Pakistan away from China,
To this end, Moscow has been making conciliatory
gestures to Pakistan, In his address to the 15th Soviet
Trade Union Congress, in March 1972, Brezhnev said that
the Soviet Union w^ as for having good relations with
Pakistan; that "no conflicts and no contradictions in
117interests divide us from that country", He also
pleaded for "the establishment of relations of lasting
peace and good-neighbourship among India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh. This would be a substantial contribution to
the normalisation of the political climate throughout 
X X ^Asia", The Soviet Union also began the construction
work on the Russian-aided steel mill in Pakistan in 
1 19December 1972, The USSR and Czechoslovakia also
^^^See Appendix I c
^^^Pravda, March 21, 1972, Complete text in CDS?, 
Vol.XXIY,No, 12, pp.7-8.
Times, January 2, 1973
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agreed to cancel that part of Pakistan's debt to them 
which was spent in Bangladesh while it was a part of 
Pakistan.
Pakistan must be equally interested in maintaining
friendly relations with Moscow because of its strong
influence both in Afghanistan as well as in India, the
countries with which Islamabad has problems, China's
121polite refusal to conclude a treaty with Pakistan
must have convinced Bhutto of the need for maintaining
good relations with Moscow. He visited the Soviet Union
in March 1972 and reported to his National Assembly that
he had "been able to normalise our (Pakistani) relations
122with this Great Power and neighbouring State",
It is always shrewd politics to have some leverage 
with both parties to a dispute in the interests of 
diplomatic manoeuvrability. If the Soviet Union develops 
sufficient diplomatic influence in Pakistan, she may try 
to play a quiet role in finding a solution to the Kashmir 
dispute,
India is willing to settle the dispute on the basis 
of the status quo, i.e., turning the cease-fire line into
1 2 0
The Hindustan Times, March 12, 1973.
l^^See Chapter VIII p. 275 - 
122 President Bhutto's Address to the National 
Assemblv, (Islamabad: The Department of Films and
Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1972), p.37* 
(Hereinafter referred to as President Bhutto's Address to 
the National Assembly), See also Chapter XI, p, 58) for a 
second visit to Moscow by Bhutto, See also P. Kutsobin 
and V. Shurygin, "South Asia: . Tendencies Towards Stability", 
International Affairs (Moscow), No. 4, (197 3), p.48. The 
article commends Bhutto for his new p o l i c y .
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12 3international border. If the Soviet Union can assist
both parties in finding a satisfactory settlement of the 
dispute, which is not easy, she will have outwitted China 
in the subcontinent.
In the event of the Soviet Union ignoring India's 
interests in Kashmir in pursuit of her own interests, there 
will be tensions in Indo-Soviet relations. In any case, 
if India is ready to forego economic aid, as she has to 
at some time or another, she can resist pressure from 
great powers. The great powers cannot force India into 
ceding Kashmir to Pakistan except by resort to force - 
a course of action which they are hardly likely to adopt.
See Chapter III, p. 106 At the Simla 
Conference in July 1972, Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto agreed to 
"settle their differences by peaceful means through 
bilateral negotiations, or any other peaceful means 
mutually agreed upon by them"; they also agreed to 
discuss "the final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir".
See The Times, July 4? 197.2,
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CHAPTER VI
GOA
Goa, Daman and Din, the three Portuguese colonial 
pockets lay on the West Coast of India® The total area 
of the Portuguese possessions was 1301 square miles; 
the population was 600,000.^ They were occupied by 
Portugal in 1510,^
PORTUGUESE TENACITY
The Indian desire to liberate them from Portuguese 
control was natural and legitimate, more so after the 
British and the French left the shores of India.
The Portuguese were insistent on holding on to these 
territories, as they were in regard to their African 
colonies until recently. This defiance of the spirit of 
the times was not helpful for an amicable settlement of 
the dispute. Salazar amended his constitution in 1951 
under which all Portuguese colonies were declared her 
overseas provinces in order legally to forestall demands
Russel Brines, op.cit., p.153.
2Jose Shercliff, "Portugal's Strategic Territories", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (January 1953)? p.324.
The French had even smaller pockets along the east­
ern coast of India. Their four pockets of territories 
together had an area of 195 square miles, with Pondicherry 
as the capital. See the Times Atlas of the World (London: 
Times Newspaper Ltd., 1968), p.xvi.
Under an agreement concluded on October 21, 1954? 
France transferred power over these pockets to India. The 
Indo-French Treaty of May 28, 1956, completed the legal 
process. Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents
1Q4.7-196a.~p.21.
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A
for independence.
With no free public opinion to restrain at home, 
and powerful sympathisers in NATO, Salazar could suppress 
passive resistance to colonialism in Goa with an iron 
hand.^
Nehru was for a negotiated settlement with Portugal.
In his reply to the Lok Sabha debate on Goa, Nehru said
on July 26, 1955? that if Portugal was prepared to accept
that her colonial pockets were de facto parts of India, he
would not mind if there was delay in their transfer to
India; but where the basic right was denied, there was no
use of argument.^ Portugal's position being what it was,
there was no possibility of a peaceful settlement.
Nehru waited for fourteen years for a peaceful
transfer of the Portuguese pockets; Salazar remained firm
in refusing to discuss the issue.
In the meantime, relations between Pakistan and
Portugal began improving; two years before the Indian
action in I961, Pakistan called India's claim to Goa 
y
spurious. At the NATO meeting in Paris in December I961,
^John K. Galbraith, op.cit., p.277. For a defence 
of the Portuguese colonial policy, see 0 , Salazar, "Goa 
and the Indian Union: The Portuguese View", Foreign
Affairs Vol. XXXIV, No.3- (April 1956).
^See Chapter III, p.j09 *
^India's Foreign Policy, p»115*
7
Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna
Menon's View of the World (London: Oxford University Press,
1968), p.125.
When the Indian action began, a Pakistani Foreign 
Ministry spokesman called it "naked militarism" and "the 
mask is off". The Times, December 20, I96I,
The Dawn, a Pakistani paper, claimed for Pakistan 
"full and legitimate share" in the Portuguese colonial 
pockets as Pakistan is an equal successor to the former 
*!British Indian Government". Quoted in The Hindu,
December 20, 196I,
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Nagueira, the Portuguese foreign minister was reported to
have asked Dean Rusk, the U*S, Secretary of State, to
suggest to Pakistan to move a couple of Pakistani divisions
to the border to frighten India, Rusk, however, rejected 
8the proposal. Faced as India was with territorial 
disputes with China and Pakistan, any Pakistani-Portuguese 
understanding was bound to be disconcerting for her.
Having put off action twice in the hope that 
Portugal's friends would force her to part with Goa*^  Nehru 
finally used force to liberate Goa, The Indian forces 
went into action on December l8, I96I.
THE BRITISH REACTION
Lord Home, Foreign Secretary, said in the House of 
Lords on December I8, I96I, "We utterly deplore this 
action", Wlaen the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, 
Duncan Sandys, read Lord Home's statement in the House of 
Commons, the Conservatives shouted "shame", John Hall 
(Conservative) said that this was "only the latest in a 
series of acts of aggression by India"; William Rees- 
Davies (Conservative) described Nehru's action as 
"hypocritical piracy"•
In reply to a question from Woodrow Wyatt (Labour) 
as to why the government was taking such a lofty view of 
Nehru's action disregarding the imprisonment of thousands 
of Goanese by the Portuguese, Sandys said, "I have no 
doubt Mr, Wyatt's words will be favourably received in
o
John K, Galbraith, 00^cit.; po282.
^The Hindu, December 31? 19&1
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Delhi, In the case of Suez, we referred the matter to 
the United Nations and discussed it patiently there for 
many months", The British government did not seem to 
have forgotten Nehru's denunciations during the Suez crisis. 
An editorial in The Times of December l8 , I961, 
described the Portuguese enclaves as an anomaly, but 
sarcastically reminded Nehru that he "has been the apostle 
of peaceful evolution. He has delivered homilies, 
lectures, admonitions, and reproofs to the rest of the 
world", A second editorial, on December 19? I961,
observed that the factors that had driven Nehru to this 
action could be traced far back; in this context, the 
editorial referred to Kashmir and Hyderabad, India's 
action in Goa was described as "ruthless aggression",
THE AMERICAN REACTION
J,K, Galbraith, the United States ambassador to
India, interceded with Nehru and got the Goa action put
off for"three or four days" ; Washington gave only "vague
diplomatic pressure" in r e t u r n . O n  December 18, I96I,
the day the action began, the State Department sent a
telegram to Galbraith asking him to request Nehru to stop
action in Goa for six months. In return they promised "a
12major effort" with the Portuguese, Nehru could not do
that at that stage because the action was on.
On December 19? I96I, the State Department
^^The Hindu, December 20, I96I,
^^AoMo Schlesinger Jr®, A Thousand Days: John F . 
Kennedy in the White House (London: Andre Deutsch, I966),
p.457,
^^John Kg Galbraith, oo*cit,, p,284.
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demonstratively cancelled a scheduled showing of a film
at a Department reception, on Nehru's visit to the United
States in November I96I. It would be inappropriate to
show the film at a time when the United Nations Security
Council was meeting on the Portuguese allegation of
1 3aggression, the Department announced.
According to Schlesinger, Salazar urged that, in 
the Security Council debate, the United States keep 
things to the "narrow issue of aggression"; and the 
State Department had assured the American ambassador in 
Lisbon that the United States would "not raise the colonial 
issue". This commitment, "undertaken without Whxte House 
consultation, tied our hands at the United Nations",
Galbraith sent a telegram to the State Department 
to the effect that the United States should drop support 
for the Portuguese colonies. But the American Embassy in 
Lisbon wanted that "we stand four-square by our Portuguese
ally".IS
Kennedy complained, indirectly, that the event took 
place so soon after Nehru's visit to the United States; 
he wrote, "I confess to a feeling that we should have 
discussed this problem".
States often find it expedient to proceed without 
consultation of even allies. The United States did not 
consult its closest allies in the Cuban Tftiissile crisis in 
1962; nor did Britain consult the United States on its
^^The Hindu, December 21, I96I*
Schlesinger Jr., op. cit,., p,45S- 
^^John K, Galbraith, op,cit,, p,276,
^^Quoted in AoM, Schlesinger Jr., op,cit., p,460
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17Suez action in 1956, As the United States had abstained
on the United Nations General Assembly resolution to end 
colonialism in i960, Nehru could hardly expect a 
sympathetic hearing from the United States. No useful 
purpose would have been served by prior consultation,
THE SOVIET ATTITUDE
Since the days of the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to
India in 1955? the Soviet Union had kept up her support to
India on the i s s u e , A  correspondent wrote in Pravda
in March 196I that what nourished the contempt with which
Portugal rejected the strong demands of India was the
20support of her senior partners in NATO,
In the Soviet-Indian joint communique issued at the
end of Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1961,
Khrushchev declared that he had a profound understanding
of and sympathy with the desire of the Indian people to
achieve the immediate liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu
21from Portuguese colonialism.
Mien the Indian army went into action, Brezhnev, 
then President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was 
on a state visit to India* He declared; "Here in Bombay
17During the Cuban'Missile, crisis of 1962, the 
allies, including Britain, were neither consulted nor 
informed by the United States until the blockade was about 
to take effect, Elie Abel, The Missiles of October (London: 
MacGibbon and Knee Ltd,, I969), p,82.
On the Suez crisis of 1956, the "United Kingdom 
decided against any consultation before taking this action" 
D,D, Eisenhower, op, c.it. , p,76,
^^See Chapter I?jj P.‘l28
l^See Chapter III, p.111 
2 n
Pravda, March 24? I961.
21"^Foreiffli Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-
1964? p.508.
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we feel with what satisfaction and enthusiasm the Indian
people receive the hews about the beginning of the
liberation of Goa and other territories on the Indian soil
22which were invaded by the Portuguese colonialists". " At
a later engagement, at the Indian Institute of Technology,
Brezhnev finished his speech and resumed his seat, and as
soon as his last slogan, "Long live the unbreakable
friendship between the peoples of USSR and India", was
translated into English, he sprang to his feet, raised
2 3his hand and shouted "Down with colonialism]"
In a letter to Nehru dated December 20, I961, 
Khrushchev said, "... This step by the Government of India 
is a serious contribution to the cause of the noble 
struggle of peoples for the full and immediate liquidation 
of the disgraceful system of colonialism.
"The Government of India displayed the maximum 
patience and self-restraint in its striving to restore 
historical justice and to liquidate the last bases of 
colonial rule on the soil of free India by peaceful means. 
However, the colonialists, leaning on the support of the 
NATO military bloc, ignored the people's will and created
9 2
The Hindu, December 20, I961.
2 3Ibid. At a civic reception in New Delhi on 
November 27, 197 3? during his second visit to India, 
Brezhnev reminisced of his visit to India 12 years ago and 
said he could not forget the joyous scenes at many places 
after the liberation of Goa. Mission of Friendship, (New 
Delhi; Soviet Land Booklets, Information Department of the 
USSR Embassy, 1973)? p*15* Thus, he subtly reminded the 
audience of the support that the Soviet Union gave India 
on all issues impinging on her national interests.
Mission of Friendship is a collection 'of speeches 
by Brezhnev, Mrs, Gandhi and others, and articles written 
by Soviet and Indian leaders and officials published after 
the Soviet leader's visit to India, (hereinafter referred 
to as Mission of Friendship).
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a constant threat to the peaceful labour of the Indian
-, n 24 people",
Khrushchev also sent a telegram to Nehru on
December 21, I96I, saying that the "resolute actions of
the Indian Government to do away with seats of colonialism
in its territory were absolutely lawful and justified".
He also conveyed the Soviet people's wishes for the success
of India's efforts for "the consolidation of her 
2 5independence"•
THE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
tht
The United States,^United Kingdom, France and 
Turkey sponsored a resolution in the Security Council on 
December I9? I96I, calling on India to halt hostilities.
The United States delegate, Adlai Stevenson, made a 
bitter attack on India, He said that that was a "fateful 
hour for the United Nations", He called Nehru, "an 
apostle of non-violence" and contrasted his action with 
his professions; and Mr, Menon, "so well-known in these 
halls for his advice on matters of peace and his tireless 
enjoinders to every one else to seek the way of compromise 
was on the borders of Goa inspecting his troops on the zero 
hour of invasion". The territories, Stevenson continued, 
had been Portuguese for 4OO years. What was at stake was 
not colonialism but a cold violation of an article of the 
Charter which forbade the threat or use of force, Nehru,
'^^ Izvestia, December 22, I961, Complete text in 
CDSP Vol. XIII, No, 51? p.28. See also S, Vishnevsky's 
strong attack on the West on its Goa policy in Pravda, 
December 20, I961.
^^The Hindu, December 23? I96I,
189
he reminded his audience, often said no right end could 
be served by wrong means. The Indian tradition of non­
violence had inspired the whole world, but this act of 
force knocked the ground from underneath the Indian
pronouncements, "We must ask for an immediate cease-fire,
2 6We must insist on withdrawal of the invading forces",
Stevenson did not have a word against colonialism
in his speech. In reply to Galbraith*s criticism of
this omission, Stevenson sent a telegram to him saying,
an adverse reference to colonialism in his speech to
the Security Council had been taken out of his main speech
27
by the State Department",
The Soviet delegate, Valerian Zorin, on the other
hand, opposed the Western resolution on the ground that it
sought to apply the principles of the Charter in a manner
contrary to the General Assembly*s resolution on the
2 8abolition of colonialism passed in i960. He wanted
sanctions against Portugal to force it to comply with the 
General Assembly resolution. When the Western resolution
29was put to vote, the Soviet Union vetoed it,
EVALUATION
The diplomatic benefits of the Soviet stand on Goa 
were obvious# Having moved a resolution for the
0 0
immediate abolition of colonialism in September i960, 
Khrushchev could not have missed the opportunity of causing
26The Hindu, December 20, I961. 
^^John K, Galbraith, on#cit,, p.292
See Chapter IV^  p, 128
^^The Hindu, December 20, I961,
20"See Chapter ppb 129-1 $0
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further embarrassment to the West. ' . ..
Indian public opinion was naturally incensed with 
the Western insensitivity to Indian feelings. The 
nationalists could interpret this as Western readiness to 
scuttle every Indian attempt at territorial unification; 
it had been the same in Hyderabad and Kashmir in the late 
1940s as in Goa in I961, However embarrassing Nehru*s
o 1
Goa action in the context of his penchant for sermonising
was to the Indian intelligentsia, this was an episode
which could not have endeared the West even to the most
22anti-Communist among them.
Nothing would have been lost by ignoring the event
after it has passed; Kennedy continued subtle
2 2recriminations. On the contrary, the Soviet Union
21Two weeks before he ordered the army to march 
into Goa, Nehru said, in a speech in Calcutta on December 
3, 1961, that India was committed to the solution of 
international disputes by negotiations. The world 
situation was such, he said, that a small conflagration 
somewhere might set off a universal conflagration. The 
Times, December 4y I96I,
22 .
The Hindu wrote in an editorial that "Whatever 
may be Portugal *s value to the West as a member of NATO, 
her role as a colonial power could not but be a liability 
to the West in its ideological warfare". See its 
edition December 21, I96I,
2 2Nehru wrote a letter to Kennedy after the event. 
He asked, "Why is it that something that thrills our 
people should be condemned in the strongest language in 
the United States?" He had been "deeply hurt", he 
wrote, by the "extraordinary and bitter attitude of Mr, 
Adlai Stevenson",
Kennedy replied that Nehru had his sympathy on the 
colonial aspect of the issue. He continued, "All 
countries, including of course the United States, have a 
great capacity for convincing themselves of the full 
righteousness of their particular cause. No country ever 
uses force for reasons it considers unjust ,,,, I fear 
that the episode in Goa will make it harder to hold the 
line for peace in other places, Quoted in A.M, 
Schlesinger Jr,, op,cit,, pp.459-460,
Icontinued to justify India* s action long after the event,
This contrast would make an impact on Indian public 
opinion, Masses may not understand ideological nuances, 
but they do feel the thrill of a nation*s victory; 
incorporation of Goa and other Portuguese pockets into 
India represented just such an experience for them; the 
Soviet Union took a sympathetic attitude, and the West a 
hostile one.
Besides the temperamental incompatibility between 
Nehru*s insistence on non-alignment and the equally 
insistent refusal of the United States to come to terras 
with it, the need for bases required the United States* 
appeasement of Portugal, It was too much to expect
India not to disturb Portuguese possessions for the sake 
of American national interests. The Americans probably 
feared that the Indian take-over of Goa would be a 
precedent for a similar Chinese action in Macao and 
Hong Kong; if nothing else, these islands served as 
listening posts for the West off the Chinese coast. This 
was hinted at in the press conference that Dulles gave,
 ^In his Report on the international situation made 
to the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 1962, Khrushchev, 
said: "India, its government, showed patience, put up
with this (Portuguese colonialism) for several years, 
then took and threw out the colonialists. Were they 
right in doing this? Of course they were!" The United 
States and United Kingdom, he continued, tried "to have 
India recognised as aggressor"; and "only the veto of 
the Soviet Union prevented this", Pravda, December 13, I962,
2 2The Portuguese islands of Azores and Cape Verde 
were strategically important to the United States, In 
1952 the United States concluded an agreement with 
Portugal for the use of the Azores bases in peace and war. 
See Jose Shercliff, oo.cit,, p.321,
1 9 2
in defence of his statement that Goa was a Portuguese
province, wherein he mentioned M a c a o ; K e n n e d y  also
alluded to this fear in his letter to Nehru in which he
said that the Indian action in Goa would make it harder
27to hold the line for peace in other places, China
added to their uneasiness with a habitual anti-colonial 
statement issued on December 19  ^ 1961^ in support of the 
Indian Action, in spite of tensions in Sino-Indian
n Q
relations,^
The Soviet Union gained a strong psychological
point over the West; unlike the West which taunted and
hurt Indians national psyche, the Soviets gave it solace
by strong support and comforting words. Even East
Germany, whose existence India was not prepared to recognise
until 1961, and with which India was not ready to have
diplomatic relations, in order not to hurt West Germany,
until almost a decade after the Goa episode, supported 
29India on Goa* For many Indians, this gave the
appearance thal^ while Russia was drumming up support for 
India, the West was making a concerted attack on her.
More important was the image building effect that 
the Soviet gesture to India could have had in the Afro- 
Asian world. The Anglo-American attitude to colonial
2 6The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII,
No, 860, (December 19, 1955), p*1007*
27See above, footnote 33,
3 8It described Goa as an inalienable part of Indian 
territory and said, "\diat calls for serious attention is 
that the imperialist powers headed by the United States 
of America openly oppose and unjustifiably censure the 
Indian Peoples just demand for recovering Goa and support 
continued Portuguese occupation of Goa". See The Hindu, 
December 21, I96I.
^^The Hindu, December 20, I961,
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and racial issues did not endear them to these countries. 
By their stand on the issue, the United States and UnitedA
Kingdom made it known to the Third World that between a
small European country and a large Asian country, they
would prefer the European, This feeling was bound to be
strengthened when the location of Goa is considered. It
was not useful to the Western defence system; there was
nothing to contain beyond Goa*s borders except India's
nationalism. Even Dulles agreed that Goa was beyond the
pale of NATO.^^ Nor was there a danger of Portugal
defecting to the Soviet camp in the event of the West not
standing "four-square by our Portuguese ally" on the issue
of Goa, The West could have guessed the Afro-Asian
reaction; yet they took their pro-Portuguese stand. On
their part, the Afro-Asian states introduced a counter-
4-1resolution rejecting the Portuguese complaint; the 
West remained unmoved. The former victims of colonialism 
could only conclude that the West was pro-colonial and the 
Soviet Union was anti-colonial.
In some cases, both super powers followed a negative 
policy during the Cold War era: the United States
automatically opposing Soviet policies and vice versa.
In the subcontinent, the United States followed this 
policy as far as India's territorial disputes with non- 
Communist states were concerned, Dulles came out in 
support of Portugal on Goa because of, what he considered, 
"the emotionalism which was sought to be created by the
^^The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, 
No, 860, p.1007.
‘^^ The Hindu, December 20, 19&1,
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Soviet rulers when they were in India",
That was the only moral justification for a negative 
policy of opposing the Soviet line even when it was right 
and in keeping with the spirit of the times. This policy 
continued for a long time after Dulles' death. The more 
the Soviet Union supported India, the greater the Western 
opposition; India, therefore, would come to depend more 
and more on Soviet diplomatic support in view of her 
disputes with her neighbours. In return, India would 
naturally take a sympathetic attitude to Soviet problems. 
The Soviet Union accepted parliamentary procedures at the 
United Nations to the extent that other major powers did. 
Therefore, the Afro-Asian votes at the United Nations 
would count, India, in those days, had some influence 
in the Afro-Asian bloc. By standing "four-square" by 
the more numerous Afro-Asian group on an issue which had 
a strong emotional appeal, the Soviet Union would try to 
be in its good books.
The Soviet Union did not face the dilemma that the 
West did in Goa: in the unlikely event of direct Western
intervention in Goa, the West would lose face with the 
emerging world; and if it did not give effective support 
to Portugal, there would be a rift in the Western camp.
The many authoritarian allies of America would grow scept­
ical about the usefulness of the pacts with the United 
States, The differences of approach to SEATO between 
Pakistan and the United States were evident even at the 
founding meeting; the United States considered it
4%See Chapter III, ,p, 110
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applicable to Communist aggression, and Pakistan, to all 
types of a g g r e s s i o n . P a k i s t a n  heartily supported 
Portugal. The Western verbal support to the latter must 
have disillusioned Pakistan with her allies' willingness 
to stand by her in what she considered to be her vital 
national interests. It is not unimportant to recall that, 
from 1961 onwards, Pakistan began improving her relations 
with China, and later, for some time, with Russia, partly 
for reasons of pressure on the West, and partly as an 
insurance against the vicissitudes of power configurations. 
Thus, the Western stand on Goa not only alienated 
the anti-colonial nationalist forces, but also failed to 
give complete satisfaction to some of their authoritarian 
allies. The West was the loser both ways; the Soviet 
Union again had won the approval of anti-colonial forces. 
The Goan episode left a dent in the Asian front of 
the United States, Pakistan realised that the United 
States would not intervene in the areas she considered 
unimportant; Goa was unimportant for the West ; so was 
Indian Kashmir, From her point of view, therefore,China 
would have had to be considered a better companion since 
she shared her enmity to India and had stakes in weakening 
India, The disarray in the Western camp must have given 
great satisfaction to Russia: fissures developed almost
simultaneously in the European, as well as Asian, theatres 
of the Western alliance; in Europe it was due to de 
Gaulle's defiant nationalism, in Asia, to Pakistan's 
obsession with India, On the other hand, the Soviet Union 
won the laurels of the Afro-Asian world for her stand on 
Goa,
43see Chapter VIII, pp.276=77.
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CHAPTER VII
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
While Kashmir and Goa were of peripheral importance 
for the Soviet Union, the Sino-Indian border dispute had 
a direct bearing on Soviet interests, for China raised 
identical points in her border disputes with India and 
the USSR, Therefore, a closer examination of the SinO- 
Indian border dispute is necessary in the context of a 
study of Indo-Soviet relations,
A HISTORY OF SINO-INDIAN 
RELATIONS
/ It is natural for fellow sufferers to support each
other. The Indian National Congress expressed its
sympathy with China and opposed the dispatch of Indian
troops there, by the British government, in a resolution
passed at Patna in 1925* A number of China days were
observed; Nehru went to China on a goodwill mission and
was received by General Chiang,^ In 1942, Chiang visited
India at the British government's invitation, met Gandhi
and Nehru, and expressed the hope that Britain would give
2
the Indians political power.
In the absence of imperial oppression which created 
a fellow feeling in the past, conflicting national interests 
were bound to complicate Sino-Indian relations in view of the 
long and undemarcated border.
^P.C, Chakravarthy, India's China Policy, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp.5-6,
■ ^Ibid,
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Having consolidated their position in China, the 
Communist leaders began talking of liberating Tibet in 
1950. Nehru wrote to Chinese leaders saying that while 
India would recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, she 
wished that Tibetan autonomy be maintained. In their 
reply the Chinese said that in any event they were "going 
to liberate Tibet". Nehru wondered: "From whom they
were going to liberate Tibet is, however, not clear".
The Chinese forces entered eastern Tibet in late 
October 1950, but paused for nearly 11 months before 
marching to Lhasa. A note from India, dated October 26, 
1950, called this "invasion of Tibet" deplorable.^ China 
was not deterred by such verbal protests.^
On November 7, 1950, Tibet appealed to the United 
Nations where India, contrary to its assurance to 
support her, backed out. On November 15^ 1950, El 
Salvador filed a request that the Tibetan appeal be put on 
the agenda; on November 24j 1950, when the request came 
up for discussion, Britain, obviously in consultation with 
India, asked for postponement,^
7
Five weeks before his death, Sardar Patel, in a 
prophetic letter to Nehru dated November 7? 1950, pointed 
to the strong language used by China in her replies to
9
Nehru's speech in Parliament, December 6, 1950.
India's Foreign Policy,(1971 ed.), p.302.
^Quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p.107.
^The Soviet attitude to neutrals being what it was 
in those days. The New Times charged that in collaboration 
with Anglo-American "imperialists", India was nursing some 
designs on Tibet. See J.A. Naik, op.cit., p.48.
^P.Co Chakravarthy, op.cit., p.31.
7
See Chapter III,footnote 20.
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Indian protests and observed: "It looks as though it is
not a friend speaking in that language but a potential
n 8 enemy".
The Sardar drew Nehru's attention to the "undefined 
state of the frontier and the existence on our side of 
a population with its affinities to Tibetans or Chinese 
have all the elements of potential trouble between China 
and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us 
that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that 
Communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any 
other ... Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism 
are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the 
Western Powers, The former has a cloak of ideology which 
makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of 
ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national and 
historical claims. The danger from the north and north­
east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist". 
He pleaded for a change in the Indian defence calculations 
of "superiority over Pakistan" to reckon with Communist 
China,^
After independence, the new Government of India 
took steps to safeguard its position in the Himalayan 
Kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim by renegotiating the 
British Indian treaties in July 1950, August 1949, and 
December 1950 respectively, Bhutan agreed to be guided 
by India in her external affairs; Sikkim continued to be 
an Indian protectorate with India having the right to
Q
See the text of the letter in the Appendix to 
D.V, Tahmankar, on.cit., pp.288-293.
^Ibid.
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station an army anywhere in S i k k i m , C h i n a  did not
seem to like these developments; The Peoples' Daily
accused India, in September, 1950, of expansionist
designs in the Himalayas,
Yet, Nehru pursued, with single-minded devotion, a
policy of wooing China. For the success of his non-
alignment policy, a positive response from the Communist
bloc was necessary; Stalinist Russia hardly ever
12responded to Nehru's overtures; he tried to break the
ice by cultivating Chinese friendship. Besides that,
short of inviting the United States to intervene, which he
was not prepared to do, it was difficult for India to
give effective assistance to Tibet, beset as she was with
1 2massive problems of her own,
! After the Chinese occupation of Tibet was complete, 
Nehru began appeasing China with vigour, India refused 
to participate in or sign the Peace Treaty with Japan 
made at the San Francisco Conference in September 1951*^^ 
On April 293 1954, the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet 
was signed. Under this, India gave up the right to 
station garrisons at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet, as also 
the right to maintain post and telegraph Installations,
^^For India's treaty with Nepal, see Girilal Jain, 
India Meets China in Nepal (Bombay: Asia Publishing House,
1959); p,164o For the treaties with Bhutan and Sikkim, 
see Foreign Policy of India; Text of Documents 1Q47-1961, 
pp. 4 and I69 respectively,
^^Quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, 00.cit.3 p,105*
^^See Chapter III, pg, 94 « 101 
12See George N, Patterson, on.cit., pp.287-288, for 
Nehru's views on this problem.
^^India wanted, among other things, that the treaty 
should specifically state that Formosa would be returned 
to China and that the treaty must be acceptable to all 
nations with interests in the Far East. See Werner Levi, 
Free India in Asia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1954), pp.120-122,
both secured after Colonel Younghusband*s expedition to
ci
16
Tibet in 1904.^^ The Panchsheel of the much-publi sed
and short-lived glory was a part of this agreement.
Thereafter began another short-lived phase of what 
Bhabani Sen Gupta called "a highly-romanticised non­
history", i*e. the slogan of 2000-year old Sino-Indian 
17friendship. During this apparently friendly phase,
Chou En-lai visited India four times between June 1954 
and January 1957*^^
But this phase did not last long. The inevitable 
national rivalries between large countries striving for 
influence began making their appearance to complicate 
Sino-Indian r e l a t i o n s , C o m m u n i s t  China had greater 
reason to dislike India's prominence in international 
forums in the 1950s because of her total exclusion there­
from, under the United States pressure, in spite of the 
United Nations Charter recognising her great power status. 
Besides national jealousies, there is a long and undefined 
border between the two countries; and a potentially 
explosive situation existed in Sino-Indian relations all 
along,
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER
India and China have a 2,896-kilometre border. The 
dispute between them involves 90,000 square kilometres of
•^^Wliite Paper I (New Delhi; Ministry of External 
Affairs, Government of India, I961), p,98. See also ppi 115-116 
(hereinafter referred to as White Paper I or II).
^^See Chapter III, p.105 
17* Bhabani Sen Gupta, op,cit., pp.21-22,
 ^ P.C. Chakravarthy, op.cit,, p,6o,
^^See K,M, Panikkar, In Two Chinas, (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1955); pp.26-27, and Werner Levi,
Free India in Asia, pp,37-38,
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territory in the eastern, 2,000 square kilometres in the
central and 33; 000 square kilometres in the western 
20sectors. The border between them was never demarcated
because until the l8th century there was no common border
between them; they were separated by two vast and sparsely
populated territories, Tibet and Uigur, which were
independent entities.
The Chinese forces first entered Tibet in 1718 to
restore the Seventh Dalai Lama and to drive away the
21Dzungar Mongols from Tibet, In 1720 the Manchus built
22a garrison in Lhasa.^ Every attempt to assert control
2 2over Tibet was resisted by the Tibetans. " China was,
therefore, satisfied with nominal control. In the wake
of the Chinese revolution in 1911; the Tibetans drove out
the Chinese forces from Tibet in 1912 and declared their
24.independence in 1913, China did not recognise the
independence.
The fear of Russian threat to her Indian empire made
2 SBritain encourage Chinese influence in Tibet. This
influence was to be respected only to the extent that the 
British interests were not affected. In 1904; an 
expedition was sent to Tibet under Colonel Younghusband*s
2 n
See Peking Review, No. 45 (November 8, I963); p.19*
^^Tsepdn W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet; A Political History, 
(Newhaven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), p.139,
^^Ibid,
23lbid., pp.198 and 204,
24ybid., pp.245-248.
2 c
Ibid, , p.196. In a letter to the Secretary of 
State for India, Lord Curzon described this Chinese 
Suzerainty "a constitutional fiction - a political affect­
ation" maintained because of "its convenience to both 
parties", Quoted, ibid,, p,219.
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command; this resulted in a convention being signed in
September I904 under which marts were established and
2 6garrisons stationed at Yatung and Gyantse.
When the British Indian Government decided to delimit
the border between Tibet and India in the eastern sector,
China was also invited to the Simla Conference in 1914;
along with Tibet. The Simla Convention recognised the
North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), a vast tract of tribal
land, as a part of India. The line that delimited the
border in this sector has been called the McMahon Line,
after the British representative at the Simla Conference.
By this time China had ceased to have even nominal control
over Tibet, having been driven out of Tibet in 1912,
27China, however, refused to ratify the Convention,
Aksai Chin, claimed and occupied by China, in the 
western sector, was a part of Ladakh, a region in the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh originally belonged to 
Tibet. Maharajah Gulab Singh of Kashmir defeated the 
Tibetans in 1842 and annexed Ladakh to Kashmir. This was 
confirmed by a treaty between Tibet and Kashmir in the same
28year. When Britain claimed suzerainty over Kashmir,
British India asked China to send a representative for
delimiting the border. The Chinese reply dated January
13; 1847; stated that the border was "sufficiently and
distinctly fixed so that it would be best to adhere to
29this ancient arrangement British India was not
o A
 ^Ibid., p.216.
27P.C. Chakravarthy, op.cit,, p.135.
9 8
Tsepon W.D. Shakaba, op.cit,, pp.177-179.
2Q
Waite Paper I, p<,26. China now claims that 80 per 
cent of Aksai Chin forms part of Sinkiang and that there 
was no representative of Sinkiang at the I842 conference 
between Kashmir and Tibet, See George N, Patterson, op. 
cit., p.191,
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unduly concerned about the borders with Tibet because 
Chinese control over Tibet was fictitious and Tibet was no 
threat to India; therefore, no further steps were taken 
on the issue,
THE BORDER TENSIONS
Wlien the maps published by Communist China began
showing large tracts of Indian territory as Chinese, India
raised the question with Peking, Every time India raised
the question, she was told by China that they were old
20maps and would be rectified in due course.
Hardly a few months after the birth of Panchsheel,
China sent a note to India, on July 17, 1954; alleging
that 30 Indian soldiers had crossed into Tibet at Wu Je
and called the act contrary to the spirit of Panchsheel,
India denied the allegation and accused' the Chinese of
21having entered Indian territory at Bara Hoti,
In September 1957; China announced the construction
lue.
of^Sinkiang-Tibet highway across Aksai-Chin. It was not
until this Chinese announcement that the Indian government
knew about the road. An Indian patrol party sent in
August 1958 to the area was detained by the Chinese, An
informal note from India sent in October 1958 brought this
22to the notice of the Chinese government. The Chinese
reply in November 1958 stated that the Indian patrol was 
detained as it entered Chinese territory, and that in the
20Nehru's speech in Lok Sabha, November 25; 1959* 
India's Foreign Policy (I96I edition), p.360.
^^White Paper I, pp. 1-3*
32ibid., pp.26-27.
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spirit of Sino-Indian friendship, it had been released
on October 22, 1958,^^
An earlier Indian note to China, dated August 21,
1958, had drawn the Chinese government's attention to a
map in China Pictorial, a Chinese magazine, which showed
large areas of Indian territory as Chinese, The note
also pointed out that Nehru had raised the issue with Chou
in , 1954 when he was in China and was told by the Chinese
leader that they "were based on old maps and that the
Government of the People's Republic of China had had no
time to correct them^ The note expressed the hope that
since the Government of China had been in power for so
many years, changes would be made in the maps,^^ The
Chinese reply, dated November 3, 1958, said that "the
reason why the boundary in Chinese maps is drawn
according to old maps is that the Chinese Government has
not undertaken a survey of China's boundary, nor consulted
with the countries concerned, and it will not make changes
3 5in the boundary on its own",
In a letter to Chou En-lai, dated December 14, 1958, 
Nehru referred to a conversation he had with him, when the 
Chinese Prime Minister was in India, in which he was told 
that China intended to recognise the McMahon Line since 
it was accepted by Peking in the case of Burma, Referring 
to the official Chinese reply of November 3? 1958, Nehru 
said: "I was puzzled by this reply because I thought
p.28.
34ibid., p.46.
p.47.
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there was no major boundary dispute between China and
India".36
Chou En-lai's reply in January 1959 exposed Nehru's
wishful thinking on Sino-Indian relations. He wrote that
"the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally
delimited"; that Aksai-Chin is a part of Sinkiang-Uigur
region; that all "this shows that border disputes do
exist between China and India"; that China had not raised
the border question before "because conditions were not
yet ripe for its settlement"; that China "finds it
necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards
the McMahon Line", though it has never been recognised;
and that the Chinese people expressed surprise at the way
the Sino-Indian border, "particularly its Western Sections",
27was drawn on Indian maps,
Chou En-lai implied that he was ready to recognise 
the McMahon Line in return for the Indian acceptance of 
Chinese claims to Aksai Chin in the west, China 
desperately needs the Sinkiang-Tibet highway, which runs 
through Aksai Chin, to control Sinkiang and Tibet; hence, 
her insistence on having Aksai Chin; Nehru was not 
ready to accept this.
From this time onwards, border incidents increased 
in frequency. The first shooting on the Sino-Indian 
border occurred on August 26, 1959; when China opened 
fire on an Indian post, Longju, killing one border police-
-7 Q
man, and injuring another; India had to abandon the post,
3 Ibid., pp.48-49.
3?Ibid., pp.52-54.
 ^White Paper II, I96I, p.6.
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In March 1959; the long simmering Sino-Tibetan 
tensions erupted; there was a revolt in Tibet, resulting 
in the flight of the Dalai Lama to India where he was 
given political asylum upon his arrival on March 31; 1959*" 
The sympathetic reaction in India to Tibetan events must 
have caused concern to China. In a statement in the Lok 
Sabha in April 1959? Nehru said that it .was not "upper 
strata reactionaries" who were solely responsible for the 
revolt in Tibet. It was "a strong feeling of nationalism" 
that resulted in the revolt; "any attempt to explain a 
situation by the use of rather worn-out words, phrases and 
slogans is seldom h e l p f u l " , H o w e v e r ,  the Government 
of India declared that it would not recognise any Tibetan 
government-in-exile in India,
In the meantime border incidents continued. On 
October 21, 1959? an Indian patrol party was fired upon 
by the Chinese near Kongka Pass in the western sector.
Nine Indian policemen were killed and 7 captured by China 
in the incident. In reply to an Indian protest, China 
claimed that the Kongka Pass was Chinese,
In 1959-1960 China built a second highway across 
Askai Chin, and "in the 196O map the boundary has been 
pushed forward to include a much wider area",^^
India had to devise some policy to contain this
'^ S^ee Frank Moraes, The Revolt in Tibet (New York; 
Macmillan Co., I96O), pp.3-15*
'^ F^oreign Policy of India, p, 324*
^^Quoted in P.C, Chakravarthy, op,cit,, pp,97-98* 
^^Wliite Paper II, pp,14-l6,
^^George N, Patterson, "Recent Chinese Policies in 
Tibet and Towards the Himalayan Border States", The China 
Quarterly , No. 12, (October-December I962), p,195*
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Chinese fenward thrust. Between August-Nsvenbor 1959*. the sray 
was wade respensible for the proteotlen ef the Nimslsysn herder# 
until then guarded by herder pelide*^ Nehru** rep]y t# Chinese 
enoreaohments was, what oatae te be oalied, the ferward pelioy,
Ohis was an Ineffeotlve and disastrous pelioy #f sending a 
handful ef ill'*equipped and ill'^repared soldiers to get into 
the i<y wastes of Aksai Chin to establish posts without proper 
logistio support. In this way, the Indian arsy established posts 
in a 2^500^^uare mile area.^ "^  How the Indian and Chinese armies 
found themselves face to faoe.
At this s^e, China proposed that both sides 
withdraw their foroas to a line 20 kilometres beyond the line of 
actual control. Nehru rejeotad this and proposed instead that 
both parties withdraw from areas claimd by the other and create 
a **n#~man*s land^ of about 12,000 square miles. Ihls was not 
acceptable to China. Border incidents continued to occur with 
increasing frequency^^^ until the war broke out in October, 1962.
Tïïâ BOR23BR WAR OP 1962.
The idiole basis of Nehru* s China policy was 
under attack in India; and he sought shelter under tougdi words.
On his way to Ceylon on October 12, 1962, he said at a 
press conference in New Bslhii ** I have given orders to 
the army to throww^  the Chinese out. The failure of his
44. Imme J. Khvic, W W * g  aagfft.ibK (Berkelyi diversity
of California Press, 1967), PP. I65-I69
45. Peking Review, No. 44# (November 2, I962), PP. 8-9.
46. Copal, **India, China and the Soviet Itolon", Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, Vol. XII, No.2, (August 1966), P. 247.
46A. There wore violent border incidents in JbnO and October 196O, 
April^ Way, dbijprt August and September 1961 # January, Nay, July, 
September (twice) and October (10), 1962. See V*B. Kamik, 
Chinese Invasion# Background and sequel (Bombayi Bharatiya Vidya 
Bhavan# 1966), PP. 274-76. : '
47 The Htndy. October 13, 1962.
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China policy seemed to have frustrated him so much that 
he did not realise that by such tough words he was only
giving the Chinese a pretext to attack, A Jen-min
Jih-nao editorial of October 14? 1902, declared, citing 
Nehru's statement, that a massive invasion of China was 
imminent,
The war started on October 20, 19^2, with massive
Chinese attacks all along the border. At the height of 
the war, China made 3 proposals on October 24? 1962, for 
ending the conflict: l) Both parties should agree to
settle the dispute peacefully. Pending a peaceful 
settlement, both parties should respect the line of
actual control along the entire border, and the armed forces
of.each side would withdraw 20 kilometres from this line 
and disengage. 2) If India agreed to the first proposal, 
China would withdraw her "frontier guards" in the eastern 
sector to the north of the line of actual control; at the 
same time, both China and India should undertake not to 
cross the line of actual control, i,e, the "traditional 
customary line" in the middle and western sectors,
3) Eventual talks between the Prime Ministers of India 
and China for the settlement of the border issue.
There was disagreement on what constituted the line 
of actual control; India and China interpreting it to 
suit their own interests, Chinese definition of the line 
was unacceptable to Nehru, who therefore rejected the
^^Peking Review, No, 42, (October 19, 1962), p.6,
See also Neville Maxwell, India's China War, (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1971)? for a pro-Chinese interpretation of 
the events leading to the war of I962 by a western writer,
^^Peking Review, No, 43? (October 26, 1962), pp.
5-6.
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the Chinese proposals, Anyway, there was nothing that
India could do on the front; her army suffered a 
disastrous defeat. Victorious China declared a 
unilateral cease-fire on November 20, I962, held all
the territory she wanted in the western sector and pulled 
back from the eastern sector in due course,
When the first shooting took place on the Sino- 
Indian border, on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to the 
United States, Tass issued a statement which took a neutral 
stand on the dispute. That was an indication that all
was not well with Sino-Soviet relations. It is, therefore, 
proper briefly to take a look at the state of their 
relations in the context of the study of Soviet attitude 
to the Sino-Indian border issue,
SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS
As was proved by Tito's revolt against Stalin in
1948; in countries where Communism came to power largely
due to indigenous efforts fealty to the Soviet Union would
not last long. The Chinese party came to power entirely
by its own effort. In his speech at the tenth party
plenum in October I962, Mao said that Stalin opposed, in
1945? the Chinese party staging a revolution; the Chinese
Ç 0
party did not obey him and the revolution succeeded,
Mao also said that even after the success of the 
revolution, Stalin did not trust China, fearing that the
^^The Hindu, October 29? 19Ô2,
^^The Hindu, November 21, 19&2,
52
'See pp. 217 = -]8.
Quoted in John Cittings, "The Great Power Triangle 
and Chinese Foreign Policy", The China Quarterly, No, 39?
(July-September 1969), pp,43-44.
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Chinese leader might become another Tito, When Mao went 
to Moscow to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union, "Stalin 
did not wish to sign"; he finally signed one after two 
months of negotiations. It was only after China's 
resistance to America: that Stalin trusted China,
A self-confident China's claim to solving the problem 
of building Communism in underdeveloped countries would 
not be conceded by the Soviet Union, for that meant 
conceding to China the leadership of the movement in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America,
Wlierever practicable, the Soviet Union would use the 
local parties as instruments of her diplomacy. For 
example, when the Soviet government praises the Indian 
government's socio-economic achievements in times of 
cordial relations, it means that the CPI is being given a 
hint that any activity which is likely to frustrate Soviet 
diplomatic goals would not be favoured during that period; 
conversely, when the Soviet Union feels that the Indian 
government's sentiments need not be unduly taken into 
consideration, as she seemed to have felt in 1968,^^ and 
begins to make critical comments about India, the CPI 
will be free to act. Therefore, Moscow does not want 
any competitors for the loyalty of parties.
In a large underdeveloped country like India with 
massive problems like poverty and unemployment, the
^^ Ibid.
^Donald S, Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956- 
1961 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1962), p.15.
^^See Chapter V, pp. ^£ 2
d n
Communist party can be particularly useful, as an instru­
ment of pressure for Moscow, if it is strong and united.
In certain states of India, the CPI had a fairly large
cj
following; it polled a substantial number of votes, 
Sino-Soviet differences had their impact on the CPI,
China encouraged leftist elements in the CPI first to 
attack the CPSU in the CPI;^^ and after the split in the 
party in Novernber-December 1964, when the two factions in 
the party emerged as two separate parties, viz,, the CPI 
(pro-Moscow) and the CPI (Marxist), China supported the 
latter. When the CPI(M) held its Congress in October- 
November 1964? the Peking Review wrote: "This Congress
of historic significance announced the expulsion of the 
renegade Dange^^ group from the Communist Party of India".
The Soviet Union could not have endeared herself to 
Peking by her proposal for a conference on the Middle East 
crisis of 1958 between the United States of America, USSR, 
the United Kingdom, France and I n d i a , A m e r i c a n  attempts 
to keep out China from all international councils were
57See Conclusions, p. 415 •
r o
At the World Federation of Trade Unions meeting 
in Peking in June 196O, the Chinese delegation attacked 
the Soviet Union, Hare Krisna Konar of the CPI, who was 
to join the leftist faction after the split in the party, 
was chosen by the Chinese to lead the attack on the CPSU 
in the CPI, He told this to the Calcutta District 
Committee of his party. See Donald S, Zagoria, op,cit., 
p.337.
^^Dange is the Chairman of the CPI,
^^Peking Review, No, 4? (January 22, I965), p.17. 
This support did not last long as the CPI(M) was not ready 
to accept the Chinese line on Kashmir and other issues.
See Bhabani Sen Gupta, "China and Indian Communism", The 
China Quarterly, No, 50, (April-June 1972), p,28l.
^^See Chapter III, p,112
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frustrating enough for Peking; the Soviet proposal 
ignored Chinese claims as well, Khrushchev's eagerness 
to promote India's stature for reasons of diplomatic 
expediency could not have been appealing to China consid­
ering the rivalries between Peking and New Delhi,
Then there were other factors which contributed to 
Sino-Soviet tensions like the "unreasonable demands 
designed to bring China under Soviet military control"; 
the Soviet refusal in 1959 to give technical data to make 
an atom bomb under an agreement made in 1957; Khrushchev's 
attempts to sell^two-China theory to Mao after his visit 
to the United States in 1959; the withdrawal of Soviet 
technicians from China in I96O; and the nuclear test ban 
treaty of 1963?
IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTES
In a lengthy article on the origin and development 
of differences between the CPSU and the Communist Party of 
China, Chinese spokesmen said in I963 that the Chinese 
party had never accepted the policy of complete negation 
of Stalin and the thèses on peaceful transition to
5 3
Socialism. They were "gross errors of principle".
The article referred to the objections to the theses made 
known to the Soviet leadership by Mao Tse-tung, Liu 
Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai,
62See "The Origin and Development of the Differences 
Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves - Comment 
on the Open Letter of the CC of the CPSU, Peking Review, 
No. 37 (September 13, I963), pp.7-20,
p-7. 
t b i d . , p.9.
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The encouraging rate of Soviet economic growth^^_ 
and near-parity with the United States in military 
s t r e n g t h , m a d e  the Soviet leadership increasingly self- 
confident. Therefore, while in his Report to the XX tk 
Congress Khrushchev declared, with necessary reservations,
67that "war is not a fatalistic inevitability", in his
Report to the XXiStCongress, he confidently declared that
there was no longer "capitalist-encirclement" of the
Soviet Union and that peace is possible even while
68capitalism exists. The United States'recognition of
Soviet power gratified the Soviet ego; awareness of the 
dangers involved in further Soviet expansion made the 
Soviet leaders realists; and they advocated peaceful 
co-existence. On the other hand Chinese national 
ambitions remained unfulfilled because of American hostility 
to her. Therefore, any rapprochement before her 
grievances against the United States were redressed was 
unacceptable to Peking,
China naturally insisted on ideological equality.
For instance, a Jen-min Jih-pao editorial on January 27, 
1963, pleaded for unity in the international movement on 
the basis of the 1957 Declaration and the i960 Statement.
^^See Chapter I, p. Jt .
^^In a speech in Obnova, Bulgaria, Khrushchev told 
his audience, with obvious satisfaction, that Kennedy 
himself told him that the United States and USSR were 
military equals. The Soviet leader, however, hastened to 
add that the USSR was stronger than the "imperialists", 
Pravda, May 19, I962,
^^See Chapter I, p. 53
68,,., .I Did p p4 #
SI 4
It said that these two documents were unanimously agreed 
upon by the parties and "are binding on all the fraternal 
Parties •«• No single Party or group of Parties have the 
right to change them or to declare them null and void”,
The editorial went on to say that ”it is impermissible to 
impose the programme, resolutions, line or policies of any 
one Party on other fraternal Parties, or to require other 
fraternal Parties to obey the irresponsible, self­
contradictory statements made by the leader of a Party
who talks this way one day and that way the next as if
7 0those statements were imperial decrees,.,”,
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
It is now known that China made irredentist demands
on'Russia as early as 1954, Mao told a delegation of
socialist deputies of the Japanese Parliament in July
1964 that there are "too many places occupied by the
Soviet Union” and that when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited
China in 1954, the Chinese leaders took up the question of
Mongolia but they (the Soviet leaders) refused to discuss 
71it, Mao then recounted the territories occupied by
Russia from Japan, Finland, Poland, Germany, and Rumania
7 2and added that they "took everything they could”.
China, he said, had not yet presented her "account” for 
the territories lost to Russia, In regard to the Kurile
^^Peking Review, No. 5; (February 1, 1963)5 p,9«
^^Ibid.
71Qpoted in Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in 
the Sino-Soviet Conflict; Documents and Analysis (Stanford 
The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace,
Stanford University, 1965), p.42,
^hbid.
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Islands, Mao said, "the question is clear as far as we
7 3are concerned - they must be returned to Japan",
In a separate interview with a member of the
Japanese Parliament, Chou En-lai said in July 1964 that in
an interview with "Premier Khrushchev in January 1957, I
requested that the USSR make proper arrangements for the
territorial issues covering Japan, China, the Middle East,
and the Eastern European countries including Finland, I
could not get a satisfactory answer from him then, but the
announcement of the issue was kept secret because the
Sino-Soviet dispute was not public at that time,"^^
According to Doolin, the total Chinese territorial
claim on Russia is of the order of 600,000 square miles,
Thus China not only made territorial demands on Russia,
but also egged on other countries to make similar demands
and extended unilateral support to them. Had so many
demands from so many countries materialised, it would have
been a great diplomatic embarrassment to the Soviet Union,
Pravda replied in September 19^4: "No one disagrees:
the Czarist Government carried out a predatory policy
just as the Chinese Emperors carried one out themselves
7 6to the extent of their abilities",
Khrushchev also made a statement, also to a Japanese 
Parliamentary Delegation in September I964, He said that 
the Chinese emperors seized Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet 
and tried to conquer Korea, He also reminded his guests
f^ibid.
^^&noted. Ibid,, p.45,
7 5Ibid,, see the foreward to the book, --
Quoted, ibid,, pp.51-52,
that the people of Sinkiang are ethnically different from
the Chinese, He added that "the only difference being that
the stronger aggressors grabbed more and the weaker one 
77grabbed less".
Thus, from the Soviet point of view, China was a 
diplomatic nuisance, ideological challenge and territorial 
menace. Therefore, the Soviet Government could not have 
supported the Chinese claims on India; that would have 
created a dangerous precedent* Moscow could not uphold 
Indians case either for fear of doing irreparable damage 
to bloc Unity in those early stages of the split,
TH£ SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE SINO-INDIAN 
BORDER DISPUTE
i In February 1957, Chester Bowles had a lengthy
discussion with Khrushchev in Moscow; much of it centred
on India. IVhen Bowles said to Khrushchev that the
Soviet Union and the United States of America "might
ultimately face a common problem in regard to China, he
78did not disagree". As mentioned above, as early as
1954 Mao had raised the question of the propriety of
Soviet control of Mongolia, and in 1957 Chou En-lai had
asked Khrushchev to make territorial concessions to the
countries whose territories Russia had occupied over 
7 9centuries. Therefore, Khrushchev had some weighty
reason for not disagreeing with Bowles,
In Spite of such problems with and apprehensions of
^^Quoted, ibid,, pp.70-71.
7 RChester Bowles, "America and Russia in India", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLIX, No, 4, (July 1971), p.637* 
79cSee pp. 214 - 15
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China, the Soviet Union adopted an attitude to the Sino-
Indian border problem which can only be described as a
riddle. The Soviet press did publish some articles
critical of China; Khrushchev did blame China for the
tensions and violence on the border; but the Indian
claims were never upheld, Soviet atlases continue to
8 0show the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian border.
When the Tibetan revolt took place in March 1959?
the Soviet press echoed Chinese denunciations, A
correspondent wrote in Pravda that after the Communists
came to power in China, the liberation of Tibet was
peacefully solved", In spite of the Chinese government
fully observing the 1951 agreement which guaranteed
autonomy, the reactionary "leadership of Tibet entered
into collusion with imperialist elements abroad and,
against the will of the Tibetan people, took the path of
open betrayal of the motherland by staging an armed 
81uprising", The article repeated the Chinese charge that
a centre for directing the uprising was set up in
8 2Kalimpong in India,
When the first of the shooting incidents took place 
in the eastern sector of the border, Tass issued a
8 0Atlas Narodov Mira Glavnoi Ooh-prava, (Moskva ; 
Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1964), pp,Ô0-63, This version was 
repeated in 1972. There was criticism of this Soviet 
action in the Indian Parliament, See below 242. .O
Pravda, March 30, 1959. Complete text in CDS?, 
Vol. XI, No, 13, p.20,
8 2Ibid, See also Pravda, April 5, 1959 and 
Izvestia, October 8, 1959, for more pro-Chinese articles 
on Tibet,
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statement on September 9, 1959, Referring to the
western versions of the incident, the statement said,
"Those who inspired it are trying to discredit the idea
o f  p e a c e f u l  c o - e x i s t e n c e  of s t a t e s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l
systems and to prevent the strengthening of the Asian
peoples' solidarity in the fight to consolidate national 
8 3independence". The statement continued that on the
eve of Khrushchev's visit to the United States, the 
incidents were being exploited by those circles in the 
United States who were opposed to lessening of tensions.
It went on it "would be wrong not to express regret that 
the incident on the Chinese-Indian boundary took place",
The Soviet Union has friendly relations with both China 
and India, "The Chinese and the Soviet peoples are tied 
together by indestructible bonds of fraternal friendship 
based on the great principles of socialist internationalism. 
Friendly co-operation between the USSR and India according 
to the ideas of peaceful co-existence is developing 
successfully". The Soviet leaders expressed the conviction, 
the statement said, that both parties would "settle the 
misunderstanding" taking into account their mutual interests
Q r
in the spirit of traditional friendship,
K h r u s h c h e v  w a s  t o  a r r i v e  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o n  
S e p t e m b e r  l6, 1959, w i t h  h o p e s  o f  r e a c h i n g  s o m e  u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g  w i t h .E i s e n h o w e r . T h e  s h o o t i n g  o c c u r r e d  at a
m o s t  i n o p p o r t u n e  t i m e  f r o m  h i s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w .  So, h e
•^^P r a v d a , S e p t e m b e r  10, 1959, C o m p l e t e  t e x t  i n  C D S P ,  
V o l .  X I ,  No. 36, p . 14.
84-
85-'Ibid.
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exhibited his displeasure with China by this statement.
Unlike the Soviet press comments on the Tibetan revolt,
there was not a word of support for China in this statement,
nor reproachful words for India, as there were, by
8 6implication, in the comments on Tibet. The Soviet
Union, thus, altered its policy within six months and 
served notice to China that Moscow's support would not be 
automatic. This was a very unusual statement for a 
socialist country to make on a dispute between a socialist 
and a non-socialist state. As China was to say, this
Q ly
statement advertised the schism in the camp,
8 8On the Kongka Pass firing incident, the Soviet
press carried both the Indian as well as the Chinese 
89versions.
In his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet 
on October 31, 1959, Khrushchev declared that peaceful 
co-existence of states with differing social systems 
assumed elements of mutual concessions and mutual 
consideration of interests, since otherwise normal 
relations could not be built among s t a t e s , H e  
continued, "we greatly regret the incidents that have 
recently occurred on the borders of two states friendly 
to us ,•, we are especially aggrieved that these incidents
^ See p. 2YI
• See Summary, p. i, 
o o
See p.206'
Q  Q
See the Tass dispatches from Peking and New Delhi, 
dated October 27, 1959? in Pravda, October 29, 1959. 
Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XI, No. 43, pp.31"32
^^Izvestia, November 1, 1962, Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol. XI, No, 44, p.4.
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have resulted in losses of life on both sides... It
would gladden us if there were no repetition of the
incidents on the Sino-Indian border and if the frontier
disputes were settled through friendly negotiations to the
mutual satisfaction of both sides",
China revealed in 1963 that in a verbal notification
to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,
on February 9, I96O, the Central Committee of the CPSU hcid
stated that ^one cannot possibly seriously think that a
state such as India, which is militarily and economically
immeasurably weaker than China, would really launch a
military attack on China and commit aggression against it";
that China's handling of the issue was "an expression of
a narrow nationalist attitude"; and that "when shooting
was heard on the Sino-Indian border on the eve of N,S.
Khrushchev's trip to the United States, the whole world
considered this to be an event that could hamper the
Q 2
peace-loving activity of the Soviet Union",
On June 22, 1960, Khrushchev told the head of the
Chinese delegation to the Rumanian Party Congress: "I
know what war is. Since Indians were killed, this meant
that China attacked India", He also added, "We are
Communists, for us it is not important where the frontier 
93line runs",
^Vhen the Sino-Indian war broke out in I962, the 
Soviet Union was locked in a potentially dangerous conflict
91lbid,, p.8.
Peking Review, No, 45. (November 8, I963), p, 19*
93ibid., p,20.
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with the United States in the Caribbean, In an editorial
on October 24, 1962, on the developments in the Caribbean,
the Chinese paper Jeri-min Jih-pao denounced Kennedy and
the United States, and assured Cuba of the firm support of
the entire socialist camp and of all peace-loving
countries and peoples of the w o r l d " , A  Chinese
government statement on October 25, I962, referred to the
Soviet government statement of October 23, I962, which
threatened "to smash the aggressive schemes of the U.S.
imperialist bloc and said that China "fully supports
this just stand of the Soviet Government",
Until Moscow agreed to Kennedy's terms for the
settlement of the missile crisis, on October 28, 1962,^^
it was hard to predict what would happen. Therefore,
Khrushchev had to make concessions to China to secure her
support. Hence, forgetting all past homilies on the
97insignificance of borders,^ the Soviet press came out in 
support of the Chinese proposals of October 24, 1962, for 
ending the hostilities and composing the differences on the 
Sino-Indian border.
An editorial in Pravda on October 25, I962, repeated 
cliches like communist peace policy and the West’s war- 
' mongering and declared that the Sino-Indian border problem 
was a "legacy" from the "British colonialists, who carved 
and recarved the map of Asia at their pleasure. The 
notorious ’J'lcMahon Line" was imposed on the Chinese and
^^Peking Review, No, 43 (October 26, I962), p.l6.
"^^ Peking Review, No. 44 (November ,2, I962), p,5.
9^Elie Abel, op,cit., p,l86,
97cSee p. 221
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the Indian people; it was never recognised by China", "
The editorial emphasised the bonds of common ideology
between China and the Soviet Union and said that the
"combined forces of the socialist camp securely guarantee
every socialist country against the encroachment of
9 8imperialist reaction",
In an apparent warning to the CPI, the editorial 
said that the "fact must be faced that, with the exacerba­
tion of relations of the kind now occurring, even some 
progressive-minded people may succumb to nationalistic 
influences and take a chauvinistic stand. But in 
questions of the fight for peace, the settlement of 
international disputes, this sort of attitude does no 
good. These matters call for an internationalist approach, 
for actions aimed not at fanning animosity and exacerbate
the conflict but at settling it by peaceful means, through 
99negotiations",
The editorial continued that the Soviet people "see 
the statement of the Chinese government as evidence of 
sincere concern over relations with India and eagerness to 
bring the conflict to a halt. The proposals made by the 
Chinese government are in our opinion constructive.
Without impairing the prestige of the parties, they 
represent an acceptable basis for opening negotiations and 
peacefully settling the disputed issues with regard for 
the interests of both the Chinese People's Republic and 
India"
^Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XIV, No. 43, pp.17-18
99ibid.
l°°Ibid.
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Izvestia also wrote an editorial on October 26,
1962, in the same tenor,
In so writing, the Soviet press completely ignored
the repeatedly declared Chinese readiness to recognise
McMahon Line in return for the Indian recognition of their
claim to Aksai Chin in the West, Both Pravda as well as
Izvestia were vehement in their denunciation of the
McMahon Line,
In thus ignoring the Indian sentiments, Moscow must
have been emboldened by, what Werner Levi called, the
non-alignment of the non-aligned in the Sino-Indian 
102conflict. Only Malaya and Cyprus clearly supported
103India; Yugoslavia did as much by her pro-Indian press
c o m m e n t s , T h e r e f o r e ,  there was no fear of Moscow
!
losing face with the non-aligned.
But during the Sino-Indian war, the Soviet Union 
made a friendly gesture to India by agreeing to her 
setting up a consulate at the Black Sea port of Odessa, 
Then, only Poland and Czechoslovakia had consulates in 
Kiev; the only non-Communist country to have a consulate
See the complete text, ibid,, pp,17-18,
102Werner Levi, "Indian Neutralism Reconsidered", 
Pacific Affairs, Vol, XXXVII, No, 2, (Summer 1964), p.147.
^^^The Hindu, October 29, 1962,
^^^An editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao, on December 3, 
1962, referred to various Yugoslav journals' support to 
India and declared that the Chinese people "are firmly 
opposed to any "mediation" in which that group takes 
part", Peking Review, No, 49 (December 7, 19 62), p.8* 
This was a warning against Yugoslav participation in the 
Colombo Conference of non-aligned states which was 
convened to mediate in the Sino-Indian dispute,
Yugoslavia did not participate.
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was Turkey, at Batum on the Black Sea; China had none in 
the Soviet Union; and the three Soviet consulates in 
China were closed not long before the Sino-Indian war.
The news from London, dated November 15, I962, said that
special significance was being attached to the opening of 
the Indian Consulate and the publicity being given to it 
in the Soviet Union,
On the arrest of Communists in India during the 
Sino-Indian war, Pravda quoted the Hungarian, Italian and 
British Communist Parties' criticism of the act and 
declared that the Soviet Communists were solidly behind 
these utterances. It spoke of the letters from the 
members of the CPSU "condemning the mass repressions 
against the fraternal Indian Communist Party", The
CPSU could not have allowed the Chinese party to don the 
robes of the. guardian of the persecuted Communist parties 
all over the world, and sit idly by.
However, the moment the Cuban Tm.ssile crisis was
107resolved, Sino-Soviet polemics reappeared; and the
Soviet Union ceased to mention the Chinese proposals of 
October 24, 19^2,for the settlement of the Sino-Indian 
dispute. An editorial in Pravda in the first week of 
November I962, accused the West of "pouring oil on the 
flames" by offering weapons to India, and pleaded for a
^^^The Hindu, November 17, 1962,
^^^Pravda) November 30, I962, Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol, XIV, No, 48, p.24.
107An editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao was to say that 
during "the Caribbean crisis, they (Soviet leaders) spoke 
a few seemingly fair words out of considerations of 
expediency"; that when the crisis was over, "they went 
back on their words". See Peking Review, No, 45
(November 8, I963), pp.18-27.
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cease-fire and unconditional negotiations between India
10 3and China to settle the Sino-Indian border dispute.
In this editorial, the Chinese proposals of October 24,
1962, were neither mentioned nor extolled, as had been 
done in the Pravda and Izvestia editorials of October 25, 
and October 26, 1962, respectively,
Then, the Chinese government issued a statement on 
November 30, I962, on Cuba, It praised Castro for 
"upholding the revolutionary principle of not begging the 
imperialists for p e a c e " , I n  other words, the statement 
taunted Moscow for "begging the imperialists for peace", 
Khrushchev replied in kind. In his report on the 
international situation, made to the Supreme Soviet, on 
December 12, I962, he said that the peaceful settlement of 
the Caribbean crisis met with "loud cries of dissatisfac­
tion" from people who call themselves Marxists-Leninists 
"although their actions have nothing in common with 
Marxism-Leninism". He said that ",,, some go so far as to 
allege that the Soviet Union surrendered to imperialism",^^^ 
Pointing to Hong Kong and Macao, Khrushchev taunted: 
"The aroma coming from these places is not a bit better 
than the smell from colonialism in Goa", But it would 
be wrong to prod China for untimely action, "If the 
government of the Chinese People's Republic tolerates Macao 
and Hong Kong, evidently there are weighty reasons for
^^^Pravda, November 5, I962. Complete text in CDSP,
Vol, XIV, No. 43, p.18.
^®^See pp. 221 - 25 ^
^^^Peking Review, No, 49 (December 7, 1962), p,9*
111 Pravda, December 13j I962. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XIV, No. 52, pp.3-8.
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doing so".
Referring to the "deplorable events" along the 
Sino-Indian border, Khrushchev reaffirmed the Soviet stand 
on the issue as contained in the Tass statement of 
September 9, 1959»^^^
While he was glad about the unilateral Chinese 
cease-fire, it ’^may be asked: How can you claim that this
was a reasonable step, when it was taken after so many 
lives had been laid down and so much blood shed? Would 
it not have been better if the sides had not resorted to 
hostilities at all?
"Some are already saying that China, if you please, 
ceased hostilities apparently because India began to 
receive support from the American and British imperialists. 
Consequently, say such people, the Chinese People's 
Republic felt that if the conflict were to develop into 
a major war that would require even greater sacrifices.
"Yes, evidently the Chinese friends took account of 
the situation, and this again speaks for their wisdom and 
awareness that when war breaks out between friendly 
neighbouring states the imperialists always try to benefit 
by it".114
About the arrest of Communists in India, he said 
that if the war continued, even the pacifists would be 
placed in this category, "Here you have a debauch by 
reactionary forces, by the most brazen militarists and 
reactionaries",
ll^Ibid. 
^^^Ibid,
^^^Ibid.
ll^Ibid,
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He continued, "Did China ever set herself the aim 
of invading India? No, we reject such assertions as 
slander. And, of course, we likewise absolutely do not 
accept the idea that India wanted to start a war with" 
China".
During the war, the Soviet Union exhibited vacillation 
on the MIG deal under which Soviet technical and economic
aid was to be given to set up a factory for making MIG21
117 *planes in India. Even the delivery of 12 MIG21 planes
118under an agreement made in July 1962 was delayed.
Obviously, the Soviet leaders did not like to burn their 
bridges with China prematurely on account of India,
However, they tried to retain goodwill for their country 
in India* For instance, the then President of India, Dr,
S. Radhakrishnan, told Professor Gordon that Russia 
threatened to stop oil supplies to China to force her to 
end the war,^ It is probable that the Soviet leaders
either leaked this news out or told the Indian leadership 
to convince them of the constructive role they played 
behind the scene.
With the Caribbean crisis out of the way, more events 
occurred in the Soviet Union which could be interpreted as 
friendly gestures to India, On June 27, 1963, four
ll^Ibid,
117L o m e  J, Kavic, op, cit, , p. 200,
^^^Ibld., p.1 0 8.
Suotecl in J.A. Naik, op.cit. , p. 157. V.K.K.
Menon said: I have no doubt in my mind that one of
the conducive factors behind the Chinese withdrawal was 
the Soviet unwillingness to give them support, not only 
military but in fuel and other things", Quoted in 
Michael Brecher, India and W orld Politics: Krishna Menon's 
View of the World, p.169.
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Soviet citizens smashed the photo-display windows at the
Chinese Embassy in Moscow. Among the photographs on
display were those of release of Indian prisoners of war
by China and of the "persecution of Chinese nationals' in
India by the Indian Government", to use HSinhua News
120Agency's words.
On July 25, 1963, Khrushchev, along with his wife 
and daughter, attended a luncheon in honour of Mrs.
Gandhi at the Indian Embassy in Moscow, This was an 
extraordinary act of courtesy on the part of the Soviet 
head of government and party, for in those days she had 
no official position.
However, Moscow also made friendly gestures to 
Peking, On December 17, 1963, the Soviet Union voted 
against an Afro-Asian resolution to amend the United 
Nations Charter to enlarge the Security Council membership 
from 11 to 15 and that of the Economic and Social Council 
from 18 to 27, to give greater representation to the 
Third World in the United Nations bodies. The resolution 
was, however, passed in the General Assembly. On 
December 22, I963, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued a statement explaining wby it had voted against.
It said that any amendment to the Charter needed the 
support of two-thirds members of the United Nations, 
including that of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council, The United States was to be blamed for 
the abnormal situation of the Chiang "clique" representing
Quoted in The Hindu, July 2, I963. The Chinese
news agency called it "a planned act of sabotage", and a 
"flagrant provocative incident disrupting Sino-Soviet 
friendsliip", Ibid,
229
China on the Security Council. The Soviet Union would 
support the enlargement if the People's Republic of China 
consented to it. The statement continued that in reply 
to a Soviet query, China said that, under the then 
existing conditions, she could not assume obligations; 
that she did not approve of enlargement, but, preferred, 
instead, just distribution of the available seats in the 
United Nations bodies. Therefore, the Soviet Union 
wanted postponement of the vote; the Afro-Asian bloc 
insisted on it; so, the Soviet Union voted against the
T . . 121resolution.
This apparently sweet and reasonable Soviet gesture 
towards China could be put to good diplomatic use by 
Khrushchev* The burden of rejection would be borne by 
China, if she rejected the proposal outright, and the 
Third World would take note of that, Khrushchev could 
also tell the leaders of the international movement that 
he was even prepared to court unpopularity among Afro- 
Asian countries for the sake of China, and yet China 
remained unappeased.
But in February I964, Suslov spoke some tough words. 
In his report to the Central Committee on the 14th of that 
month, he said: "It is a fact that precisely at the height
of the Caribbean crisis, the CPR government extended the
121 Pravda, December 22, 19&3. The Soviet statement 
also referred to an editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao on 
December I8, I963, which said that if redistribution
failed to satisfy the Afro-Asian group, then China would 
support the amendment to enlarge the United Nations bodies, 
and said that if this corresponded to the Chinese 
government's view, and if it would confirm this, then the 
whole situation would change. Ibid,
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armed conflict on the Chinese-Indian border. No matter
how the Chinese leaders have tried since then to justify
their conduct at that time, they cannot escape
responsibility for the fact that through their actions
they in effect aided the extreme reactionary circles of
imperialism, aggravating an already complex and difficult
1 29
situation in the world"•
However, the Soviet Union continued to waver in 
fulfilling her commitment to India on the delivery of MIG 
planes under the July 1962 agreement. In the spring of
1964, 6 MIG planes arrived "devoid of such essential
equipment as fire-control radar" and with "meagre
12 3armament and a severely limited combat radius", It is
hard to establish if there were internal pressures on 
Khrushchev not to exacerbate Soviet relations with China 
on account of India, But this caution could always be 
cited by him in the deliberations of the leaders of 
international movement as a proof of his consideration for 
Chinese sensitivities.
The interviews granted by Chou En-lai and Mao Tse- 
tung to Japanese parliamentarians in July I964 must have 
decided the i s s u e , S o m e t i m e  that summer, due 
probably "to virtually irrevocable split with Peking", the 
Soviet Union agreed to build the MIG factory by the end of
1965, She also promised to keep India informed about 
subsequent improvements in the designs and equipment of
1 22
Pravda, April 3, 19&4* Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol, XVI, No. 13, p.11,
12 3"Lome J, Kavic, op, cit, , p. 200. 
l^^See pp, 214 - 15
125MXG21S.
After Khrushchev's ouster, there were rumours to 
the effect that he was criticised for economic and 
military aid to India. • Kosygin told Mrs. Gandhi, when 
she visited Moscow as Minister for Information and
126Broadcasting, that there was no truth in the reports,
EVALUATION
Soviet policy on the Sino-Indian border conflict 
changed according to Soviet diplomatic needs, Moscow 
adopted a neutral stand on the issue on the eve of 
Khrushchev's visit to the United States, where he hoped 
to come to an understanding with Washington on ending the
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East-West confrontation; it took a pro-Chinese stand for 
the duration of the Caribbean crisis; and once the crisis 
had passed, Soviet comments on the border conflict were
128unfriendly to China, By these turns and twists in
her policy, the USSR probably expected China to cease 
her attacks on Moscow, at least to get its support on the 
border issue. But China remained implacable. On the
contrary, Nehru was ready to give credit to the Soviet
Union for every small concession that she made on the 
issue; he w^ as even ready sympathetically to understand
Soviet inability to remain neutral on the issue during the
12 5L o m e  J, Kavic, on. cit, , p,200,
126The Hindu, November 1, I964. At this meeting he
was also reported to have reiterated Soviet support to 
India on Kashmir, Ibid, But Soviet Kashmir policy did
undergo a change. See Chapter iV, PP, 153 ."“ 159
^^^See p, 218 
128 -  _See pp, 221 223
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Caribbean crisis in view of her treaty obligations and 
120
interests, a concession he never made to the West.
He made every effort to keep the Soviet Union in
good humour. Commenting on the Tass statement of
September 9? 1959? Nehru said at a press conference in
New Delhi on September 11, 1959î "Considering everything
the statement was a fair one and an unusual one for the
Soviet Government to sponsor". He added, "I appreciate 
1 30it very much", Such appreciation was not forthcoming
from China even when the Soviet press openly supported
the Chinese claims at the height of the missile crisis.
On the next day, September 12, 1959? in his reply
to the debate in the Lok Sabha, Nehru said:
I would beg of you not to think of this matter
in terms of Communism or anti-Communism, The
House must have seen the statement issued more or
less on behalf of the Soviet government. The
House knows the very close relations that the
Soviet government has with the Chinese government.
The issue of that statement itself shows that the
Soviet government is taking a calm and more or
less objective, dispassionate view of the situation,
131considering everything ,
While China taunted Khrushchev for "capitulationism"
pp. 233
^30xhe Hindu, September 12, 1959.
131India's Foreign Policy, p,356. In his speech 
at the Rumanian Party Congress, on June 26, i960, 
Khrushchev was reported to have said that the Chinese 
dispute with India had nothing to do with capitalism or 
socialism; it was purely a nationalist dispute and had 
done the cause of socialism untold harm, quite apart from 
such details as losing Kerala to Communism, Edward 
Crankshaw, on* cit,, p,108.
in the Caribbean crisis, Nehru conveyed to him "our warm
approval of the wisdom and courage you have shown in
connection with the Cuban situation". He also spoke of
Khrushchev's devotion to peace and the catastrophe for
132the world in the event of a super-power clash.
After the Soviet press had endorsed the Chinese 
proposal for the settlement of the dispute, Nehru even 
viewed the problem from the Russian angle. In an 
interview, recorded for the United States television net­
work, CBS, Nehru said on October 30, 19^2: "I should
imagine that developments of the world situation in regard 
to Cuba etc,, probably made it necessary for them (Russians) 
not to fall out with China", He expressed the hope that
with Cuba out of the way it would be easier for them to
13 3"revert to their neutral attitude". In another
television interview, he reiterated that he would continue
the policy of non-alignment and, "all that we expect from
them (Russians) is to continue to be friendly with us and
not to do anything injurious to us, I do think that they
134.do have friendly feelings for us". The Soviet Union
did not find such understanding in Chinese pronouncements, 
Nehru was determined to be non-aligned. He was 
aware of the disadvantages of complete dependence on the 
West, While readily responding to India's call for 
military aid during the Sino-Indian war, the United States 
and the United Kingdom asked Nehru to come to an under­
standing with Pakistan on Kashmir* Nehru was, therefore,
192 Pravda, October 31? 1962, Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XIV,“No. 43? p.13.
133,jhQ Hindu, November 1, 1962,
^^^The Hindu, November 10, 1962,
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beckoning to the Soviet Union to take note of his desire 
to be non-aligned. This did not go unnoticed; Pravda 
published his BBC interview in which he reaffirmed that 
non-alignment would continue despite Western military
aid.135
On her part, the Soviet Union did not overlook the
traumatic effects on India of the defeat suffered at the
Chinese hands, Moscow tried to understand India's
problems too. According to Galbraith, Nehru told him on
October 29? 1962, that the Soviets "had indicated that
they realised that assistance from us (United States) was
inevitable, but hoped that this would not mean a military
196alliance between the United States and India"« This
understanding on the part of the Soviet Union had a
response from Nehru* He told the United States
ambassador that he "wanted to avoid irritating the Soviets
1 97as much as possible".
The Soviet Union could not have ignored some of the 
domestic developments in India, There was a lively
19 5Pravda, November 28, I962, Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol. XIV, No, 48, p,24.
^^^John K. Galbraith, op,cit,, p,445.
1 97Ibid, Under instructions from the Ministry of 
Defence, the Indian press began to play down the United 
States arms lift, Galbraith thought that was in response 
to Soviet request. Therefore, he raised the issue with 
the Ministry of External Affairs and was told that 
publicity was not being given to prevent saboteurs from 
having knowledge of where the arms were being unloaded.
He was unconvinced and addressed a letter to Nehru urging 
him to be forthcoming. He told him that "it was better 
to lose a truckload of ammunition to the saboteurs than 
to have a shipload not arrive for political reasons"*
Ibid, See pp.458, 461 and 464.
debate in India on non-alignment policy in the wake of
•I o  Q
the war with China, C, Rajagopala Chari, called for 
"firm alliance with the United States and other Western 
p o w e r s " , T h e  Indian press was critical of non- 
alignment too. The Indian Express wrote that if alignment 
was a bit of sovereignty lost, non-alignment meant a good 
bit of territory lost.^^^ The Thought wrote, coimnenting 
on Nehru's defence of non-alignment, that he had said 
"things which all but obliterated the difference between 
. friends in need and friends in words. If the West supplied 
us arms in the hour of our sorest trial, the Soviet Union 
promised us half-a-dozen MIG planes", The Citizen
(JCanpur) wrote that "the tragedy is, nobody dares to say we 
are worshipping at the shrine and burning incense at the 
alter of the God that failed (non-alignment)",
The Soviet leaders also had a God that failed them, 
i.e. proletarian internationalism; this concept did not 
unite Russia and China, While the non-aligned world was 
beneficial to Russian diplomatic interests, China was 
becoming more and more a threat to her interests.
Naturally, the Soviet Union would prefer a friendly non- 
aligned group to a hostile China, which did not respond, 
to what Moscow considered, friendly gestures from it.
Internal attacks on non-alignment in India seemed 
to have caused concern to the Soviet Union. The desertion
^^^See Chapter VIII?footnote 59.
1 90
Quoted in Pravda, April 24? 1963. ■ Complete text 
in CDSP, Vol, XV, No, 17 p. 23.
^^^Quoted in Werner Levi, op,cit,, pp,140-142,
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of the biggest non-aligned State, India, from the non- 
aligned group, for reasons of national security, would 
have caused second thoughts in many small non-aligned 
states on the continuance of non-alignment policy; 
this was an unpleasant prospect for the Soviet Union,
This was reflected in an article published in Pravda by 
a "commentator". He thought that , "world reaction" had 
exploited the India-China war to start an offensive 
against the young nationalist states. In the chorus 
of enemies of non-alignment policy, the voices of 
"reactionary circles" of several Asian countries, in the 
first place^India itself, could be heard. The commentator 
referred to calls for radical revision of India's foreign 
policy by rightist parties in India to substantiate his 
argument,
The article then recounted how non-alignment helped 
young states: it enabled Egypt defend herself against the
Anglo-French invasion; it enabled India to wrest Goa from 
Portugal; it facilitated the return of West Irian to 
Indonesia, Non-alignment helped in economic development 
too: Egypt got the Aswan dam, and India, 3 steel mills.
The article referred to the "clearly prompted 
articles" in the American press to the effect that if India 
did not join SEÂTO, it could lose out in the conflict over 
Kashmir and asserted that it was precisely because India 
did not follow the lead of the "imperialists" and maintained 
her neutrality that it was able to defend her rights to
^^^Pravda, December 25? 19Ô2
^44ibid.
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14 5the Indian lands claimed by Pakistan,
The commentator cautioned that joining the 
"imperialist bloc" would not strengthen the defence 
capability of young states* On the contrary, non- 
alignment created broad international support which ensured 
the security of young states,
The commentator declared that the Soviet Union 
supported non-alignment believing that in the present 
historical conditions it was in the best interests of the 
newly-liberated countries,
There were many other developments in India which 
could have caused concern to the Soviet Union, Ignoring 
Pravda' s advice to shun chauvinism, the CPI passed 
a resolution in November 1962, by a two-thirds majority, 
unequivocally condemning C h i n a , I t  called on the 
Indians to unite behind Nehru "in defence of the motherland 
against Chinese aggression", and also made it clear that 
the party was not opposed to "buying arms from any country 
on a commercial basis",^^0 With the hopes of exercising 
influence over the Chinese Communist Party,. ‘ , in
any-case fast receding, the Soviet Union would at least 
like to have an effective influence on the CPI, The CPI 
would lose face with the people unless it fell in line 
with the national mood; the party already carried the
145ibid.
l^^ibid,
147ibid,
^^^See p .  222
^^^Robert W, Stern, "The Sino-Indian Border Contro­
versy and the Communist Party of India", Journal of 
Politics, Vol, XXVII, No, 1, (February I965)? p, 85.
^^^Quoted in Marcus F, Franda, Radical Politics in 
West Bengal (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
1971)? p/97.
stigma of having joined hands with the British and worked
against the nationalist movement during the Second World
War, in line with the then Soviet policy,
Public opinion polls in India conducted in the wake
of the Sino-Indian war showed a dramatic jump in United
States popularity. In the USIS public opinion poll in
October 1957? only 2.5 per cent held a "very good" opinion
of the United States ; it was 7 per cent only in mid-
October 1962 ; in the last week of November I9 62, however,
it had jumped to 62 per cent, 85 per cent of those
interviewed reported an improved view of the United 
1 52
States,
There was a natural nationalist backlash at the
Soviet endorsement of the Chinese proposals made during
the war. The Hindu editorially commented; "We can only
conclude from this farrago of insinuations that the
Russian papers and the Soviet Communist Party have not
taken the trouble to examine the evidence or even to use
their common sense in deciding what a country's natural
boundaries are likely to be. The fact that a British
official, named McMahon, drew a red line ,,, does not make
15 3it a creation of British imperialism".
Reminding Russia of her own border trouble with 
China, the paper said that the fact that "she would now 
choose to swallow Chinese claims to India's territory 
shows that she is afraid of further alienating a 'brother'
^^^See Chapter III, p, ) 12
^■^^John K. Galbraith, op. cit, , p, 512,
^^^The Hindu3 October 28, I962
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Communist, country with whom relations have deteriorated 
in recent years. When India has taken great pains to 
keep out of military alliances or commitments, it is quite 
absurd to talk of * imperialist’ countries manipulating 
her border disputes for their own ends”.^^^
There were other unwelcome developments from the 
Soviet point of view: Moscow*s favourites like V.K.K.
Menon and KoD, Malaviya lost their cabinet posts; veteran 
liberal-nationalist leader, Acharya J.B. Kripalani, who 
lost to V.K.K, Menon in the I962 general election, and 
M.R. Masani, one of the leaders of the rightist Swatantra 
Party, were elected to Indian Parliament, defeating the
ICC
Congress candidates, in 1963; in July I963, the
Indian government agreed to joint air exercises with the 
United States* and the United Kingdom*s air forces; 
and it also made a deal with the Voice of America under 
which the latter was to set up a 1,000,000-watt trans­
mitter in Calcutta for the All-India Radio, subject to
the condition that the station would broadcast Voice of
1America*s programmes 3 hours a day for 3 years.
Such developments could not be totally ignored by 
the Soviet Union, In I963 and 1964? China also deepened
^^^Ibid.
^^^Pravda, August 10, I963.
^^^The Hindu, July 23? 19^3* Krasnaya zvezda (Red 
Star) the Soviet Defence Ministry organ, wrote on July 
27, 1963, that the subordination of the Indian armed forces
to the United States and British military leaders "might 
lead to serious consequences with regard to the main­
taining of peace in South East Asia and security of India 
itself". Quoted in The Hindu, July 29? 19&3.
•^^ I^zvestia, July 20, 19&3. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XV, No. 29, p.25. The deal fell through because of 
criticism in India.
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the crisis in the Communist camp by making public the
many points of difference between herself and the Soviet 
1S 8Union, This made it easy for Khrushchev to make
more friendly gestures to India,
China regarded India as one of the points of 
difference between herself and the USSR, In an article 
written by the editorial department of Jen-min Jih-oao 
entitled "The Truth about How the Leaders of the CPSU 
have Allied Themselves with India Against China", it was 
stated: "One of the important differences of principle
between the Soviet leaders and ourselves turns on. the 
Sino-Indian boundary question", From India's point 
of view, to be one of the points of difference between 
China and the USSR was advantageous. Therefore, Nehru 
was anxious not to irritate Russia by becoming over­
dependent on the United States, The People's Daily wrote 
on July l6, I963, that one of the "cardinal tenets" of 
Nehru's foreign policy was to widen differences between 
China and R u s s i a , N e h r u  could not have either created 
or widened the gulf between them; conflicts were 
inherent in Sino-Soviet relations,
Moscow knew the Chinese irritation with its cordial 
relations with India, However, it would not embitter 
its relations with India just to satisfy China, the more 
so when New Delhi was trying to be considerate to Moscow
See Peking Review, No, 35> (August 30, 19&3) and 
No, 45 (November 8, I963), See above pp. 209 ™ 21^ 
and below p 24I - footnote I62,
^^^Peking Review, No. 45  ^ (November 8, I963), pp,
18- 27.
^^^Quoted in The Hindu, July 17, 19^3.
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even when it- would not uphold India's case on the border 
issue. Without alienating India, Russia did tacitly 
uphold the Chinese border claims through Soviet atlases; 
for a short while during the Caribbean crisis, Moscow 
even openly supported Chinese arguments. The Chinese 
attitude amounted to demanding Soviet support on their 
own terms; they would not appreciate any Soviet concern 
for India's feelings. Soviet diplomatic interests in 
India were-inadvertently promoted by China; her publication 
of private correspondence and verbal exchanges between 
herself and the USSR, in which the latter was seen as
162defending India's position, neutralised the effects of 
the absence of open support to India, This, and Nehru's 
desire to be non-aligned, safeguarded the Soviet position, 
as a friendly power, in India,
Russia discreetly held and still holds an olive 
branch to China as far as the Sino-Indian border issue is 
concerned. This is borne out by the maps she put out and 
still does. During the Sino-Indian war, the government of 
India forfeited the Soviet atlas showing large areas of the
161
See p,217
162A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial in November I963 
revealed that when the Soviet Government informed the 
Chinese Government that the Soviet news agency, Tass, 
was going to issue a statement on the Sino-Indian border 
shooting on September 10, 1959; Peking had requested Moscow 
to refrain from doing so; but, instead, Tass had released 
the statement ahead of time, in the night of September, 9, 
1959; that when Khrushchev was in Peking in October 1959; 
the Chinese leaders had personally explained to him about 
the border incidents; that he was not interested in 
listening to the Chinese version, and, instead, had said 
that anyway it was wrong to shoot people dead. See 
F eking Revi ew, No, 45 (November 8, I963); pp.18-27,
See also Peking Review, No* 35 (August 30, 1963),
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State of Jammu and Kashmir and entire NEFA as parts of
163China, The Indian government protested to the
Soviet government many times. Like the Chinese, the 
Russians always gave evasive replies and promised to look 
into the affair, but never did. Even after the Indo- 
Soviet treaty, the Soviets continued to publish maps 
showing the areas claimed by China as part of her territory. 
There was a heated debate in the Lok Sabha on May 25;
1972, on the latest Soviet maps continuing to show the 
Chinese version of the Sino-Indian border alignments.
The members of the House reminded the Government of India 
that protests have been lodged with the Soviet government 
over the years and said that the oral assurances given 
by Moscow had no political significance. The harassed 
Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, side-stepped the issue by 
attributing the opposition's criticism to the right wing's 
"stubborn hostility" to R u s s i a , T h a t  evasive reply is 
an apology for the Indian government's need for Soviet 
support, diplomatic, and, to an extent, economic.
The Soviet maps of the Sino-Indian border are not 
even neutral; they are 100 per cent pro-Chinese, To be 
neutral, they should have shown NEFA as Indian and Aksai 
Chin as Chinese, for that is the exact position on the 
border to-day; and even China said before the 1962 war 
that she was prepared to accept such a settlement,
But since their maps were biased in favour of China from
^^^The Hindu, November, 16, I962,
^^^The Times, May 26, 1972, India reacts angrily 
when the West does any such thing on Kashmir,
^^^See p.205
the beginning, the Soviet leaders seem to be hesitant to 
revise their maps to make them conform to reality on the 
borders. Thus, on this issue, the Soviet Union seems to 
respect the Chinese feelings more than the Indian, This 
interpretation has to be read in the context of our 
knowledge of the alacrity with which histories are revised, 
and old works are taken out of circulation when a change 
of policy or leadership occurs in the USSR, Nothing would 
have prevented the Soviet leadership from bringing their 
maps up to date except their unwillingness to do so.
The Soviet policy on the Sino-Indian border issue 
seems to be not to commit herself to the Indian line even 
while cultivating as close a relationship with her as 
possible. It is always good to keep policy options open 
as long as it can be done. India's desire not to be 
completely dependent upon the West, her need for Soviet 
support, and the ossified state of Sino-Indian relations 
do not leave her much manoeuvrability. Here lies Soviet 
freedom. She can refuse to commit herself to India's 
stand on the border, which China would take note of 
whenever the time for composing the differences with Moscow 
is ripe, and yet maintain close relations with India, which 
New Delhi, at least for the present, wants.
CHAPTER V.ÏIÎ^  244
THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP 
AND CO-OPERATION
BACKGROUND
It has already been pointed out that there was
some cooling in Indo-Soviet relations in the wake of the
supply of Soviet arms to Pakistan in 1968,^ India's
response to this shift in the Soviet stand was to make
attempts to improve relations with China and the United 
2
States; she also exhibited reluctance to say anything in 
support of the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet border 
flareup in 1969*^ Nixon visited India in August 1969»^ 
However, on return home, he resumed arms supplies to 
Pakistan,^ In an attempt to improve relations with 
China, Mrs. Gandhi hinted at normalisation of relations
with Peking in I968 and again in 19&9; there was, however,
_ 6 no response from it.
While India's relations with Pakistan and China
remained hostile, and Nixon reintroduced tensions into
^See Chapter V, PP*igp =
"Pran Chopra, on.cit., pp.8-9,
Ibid. For an instance of Soviet sensitivity to 
third countries' neutrality on the Ussuri incidents see 
M. Volgin's criticism of the Yugoslav press for having 
IIborrowed without any commentary whatsoever the 
terminology of Peking's confederates in Tirana.,.."
Izvestia, March 30, I969, Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXI, 
No. 13, p.22.
^Pran Chopra, op\, cit . , p. 53.
^Ibid.3 pp.8-9. The United States suspended arms 
supplies to India and Pakistan in 1965, when war broke 
out between them. See Chapter IV, p.88,
^William J, Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great 
Powers (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972), p.322.
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Indo-American relations by the resumption of arms 
supplies to Pakistan, the Soviet Union began to grow warm 
towards India in response to Mrs. Gandhi's resort to 
radicalism to defeat and disgrace her rightist political
7
rivals in the ruling Congress Party.
Irreconcilability of views and interests between its 
right and left wings led to a split in the Congress party 
in 1969. Mrs, Gandhi got the Parliament dissolved in 
1970 and went to the polls in March 1971; with a radical 
manifesto. She secured a two-thirds majority in the
Q
lower house of Parliament,
The Soviet leadership's satisfaction with the 
developments in India was evident from Brezhnev's Report 
to the XXIV Congress of the CPSU in March 1971* He said 
in it "... the struggle against the forces of reaction 
and against the henchmen of imperialism is under way 
everywhere, and in some countries the progressive forces 
have already achieved important gains. Suffice it to 
recall, for instance, such events as the recent 
nationalisation of large banks in India and the inspiring 
victory over right-wing forces in the recent elections to 
the House of the People of the Indian Parliament, This 
is evidence that the masses of people in this country 
resolutely oppose the reactionary, pro-imperialist forces 
and stand for the implementation of land reform and other 
social and economic transformations,.a",^
7For Soviet comments sympathetic to Mrs. Gandhi 
in the tussle for power in the Congress Party, see 
Pravda> August 24, 1969; Izvestia, September 14; I969 
and November 15, 1969.
g
B.L, Sukhwal, op, cit,, Appendix 1,
^Pravda, March 31, 1971* Complete text in CDSP, Vol 
XXIII, No," 12, p.9,
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However, it is not India's internal developments 
between 1969-1971 that shaped the Indo-Soviet treaty; 
evidence suggests that international developments in the 
second part of 1971 were instrumental in its making. " The 
fact that the treaty followed on the heels of Nixon's 
announcement of his plan to visit Peking suggests that 
the prospect of Sino-American detente caused concern in 
India and the Soviet Union, It is, therefore, proper to 
refer to evidence which testifies to the fear of China, 
common to both the USSR as well as I n d i a , w h i c h  was 
heightened by the prospect of Sino-American detente and 
led to the treaty,
SOVIET APPREHENSIONS OF CHINA
Soviet apprehensions of China seemed to have begun 
long before public polemics between them broke out. This 
comes out clearly in Khrushchev's memoirs. According to 
Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tiing's initial hesitancy to his 
suggestion, made during his visit to Peking in October 
1954; for bringing in one million Chinese workers to work 
in Siberia was followed by generous Chinese offers to send 
more and more workers, Khrushchev reasoned; "Wliat had 
the Chinese been up to? I will tell you. They wanted 
to occupy Siberia without a war".^^ Wien public polemics 
began much more was known about their fears and 
suspicions e.
^^See Chapter V, p« 158 ; Chapter Vljjand above, 
p, 244 for factors contributing to India's fear of China
j 1
Strobe Talbott, transi, and ed,, on,cit., p,250,
<4f
Considerations of power politics call for wooing
of as many enemies of one's enemy as possible; the
Soviet Union does just that in India, When he was on a
visit to India, Marshal Grechko was reported to have
given an assessment of the clashes between Soviet and
Chinese forces, on the Ussuri river in March I969, to the
12Indian Government. He was also reported to have
assured India of Soviet aid in the event of Chinese attack,
Moscow's apprehensions about China seem to have been 
heightened by the apparent indifference with which China 
has treated Soviet p o w e r . T h i s  is reflected in 
Brezhnev's Report made on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the formation of the USSR. He said in it 
that "doing the greatest possible harm to the USSR" is the 
sole criterion determining the Chinese leaders' approach 
to any major international p r o b l e m . R e f e r r i n g  to "the 
Chinese leaders' complaints about a mythical 'Soviet 
threat'", he asked why Peking did not respond to Moscow's 
proposals for"a special treaty renouncing the use of force"
16repeatedly made since I969. This Chinese silence seems
12Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., p,ll8.
1 2The New York Times, March 10, I969*
^^"We Chinese are not afraid of atom bombs", said 
Chou En-lai in his interview with James Reston, "we are 
prepared against their (Russian) attack on us. That is 
why we are digging underground tunnels..." The New York 
Times, August 9, 1971»
1 SThe Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics; Report by L.I. Brezhnev, General- 
Secretary of the Central Committee of CPSU, December 12, 
A2Z.& (Moscow; Novosti Press Agency Publishing House,
1972), p.46, (Hereinafter referred to as the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)•
^^Ibid., pp.46-47, He revealed that a draft treaty 
was submitted to Peking on January 15; 1971. Ibid.
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to heighten Soviet fears of China and her intentions.
This fear does not seem to be confined to official 
quarters alone. Even as irrepressible a dissenter as 
Alexander Solzhenitzyn expressed similar fears in his" 
letter to the Central Committee on September 5; 197 3*
He wrote: "For the next half-century our only genuine
military need will be to defend ourselves against China,
17and it would be better not to go to war with her at all,,"
He cautioned the Soviet leaders: "You have against you a
country of almost a THOUSAND MILLION people, the like of
which has never yet gone to war in the history of the 
18world". He warned that if the Second World War cost
the USSR 20 million lives, a war with China would cost 6o 
millions. "We shall have no ally in that war, none, at 
least, the size of, say, India".
BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL FOR COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY IN ASIA
Such fear probably prompted Brezhnev to propose a 
scheme for collective security in Asia at the international
17See the text in The Sunday Times Weekly Review,
March 3; 1974.
18
19Ibid, See also Yuri Sterligov, "\\Thy the Maoists 
Are Digging In?", Soviet Weeklv, (London) April 14; 197 3* 
This fear is, of course, two-sided, China is 
fearful of Soviet interventions in the affairs of 
Communist States, Speaking at the Rumanian Embassy in 
Peking on August 23; 1968, Chou En-lai likened Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August I968 to Hitler's 
invasion of that country in the past. He warned that 
Rumania was facing the danger of foreign intervention 
and aggression and assured her of China's support,
Peking Review, No, 34, Supplement, (August 23; I968), 
pp.III-IV.
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conference of Communist parties on June 7; I969, "We
think", he said at the conference, "that the course of
events also places on the agenda the task of creating a
20system of Collective Security in Asia"• He did not
spell out what exactly it meant, 'In his report to the
Supreme Soviet a month later, Gromyko, however, rejected
the "fictions" that it was aimed against any power in
Asia, As both a European as well as Asian power, he
said, the USSR is interested in all the people of Asia
2 1
living in peace.
In his speech to the 15th Congress of the Soviet 
Trade Unions, Brezhnev defined the concept on March 20, 
1972, in these words: "Collective Security in Asia must,
in our view, be based on such principles as renunciation 
of the use of force in relations between states, respect 
for sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, non­
interference in internal affairs and the broad development
of economic and other co-operation on the basis of full
22equality and mutual advantage". Anyway, the proposal
did not meet with positive response from countries of 
Asia,
Such was the state of relations between India and 
China and China and the Soviet Union when President Nixon 
made his surprise announcement.
20Pravda, June 8, I969, Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol, XXI, No, 23; p.16,
21
2 2
Pravda, July 11, I969,
Pravda, March 21, 1972, Complete text in CDS P, 
Vol. XXIV," No. 12, p,7.
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NIXON'S ANNOUNCEMENT TO VISIT PEKING
On July 16, I97I; President Nixon announced his
plan to visit China. A statement issued in Peking said
bhat since Nixon had expressed a desire to visit China,
2 3Chou En-lai had extended an invitation to him.
This about-turn by Nixon caused confusion even
among America's close allies; it is not surprising if
India and the Soviet Union were suspicious. For Nixon
had written, as late as 19&7; that Peking was a source of
common danger for most Asian s t a t e s , W h i l e  he wanted
American A$ia policy to come to "grips with the reality of
China", this "does not mean, as many would simplistically
have it, rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit
it to the United Nations and to ply with offers of trade,.,
It does mean recognising the present and potential danger
2 5from Communist China". He also felt that dealing with
"Red China is something like trying to cope with the more
26explosive ghetto elements in our own country", For
such a hostile critic of China as Nixon asking for an 
invitation from her and accepting it was bound to cause 
misgivings in Moscow and New Delhi,
The Times of India, July 17, 1971,
George W, Ball wrote that President Nixon's plan to 
stay for one week in Peking was "a longer bilateral visit 
than any American President has made to the government of 
any foreign nation in our entire national history". See 
his, "Nixon's Appointment in Peking - Is This Trip 
Necessary?" The New York Times Magazine, February 13,
1972.
^^Richard M, Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam", Foreign 
Affairs, Vol, XLVI, No. 1- (October,. I967), p. Ill*
^tbid„ , p.121.
9 A
 ^Ibid., p.123.
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(i) ITS IMPACT ON INDIA
On the surface, it seemed that India was happy with
the development. Sardar Swaran Singh, India's Minister
for External Affairs, welcomed it in the lower house of
27the Indian Parliament. This was, however, not the
whole truth. How the significance of this development
was read in India was hinted at by Mrs. Gandhi in an
interview with the correspondent of The New York Times,
Sulzberger, on February 12, 1972. Asked as to where had
Indo-American relations gone wrong, she replied: "I
suppose your attitude toward India changed when your policy
2 8toward China changed". Such, therefore, was the Indian
view of the development.
There was a grave crisis in the subcontinent in the
developments in East Pakistan, Nixon motntained silence
at the military atrocities in East Pakistan and the
29
problems posed to India by the crisis; then he gave 
the world the startling news of his impending visit to 
China. This must have convinced India that it was time 
to take appropriate steps to safeguard her interests.
That the developing crisis in the sub-continent and 
the growing warmth between Washington and Peking hastened
The Times of India, July 17, 1971*
28The New York Times, February 17, 1972.
The new respect for China in America drew sarcastic 
comments from some Indian correspondents. Commenting on 
Prof. J,K, Galbraith’s visit to China, G.K. Reddy of The 
Hindu described it "as part of the new American craze for 
making a pilgrimage to the celestial citadel of Maoism", 
The Hindu, June 2 3, 1973.
^^See Chapter ITg pp.288 - 691
the Indo-Soviet treaty, becomes clear from Mrs, Gandhi's
speech at a rally, during Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi,
on November 27, 1973. She said that during the Bangla
crisis many people had thought that India was alone and
that none supported her; that she had made trips to many
countries to explain the true state of affairs; and
that Russian support had given India greater confidence
and strength. She continued; "Although we had been
earlier also thinking along these lines, it was undoubtedly
your standing by us during such an hour which gave us new
encouragement and we could further cement our long-
30standing friendship by a formal treaty",
Sardar Swaran Singh, however, told the Parliament
that the treaty had nothing to do with either Nixon's
visit to Peking or the developments in East Pakistan; it
31had been in the making for 2 years. Singh was probably
indulging in a public relations exercise when he denied 
any connection between the treaty and the significant 
international developments that took place in 1971; Mrs, 
Gandhi, on the other hand, agreed, more than two years 
after the treaty, that there w^ as a connexion between the 
two.
It is not clear why India thought of a treaty with 
the Soviet Union before the developments in 1971 made it 
useful. It is probable that growing opposition in the 
United States to foreign coimnitments and hints of change 
being given by Nixon since I969 made a fresh assessment
30Mission of Friendship, p,28,
^^The New York Times, August 11, 1971.
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of India's needs and policies necessary.
The Nixon doctrine, enunciated at Guam in 19^9;
gave a notice even to the United States' allies that
a direct combat role for United States general
purpose forces arises primarily when there is an overt
conventional attack. In such cases, we shall weigh our
interests and our commitments, and we shall consider the
32efforts of our allies, in determining our response".
It would not be wrong to say that at least since the
Himalayan debacle of 19Ô2, India enjoyed vicarious benefits
from the United States conmiitments in South East Asia,
Indian defence planners could take into consideration
Chinese fear of Washington's response should any of
Peking's military acts threaten the survival of their 
3 3country. Under the new doctrine, even the United
States' allies were told that there would not be any 
automatic United States' response; India, therefore, could 
not expect any indirect benefits from United States' 
commitment s.
Besides that, President Nixon, referring to the 
subcontinent in his State of the World Message to the 
Congress on February 25; 1971; said that the United States 
"will do nothing to harm the legitimate Soviet and Chinese ■ 
interests in the area",^^ Such sweet reasonableness
^^^uoted in Earl C. Raverial, "The Nixon Doctrine 
and Our Asian Commitments", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLIX,
No. 2, (January 1971), p.203.
3 3For instance, the United States warned Peking not 
to intervene in the Indo-Pakistani war of I965 at the 
meeting of the Ambassadors of China and the United States 
in Warsaw on September 15; 1965. See The Times,
September 16, 1965  ^ See also The Times, September 15;
1965, and Chapter "V, p.158
"^^ The New York Times, February 26, 1971.
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exhibited by Nixon towards China could not be appealing 
to India in view of the state of Sino-Indian relations; 
what China considered legitimate need not necessarily 
be so from the Indian point of view.
These considerations and the developments in 1971 
must have convinced India that a closer relationship with 
the Soviet Union, whose interests, in respect of China, 
are identical with her, would be beneficial,
(ii) ITS IMPACT ON THE SOVIET UNION
Pravda reported Nixon's July l6 statement on the 
trip to Peking on July l8, 1971* How deep was the
Soviet concern with this development was reflected in 
Soviet press comments and articles by Soviet experts on 
the United States,
Commenting on Nixon's assurance that the journey was 
not directed against any other nation, a correspondent
wrote in Pravda that "there is a big difference between
36the words and deeds of the US ruling circles", He
continued that "the contacts with Peking are also regarded
by many people in the USA as a continuation of this
37reactionary anti-Communist course". In support of this
contention he quoted The Daily News (New York) which hoped 
that the visit was ,,, "Machiavellian policy with the
Pravda, July I8, 1971.
^^Pravda, July 25; 1971» Complete text in CDSP,
Vol, XXIII, No, 30, p.1.
37^^Ibid.
long-range goal of setting Red China and Red Russia
3 R
against each other"* The correspondent reminded his
readers how Peking used to call for an implacable and
uncompromising struggle against imperialism and pointed
39to continuing anti-imperialist "invocations". He then
made a survey of East European and other Communist papers 
all of which saw in this trip an anti-Soviet plot.^^
The Soviet specialist on the United States of America, 
G, Arbatov, wrote in Pravda that the United States 
attitude to China began to change only after the Chinese 
leaders' hostility towards the Soviet Union and their 
splitting line in the revolutionary and liberation move­
ment became a p p a r e n t , H e  referred to the days when 
anyone suggesting change in the United States China policy • 
was accused of "treason" and averred that bourgeois and 
petit-bourgeois America supported the change because of the 
belief that China ceased to be revolutionary and hope that 
with its help the United States could "end the war in 
Vietnam on conditions quite acceptable to the American 
bourgeoisie",^^ In support of this argument he quoted 
The New York Post, which wrote: "Why the Chinese
^^Ibid,, p.2,
39ibid,, p.l,
^^For instance, Hungarian paper Nepszabadsag felt 
that anti-Sovietism was one of the elements of the plat­
form on which the Chinese-American rapprochement was 
taking place.
The Japanese Communist party paper, Akahata, wrote 
that the United States policy of rapprochement with 
China represented the implementation of "divide and rule" 
course.
The British Commiunist party paper. Morning Star, 
wrote that one of Nixon's goals was to provoke still 
greater disagreements among the Socialist states. Ibid,, 
pp.2—3.
^^Pravda, August 10, 1971* Complete text in CDSP,
Vol. XXIII, No, 32, p.l.
, p.2.
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Coimnunlsts decided to make things easier for the President 
at this moment is à problem for the Sinologists and 
Maoists",
Arbatov, however, felt that, judging by the United 
States' press comments, the American public was especially 
interested in the question of the possible effects of the 
new policy upon the United States’ relations with the 
Socialist countries, in the first place with the USSR,
This, he continued, was understandable in view of the 
political, economic and military might of the USSR,^^
He also wrote that many in the United States understood 
well that a great deal "depends on the direction and 
course of development of US relations with the Soviet 
Union",
Suspicion of what lay behind the visit was evident 
when he quoted The Washington Post, which wrote: "In
spite of all American public denials, Nixon administration 
officials privately express an opinion that it is not in 
the interests of the USA to allay fully the Soviet Union’s 
suspicions concerning US-Chinese agreements that may 
displease Moscow or make her uneasy",
Arbatov then referred to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearings in which former State Department 
officials, persecuted during the McCarthy era, stressed
43lbid, 
44%bid,, p.3, 
4^lbid.
^^Ibid„, p*4.
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that they conceived rapprochement with China as a means 
of breaking China away from the Socialist Camp, of 
driving a wedge between the USSR and China by using Mao's 
readiness, revealed even in the 1940s, to look for ways 
of improving relations with Washington.
He, however, wrote that if the United States- 
China relations had a positive aim, the USSR would 
welcome the development; she, in fact, had expressed her 
readiness to improve relations with the United States and 
China at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU. But, at the same 
time, he warned that the "positions of the USSR and of 
world socialism are strong enough to meet any possible 
turn of events with confidence",
Arbatov's article, thus, was a mixture of fear and 
hope, conciliation and defiance; it must have been an 
epitome of Soviet leadership's reaction to Nixon's 
projected visit.
In view of such fears and suspicions, it was not 
unnatural that India and the Soviet Union expressed their 
solidarity through the treaty,
THE TREATY
Gromyko went to India in the first week of August 
1971; and bn August 9; 1971; the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 
Peace, Friendship and Co-operation was signed.
After signing the treaty, Gromyko said that friend­
ship and co-operation between the USSR and India did not
47lbido
4Blbid.
^^The Times of India, August 10, 1971
25B
rest on transient factors but on lasting vital interests 
of their peoples, and their interest in the maintenance of 
p e a c e , S a r d a r  Swaran Singh described the treaty as an 
important landmark on the path of development of Indol 
Soviet relations. Gromyko's visit, he continued, coincided 
with developments in the subcontinent which were causing 
general concern in both countries and which might pose a 
threat to peace and security.
Singh assured the Parliament, after signing the 
treaty, that it strengthened India's policy of non- 
alignment; Mrs, Gandhi also repeated that non-alignment 
would continue; and T.N. Kaul, Secretary, Ministry of 
External Affairs, assured the United States Ambassador, 
Keating, that it was not a military alliance and that it 
was only intended to give greater credibility to the
52
concept of non-alignment,
53The treaty has 12 articles; it is concluded for 
the duration of 20 years and will be automatically extended 
for each successive period of five years unless either 
party gives notice to the other expressing its desire to 
let the treaty lapse, 12 months before its expiration 
(Article 10),^^
The inevitable embellishments of all political 
treaties, pious hopes and platitudes, have been given their 
place in the treaty. For example, Article 5 speaks of
^^Pravda, August 10, 1971* Complete text in CDS?, 
Vol. XXIII, No. 32, p.6,
S^Ibid.
^^The Hindu, August 10, 1971#
5 3”See Appendix I ,
S^ibid.
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the parties' deep interest in ensuring universal peace
and security; Article 6 attaches great importance to
economic, scientific and technological co-operation
between the parties and hopes that the signatories "will
continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous
and comprehensive co-operation in these fields.,."; and
Article 4 says that "India respects the peace-loving
policy" of the USSR and that the USSR "respects India's
policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy
constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of
universal peace and international security and in the
5 5lessening of tensions in the world".
Articles 8, 9 and 10 constitute the significant part 
of the treaty.
Under Article 8, each party "solemnly declares that 
it shall not enter into or participate in any military 
alliance directed against the other party", and "undertakes 
to abstain from any aggression against the other party and 
to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of
56any act which might inflict military damage" on the other. 
Under Article 9, each party "undertakes to abstain 
from providing any assistance to any third party that 
engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the 
event of either party being subjected to an attack or a 
threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall 
immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to 
remove such threat and to take appropriate effective
^^rbid. 
 ^ Ibid,
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measures to ensure peace and the security of their coun­
tries" •
Under Article 10, each party "solemnly declares 
that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret of 
public, with one or more States: which is incompatible
with this Treaty". Each party "further declares that no 
obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered 
into, between itself and any other State or States, which
r Q
might cause military damage to the other Party",
REACTION IN INDIA
The universal acclaim that greeted the treaty in 
India, in which almost all anti-Communist leaders, parties 
and papers joined, shows how, in the wake of the Bangladesh 
crisis and the Sino-American detente the nation was 
gripped by a sense of fear and isolation.
(i) LEADERS
Rajaji welcomed the treaty and said, "President 
Yahya Khan of Pakistan cannot fail to be impressed by 
this development of friendship and co-operation between 
India and Russia. Although America has proved to be a 
broken reed in this connection, if Great Britain follows 
the lines of this treaty between India and Russia, it will 
be a matter of great satisfaction".
5?Ibid.
SBlbid.
^The Hindu, August 10, 1971. See Chapter III, p. 
footnote 68 for a brief biographical note on Rajaji.
As the Chief Minister of Madras, he told the Communists in 
the Legislative Assembly in 1952: "I place my cards on
the table and tell, you plainly that I am your enemy No, 1 
and you are my enemy No. 1. That is my policy from A 
to Z". The New York Times, May 10, 1952, as quoted in 
Werner Levi, Free India in Asia, p.83.
£61
Jaya Prakash Narayan congratulated Mrs, Gandhi and 
Swaran Singh on the treaty and described it as "the surest 
guarantee of peace in South Asia".^^*
(ii) PARLIAMENT
Participating in a discussion on the treaty in the 
Lok Sabha, Swaran Singh referred to Article 9 of the 
treaty^^ and said: *"This should act as a deterrent to 
any powers that may have aggressive designs on our terr­
itorial integrity and sovereignty. It is, therefore,
62in essence a treaty of peace • "
The Leader of the Jan Sangh group in the House,
A.B, Vajapayee, said that the treaty gives India "a friend
who can be trusted, who can stand by us in the thick and 
6 3thin". He and Manoharan of the DMK (Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam) demanded that Moscow withdraw Soviet maps showing
Indian territory as Chinese, and hoped that Radio Peace
and Progress would stop objectionable broadcasts on
India's internal developments.^^
V.K.K, Menon wanted the Government of India to dispel
6 5the impression of some papers that it is a security pact.
^^Ibid,
Jaya Prakash Narayan was a Communist as a young man 
He studied in various Universities in the United States, 
Later in his life he was disillusioned with Communism. He 
actively participated in the nationalist movement in India, 
He was a member of the Congress-Socialist group. After 
India's independence, he founded the Praja Socialist 
Party with other Socialists, He refused to join Nehru's 
cabinet and merge his party with the Congress in spite of 
the latter's request. Later he quit politics and joined 
the Gandhian bhoodan (land gift) movement,
^^See Appendix I,
62
The Hindu, August 10, 1971*
^^Ibid,
^^Ibid. , see also Chapter . .V, p. I65 and Chapter VII 
p, 217 *
^Ibid*
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P i l o o  M o d i ,  a s p o k e s m a n  f o r  t h e  S w a t a n t r a  g r o u p ,  
h o w e v e r ,  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  w a s  c o u c h e d  m o r e  or l e s s  i n  
t h e  s a m e  l a n g u a g e  as t h e  W a r s a w  P a c t ' s ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  g e t s  m o r e  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  i t . ^ ^
S a m a r  G u h a  of t h e  P r a j a  S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y  s a i d  t h e r e  
w a s  n o  n e e d  f o r  c o d i f y i n g  I n d o - S o v i e t  r e l a t i o n s .  H e  
a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  t r e a t y  t o  t h e  " f e a r  o f  t h e  g h o s t  o f  C h i n a
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a n d  i t s  c o m p l i c i t y  w i t h  P a k i s t a n " ,
S h i b b a n l a l  S a x e n a ,  I n d e p e n d e n t ,  s a i d  t h a t  N e h r u  
s t o o d  b y  n o n - a l i g n m e n t ,  "I a m  s o r r y  h i s  d a u g h t e r  h a s  
b u r i e d  i t " ,
(iii) P R E S S  C O M M E N T S
T h e  H i n d u  r e p o r t e d ;  " I n d o - S o v i e t  D e f e n c e  T r e a t y  
S i g n e d " ,  i n  i t s  e d i t i o n  o n  A u g u s t  10, 1971.
I t  coiimiented e d i t o r i a l l y  t h a t  t h e  " r e c e n t  d e v e l o p ­
m e n t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  G en. Y a h y a  K h a n ' s  r e p e a t e d  t h r e a t s  t o  
a t t a c k  I n d i a ,  C h i n a ' s  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  s u p p o r t  t o  P a k i s t a n  
a n d  P r e s i d e n t  N i x o n ' s  c l e a r  h i n t  t o  I n d i a  t h a t  i n  t h e  
e v e n t  o f  i t s  g e t t i n g  i n v o l v e d  i n  a w a r  e i t h e r  w i t h  P a k i s t a n  
o r  C h i n a  i t  w i l l  h a v e  t o  f e n d  f o r  i t s e l f ,  o b v i o u s l y  l e f t  
N e w  D e l h i  w i t h  n o  a l t e r n a t i v e  b u t  t o  l o o k  e l s e w h e r e  f o r  
e f f e c t i v e  a s s i s t a n c e  a n d  w h a t  m o r e  p o w e r f u l  s o u r c e  c o u l d
I b i d , T h e  W a r s a w  P a c t  i s  m o r e  s p e c i f i c .  A r t i c l e  
3 o f  t h e  P a c t  c a l l s  f o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  s i g n a t o r i e s  
i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a t h r e a t  of a n  a r m e d  a t t a c k ;  A r t i c l e  4 
d e a l s  w i t h  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  v i c t i m s  o f  a g g r e s s i o n  
" i n c l u d i n g  t h e  u s e  of a r m e d  f o r c e " ;  a n d  A r t i c l e  5 p r o v i d e s  
f o r  a j o i n t  c o m m a n d ,  . K e e s i n g ' s  C o n t e m p o r a r y  A r c h i v e s ,
i g s 5 - i 9 S 6 . p p . 14250- 14251.
A u g u s t  10, 1971.
6there be than the Soviet Union?"
Referring to Singh's claim that the treaty 
strengthened non-alignment, the editorial said, "since 
non-alignment has become a dogma for New Delhi rather"than
a policy, Mr, Swaran Singh's claim should cause no
• 70surprise",
It, however, cautioned: "Apart from the unwisdom
of putting all eggs in one basket, it will be foolish for
India to get into a situation where it will have to
consider every enemy of Russia as its own enemy. That
7 1will be the Dulles' doctrine in reverse.,.".
The editorial went on to say that if circumstances
created "a compulsive reason for New Delhi to sign the
present treaty with Russia, Moscow has an equally strong
reason, because of its troubles with China, a great Asian
power, to sign the treaty with India, the other rising 
72power",
It added that while the threat of a war with
Pakistan was an immediate problem, the bigger and more
important problem for India is economic development and
assistance from the West and Japan , In pursuing
friendship with Russia, the Government of India should
therefore take care to see that relations with these
7 1countries are in no way neglected or marred ,
The Times of India's editorial captioned, "Too Early 
to Judge", called it an "unusually bold step" which was
71Ibid.
^Tbid,
open to criticism on grounds of its departure from "non-
alignment as interpreted all these years"* It, however,
said that no policy could be regarded as permanent in
these dangerous and fast-changing times. The treaty^
it went on, would be judged primarily by one yardstick:
"Whatever their reservations, the people of India will
welcome it if it permits New Delhi to extend all out
support to the Mukti Bahini (Bengali guerillas) undeterred
by fear of aggression by Pakistan with or without Chinais
connivance, encouragement and support". It further said
that in spite of all the burden imposed by the crisis.
New Delhi would "not have adopted the present course of
action if President Nixon had not pursued a wholly
74perverse policy on the question of Bangladesh".
' The Indian Express editorial endorsed Swaran Singh^s 
description of the treaty as "an important milestone" in 
Indo-Soviet relations. The paper thought that the"draft 
of the treaty was evidently finalised in Moscow during the 
visit there of the Prime Ministères special emissary, Mr, 
D.P. Dhar
The editorial went on to add that it could not be 
strictly described as a military alliance "for it does not 
explicitly provide for automatic assistance by one party 
to the other in case of aggression by a third country".
This treaty, it went on, is unlike the Soviet-UAR treaty 
where the Soviet Union had underwritten the defence of UÂR* 
Indo-Soviet treaty "purports to be a treaty between equals.
The Times of India, August 10, 1971.
7 r
The Indian Exprès^, August 10, 1971*
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not between a big power and a client state,,," It is,
7 6therefore, in keeping with India*s non-alignment.
Referring to Article 9 of the treaty, the editorial
said it is "a guarantee of immediate action; but in the
absence of a joint command, action can only follow
consultations and the emphasis on "effective measures"
77is noteworthy".
The Soviet Union, the editorial said, "whom China 
increasingly regards as its main enemy, looks on the move 
for a Sino-American detente with ill-concealed suspicion, 
India would normally have welcomed the change in the US 
attitude towards China, but it cannot but be disturbed by 
the emergence of an apparent Washington-Peking-Islamabad 
axis".’^®
China, the editorial continued, was giving weapons
to Yahya, so was Nixon, against United States* public
opinion, as a reward "for serving as a bridge between
Washington and Peking",
When Washington "told New Delhi that in the event
of China joining Pakistan in a war against India, this
country should not count on US assistance, Mrs. Gandhi*s
Government obviously felt impelled to seek ways of
breaking the encirclement with which this country was
threatened. The immediate result is the new treaty
8 0between India and the Soviet Union",
^h b i d .
7?Ibid.
7®Ibid.
^h b i d .
80-,. -jIbxd,
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SOVIET SATISFACTION
Such near-total support for the treaty in India was
bound to be heartening to the Soviet Union, In its
editorial on August 11, 1971, Pravda echoed Gromyko*s
views that not transient factors but lasting, vital
interests of the two States form the foundation of the
close relations between India and the USSR. The treaty,
the editorial said, placed these relations on a still
81stronger legal and political basis.
When Mrs, Gandhi visited Moscow in September 1971,
Kosygin repeated Gromyko*s theme at a lunch in her honour
on September 28, 1971, He said that history has many
examples of rapprochement between countries based on
temporary and pragmatic coincidence of their interests.
Indo-Soviet relations, he claimed, are built on a
8 2fundamentally different basis,
REACTION IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Senator Edward Kennedy, who was on a visit to Bengali
refugee camps in India, said: "I think India has to
preserve its national interest, ,,, and meet in
81particular its security requirements",
The Pakistani paper, The Dawn, reported on its 
front page: "Soviet Umbrella for India: Mutual Defence
Treaty S i g n e d " , P r e d i c t a b l y ,  Bhutto called it a pact 
of aggression against Pakistan and China, He felt that
O  -I
Pravda, August 11, 1971,
8 2Pravda, September 29, 1971»
^^The Hindu, August 10, 1971,
^^The Dawn, Karachi, ‘ August 10, 1971
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Russia felt isolated after it had suffered reverses in
the Sudan, moved to the subcontinent from the Middle East,
8 4and found a willing partner in India.
In an editorial comment. The Dawn said: "After all
the Moscow-Delhi pact has been arrived at in a certain
context, India is at present engaged in carrying out its
plot, hatched a long time ago, to undo the partition of
the subcontinent which it accepted only formally under
the compulsion of circumstances", This would enable
India, the editorial went on, to intensify the war by
proxy and or direct aggression against Pakistan "and then
invoke the provisions of the Moscow-Delhi pact in order to
prevent friendly countries from coming to the aid of
Pakistan". The editorial asked if Moscow was bound, in
terms of the treaty, to accept India's word that any
military activities it might be engaged in against
8 6Pakistan were "defensive" in nature.
The New York Times* editorial referred to apprehensions 
in Moscow and New Delhi about growing Sino-American 
rapprochement and India's sense of isolation as Pakistani 
civil war spilled over to India's side of the border, and 
conmiented that the Soviet-Indian friendship accord 
"strengthens Soviet influence in the second most populous 
nation in Asia - and the world - at the expense of the 
United States, It could increase the danger of a local 
war leading to a big power confrontation on the Indian
The Dawn, August 11, 1971. The Chinese 
Consul called on Bhutto at his hospital and had 
"constructive" talks on August 11, 1971. The Dawn,
August 12, 1971.
^^The Dawn, August 11, 1971.
87subcontinent"«
The Times (London) correspondent reported from New
Delhi that India had discarded her non-alignment policy
88and that the treaty was in reality a defence pact.
The Times coimnented editorially.:
In spite of Mrs, Gandhi's description of the 
treaty as one of non-aggression it has spikes bn 
it; they are. intended to be visible to those 
who might otherwise unthinkingly impale themselves 
upon them. Consultations over what either side 
regards as a threat may be a rather watered down 
version of defence treaties of the past, but very 
properly nowadays it is thought that war can be 
evaded if the threat of it is seen and acted upon, 89
. e v a l u a t i o n
Brezhnev's call in 19&9 for collective security in 
Asia was an attempt by Moscow to find a solution to her 
problems with China through diplomacy, IVhen he defined 
the concept in 1972,^^ it was made open to all, including 
China, This definition made his concept a perfectly 
innocuous one, with laudable objectives like maintenance 
of peace and security in Asia to everyone's benefit. If 
China subscribed to it, since it was welcome to do so, 
Russia's fears about her border with her would be set at 
rest; if she rejected the concept, and the countries on 
her periphery endorsed it, Moscow's purpose would be served 
tooe As it turned out, nothing of the sort had happened. 
Countries fearful of China, in South East Asia, like
■^ T^he New York Times, August 10, 1971o
The Times, August 10, 1971- Peter Hazelhurst
reported it.
89
90
B^ibid
See p, 24.^
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Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia, had been aligned with 
the United States of America either directly or through 
Britain; others did not respond to the proposal.
As the plan of Collective Security had not material­
ised, the Soviet Union turned to bilateral treaties with 
countries located in areas important to her interests.
It was Egypt first, followed by India and later Iraq,^^
The Soviet treaties with the two Arab countries do 
not involve direct Soviet security interests to the same 
extent as the Indo-Soviet treaty. While Arab hostility 
to Israel is real, that of the Soviet Union is only a 
diplomatic necessity, Israel is far away from the Soviet 
Union; she is no threat to her security either. The 
interests of the Arabs and the Chinese do not clash; 
therefore, the Arabs would not like to irritate China on 
account of the Soviet Union,
The Indo-Soviet treaty stands on a different footing. 
There are serious clashes of interest between India and
Q2
China and the USSR and China, Nixon's surprise
announcement to visit Peking seemed to have heightened 
the already existing apprehensions of China in India and
Both the Soviet-Egyptian and the Soviet-Iraqi 
treaties are more or less identical with the Indo-Soviet 
treaty. Both have a duration of 15 years with provisions 
for automatic extensions for each succeeding 5-year 
periods unless denounced by one of the parties. See 
Pravda, May 28, 1 0 / for Soviet-Egyptian treaty and
Pravda, April 10, 1972, for Soviet-Iraqi treaty.
92See Chapter VIland above pp,246“49
0 3
the Soviet Union, The treaty seemed to have been a
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response from India and the USSR to Nixon's announcement.
Is the alliance with India useful to Soviet security 
interests? The Times, for instance, wryly commented that 
there was no chance of Indian divisions going to the Red 
Army's r e s c u e . I n  spite of the Indian refusal to offer 
bases to the Soviet Union, or the inability, to quote The 
Times again, of her divisions to rescue the Red Army, the 
treaty has its own uses to Moscow,
The very fact that India, which consistently refused 
to ally herself with the West, with which she has so much 
in common, made an alliance with Moscow was a diplomatic 
triumph for the USSR,
Besides that, treaties are not made only to wage wars; 
wars are only ultimate weapons for the preservation and 
promotion of national interests. An alliance with a large 
country which is an enemy of one's enemy, and the 
psychological pressure this exerts on the enemy are equally 
important considerations in treaty making, India is a 
large country; her relations with China are still cold; 
q 3
 ^ Some of Nixon's casual comments in China seemed 
to have upset Brezhnev, He thought that the United 
States and China did not reveal everything they discussed; 
and that there was "some basis for thinking that the 
dialogue went beyond the framework of bilateral relations 
between the USA and China"• He wondered how else could 
Nixon's statement in Shanghai that China and the United 
States "to-night hold the future of the world in their 
hands" be interpreted. See Brezhnev's speech at the 15th 
Soviet Trade Union Congress in Pravda, March 21, 1972,
Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIV, No, 12, p.7.
This suspicion of Sino-American detente seemed to have 
continued even after Nixon-Brezhnev summit. See, for 
example, G, Kadymov, "Wliy Peking Wants Uncle Sam to Stay 
in Asia?" Soviet Weekly, London, February 17  ^ 1973*
^^See its editorial on the treaty, "Hands Joined 
Across the Himalayas", dated August 10, 1971.
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and after the 19^2 defeat, she emerged as a military 
power of considerable proportions with the world's fourth 
largest army, fifth largest air force, eighth largest 
navy and largest manufacture of armaments in the Third 
W o r l d , I f  nothing else, the Indo-Soviet treaty would 
be a cause for serious concern for China, and unease for 
the United States of America, which evidently would not be 
happy watching the world's largest democracy become a 
Soviet ally. The Soviet Union, probably, hoped that her 
treaty with India would have a restraining influence on 
the United States dealings with China; for, this treaty 
would remind the United States foreign policy makers of 
their pet theory for a long time; the domino theory.
United States policy makers could not ignore the 
possibility of the Indo-Soviet treaty having a domino effect 
on the countries on China's periphery and other United 
States allies who were unhappy with the way Washington 
unfolded its new China p o l i c y , A n y  caution in United 
States relations with China would serve Soviet interests 
and allay her fears.
Moscow could expect another advantage from the 
treaty: this Moscow-New Delhi connection would heighten
Chinese fears of the refugees from Sinkiang based in the 
Soviet Union and the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees living 
in India* China had exhibited her fear of these foreign-
Q c
See Inder Malhotra, Mrs, Gandhi's Active 
Resistance, The Guardian, July l6, 1974.
9 6For a discussion of the effects of Nixon's 
surprise announcement on the United States allies, see 
George W. Ball, .op^ ,_cit, , p.52.
e.\c.
97based minority nationalist groups many times. This
Chinese fear of the refugees from her minority nationalities 
based in India and the Soviet Union is not of insignificant 
use for Soviet diplomacy.
Mrs, Gandhi's radical programmes haA some appeal 
for Moscow, Closer relationship with India fits in with 
the view expressed by Brezhnev, in his Report made on the 
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Communist revolution, 
that the "extent and concrete forms of friendly relations
with young national states depend on the general
Q Rpolitical course of the particular state". That means,
the more "progressive" a non-Communist state is the closer 
would be Soviet relations with her. In his Report made 
on the 50th anniversary of the USSR in 1972, Brezhnev 
testified to the progressive character of India when he 
spoke of "the consolidation of progressive, anti­
imperialist forces" t h e r e , T h e r e f o r e ,  Soviet explanation 
for the closer relations with India at present can have
97For instance, participating in the debates on the 
Bangladesh crisis in the Security Council on December 4 and 
5: 1971, the Chinese delegate referred to the Indian and
Soviet delegates' reference to the presence of ten million 
East Pakistani refugees in India as one of the justific­
ations for the Indian action, and asked them if on the 
same analogy India and the USSR would use the refugees from 
Tibet and Sinkiang as "a pretext for launching armed 
aggression against China", See The Peking Review, No, 50, 
(December 10, 1971), pp.7-8,
^^Pravda, November 4^  19&7. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XVIX, No, 44, p.16,
^^The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, pp,48-49- Brezhnev said: a
policy is progressive if it firmly repulses neocolonialism, 
and promotes the sovereignty and independence of the young 
states, and their economic liberation from imperialism, and 
if it is for peace, for social progress and closer solidar­
ity with the other progressive forces of our time, and 
particularly with the Socialist countries". Ibid,, p*48.
ideological overtones. This is not to say that ideology 
has any great importance in Soviet foreign policy; but in 
the Communist milieu ideological rhetoric has its role.
In its polemics with China, alliance with non-communist 
but "progressive" India scores a point for Moscow for 
whatever worth it is.
The treaty was a significant departure from India's 
original policy of not entering into such commitments with 
other states, India must have had weighty reasons for 
departing from her policy. The United States' attitude 
to India during the Bangladesh crisis could only give the 
impression in India that in the assessment of the United 
States' foreign policy makers India was insignificant.
In fact, some influential public men and scholars in the 
United States mentioned this in their writings or talks, 
India, naturally, feels that Soviet interest in her 
rather than United States' condescension is a better means 
of serving her interests. The United States' stand on 
crucial issues affecting India's interests, Kashmir, Goa, 
Bangladesh, or issues affecting her emotions, colonialism
Chester Bowles wrote that Soviet interest in 
India is primarily based on "the Soviet estimation of 
India's geopolitical importance as a partial balance to 
the political influence and potential military weight of 
China", On the other hand, the United States 
government "has never considered India to be of major 
political significance to the future of Asia"• India 
has been seen "as an impoverished nation struggling 
bravely but probably futilely to govern itself through 
democratic institutions, which for humanitarian reasons 
we have felt obliged to assist", "America and Russia 
in India", pp,637-638, See also India Abroad (New York), 
Vol. II, No. 18, (August 15, 1972), p,12, for similar 
views expressed by C, Gilpatric, who was Associate Director 
of the Rockefeller Foundation in India*
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and racialism, bears testimony to the American public men's
assertions of American government's assessment of India,
In sharp contrast to the United States policy, the
Soviet policy gives due importance to India. This serves
India's interests as well as soothes her national ego; and
the Soviet Union gets due credit for this consideration,^
The lop-sided South Asia policy of the United States won
support for the treaty from Indian liberals and liberal 
102newspapers who have been critical of Soviet policies,
domestic as well as foreign, and wary of India's cosy
103relationship with Moscow,
-Vhe.
While the identity of^Sino-American approach to the 
Security Council debates on the Bangladesh crisis confirmed 
India's fear of the United States' new China policy, the 
stout Soviet diplomatic support to India, at a time when 
she was practically isolated in the United Nations, even
101Welcoming Brezhnev to India, during his visit to 
New Delhi in November 1973, The Times of India commented 
editorially, on November 26, 197 3: "The Indian people
“would have welcomed this gesture (the visit) at any time. 
They are bound to do so all the more at this stage when an 
acute and prolonged economic crisis has led some other 
capitals to cast doubt on this country's future. By 
coming here now Mr, Brezhnev is proclaiming his faith not 
only in the strength and durability of Indo-Soviet 
co-operation but also in India's progress and durability",
^^^See pp. 260 Ô5.
10 3An editorial in The Times of India, on November 
26, 19735 declared that Indo-Soviet friendship "long
ceased to be a partisan affair in India and that in reality 
most critics of the government cherish it as much as its 
supporters".
Seven private companies put big advertisements in 
The Times of India on November 26, 1973; welcoming Brezhnev, 
ibid.
Even an inveterate critic of Mrs. Gandhi, Madhu 
Liinaye (a Socialist M,P,), met Brezhnev in New Delhi and 
told him that Indo-Soviet friendship does not depend upon 
elthei* Mrs, Gandhi or her government. See The Times of 
India, December 1, 1973«
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at the cost of Moscow suffering isolation itself in the 
process, demonstrated to the Indian public the usefulness 
of the treaty*
The fact that the Soviet Union had exhibited a 
willingness to share India's isolation from the rest of 
the Third World by supporting her on the Bangladesh crisis 
suggests that Moscow must have considered the Sino- 
American detente a serious enough development necessitating 
appropriate steps to preserve its interests. Once before, 
the Soviet Union ranged herself against the Third World 
for tactical reasons; on that occasion, Moscow gave an 
explanation for its d e c i s i o n . B u t  on Bangladesh no 
such statement was issued.
The seriousness with which Moscow stood by its ally, 
India, seemed to have been noted in Peking, Bhutto 
revealed that he proposed to Peking in 1972 that Pakistan 
and China conclude a treaty; but the Chinese leaders told 
him that "it was common interest rather than pacts which 
m a t t e r e d " . S h o r n  of diplomatic niceties, Peking told 
Pakistan that it was not interested in the offer in view 
of the unacceptable risks involved in it. Such 
revelations strengthen the belief in India that the treaty 
would be a deterrent to any direct Chinese intervention.
Then, is the Indo-Soviet treaty a military alliance? 
The Indian Government is emphatic in stating that it is
lO^See Chapter IX , pp. 297-299'
^^^See Chapter VIi pp* 220^29 . .
^■^^The New York Times, February 13, 1972* Chou 
En-lai had also pointed out to Bhutto that China "had 
a defence pact with another Coimnunist country, the Soviet 
Union, and now look where that stands* They (the 
Chinese leaders) said their policy was now averse to 
pacts but that mutual interests were better and produced 
more binding ties"* Ibid*
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not, and that it remains non-aligned. However, non-
alignment would be no bar to taking whatever Soviet aid
becomes necessary should India's survival be at stake;
states never sacrifice tangible interests for the sake of
concepts, however venerable. The vagueness of the
language of the treaty notwithstanding, the Indo-Soviet
treaty can be effective in the military sense too should
their interests be seriously jeopardised by any Chinese act.
In fact vagueness of language is an asset: it keeps the
a
adversary guessing as to the nature of^joint response; it
does not bind the parties to automatic response in all
cases; and yet it enables them to act effectively should
the situation so demand.
The language of a treaty need not necessarily be the
sole guide to action. T-his has been demonstrated many
times by history. For instance, Britain acted under its
treaty obligations when Belgian neutrality was violated in
1914; it intervened when Polish freedom was trampled in
1939® But, in spite of a commitment to defend "all
conquests and colonies" of Portugal, under a secret
107article of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of I661, a 
British Foreign Office spokesman said, when it became clear 
India intended to use force to integrate Goa with India, 
that "there would naturally be no question of engaging in 
hostilities against I n d i a " , T h e  post world war II 
treaties prove this point too. At the Manila meeting, 
where the SEATO pact was signed on September 8, 1954, 
Pakistan was particularly insistent on using the word
1 07 The Times I December 14, I96I. 
^^^The Times, December 15, I96I*
"aggression" without qualifying it with Coimnunist in 
article 4 of the treaty, obviously with India in view. 
While the United States accepted this to facilitate the 
signing of the treaty, her delegate immediately issued 
a unilateral declaration saying that the reference to 
aggression in article 4 would "apply only to Communist 
aggression", but affirmed that "in the event of other 
aggression or armed attack it will consult" under the 
provisions of the treaty.
Therefore, the imprecise language of the Indo-
Soviet treaty need not make it ineffective. Article 9 of
the treaty calls for "mutual consultations" in the event
of either party being subjected to "an attack or a threat
thereof" in order "to remove such threat and to take
110appropriate effective measures". An attack need not
take place, "a threat thereof" will also set the 
machinery of consultation in motion; and the result may 
be "appropriate effective measures". These measures, 
probably, depend upon the quarter from which the threat 
arises and the seriousness of the threat. If it is one 
of those periodic Indo-Pakistani duels. New Delhi does 
not need direct Soviet intervention, and the United States 
would not tolerate any such Soviet act either. If, on 
the other hand, it is one of those familiar minor 
nuisances caused by China on the Sino-Indian border, the 
"appropriate effective measures" need only take the shape 
of anti-Chinese propaganda barrage from Moscow or
^^^Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1952-1954, 
pe 13764* See also Chapter IV, 71 «,
^^^See Appendix I*
harassment of China on the Sino-Soviet border. In the
unlikely event of a direct Chinese attack on India
threatening the very survival of the country, Moscow, in
all probability, will intervene under its treaty
obligations. Under such circumstances, it would not be
an easy decision for the United States to stop the Soviet
111intervention and let India be destroyed by China.
In the event of a Sino-Soviet war, Moscow does not 
need and New Delhi cannot directly render military help 
to it; but, India, with her large military establishment 
and resident Tibetan refugees and the Dalai Lama would be 
a source of serious worry for Peking, Indo-Soviet 
collaboration would, thus, impose a formidable burden on 
the Chinese military in view of thousands of miles of 
Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian border that it has to take 
care of and the danger that disaffection among dissident 
nationalities on the entire Chinese border would pose to 
it.
The terms of the treaty notwithstanding, the
effectiveness of treaties last as long as mutual trust and
coiimion fears last. For instance, after the liberation
of France, General de Gaulle signed a treaty with Stalin
under which they agreed to take "all the necessary measures
in order to eliminate any new menace coming from Germany
and to take the initiative to make any nev/ effort of
112aggression on her part impossible". This treaty did
^^^See pf.261 1 for the then Indian Minister for 
External Affairs' view of Article 9*
112Article 3 of the treaty, Quoted in Roy C, 
Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics, (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), p,83*
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not last long. In view of the Soviet conduct in Eastern 
Europe, France did hot hesitate to join NATO in 1949»
In a way, the Indo-Soviet treaty has one favourable 
factor for its durability: absence of common borders, and
consequently the traditional fears associated with smaller 
and weaker states of their bigger and powerful states. 
However, differences need not arise only on territorial 
grounds; temperamental incompatibilities and clashes of 
interests rupture relations too. In spite of there being 
so much in common between India and the United States and 
the United Kingdom, in addition to absence of territorial 
disputes and common borders, tensions have always been 
present in Indo-American and Indo-British relations because 
India refused to see international developments through 
their eyes and because they ignored her vital interests 
in pursuit of theirs.
The effectiveness and durability of the Indo-Soviet 
treaty rests more particularly on the American attitude.
It was the fear of what lay behind Sino-American detente 
which seemed to have resulted in the signing of the treaty, 
India and the USSR did not sign a treaty in spite of 
tensions in their relations with China for over a decade.
If Washington allays the fears of the USSR and India about 
Sino-American detente, much of the usefulness of the 
treaty for India and the Soviet Union would be lost. As 
it happened many times before, if the immediate fear which 
gives birth to a treaty blows over, the treaty becomes 
defunct in effect even if it continues to exist on paper, 
Moscow seems to be happy with its relations with
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Washington now. As long as Washington ignores India's
interests and heightens her sense of fear in pursuit of 
its triangular diplomacy, India's need for Soviet support 
will continue. Many of Mrs* Gandhi's statements and 
writings since the treaty bring out one thing: India's
fear that Washington's actions were impinging on her 
vital i n t e r e s t s , ^ S i n c e  Moscow's relations with Peking 
are still tense, it would still support New Delhi to the
tUa-t"
extent^Soviet interests are furthered by doing so.
But the Indian leadership cannot be unaware of the
undesirability of overdependence on any power, New^  Delhi
is aware of the change in Soviet policy towards Kashmir
in the mid-1960s when Moscow's interests required it,
India, therefore, must be interested in improving her
relations with the United States and China to have more
116
diplomatic manoeuvrability. There are no difficult
problems in India's relations with the United States; 
attempts to improve relations between India and the USA
113
In his address to the Indian Parliament on 
November 29, 1973, Brezhnev spoke of the usefulness of 
Soviet-American detente ; in the Indo-Soviet Joint 
Declaration too this was welcomed. See Mission of 
Friendship, pp,6o and 78,
^^^See Mrs, Gandhi, "India and the World", Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. LI, No, 1, (October 1972), pp,74-75, and 
India News (London), Vol. XXVI, No, 2, (June 30, 1973).
^^^See Chapter V, pp* I5 5 - 6 6
116Mrs, Gandhi subtly served notice to Brezhnev 
that she intends to work for better relations with the 
United States and China, though she did not name them. 
Speaking at the civic reception to Brezhnev on November 
27, 1973, in New Delhi, she said that the treaty is not
directed against any country; that the Soviet Union is on 
friendly terms with almost all countries; and that in 
exactly the same way India is seeking to expand the area 
of friendship. See Mission of Friendship, p.28* For 
Mrs, Gandhi's overtures to China, see above, p»244
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117are already afoot.
If there is necessary response from Peking, India 
would be willing to find a solution to her problems with 
China, India may consider the treaty an insurance against 
any Chinese military adventure in South Asia to her 
disadvantage; she would not like to turn it into an 
instrument for the perpetuation of Sino-Indian hostilities. 
It is significant that India did not endorse Brezhnev's 
Collective Security plan for Asia in the Indo-Soviet 
Joint Declaration issued at the end of the Soviet leaders' 
visit to India. Brezhnev tried to sell the concept to
118the Indian Parliament in his address to it; however,
the Joint Declaration did not mention Collective Security
by its Soviet nomenclature; it was only alluded to,^^^
India's misgivings about this Soviet scheme were
expressed when Madhu Limaye (& Socialist M.P.) told
Brezhnev that Collective Security looks like an attempt
120to gang up against China, The absence of a reference
to Collective Security in the Indo-Soviet Joint 
Declaration suggests that the Indian Government feels 
likewise. Thus, in spite of the treaty, India is not
117
Dr, Kissinger visited India in October-November 
1974# During this visit an agreement was signed to 
create an Indo-American Joint Commission for promoting 
co-operation in economic, commercial, scientific, 
technological, educational and cultural fields. The 
Overseas Hindustan Times, November 7 1974* The first
meeting of the Commission was held in October 1975 in 
Washington at which India's Minister for External Affairs 
was present, A number of agreements were signed at this 
meeting to promote co-operation in various fields. The 
Overseas Hindustan Times? October, 16, 1975*
■j -| Q
See The Mission of Friendship, p*58. He addressed 
the Parliament on November 29, 1973, Ibid *
, p . 8 1 ,
1 ? n
The Times of India, December 1, 1973»
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automatically accepting the Soviet point of view on all
issues* Another example of India being assertive in
pursuit of her interests is provided by the underground
J 21nuclear explosion she conducted on May l8, 197 4, in
spite of the knowledge of Soviet opposition to further
122nuclear proliferation.
For the present, India may like to derive indirect
benefit from Soviet power, through her treaty connections
with Moscow; but in all probability, she would like to
develop her own credible deterrent to Chinese power rather
than be dependent on Soviet power; and this may not be
to Soviet taste if credible deterrent means nuclear weapons»
The Soviet Union may like to weaken Chinese positions in 
12 3Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan; and this may not be to
India's liking if that means ignoring India's interests in 
the region. The Soviet Union and India belong to two 
different categories: the former is a global power and the
latter, a regional power. Therefore, it is more likely 
that Moscow's global strategy would clash with India's 
regional interests. The effective life of the Indo- 
Soviet treaty, therefore, depends upon the degree to which 
the Soviet Union and India are successful in making the
The Guardian, May 19, 1974,
122In his foreign policy report to the Supreme 
Soviet in July I969, Gromyko mentioned that 9O states had 
already signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and 
expressed the hope that those countries where the issue 
was still under discussion would arrive at the only correct 
conclusion that it was necessary to sign and ratify the 
treaty. Pravda, July 11, I969,
12 3Bhutto repeated at a joint session of the two 
houses of Pakistani Parliament that his government was 
anxious to have good relations with the Soviet Union. The 
Guardian, August 27 ^ 1974* See also Chapter 'V, pp,178'“79 -
former's global interests compatible with the latter*s 
regional interests.
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CHAPTER IXv :
THE BANGLADESH CRISIS 
BACKGROUND
The Muslim League, which spearheaded the movement
for the partition of India on a communal basis, originally
called for the creation of two Muslim states. In its
resolution on March 23j 1940, it demanded "that the areas
in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in
the northwestern and eastern zones of India, should be
grouped to constitute "independent states" in which the
constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".^
By the time partition became a reality in 1947, the League
managed to have one Muslim State, with its two wings
being separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory.
This physical distance between the two wings was reinforced
by emotional distance due to differences in language and
culture. While Bengalis constituted a majority of the
2
population of Pakistan, Jinnah, its founder, proposed to
make Urdu the only official language; this was opposed
3by the Bengalis,
In the words of a Bengali author, G.W. Choudhury, 
even in their own province, all the key posts in the
The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, (Calcutta:
The Annual Register Office, 1940), p.312, See also 
Z.Ao Bhutto, "Pakistan Builds Anew", Foreign Affairs 
Vol.LI, No, 3, (April 1973), p.545.
^G,W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Wiiy It Happened?",
International Affairs (London) Vol.XLVIII, No. 2, (April
1972), p, 242%
^Ibid,, p.247c
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administration were held by West Pakistanis with direct 
access to the central ruling "clique",^ "The Bengalis 
found a new ruling group set over them in place of the 
former British officials",^ West Pakistanis considered 
Bengali Muslims "as converts from lower-caste Hindus",
In the economic field, too, disparities between the 
two wings continued to widen over the years, A report 
made to the Government of Pakistan by a panel of experts 
said that in 1959-1960 the per capita income in West 
Pakistan was 32 per cent higher than in East Pakistan; 
over the next 10 years the annual rate of growth of income 
in the West was 6,2 per cent while it was only 4*2 per 
cent in the East; so, by 1969-1970 the per capita income 
in the West was 6l per cent higher than in the East,^ 
Therefore, Mujib ur Rahman proposed a six-point 
plan in I966, The six points were; 1) There should be 
a federal constitution, 2) The Centre should direct only 
foreign affairs and defence, 3) The two provinces should 
have different currencies, and there should be barriers 
to the movement of capital from one province to the other,
4) All. collection by way of taxation and other revenues
should vest in provinces, 5) All foreign exchange
earned by East Pakistan should be at her disposal, 6) There
g
should be an East Pakistani militia,
p. 243.
^Xbid,
^Ibid,
n
Ibid., p,246. Even Bhutto conceded that East 
Pakistan was exploited "with callous thoroughness". See 
President Bhutto's Address to the National Assembly, p,19•
^Quoted in Herbert Feldman, "The Communal Problem 
in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent; Some Current Implic­
ations", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No, 2, (Summer I969), 
p,l62.
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THE CRISIS
The first ever general election since the birth of
Pakistan was held on December 7, 1970. Bhutto's party
won in West Pakistan on the main theme of a "thousand
years" war with India to restore national honour which
A>ub Khan was alleged to have sacrificed at Tashkent,
under Soviet pressure, in 1966, Mujib contested the
elections on the basis of his six-point plan. He
captured 167 out of I69 seats alloted to East Pakistan in
the National Assembly; that was also an absolute majority
in the H o u s e * T h e  prospect of Mujib becoming the Prime
Minister and the western wing losing its pre-eminence was
unacceptable to most of the generals and Bhutto, The
latter declared that Puhjab was the bastion of power;
that Mujib*s victory was regional; that two majority
groups must be recognised; that two prime ministers might
be necessary; that he would not play the role of a loyal
opposition l e a d e r , S i n c e  Bhutto threatened to boycott
the National Assembly unless Mujib^ came to terms with him,
and since the army was not prepared to accept the six-
point plan, the National Assembly, which was to meet on
March 3? 1971, was indefinitely postponed on March 1,
121971. This triggered off a violent reaction in East
Pakistan; and on March 25, 1971, the military crackdown 
1 3began.
^G.W. Choudhury, "The Last Days of United Pakistan", 
International Affad.i^ s (London.) Vol. XLIX, No, 2 (April
1973), p.235.
^hbid.
. pp.236-237.
^^Ibid., pp.237-238. 
l^ibid.
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ITS IMPACT ON INDIA AND HER RESPONSE
Refugees, fleeing from military brutalities, flooded
the sensitive eastern zone of India* Seven out of ten
million refugees were H i n d u s , T h e r e  was a danger of
their harrowing experiences in East Pakistan causing
communal tension in India, The cost of the maintenance
of the refugees was ,a great burden on India; special
taxes were imposed for the purpose. Up to February 1972,
India spent Rs, 36OO million on the r e f u g e e s , A  great
majority of the refugees went to the Indian state of West
Bengal, This state was politically unstable between
1967-1972; it was here that a Maoist group, known as the
Naxalites, took to terrorism in 1967.^^ There haA always
been trouble between Assamese and Indian Bengalis in the
State of Assam, There was, therefore, fear that the flow
of Bengalis from East Pakistan into Assam would aggravate
17troubles there. If the stalemate in East Pakistan
continued indefinitely, there was a possibility of the 
leadership of the guerillas passing into the hands of 
extremists inimical to India endangering the security of 
north east I n d i a , T h e  refugees became competitors for 
scarce jobs contributing to the fall in already poor wages, 
Mrs, Gandhi was, however, not for taking any precipitate 
action.
^^M,S, Rajan, "Bangladesh and After", Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. XLV, No, 2 (Sunmier 1972), p,199.
l^Ibld.
Marcus F, Franda, op.cit,, p,l5l* This movement 
was, however, suppressed,
17Pran Chopra, op* cit», p.119®
 ^ Ibid.. p.111.
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The Indian Prime Minister wrote to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations; she pleaded for international
action to solve this p r o b l e m , S a r d a r  Swaran Singh,
India's Minister for External Affairs visited the USSR,
Britain and the United States in June 1971 to persuade 
20them to acte
Mrs. Gandhi paid visits to London and Washington 
herself and pleaded for British and American pressure on 
General Yahya Khan to end repression and try to find a 
political solution; nothing of substance came of her trip 
to Washington (see below). In the meantime, conditions 
deteriorated in East Pakistan, The Government of India 
did help guerillas with weapons and training, and, in the 
third week of November permitted the Indian army to reply
! I
in kind to the Pakistani army's shelling of Indian border
villages in the course of their pursuit of guerillas from
East Pakistan, On December 3, 1971, Pakistan bombed some
of the airports of the Indian Air Force; and the war 
21began,
THE UNITED STATES ATTITUDE
Not even the United States military supplies, though
small in quantities, to Pakistan were stopped until
2 2November 7, 1971. This could only create the impression
Cited by Sardar Swaran Singh, the then Minister 
for External Affairs, in his speech to the Security Council 
on December 12, 1971. Bangladesh and Indo-Pak War; India
speaks at the U.N*, (New Delhi; Publications Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of 
India, 1972), pp.36-37.
? n
The New York Times, June 19, 1971.
21
The Times of India, December 4, 1971.
 ^^ Th e New York Times, November 8, 197 1 <>
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in India and East Pakistan that the United States did not
care for their interests much.
As has been mentioned above, Mrs, Gandhi visited
Washington in November 1971* Welcoming her, on November
4, 19715 President Nixon said that the tragedies that had
struck India then, particularly floods and tidal waves,
21generated a sympathetic response in the United States*
He did not refer to the East Pakistani tragedy at all,
Mrs, Gandhi, on the other hand, spoke of the "man-made
tragedy of vast proportions"—-an obvious reference to East
Pakistan-—and pleaded for United States pressure on Yahya
to release Mujib and work for a political settlement,
When the war broke out the United States took an
anti-Indian stand. The New York Times editorially
commented on December 4, 1971, that one of the causes of
the war was "the self-righteous intransigence of Indians
2 Kresponse" to "brutal suppression" in East Pakistan,
On December 4, 19715 the State Department put out a 
statement saying that "the beginning of the crisis can 
fairly be said to be the use of force by Pakistan", but, 
"India bears the major responsibility for the broader 
hostilities" inasmuch as, "since the beginning of the
2 1The New York Times, November 5; 1971* This was a 
reference to the cyclone that killed 10,000 people in 
the Indian state of Orissa, Ibid,
^h b i d .
2 c
However, another editorial of The New York Times 
on December 5; 1971, blamed the Nixon administration for- 
having "ignored the fundamental threat to India posed by 
Yahya Khan*s harsh repression in East Pakistan",
Yet another editorial in The New York Times on 
December 7 1 9 7 1 ;  spoke of India’s "aggressive war" ^
The Times, London, editorially commented on December 
4; 1971? tJiat even if by a miracle all refugees were to go 
back to East Pakistan, "India would not have been content 
to let things lie ^^ proximity has too powerful an effect 
for that"
2<
crisis, Indian policy, in a systematic way, has led to the
26perpetuation of the crisis".
On December 6, 1971; the United States suspended
economic aid to India. Making the announcement, Charles
W. Bray of the State Department said; "The United States
is not making a short term contribution to the Indian
economy to make it easier for the Indian Government to
27sustain its military efforts". The United States, a
spokesman for the State Department said, was actively 
working for a settlement, including some autonomy for
2 8East Pakistan, when India suddenly attacked Pakistan.
On December 12, 1971; the United States nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier Enterprise and 7 other amphibious ships 
were diverted to the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly for 
evacuating Americans and other foreigners from East
90
Pakistan. Since^on December 11, 1971, British planes
evacuated all foreigners who wished to leave East 
Pakistan, this American explanation was unconvincing; 
this could only be interpreted in India as an attempt to
26The New York Times, December 5; 1971*
The British delegate abstained on all the United 
Nations votes on the Bangla crisis.. However the Alec- 
Singh Communique, issued at the end of the Indian 
minister’s visit to London on June 22, 1971, called for 
"a solution acceptable to the people of East Bengal". 
Quoted in Pran Chopra, op.cit., p.133.
 ^^ The New York Times, Dec emb er 7, 1971,
2RThe New York Times, December 8, 1971.
^^TheNew York Times, December 13, 1971.
^^The Ne 1 York Times, December 12, 1971.
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31ïîpishtan har.-^
On D#oen0er 14» 1971» » 9poke»mm f#r Hixon
hinted at the peaslhiXlly #f oanoeXlatlen #f the President's
32
soheduXed Visit t# Mssosw unXess it restrained India* In  spite 
of the furore caused in  3hdla at the news of diverting Whited 
States ships to the Bay of Bengal» the ships sailed into the 
on leoamher 15# 1971#^^
5idian Public opinion was further incensed 
by coluimist Jack Anderson's revelations in January 1972# He 
published " secret sensitive ” texts of the 3%ational Security 
Oouwil's Washington %»eoiaX Action Group on the Crisis between 
IhdLa and Pakistan. These revealed that the President specifi­
cally directed #ie State Bepartment ” to tilt in favour of Pakistan”.
Anderson revealed that the following the
military crack-down in East Pakistan» the Whited States ambassador
to India» Kenneth B* Keating» asked that the Whited States
35throw her moral support behind India. It was also
51. See Chapter XI» PF* 591 - 92.
52. She Hew York Times. Bscember 15» 1971#
53# The Kew York Times. Bboember 16» 1971*
54# See the texts in The Hew Xerk Tlt^ s. January 6» 1972» Copies of the
f w e r e  handed over to Jack Anderson by an officer 
who did not agree wl-fâi the ”tilt”
35. D»id.,
34
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revealed that the United States Consul in Dacca, A.K.
Blood, reported that "genocide" was taking place in East
Pakistan, All these diplomatic reports were ignored
by the President,
Even after the end of the war Nixon did not allow
the frayed tempers in India to cool down; he raked up
the issue again in his foreign policy report to the
Congress, He reasserted in it that India was primarily
to blame for the flare-up. This time he alleged that he
had convincing proof, from a source in the Indian
cabinet, that India wanted to seize Pakistan-held
37Kashmir and destroy the Pakistani armed forces,
THE SOVIET ATTITUDE
In the early I96OS when both the blocs were in a 
state of flux, and when Pakistan was cultivating Chinese 
friendship in defiance of the United States, the American 
ambassador to Pakistan, McConaughy, said, probably 
inadvertently, at Dacca in February 1963, that^motivated 
by a desire "to eliminate the economic discrepancy between 
East and West Pakistan", the United States wished to give 
aid to East Pakistan and strengthen relations with her. 
This caused a controversy in Pakistan, Pravda published 
Pakistani press cojimients on the speech and observed, that 
the "latest statement of the American ambassador was 
clearly aimed at creating a split between West and East
 ^The New York Times, February 10, 1972.
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Pakistan and at distracting the public from the struggle
38against the military alliance with the USA", The
Soviet Union could not have been unaware of the dispar­
ities between East and West Pakistan and the resultant 
disaffection in the East; but, such sympathetic comments • 
would earn credit for the Soviet Union as an upholder 
of Pakistan’s national integrity while causing estrange­
ment between the United States and Pakistan, The then 
foreign policy tactics demanded such a course of action.
We have already discussed how the Soviet Union played 
host to the conference between India and Pakistan at
Tashkent in I966, and how it sold weapons to Pakistan in
3 0the face of opposition from India in 1968. Ever since
the Tashkent Conference Kosygin had been regularly sending 
greetings to the heads of government of India and Pakistan 
on the anniversary day of Tashkent every year; so he did 
in January 1971.^^ Izvestia also reported that a Soviet- 
Afghan agreement was concluded on the use of Afghan roads, 
built with Soviet assistance, for direct trade between the 
Soviet Union and Pakistan,
However, in the wake of the crackdown in East 
Pakistan, Podgorny sent a message to Yahya Khan, dated 
April 2, 1971; which could be interpreted as an unfriendly
act in Pakistan, The message said that the reports that 
"the military administration has found it possible to 
resort to extreme measures and has used armed force against
38 Prayda, February 23, I963. Complete text in CDSP,
Vol. XV,"No. 8, p.29.
^^See Chapter V, pp. 157 “* 66
^^Pravda, January 10, 1971, Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XXIII, No, 2, pol9e
^^Izvestia, January 30, 1971.
.£ÿ4
the East Pakistani population has been received with 
great alarm in the Soviet Union",
The arrest of Mujib, "who received such convincing 
support from the overwhelming majority of East Pakistan’s 
population", has also "aroused concern in the Soviet 
Union", The Soviet Union, the message went on, could 
not "refrain from voicing a well-intentioned word from 
friends ,,, ", The Soviet leadership remained convinced 
that the problem "must be solved by political means, 
without the use of force",
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 
Podgorny continued, made "an insistent appeal for the 
adoption of the most immediate measures to stop the 
bloodshed and repression against the populace in East 
Pakistan ,,,",
, The message assured Yahya that in "addressing this 
appeal to you, we are guided by the generally accepted 
humanitarian principles set down in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and by the concern for the 
welfare of the friendly Pakistani people", He ended the 
letter with the hope that the motives that guided the 
appeal would be correctly interpreted. The letter did 
not remain a diplomatic secret; it was published in 
Pravda.
Then came Gromyko’s visit to New Delhi and the 
signing of the Treaty with India, On East Pakistan, the
^^Pravda, April 4, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol.XXIII,No, 14; pp.35-36.
43lbid.
DIbid,
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joint communique, issued at the end of Gromyko’s visit,
said that "there can be no military solution". It
called for "urgent steps" in East Pakistan "to achieve
conditions of safety for the return of the refugees to
their homes",
Mrs, Gandhi visited the Soviet Union in September,
1971. At a lunch in her honour on September 28, 1971;
Kosygin said that it was impossible to justify the actions
of the Pakistani authorities. He also said that the
influx of refugees, equal to the size of the population of
an average European country, had created a problem for
India, He appealed to Yahya to take steps for the
political settlement of the problem that would take the
legitimate interests of the population into account. He
also assured that the Soviet Union would do everything she
47could to maintain peace.
The joint communique issued at the end of Mrs, 
Gandhi’s visit, called for a political settlement of the 
problem of East Pakistan, taking into consideration the 
’inalienable rights and legitimate interests of the. people 
of East Pakistan", and for the swift and safe return of 
the refugees,
As conditions along the India-East Pakistan borders 
deteriorated, there began a sustained campaign, in the 
Soviet Press, against Pakistan, A correspondent wrote 
in Pravda that Mujib’s secret trial was an attempt on the
^^Pravda, August 12, 1971, Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol, XXIII, No. 32, p,9.
^^Pravda, September 29; 1971.
^^Pravda, September 30, 1971,
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part of Pakistan to shift responsibility for the events 
"to those who have been the victims of the large-scale 
bloody repressions the army has carried out He
wrote that the semi-feudal structure in Pakistan was hot 
abolished until 1959j that, according to Pakistani official 
data, 22 families controlled 65 per cent of industrial 
production, 80 per cent of banking, and 97 per cent of 
insurance; that the feudal-monopoly combine used the most 
reactionary forms of ideology and propaganda, including 
theocratic tendencies and anti-communism; that, according 
to official data. East Pakistan received 37 per cent 
nationwide appropriations under 3 plans although it 
constituted nearly 60 per cent of the population. The 
article also repeated the Soviet government’s calls for 
Mujib’s release and a political settlement*
Pravda also reported that there were rallies in the 
diesel locomotive %*.epair plant in Tashkent, a Inotor plant 
in Minsk; a bearings plant in Kuibyshev; and a foundry 
machinery plant in Alma Ata, against mass repression in 
East Pakistan,
In October 1971, a delegation led by N,P. Firyubin, 
Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, visited India for 
talks under the practice of annual consultations and in 
accordance with article 9 of the Indo-Soviet treaty,
After the talks held on October 27, 1971, both "sides
^^Pravda, October 10, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XXIII, No. 41, pp.1-2.
^^Pravda, October 13, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vole XXIII, No. 41, p.36.
51See Appendix I.
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agreed conipletely in their assessment of the present 
situation,"
Yet another correspondent wrote in Izvestia on 
November l6, 1971, that "a burden unprecedented in modern 
history is being thrust on India, forcing her "substanti­
ally to reduce appropriations" for progressive socio­
economic reforms. He quoted the Associated Press to the 
effect that Pakistan had massed 250,000 troops on India’s 
western border; India, in the words of a spokesman of 
the Indian defence ministry, he wrote, was bringing her 
troops to "combat readiness" in view of Pakistani steps.
He obviously referred to China when he wrote that "... 
certain political forces located beyond the borders of 
these countries are not averse to warming their hands by 
kindling a conflict.
When the war broke out on December 3, 1971, the 
United States called a meeting of the United Nations 
Security Council on December 4, 1971, and introduced a 
resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of 
forces from each other’s territories. The Soviet Union 
vetoed the resolution; Britain and France abstained, 
while China supported the United States resolution,
On December 5, 1971, the United States introduced
a
yet another resolution calling for cease-fire and
withdrawal; the Soviet Union vetoed for the second time. 55
^^Pravda, October 28, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XXIII, No'. 43, p.19.
5 3Izvestia. November l6, 1971. Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No, 46, p.20. See also Pravda, 
November 9, 1971, and November 23, 1971, for more pro- 
Indian and pro-Bengali comments.
'^'^The New York Times, December 5, 1971.
 ^'^The New York Time s -, Dec emb er 6, 1971.
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China introduced a resolution of her own condemning India; 
Russia threatened to veto; whereupon, China withdrew it. 
Russia sponsored a resolution calling on Pakistan to end 
all violence in East Pakistan and arrive at a political 
settlement; this was vetoed by China.
Tass issued a statement on December 5, 1971, saying 
that Pakistani repression in its eastern wing, and the 
bombing of Indian airfields on December 3, 1971, were the 
causes of the war. It said that the Soviet appeals to 
Pakistan for peaceful political settlement were ignored; 
that "... the Soviet leaders informed President Yahya 
Khan that an armed attack against India by Pakistan, under 
whatever pretext it might be made, would evoke the most 
resolute condemnation in the Soviet Union", The Soviet 
Union, the statemënt continued, could not remain 
indifferent as the war was taking place "in direct 
proximity to the borders of the USSR and, hence, involves 
its security interests". For some inexplicable reason, 
while the Soviet delegation to the United Nations was 
vetoing the American-sponsored cease-fire resolutions, the 
Tass statement went on to declare that the Soviet 
government was for the ijimiediate cessation of bloodshed 
and for a political settlement in East Pakistan "based on 
respect for the legitimate rights and interests of its 
people". It asked other countries to "refrain from steps 
that would in one way or another signify their involvement 
in the conflict and would lead to the further complication
^^Ibid,
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57of the situation on the Hindustan peninsula".
In view of the Russian vetoes in the Security 
Council, the issue was taken to the General Assembly on 
December 7, 1971. Argentina and others moved a 
resolution calling for a cease-fire and pull-back of 
armies from each other's territories. There.was 
overwhelming support for this resolution; it was adopted 
by 104 to 11 with 10 abstentions. The 11 who opposed 
the resolution were: the USSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Mongolia,
Cuba, India and Bhutan, Those who abstained included
r Q
Britain and France, The USSR introduced its own
resolution calling for a cease-fire without a withdrawal 
of forces and for a political settlement of the problem.
It could not muster any appreciable support,
Addressing the Sixth Congress of the Polish 
Communist Party on December 7; 1971, Brezhnev said that 
the bloody suppression of the basic rights and clearly 
expressed will of East Pakistan's population and the 
tragedy of ten million refugees generated the conflict.
The Soviet Union, he also said, "resolutely" calls for 
an end to the bloodshed, and peaceful political settlement 
of existing problems, taking into account the legitimate 
rights of the people and without any interference by 
external forces, and the creation of conditions for a
Pravda, December 6, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, 
Vol. XXIII, No, 49; pp.1-2,
^^The New York Times, December 8, 1971.
59^^Ibid,
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lasting and just peace in this region.
Since India ignored the General Assembly's call for
a cease-fire and withdrawal, obviously because the war was
going in her favour, the issue was taken back to the
Security Council, where the United States moved yet
another resolution on December 12, 1971? calling for a
cease-fire. This time, however, the Soviet delegate,
Malik, did not use his veto outright; instead, he asked
for time to consult his government. He threatened that
if the United States pressed for an immediate vote, he
would veto the resolution; the United States did not,^^
When the Security Council met again on December 13?
1971? the Soviet delegate exercised his third veto on
the United States resolutions. On the same day, the
Tass issued a statement describing the dispatch of United
62States ships to the Bay of Bengal as gunboat diplomacy.
The Soviet Union also remained unmoved by the in­
spired leak in Washington that Nixon might cancel his 
visit to M o s c o w , T h e  Moscow correspondent of The New 
York Times reported that the Soviet Union ignored the 
leak.^^ On the same day, a spokesman for the State
Department said that the possibility of cancelling the
6 svisit was not "a live issue",
After the war ended, a correspondent wrote in 
Pravda that the "provocative support" from the United States
^^Pravda, December 8, 1971. See also Pravda,
December 10, 1971 and Izvestia, December 12, 1971? for more 
pro-Indian comments,
6 b
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The New York Times, December 13, 1971.
The New York Times, December 14? 1971.
'See p. 206.
The New York Times, December 16, 1971.
^^Ibid
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and China enabled Pakistan to repress the Bengalis, The
article then referred to the Chinese anti-Indian campaign
in India's neighbouring countries since the border
hostilities in 19Ô2 "to compromise India" in the eyes"of
the people of developing countries and to isolate her in
order to make the path easier for her (China) to assume
the leadership of the "so-called" Third World.
"International observers", the correspondent
continued, "noted the circumstance that Pakistan's warning
about the possible start of a war with India in 10 days
coincided with the stay in Pakistan of a Chinese delegation
headed by Li Chui-Ching, the Minister of the Machine
Building Industry, The warning period expired on
December 3? and on December 3? Pakistani aircraft carried
67out a bombing strike against Indian airports",
While Nixon persevered in his policy of holding
India largely responsible for the war even after the 
68event, the Soviet Union continued the policy of justifying 
the Indian action. Speaking at a lunch that Bhutto gave -fop 
the Soviet leaders in Moscow, Kosygin said on March 17?
1972, that the Bangla crisis was determined by a clash of 
opposing forces: on the one hand the forces of national
liberation, and, on the other hand, the forces of an 
anti-popular military dictatorship that joined ranks with 
external aggressive circles hostile to the peoples of 
Hindustan, including the Pakistani people,
^^Fravda, December 28, 1971. Complete text in 
CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No, 52, p,l,
^^Ibid«
68S^ee p. 292
^^Pravda, March I8, 1972,
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The Soviet Union, Kosygin continued, pleaded for 
a peaceful political settlement; this was ignored by 
Pakistan* If history were to repeat itself, the Soviet 
Union would again take the same position because she was 
convinced it was correct,
EVALUATION
The Soviet Bangla policy evolved as the crisis in 
the subcontinent deepened, and international power 
configurations changed. The American policy remained 
rigidly pro-Pakistani from the beginning to the end. To 
start with, in January 1971? Kosygin sent his Tashkent 
anniversary greetings to India and Pakistan; this was a 
reiteration of his mid-1960s policy of playing the role 
of a peace-maker between the two. In March 1971? there 
was a general election in India in which Mrs, Gandhi 
secured a two-thirds majority in the lower house of the 
Indian Parliament, on the basis of a radical manifesto, 
and formed a stable government. In the same month, a 
civil war broke out in Pakistan and it was at the verge 
of disintegration. Obviously? in terms of power equations, 
a large and stable country is preferable to a small and 
disintegrating one; it was not surprising if Moscow gave 
up the mid-1960s policy of parity between India and 
Pakistan,
The apparent justification for the American silence 
was the concept of state sovereignty and a desire to work 
for a peaceful settlement of the problem without offending 
Pakistan, None of these could impress India; East
303
Pakistan ceased to be an internal issue of Pakistan the
moment millions of refugees crossed the border; the
United States attempts at peaceful solution were never
publicly mentioned until the war broke out; and then it
was used to blame India, The United States completely
ignored the moral dimension of the problem. Therefore?
71Podgorny's message to Yahya in April 1971? was bound to 
impress India? more so? because there was no particularly 
significant international development against the back­
ground of which this message could be described as a 
move of diplomatic expediency. It cannot be said either 
that at that early stage Pakistan's dismemberment was 
foreseen. In fact? even after the war broke out both 
the Tass statement as well as Brezhnev's speech at the
Polish Party Congress called for an end to bloodshed and
7 2political settlement of the problem, though? curiously? 
the Soviet delegation was vetoing the American resolutions 
in the Security Council to more or less the same effect. 
Therefore? in India the Russian Bangla policy would be 
considered logical: in January 1971 when nothing happened
in East Pakistan? Kosygin sent his usual annual Tashkent 
greetings; in April 1971 when the extent of human 
suffering in East Pakistan was known? Podgorny called for 
an end to military brutalities and respect for the rights 
of East Pakistanis; the contrast with the rigidly pro- 
Pakistani United States policy was obvious. This enabled
^^See pp. 295 - 94 
72
See pp. 293 ""-'99
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Moscow to effectively influence Indian public opinion,
Nixon's dramatic announcement in July 1971 of a
trip to Peking was equally a cause for concern for the 
7 3Soviet Union, Thereafter? the Soviet Bangla policy
became a three dimensional one; it met the American 
diplomatic coup on the Chinese front with a Soviet one by 
signing a treaty with India; it countered Chinese support 
to Pakistan with strong support to India and sought to 
demonstrate the limitations on Chinese power effectively 
to tilt the balance in the subcontinent; it sought to 
bolster its position in India?which had suffered some 
set-back when Soviet arms were supplied to Pakistan in 
1968? and in the process to earn the gratitude of the new 
nation? Bangladesh,
When the issue was raised in the United Nations? there 
was no unanimity among the Western nations on the Bangla 
crisis; Britain and France abstained from all votes in 
the United Nations, The complete identity of approach 
exhibited by the United States and China in the United 
Nations must have aroused Soviet fears. Therefore? the 
Soviet Union repeatedly used its veto; this was a 
reminder to the United States that she alone? or in 
conjunction with China? could not be very effective in 
finding a solution to the crisis without Moscow's 
co-operation. The political dividends that her policy 
in the United Nations could reap in India? considering 
India's pique with the United States? were not incoiisider-
^^See Chapter VII Ï,p. 25O
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able either*
After two Soviet vetoes in the Security Council? 
the issue was referred to the General Assembly where the
7 4.Soviet isolation was complete. The Argentine resolution
was opposed by only Soviet bloc countries? excluding
Rumania? and India and Bhutan, Unless an issue directly
impinges on her own interests? like the United Nations
censures on her invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia?
the Soviet Union would not adopt a stand that would
result in almost all countries of the Third World voting
against her, Wlaen she did? as when she opposed? for
tactical reasons? an Afro-Asian move to amend the United
Nations Charter to enlarge some of the United Nations
principal organs? the Soviet Foreign Ministry gave a
7 5patient explanation as to why it was done. The fact
that the Soviet Union chose to be alienated from Afro-
Asia on this issue was probably because she considered
that the growing Sino-American warmth directly affected
her interests; this called for a countervailing step;
so? she threw her support behind India,
It must? however? be mentioned that the Soviet Union
seemed to have wavered a bit after exercising two vetoes.
When the issue was debated in the General Assembly? the
Soviet Union moved her own resolution? knowing .
the mood of the members? calling for a cease-fire without
7 6withdrawal of forces. This was the first time during
74see p. m
7 5See Chanter VIjpp5 228 “ 29
76c . ,See p. . 1299
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the crisis that the Soviet Union mentioned cease-fire in
the United Nations, And when the issue went back to the
Security Council? after the General Assembly's resolution
was ignored by India? the United States moved another
resolution on December 12? 1971? calling for cease-fire;
this time the Russian delegate asked for time to consult
his government; he did not exercise a veto outright.
But this caution did not last long. As the war progressed
into the second week? it was clear that Pakistan would
lose its eastern wing. It makes diplomatic sense to
support the winning side? the more so when the losing side
is not going to go down in history as a martyr in the
cause of any great moral mission. So the Soviet Union
gave up its wavering and vetoed for the third time on
December 13? 1971*^^
To America? the Soviet Bangla policy presented a
challenge for a challenge: if the United States would
upset the balance in the Far East to Russia's disadvantage
by her new China policy? the Soviet Union would upset the
balance in South Asia to America's disadvantage by her
new South Asia policy, America could not completely
ignore this development. However great was Nixon's
eagerness to befriend China he would not write off India,
This becomes evident from his Foreign Policy Report to the
7 8Congress in 1973» The Soviet Union could? therefore?
use her treaty with India and her strong support to New 
Delhi in the crisis? which enabled it successfully to defy 
the United States? for bargaining with Nixon; if the
7?See p. 500,
Conclusions, p, 412 ? footnote 47
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United States President practised circumspection in his. 
dealings with China? Moscow would be a restraining force 
on India in the Bangla crisis*
If warmth between China and the United States arouses 
fears? suspicions and jealousies in the USSR? too cosy a 
relationship between India and the USSR causes similar 
feelings in the United States? as is borne out by Nixon's 
Foreign Policy Report referred to above* Thus? China and 
India could be useful bargaining points for the United 
States and the USSR respectively in the process of 
adjusting their interests in that part of the world*
In the Bangla crisis? the Soviet Union seemed to 
have used her support of India and her standing there for 
defying as well as conciliating the United States, We 
have seen how the USSR defied the United States as well 
as the United Nations in allying herself with India in 
the crisis, Nixon's annual Foreign Policy Report in 1972 
provides a clue as to how the Soviet Union used the Bangla 
crisis ultimately to conciliate the United States, He 
wrote that the "Soviet attitude during the crisis in South 
Asia has dangerous implications for other regional
conflicts? even though in the end the USSR played a
70 a
restraining role". That cryptic reference to^Soviet
"restraining role"? although? "in the end"? is significant.
Reference has already been made to Nixon's allegations that
India wanted to seize Pakistan-held Kashmir and destroy
the Pakistani armed f o r c e s , S i n c e  these two statements
^^The New York Times? February 10? 1972,
80»bee p. 292
;)Ud
of Nixon? viz, Soviet restraining role in the end?'and
allegations that India intended to occupy Pakistan-held
-twc
Kashmir and destroy Pakistani armed forces? are found in 
the same document? I am inclined to think that the Soviet 
Union must have claimed credit for India's unilateral 
declaration of cease-fire in the western sector once 
Pakistani forces surrendered in East Pakistan, If it 
were so? the Bangla crisis was used by the Soviet Union 
to 1) Remind the United States that if she unilaterally 
decided to shape the destiny of the world or any part 
thereof? Moscow could foil such plans; and? that any 
Sino-American moves to the disadvantage of her interests 
would be stoutly resisted (her role in the United Nations 
in the Bangla crisis), 2) Signal to Washington that she 
would be prepared for a moderate and constructive role on 
the basis of equality and mutual benefit (her restraining 
role at the end of Bangla crisis). This message did 
not seem to have gone in vain: having exchanged toasts
with Peking? Nixon turned his attention to summit meetings 
and agreements with Moscow with much vigour.
Until fears subside and normalisation takes place 
in Sino-Soviet relations? the Soviet Union would use 
every opportunity to thwart Chinese ambitions. In the 
Bangla crisis India was in a position to fend for herself 
with only Soviet diplomatic support and supply of some 
sophisticated weapons on commercial terms, China's 
client? Pakistan? was not in a similar position. All 
that China could give was vociferous support in and outside 
the United Nations? and some arms; she would not directly 
intervene? for fear of dangerous consequences, China's 
discomfiture was all the more glaring when viewed in the
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context of her helplessness to save East Pakistan wherq
there was an anti-Indian? anti-Soviet? pro-Mao party?
8lthe National Awami Party? led by Maulana Bhasani? ' who 
himself fled to India for shelter in the wake of the 
crackdown on Bengalis, Intelligent Pakistanis should 
have become aware of the limitations on China's ability 
decisively to tilt the balance in favour of Pakistan in the 
sub-continent* It is not s u r p r i s i n g B h u t t o  visited 
the Soviet Union in March 1972? on his own initiative? to
O o
repair Pakistani relations with Moscow, Again? after
India conducted an underground nuclear explosion in May 
1974? Bhutto decided to visit Moscow to discuss with the
O o
Soviet leaders its effects on Pakistan, The visit took
place in October 1974. At a dinner given by the Soviet 
government for Bhutto? he said that the Soviet Union 
exercised a positive influence on the normalisation of 
relations between the countries of South Asia* He also 
referred to Moscow's constructive contribution to the 
withdrawal of the Indian forces from Pakistani territory 
81Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani led the National 
Awami Party, Since Communist party was banned in Pakistan? 
many Communists functioned through the NAP, He was suspect 
in the eyes of the Pakistani establishment before relations 
with China grew warm. In November I968? he led a 
delegation to China on behalf of Ayub Khan, According 
to Bhasani's taped interview with Tariq Ali? who quoted it 
in his book Military Rule or Peoples Power? Mao told him 
(Bhasani) that China's relationship with Pakistan was 
extremely fragile and that the United States? the USSR? 
and India would do their best to break this. Mao also 
told him that his anti-Ayub agitation would only streng­
then the United States? USSR and India and advised him to 
be cautious* Bhasani opposed the Tashkent accord between 
India and Pakistan* See Tapan Das? Sino-Pak Collusion and 
the UoS. Policy (Bombay; Asia Publishing House? 1972)? pp. 
98-100 and 121,
8 2See Chapter ,V? p, 179 
^^The Guardian? July 0? 1974*
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and the release of 90?000 Pakistani prisoners of war.
He expressed his gratitude for this,^^ The fact that 
Pakistan considers that the maintenance of correct 
relations with Moscow is in her interest in view of its 
(Moscow's) influence in India speaks for Pakistani 
disbelief in China's ability to protect her (Pakistani) 
interests against India; the Soviet Bangladesh policy? to 
that extent? deflated Peking's image in the subcontinent.
In the subcontinent the Soviet policy achieved three 
objectives; 1) It called Pakistan's attention to Moscow's 
ability to manoeuvre in the subcontinent: her evenhanded-
ness in the I965 Indo-Pakistani war? her initiative for 
the Tashkent Conference? her sale of arms to Pakistan in 
1968 in spite of strong Indian opposition? and then her 
diplomatic help in the process of the birth of Bangladesh, 
The contrast was obvious; China does not have the same 
elbow-room, (Reference has just been made to instances 
which seem to suggest that Pakistan is conscious of this 
difference; that is a gain for Russia.)
2, The Treaty and Moscow's Bangladesh policy repaired 
relations with India? which showed some signs of cooling 
after the supply of Soviet arms to Pakistan in I968, By 
her Bangladesh policy? the Soviet Union impressed the Indian 
public how effective and helpful the treaty is in protecting 
Indian interests, Nixon? on the other hand? indulged in 
an exercise in futility by the dispatch of naval ships 
to the Bay of Bengal. Nixon would not use his ships 
against India for fear of international complications; 
their presence in the Bay did not save East
^^Pravda, October 25? 1974.
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Pakistan either* He only angered Indian public opinion 
and thus unwittingly contributed to Russian popularity in 
India*
Twice did Sardar Swaran Singh publicly express
India's gratitude to the Soviet Union for Podgorny's
8 6message to General Yahya Khan, In the joint communique
Issued on September 29? 1971? at the end of Mrs, Gandhi's 
visit to the Soviet Union? the two sides agreed to maintain 
further contacts with one another and to continue the 
exchange of opinions on questions arising out of the
Q n
Bangla crisis. In essence, India agreed to take the
Soviet Union into confidence before taking any
8 8action. The state of Indian public opinion being what
it was? such public expressions of gratitude to and 
confidence in the Soviet Union by the Indian leaders 
would further strengthen the popular image of Moscow in 
India,
While the Anglo-American press did its duty 
creditably by the suffering masses of East Pakistan? when 
the war broke out? some of the big papers could not resist 
their habit of making caustic comments on I n d i a , T h e  
Soviet press not only focused on the suffering of East 
Pakistanis? but also justified India, One commentator in 
Pravda wrote that China wanted to compromise India in the
o r
The New York Times editorially commented on 
December l6? 1971? that Pakistani military debacle was 
also "a diplomatic debacle for the United States",
O A
See Pravda, June? 9? 1971; and August 12? 1971.
^^Pravda, September 30? 1971,
8 8~For President Kennedy's complaint to Nehru against 
his failure to consult with the United States before taking 
military action in Goa? See Chapter p. 185
89cSee p, 289
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eyes of the third world countries to make it easier for
90Peking to assume its leadership. That amounted to
saying that the Soviet Union considered. India a candidate 
for leadership? which China üos trying to pre-empt* Since 
India is aware of the controlled nature of the Soviet 
press? credit for such comments would be given to the 
Soviet government too. The Soviet government’s indiff­
erence to Nixon’s clumsily-handled threat of cancellation
91of visit to Moscow? would appeal to India's national ego 
In the conditions prevailing then? this gesture would be 
interpreted in India as Soviet estimate of her importance 
even in comparison with Washington* All such steps 
during the crisis helped push Soviet prestige in India 
to the top*
3, The Soviet Union earned the gratitude of the 
new nation? Bangladesh* In contrast with Nixon's policy?
the Soviet policy would certainly look benign to the
92suffering Bengalis, Moscow could claim some gains for
the movement too* After having been banned for twenty
years under Pakistani rule? the Communist Party was
allowed to function openly in Bangladesh for sometime
9 3before she became a one-party state.
Thus? India fought an expensive war? bore a major
90»See p,
91»See p, 300
9 2For critical comments on the United States' policy 
during the Bangladesh crisis and expressions of gratitude 
to the Soviet Union by the leaders of the new nation? see 
Pravda s January 9? 1972? The New York Times , February 21?
1972? and Pravda? March 5? 1972,
Q 3Pravda, January 24? 1972,
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burden of the maintenance of the refugees and emerged as 
the dominant power on the subcontinent; Bengalis suffered 
untold miseries; Pakistan suffered defeat and 
dismemberment; China's helplessness to give effective 
help to her friend was exposed; the United States 
suffered "a diplomatic d e b a c l e " b u t ,  the Soviet Union 
scored many diplomatic successes over her rivals 
practically at no cost to herself.
^^See p, 511 ? footnote 85^
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CHAPTER X  
INDO-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS
BACKGROUND
Contrasting the historical developments in Europe 
with those in underdeveloped countries, Nehru once said 
that in Europe an economic revolution preceded a political 
revolution; when the latter came, certain resources had 
been built up by economic changes. In Asia, he said, it 
was the reverse. It is obvious, he continued, that these 
underdeveloped countries could not go through the long 
process which had industrialised Europe and America.
There was constant social pressure which might well upset 
the political fabric unless the people were given some­
thing to satisfy their longings,^
It has already been mentioned that Nehru was 
impressed by Soviet planning and thought that some such 
method had to be adopted in India to achieve quick progress, 
At its annual session in 1931j the Indian National Congress 
discussed the question of planning and recommended state 
economic planning to eliminate poverty. In October 1938 
a conference of ministers of industries adopted a 
resolution stating that industrialisation was the key to 
economic growth in India. A National Planning Committee 
was set up, under Nehru’s Chairmanship, charged with the
^Jawaharlal Nehru, India To-day and To-morrow 
(New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1960),
pp.15-16,
^See Chapter iT p.82 .
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responsibility of developing such a plan.
In April 1948j the Congress adopted an economic 
programme under which munitions, atomic energy and railways 
were to be under public ownership; and new ventures in 
coal, iron and steel, aircraft manufacture, shipbuilding, 
telegraphic and telephone industries, and minerals were to 
be reserved for the State,^
Realisation of some sort of an egalitarian society 
was one of the goals of the Indian National Congress, 
Mahatma Gandhi hoped to achieve it through his utopian 
ideal of the owners of means of production holding their 
properties in trust for the good of the society. But 
most other great leaders felt that that should be brought 
about by state intervention within the liberal-democratic 
set up. Accordingly, they included the Directive 
Principles of State Policy in part IV of the Indian 
Constitution, These, unlike the Fundamental Rights 
included in part III of the Constitution, are not enforce­
able by Courts of Law, The Directive Principles sound 
socialist in content: The State shall strive to discourage
the concentration of wealth and means of production to the 
common detriment, secure, within the limits of its 
economic capacity, the right to work, education, and 
public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, 
sickness, and secure just and humane conditions of work
Leo Tansky, The US and the USSR Aid to Developing 
Countries: A Comparative Study of India, Turkey and the
UAR, (New York: Frederick A, Praeger Publishers, 1967),
p. 69*
^Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography,
pp.510-511.
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and living wage etc,^ ^_
Dr, Solomon, an American engineer, who was Nehru’s
personal adviser between 1949-1950, advised the creation
of a central agency to evolve a unified national plan.
In March 1950, a 6-member Planning Commission was set up,^
Miile Mahatma Gandhi preferred cottage industries,
Nehru was for heavy industry. He wanted "certain basic,
key, mother industries in the country ,,. out of which
other industries grow. If we do not do that we shall
n
remain dependent on others",
In 1956, Nehru got the Industrial Policy Resolution 
adopted in Parliament. This divided industries into 3 
categories: l) Industries the future development of
which will be the exclusive responsibility of the State.
2)  Those which will be progressively state-owned and in 
which the state will, therefore, generally take the 
initiative in establishing new undertakings. But private 
enterprise will also be expected to supplement the effort 
of the State. 3) All other industries whose future 
development will, in general, be left to the initiative 
and enterprise of the private sector. Under this policy, 
ammunitions, atomic energy, iron and steel, coal, heavy 
machine building industry etc, were exclusively reserved 
for the State.^
See Articles 39-43 in Durga Das Basu, Commentary 
on the Constitution of India, Vol. I, (Calcutta: S,C, 
Sarkar & Sons Ltd,, 1955), pp.395-398,
^Michael Brecher, op,cit,, p,515*
n _
(Quoted in Asha L, Datar, India’s Economic Relations 
with the USSR and Eastern Europe 1953-1969 (C a mbr id ge: 
Cambridge University Press, 197 2), p.21.
P^.J'c Eldrige, The Politics of Foreign Aid in India 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp.197-199.
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The birth of India as a free nation coincided with 
the beginning of the Cold War. For reasons discussed
already, India’s response to the Cold War was non-
. 0 
alignment <,
THE SOVIET UNION DECIDES ON GIVING AID 
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The new nations’ desire for quick economic develop­
ment and their need for foreign aid inevitably made 
economic aid one of the components of Cold War diplomacy.
The United States had already begun extending aid to new 
nations. The post-Stalin leadership, which had changed 
the strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign p o l i c y , c o u l d  
not ignore the importance of economic aid in foreign 
policy.
Perforce, they had to find an ideological justification 
for foreign aid. The Conference of World Communist Parties 
in i960 and the XXIInd CPSU Congress in 196I found a high 
sounding ideological justification for it: "international
duty" . ^
However, the discussion of the problem of reconciling 
aid to bourgeois states with ideology continued. The 
author of a Soviet book, Pavlov, thought that the Indian 
bourgeosie adopts a "contradictory" stand on the contem-
See Chapter II, "Even in accepting economic help", 
said Nehru in March 1948, "or in getting political help, 
it is not a wise policy to put all our eggs in one basket. 
Nor should we get help at the cost of our self-respect", 
India’s Foreign Policy, p.35*
10 53 62
See Chapter I , pp,/ and Chapter III, pp*lQ5 - 105
^^See Pravda9 December 6, I960, for the Statement 
issued by the Conference; and the Road to Communism, p.497,
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porary world problems; on the one hand, it preserves the 
capitalist character of India’s economic progress, on the 
other, it offers resistance to continued attempts of
- 12foreign monopolies to regain control over her economy."
He theorised that for the Indian bourgeoisie, "the achieve­
ment of economic self-sufficiency is vitally important, 
signifying above all the consolidation of the sovereign 
bourgeois state as the mainstay of political independence
from imperialism and as a decisive factor for the class
11domination of the bourgeoisie within the country",
Pavlov considered the public sector industries in 
non-Communist states as of state capitalist nature in view 
of the political domination of the bourgeoisie. Neverthe­
less, it is progressive because it helps their independent 
economic development,^^
By the late içôos, some Soviet scholars even began 
doubting the wisdom of judging the developments in under­
developed states strictly from the Soviet ideological 
angles. For example, a Soviet writer, Zarine, wrote in 
196s that classes are not well-defined in developing 
countries; racial, national, tribal and even religious 
feelings often predominate over class-consciousness. 
Therefore, the "degree to which these factors influence
12V,I, Pavlov, India: Economic Freedom Versus 
Imperialism (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, I963),
p. 19.
^^Ibid,, p.16,
^^Ibid,, p,31- See also I,A, Benediktov, Bonds of 
Friendship; On Soviet Indian Friendship (New Delhi: Soviet 
Land Booklets, Information Department of the USSR Embassy 
in India, 1973), pp.17-18.
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social life should be taken into account when analysing
the social and class structure in the emerging countries",^^
The proletariat in developing countries has "periodic
or permanent connection with the countryside"; this
hampers the development of its class-consciousness. The.
fact that the anti-imperialist struggle in former colonies
and dependent territories is not yet over determines one
of the features of class struggle in the Third World
"namely, the historical necessity for all the nation’s
progressive forces to rally in a united anti-imperialist
front against neocolonialism. This front unites various
classes and social strata despite the antagonistic
contradictions between them. Their close alliance is the
guarantee of success in the struggle",^^
While no general democratic programme, wrote Zarine,
could be realised within the narrow framework of
capitalism, nevertheless, in "present-day conditions, it
is becoming less and less advisable to rely on sudden
17action by the revolutionary forces "
He added that in "countries lacking the objective
prerequisites for a socialist revolution, the liberation
movement can only be a national-democratic one even under
18the most favourable conditions". If class collaboration
could be advocated, as Zarine did, Soviet aid to the Third
Zarine, "Classes and class struggle in 
Developing Countries", International Affairs (Moscow),
No. 4 (1968), pp.47-48.
, p.50.
, p . 5 2 ,
18Ibid, Zarine also found Leninist sanction for his 
argument in a quotation from Lenin’s collected works Vol. 
XI (Moscow, 1962), p.214. Ibid, For a definition of a 
national-democratic state, ■ see Chapter I, pÆ*. $7 - 53^
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World countries could be justified too.
Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet writers and spokes­
men have been emphasising the need for trade "with all 
countries participating in international division of 
labour irrespective of their social systems".
By the mid-1960s, some Soviet economists began 
advocating that consideration be given to the economic 
aspects of foreign aid: some of them considered aid-
giving primarily as an alternative to domestic, investment 
and argued that it would be cheaper to import certain goods 
and materials than to produce them at home, as well as to 
have the East Europeans replace some of the raw materials
they obtained from the Soviet Union by imports from Africa
, . . 20and Asia.
Thus, an ideological as well as economic justification 
for foreign aid was found.
We now take a look at Soviet assistance to India in 
various fields,
STEEL. PLANTS
It is estimated that India has reserves of 20 billion
21tonnes of high-grade iron-ore; and 130 billion tonnes
Prof, N, Lyubimov, "Soviet Foreign Trade Problems", 
International Affairs (Moscow), No, 8 (I965), p.12. See 
also V, Arkhipov and A, Bykov, Free Trade or Exclusive 
Blocs?(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1971), 
p,27, and for a criticism of the Chinese autarkic policies, 
B.C. Gafurov et al., Asia and Africa: Fundamental Changes 
(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1972), 
pp.114-115*
9 nElizabeth Kridl Valkeriier, "New Trends in Soviet 
Economic Relations with the Third World", Wor1d Politles, 
Vol, XXII, No. 3 (April 1970), p.4l6.
^^Baibara Ward, "India and the West", International 
Affairs (London), Vol. XXXVII, No., 4 (October 196I), p.442*
2 2of coal* At the time, of independence, India’s total
steel production was only 1 million tonnes. Therefore, 
the government of India wanted to set up a steel mill 
under state management to increase steel production,
BHILAI As early as 1952, India approached the World 
Bank for a loan to set up a steel mill in the public sector.
But the Bank refused credit and suggested that the
-the 21
government should let private sector set up a mill,
A
India then turned to Britain and West Germany for help.
This was the period when the new Soviet leaders were
looking for avenues for implementing their new forward 
24policy, India’s weak bargaining position in her efforts
to secure help from Britain and West Germany for a steel
mill could not have gone unnoticed in Moscow, And the
Soviet Union stepped in to help India,
Indian faith in British technology during this
period becomes evident from what Khrushchev let the world
know in his memoirs recently. He wrote: "Our engineers
prepared a blueprint for the project and submitted it to
the Indians, who asked if we would mind if they let some
English engineers review the plant", Khrushchev commented
that that "seemed like a fairly original way of doing
business";. but the Soviet Union told India that she had
2 5no objection to that.
9 9
The Times of India Directory and Year Book 1972, 
(Bombay) p,43.
2 3
24
Asha L, Datar, op,cit,, p.ôo
25
See Chapter III, pp. I05 |05
Strobe Talbott, transi, and ed,, op,cit,, p.302
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The Soviet offer certainly improved India’s 
bargaining position. The Soviet offer was also econom­
ically advantageous.' The Indian government estimated 
that the difference between the interest charged on the 
Soviet Bhilai credit and the Rourkela (West German plant) 
credit would result in a saving of 017 millions, equal to
26about 10 per cent of the German credit for the plant,
'An agreement was signed in February I960, to expand
the production capacity of Bhilai to 2,5 million tonnes
27a year from the original 1 million tonnes. Another
recent agreement envisages this to go up to 4 million
28tonnes a year by September 1979* Yet another protocol
was signed in February 1973, for further expansion of
20Bhilai’s capacity to 7 million tonnes a year.
However, financial stringency put under a cloud the
expansion programme at Bhilai from 2,5 million tonnes to
4 million tonnes. This is because of the sharp rise in
the cost of expansion - from the original Rs,2,50 billions
30to nearly Rs.lO billions based on June 1974 prices,
Indian steel technologists are opposed to any further
expansion of Bhilai and Bokaro (see below). As it is,
they say, the installed capacity is not being utilised
because of bad maintenance, labour indiscipline and
generally lower efficiency. These problems would only
31become more complex in larger plants,
2 6Eastern Economist, February 11, 1955) p,2l8, as 
quoted in P,J, Eldrige, op,cit,, p,34*
Pravda, February 13) Ï960,
^^The Overseas Hindustan Times, February 20, 1975*
^ ^ T h e  H i n d u s t a n  T i m e s , F e b r u a r y  18, 1973*
^^A,K, Sen, "Bhilai’s Impressive Reco3"d" , The 
Overseas Hindustan Times, February 20, 1975*
31The Overseas Hindustan Times, January 2, 1975*
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BOKARO In view of the shortage of steel felt by India,
the government wanted to have one more steel mill under
st at e management, at B ok are.
There were some prominent Americans who felt that
the United States should help India build a steel mill 
-the.
in public sector. The then United States ambassador to 
/\
India, Galbraith, wrote: "This project (Bokaro) is very
important. It is needed, useful and symbolic. Many of
the things we are doing are rather anonymous - we provide
copper and other non-ferrous metals which are needed
32and useful but not very dramatic", A U,S, Steel
Corporation team studied the Bokaro steel plant and found
the site acceptable; it did not question the need for 
33the plant. But in the meantime the Clay Committee,
appointed by the United States President to advise on aid 
and other related issues,submitted its Report, It said 
that too much of United States aid was given to public 
undertakings and not enough consideration had been given 
to the "interests of our economic system", and called for 
the expansion of the aid to private undertakings which 
"alone could make the greatest contribution to rapid 
economic growth and overall development",^^ President
Kennedy came out strongly in favour of helping India build
"the 0 c
Bokaro in public sector, Galbraith also thought that
enough had already been said along Clay’s ideological line
32John Kenneth Galbraith, op,cit., p.215 
^k b i d .. p.468.
^kuoted in Leo Tansky, op. cit. , p. 6.
3 5John K. Galbraith, op,cit,, p,572.
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"to cause everyone to suppose our concern was to sustain
3 6capitalism rather than help the Indians", All this
did not help* The House of Representatives excluded
Bokaro from the scope of the foreign aid bill for 1963-1964)
without mentioning it. Thereupon, Nehru withdrew the
37request for aid for Bokaro,'
Then, India turned to the Soviet Union, which agreed 
to help in the construction of the mill* A 20-member 
team of Soviet experts came to India in August I964 to 
make a study of the project. Following this, an 
agreement was signed on January 2J, 1965, for Soviet 
co-operation in the construction of Bokaro with an initial 
production capacity of 1,5 to 2 million tonnes to be later 
expanded to 4 million tonnes. The Soviet Union granted
38credit up to 200 million roubles.
Ever since the United States evinced interest in 
Bokaro, the Soviet press and scholars closely followed the 
developments, A correspondent wrote in Izvestia in June 
1963 that the United States interest in Bokaro was 
influenced by "the fact that it is already difficult to 
make a propaganda fortune out of the stale surpluses of 
agricultural products that make up the lion’s share of
39American aid", Referring to suggestions in some United
States quarters that the U.S. Steel Corporation should 
have a share in the capital of the plant in spite of the
^k b i d . . p. 544.
37Bokaro, A Mile Stone in India’s Progress (New 
Delhi; Information Department of the USSR Embassy, (n.d,)), 
p,58 (hereinafter referred to as Bokaro),
^^Ibid., p.59*
^^Izvestia, June 9j> 1963* Complete text in CDSFp 
Vol. XV, No. 23) p.20.
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knowledge that India had resisted similar West German
demands in Rourkela, Pavlov wrote: "A class about to be
superseded on the historic scene is at times apt to lose
4-0all sense of proportion". By the time Pavlov’s book
went to the print, the United States administration’s 
efforts to finance Bokaro had not yet fallen through. 
Therefore, he wrote that the United States might change 
its attitude to public sector. "The Indian public which 
has long seen through the reasons for the British and West 
German monopolies’ participation in state-sponsored steel 
projects will undoubtedly be able to discern the enforced 
nature of possible changes in American policies as well."^^ 
He, thus, sought to ensure credit for the Soviet Union in 
case the United States changed. After the Indo-Soviet 
agreement for Soviet help for the construction of Bokaro 
was signed, a correspondent wrote in Pravda in January
1965 that the United States repeated the story of Aswan
• T- 42 in India,
The United States estimates for the three stages of 
Bokaro were Rs,7,l47.S million; the Soviet estimates
were Rs,10,273*22 million. Such plants with similar
facilities as Bokaro were built in the United Kingdom, 
Japan, Italy, France, in the past few years at less than 
half the cost of B o k a r o . I n  the United States estimate.
^^V.I, Pavlov, op.cit., p.177.
41lbid,, p.178,
^^Pravda, January 30, I965.
^^Before devaluation in June I966, the exchange rate 
was 01.00 = Rupees 4,76 and after devaluation, 01,00 =
Rs, 7 .5O0
^^Asha L. Datar, op,cit., pp.2 26-227*
'^^ Ibid. , p. 228.
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the foreign exchange component was 0512*6 million* This 
was to be financed by a 20-year loan at 5$ per cent 
interest. The foreign exchange component in the Soviet 
estimate was 200 million roubles; this credit was to be 
granted by Moscow at 2^ per cent interest for 12 years,
A Soviet booklet described Bokaro as "India’s first 
’Swadeshi’ steel p l a n t " , S w a d e s h i  means indigenous.
The Sanskrit word has an emotional connotation in India,
In the first decade of this century, the Swadeshi movement 
had advocated the boycott of British goods and the use of 
Indian-made ones,^^ The Soviet publication tried to make 
use of that term for diplomatic benefit.
However, it has to be said that it is not mere 
propaganda; there is a large element of truth in the claim 
inasmuch as Indian participation and Indian-made equipment 
in the construction of Bokaro played a dominant role.
The Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited (HSCL) 
was entrusted with the entire civil engineering work as 
well as with the work of supplying and erecting steel 
structures. The Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi, 
supplied 28,780 tonnes of steel structures besides 163,000 
tonnes supplied by the HSCL. Almost all steel structurais 
except for l6,5 thousand tonnes from the Soviet Union were 
to be procured indigenously. The Heavy Engineering 
Corporation also supplied 7 2,000 tonnes of equipment, i.e. 
one-fourth of the total used. The Mining and Allied 
Machinery Corporation, Durgapur, Instrumentation Ltd., Kota,
4^Ibid,, p.229.
Bokaro, p,11,
^^See K. Santhanam, British Imperialism and Indian 
Nationalism (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1972), po47
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the Heavy Electrical Equipment, Hardwar - all of them 
built with Soviet assistance - were also required to supply 
some sophisticated equipment* The indigenous content of 
equipment supplied for Stage I is 64 per cent*^^
In the technical and design work too, Indian 
participation was considerable. One hundred and ten 
smaller and subsidiary units out of a total of 286 were 
designed by Dastur Company, an Indian firm, A dozen 
Indian design experts specialising in different fields 
were associated with the preparation of the Detailed 
Project Report by the Soviet design institute, Gipromez, 
Almost all design work for the expansion stage will be in 
Indian hands. To sum up, about 90 per cent of building 
structures, 100 per cent of technological structures, 48 
per cent of electrical equipment and 60 per cent of 
refractories are being obtained from indigenous sources, 
According to I.S. Eroyan, head of the Soviet 
specialists at Bokaro, originally out of 197,000 tonnes of 
refractories required for the Bokaro plant, the Soviet 
Union was to deliver only 4,500 tonnes. But later it 
became clear that the Indian plants would not be able to 
deliver their share. So, the Soviet Union agreed to 
supply 45,000 tonnes. Saying that there is scarcity of 
refractories in the world, Eroyan wrote that, in fact, "we 
had to cut down refractory supplies to our own industry 
in order to fill in the gap in Bokaro"
Bokaro, ppo60-6l. However, elsewhere in the 
booklet the share of indigenous content is put at 55 per 
cent. Ibid., p.12,
^^Ibid., p,61.
p. 24.
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Under a protocol signed in February 1973, the 
capacity of Bokaro would be expanded to 10 million tonnes
a year for which the Soviet Union would grant necessary
, . , 52credits,
HEAVY MACHINES
Nehru’s preference for heavy machinery has already
r o
been mentioned, Tt was natural, therefore, that the
Government of India invited a British and a Soviet team 
to make reports on the possibility of building heavy 
machinery plants in India in the 1950s. Both made reports. 
The Soviet report was accepted because of the availability 
of credits.
In the late 1950s, three Russian-financed plants 
were set up; 1. The Heavy Engineering Plant at Ranchi 
which produces 80,000 tonnes of equipment a year for 
ferrous metallurgy, aluminium, chemical and cement 
industries and building machinery, 2. The Mining Equip­
ment Plant at Durgapur which produces 45,000 tonnes of 
equipment for mining as well as ports, 3« The Heavy 
Electricals Plant in Hardwar which produces large and 
medium size electric machines and hydro and steam units.
The plant manufactures turbine sets with capacities of 
100,000 and 200,000 kilowatts each. When keyed up to 
designed capacity, the plant will be able to provide an
^^The Hindustan Times, February IS, 1973*
p ,  316
See Aslia I,. Datar, op. cit. , pp. 204-205.
increase in the installed generating capacity of 2*7 
million kilowatts à year,^^
PHARMACEUTICALS 
Even in 1950, the average life expectancy in India
56was 32.1 years. Epidemics were common. Massive
government effort was needed to improve the situation. 
Cheap medicines was one of the means of improving health. 
In the 1950s, the pharmaceutical industry in India 
was heavily dominated by Western companies. Prices were 
high. Hardly any important medicines were manufactured 
in India; they were more encapsuled and packed. Drugs 
were heavily protected by patents.
In 1955-1956, the Soviet Union offered to set up
plants to manufacture anti-biotics and surgical
58
57instruments. Then, the United States firms in India
offered to bring down import prices for drugs
During the visit to the Soviet Union of an Indian 
economic delegation led by two cabinet ministers in May 
1959) an agreement was signed for the construction of 
plants in public sector for the manufacture of medicines 
and surgical instruments with Soviet assistance and 
c r e d i t s , T h r e e  plants were set up under this agreement; . 
1. An anti-biotics plant at Rishikesh, 2, A synthetic
5 5See S« Skachkov, "Projects of Soviet-Indian Economic 
and Technical Co-operation - An Important Factor in the 
Development of Indian Economy", in Mission of Friendship, 
pp.147-148.
56The Times of India Directory and Year Book, p.139*
It is now 52,5 years. Ibid,
57Asha L, Datar, op,cit., p,70,
^^Ibid,, p,71c
^^It was signed on May 29, 1959* Izvestia, May 31)
1959
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drugs plant at Hyderabad. 3« A surgical instruments 
factory in Madras.
OIL INDUSTRY
After becoming independent, India signed agreements 
with 3 western firms under which they set up refineries 
in India. Under these agreements, the companies were 
given complete freedom regarding the sources of supply of 
crude oil and prices,
In 1959-1960, the USSR offered India some crude oil 
at 15-20 per cent below the world market price; India 
could not accept this as the Western refineries in India 
refused to refine it. The Government of India then 
decided to set up refineries in the public sector. The 
Soviet Union and Rumania offered assistance to set up
62refineries. After Rumania and the USSR had built two
refineries in Gauhati and Barauni respectively,^^ western 
firms offered to set up refineries at nearly half the 
price of the USSR refinery. Thereupon, the Soviet Union 
brought down the cost of its second refinery at Koyali.^^ 
In those days western oil companies evinced no 
interest in prospecting for oil in I n d i a , T h e r e  was 
excess production over consumption in the non-communist 
world then; there was less incentive for western
6 0I.A. Benediktov, on.cit., p.34*
^^Asha L. Datar, on.cit., p.71.
^^Ibid.
6 3P.J. Eldrige, op.cit., p.123* 
^^Asha Lr Datar, on,cit., p.71-74,
t b i d . . p. 71.
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, . 66 companies to invest money in prospecting.
But India was eager to find her own sources of oil.
Therefore, in Septemher-October 1955) the then Minister
for Petroleum and Chemicals had visited the USSR, United
Kingdom, Rumania, France, Holland and Switzerland to
explore the possibility of technical assistance for oil
exploration. In November 1955) a Soviet team arrived
in India to examine the question.
Later, the Soviet Union helped in prospecting and
drilling work. In May 1958, gas was found near
Jwalamukhi in the Punjab; and in September of the same
67year oil was struck on the gulf of Cambay in Gujarat.
In May i960 oil was struck in Ankaleshwar, Gujarat; and 
in December I960, in the Rudrasagar region of Assam,
By 1968-69, the annual production of oil from wells 
discovered with Soviet assistance reached 3.5 million
, 69tonnes.
In May 1963, a protocol was signed for expanding the
capacities of the two Soviet-assisted refineries from 2 to
7 03 million tonnes each. Since India still needs
additional oil refining capacity, at the first session of 
the Inter-Governmental Commission for Economic, Scientific 
and Technical Co-operation in New Delhi in February 197 3) 
a protocol was signed to set up a refinery at Mathura with
Ibid., p.221.
67I,A, Benediktov, op.cit., p.30
k b i d . . pp. 30-31.
Asha L. Datai’) op. cit. , p. 223.
70loA. Benediktov, op,cit., p, 32
71an annual capacity of 6 million tonnes.
TRADE
From the point of view of self-respect, paying . 
one’s way through is more appealing to new nations than 
depending upon foreign aid. That is why developing 
countries repeatedly press for trade concessions at 
international gatherings.
At the time of independence and for a long time 
thereafter, India’s trade was heavily tied to Britain, 
with the United States coming in second place. It was 
natural that India would try to diversify her trade in 
view of the risks, political and economic, involved in 
over->dependence on one or two countries.
Since, to start with, Moscow used to advertise that 
its "disinterested" aid was rendered in a spirit of equality 
and with the mission of making the developing countries 
self-reliant, the new nations’ urge to diversify their 
trade and earn their own means for development could not 
be ignored. There was appropriate response from the 
Soviet Union to such aspirations of the developing countries, 
Since 1953, India and the Soviet Union have been 
making long-term trade agreements, generally for 5-year 
periods.
Under these agreements, the Soviet Union, and later
also other East European countries, accepted the rupee as
the unit of account in trade with India and it was agreed
7 2in principle that trade should be bilaterally balanced.
718. Skachkov, on,cit,, p.150.
7 2Asha L, Datar, op.cit,, p.88,
However, until 1958, if a surplus on either side developed
ill any year, the country concerned could demand settlement
in sterling. Between 1959-1960 the agreements between
India and the Communist bloc countries were revised and
xt was agreed not to demand payments in convertible
currency but to hold rupee balances or on India’s side to
allow an overdraft on the partner country’s rupee account
73until trade could be adjusted to absorb them. Under
these agreements, Indo-Soviet trade registered a remarkable 
increase as shown below in Table 1.
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TABLE 1.
INDIA'S TRADE \\fITH THE USSR, BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 1959-1972
Value in million rupees
Year India's
Total
Imports
India's
Total
Exports
Imports 
from the 
USSR
Exports 
to the 
USSR
Imports
from
Britain
, Exports 
to 
Britain
Imports 
from the 
United 
States
Exports 
to the 
United 
States
1 9 5 9 9,459.4 6 , 1 4 1 . 1 166.5 303.3 1 ,7 2 7 . 2 1 ,6 7 6 . 4 1,954.4 952.0
i9 6 0 1 1 ,2 1 6 , 2 6 ,3 2 4 . 2 158.7 2 8 7 . 8 2 , 1 7 1 . 5 1 ,7 0 6 . 9 3 .2 7 5 . 6 9 9 8 . 3
1 9 6 1 ’ 1 0 ,5 8 1 . 2 6 ,5 5 2 . 4 353.2 3 1 8 . 9 1,945,2 1,601.1 2,335.1 1 , 1 6 0 , 6
1 9 6 2 1 0 ,7 7 0 . 9 6 ,8 6 3 . 5 555.0 382.8 1 ,7 8 3 . 1 1 ,6 2 7 . 5 3 , 1 5 2 . 6 1 ,1 6 9 . 6
1 9 6 3 1 1 ,4 3 6 . 3 7 ,6 2 9 . 3 6 4 0 . 0 5 2 1 . 0 1,688.9 1 ,6 0 7 . 1 3 ,9 0 2 . 4 1,286.3
1 9 6 4 1 2 ,6 3 3 . 1 8 ,3 5 2 . 4 779.8 823.8 1 ,6 2 1 . 1 1 ,6 9 3 . 6 4 ,3 6 1 . 4 1 ,5 0 9 . 2
1 9 6 5 14,085.3 8 ,0 1 6 . 5 832.2 9 2 8 . 9 1 ,5 0 0 . 9 1,447.8 5,348.3 1 ,4 7 1 . 6
1 9 6 6 2 0 ,3 2 3 . 7 1 1 ,6 4 6 . 9 1,120.6 1,248.3 1,635.1 2,020.1 7 ,4 9 6 . 2 2 , 1 9 6 . 2
1 9 6 7 2 0 ,0 7 6 , 1 11,928.2 1,112.2 1 ,2 0 5 . 1 1 ,6 2 6 . 5 2,284.7 7,775.4 2 ,0 6 6 . 0
1 9 6 8 1 9 ,0 8 6 , 3 13,541.9 1 ,9 1 7 . 0 1,481.7 1,275.0 2 ,0 0 8 . 3 5 ,7 2 7 . 9 2,339.1
1 9 6 9 1 5 ,6 7 4 . 9 1 4 ,0 8 6 . 4 1,704.0 1 ,7 6 2 . 4 1 ,0 0 3 . 8 1 ,6 4 2 . 4 4,599.6 2,378.8
1 9 7 0 15,702.8 1 5 , 1 9 8 . 2 1 ,2 3 7 . 1 2,033.1 1,052.5 1 ,7 5 9 . 9 4 ,5 6 1 . 3 2 ,0 5 5 . 8
1 9 7 1 1 8 ,0 4 3 . 2 1 5 ,3 2 0 . 3 771.9 2 , 1 0 7 . 5 2,008.4 1 ,5 6 4 . 7 4 ,1 3 9 . 8 2,486.9
1 9 7 2 1 6 ,7 2 3 . 4 1 8 ,0 6 0 . 6 883.9 2,752.8 2,111.9 1,785.8 2,449.7 2 ,7 7 6 . 6
NOTE; Compiled from the United Nations Year
Books of International Trade Statistics (UNYBITS)
lires for 1959-1961 from UNYBITS, 1961, p. 322
1962 11 1962, p. 322
1963 11 1963, p. 329
19 64-1966 It It 1966, p .  370
19 67-1969 1969, p.388
19 70-1972 1972, p. 376
Explanatory Note; General Imports c.i.f.
National Exports f.o.b,
1959 calendar year; beginning from i9 6 0 , year beginning April 1 
of the year stated.
I9 7 O-I9 7 2  General Imports and General Exports
For I9 7 O-I9 7 2 , the UNYBITS, 1972, gives the value in thousand United 
States dollars, I converted the value into rupees at the current 
exchange rate of $ 1 - Rs,7.50. This has been done for the sake of 
uniformity since the UN Year Books until 197 0 give rae value in rupees.
By 1971) India accounted for 40 per cent of Soviet
7 4trade with the Asian developing countries* The Soviet-
Indian Join'feDeclaration issued at the end of Brezhnev’s 
visit to India in November 197 3 aims at increasing Indo-
*1 r
Soviet trade "by-one-aiid-a-half to two times by I98O",
According to Patolichev, USSR Minister for Foreign 
Trade, in the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union’s imports from 
India included about 12 types of goods; in 1972, the 
number went up to 6O; the share of finished products and 
semi-manufactures rose from 25 per cent in i960 to 48 
per cent in 1972; in the last few years the Soviet Union 
began importing Indian engineering products like garage 
equipment, tractor and automobile storage batteries, 
fitters tools, medical instruments, power cables, wires
eto.76
India has been almost consistently having trade
surpluses with the Soviet Union since I964; except for the
year I968, in every other year India has enjoyed 
77surpluses. Since the partners are supposed to balance
7 8their trade under Indo-Soviet agreements, sometime back, 
the USSR suggested package deals, such as the one for 
import of Indian railway wagons against export of Soviet 
civil aircraft, but this suggestion did not meet with 
success. Instead, India asked for more industrial raw
materials, drilling equipment for oil exploration, mining
7*7 " ' “
‘Vp Arkhipov and A. Bykov, on*cit., p«3 3*
7 c
See Mission of Friendship, p*84*
76N. Patolichev, "Indo-Soviet Trade Relations; Basis 
for Co-operation", The Times of India, November 26, 1973, 
The Soviet minister has been emphasising this point, i.e. 
Soviet imports of Indian manufactures, since 1965: see 
Izvestia, July 2, 1965»
^^See the table on p. 354 
7 8See po
equijimenb and fertilisers of which the Soviet Union
7 0
herself is short.
Many attempts at further expanding Indo-Soviet
trade are running into difficulties. For instance, in
1973 a cotton conversion plan was tried. Under this, the
Soviet Union supplied cotton to India for conversion into
cloth for export to the USSR; but this was given up
8 0because of its low profitability to India. The idea of
Indo-Soviet co-operation in establishing plants in third
countries has run into difficulties because India is
unable to supply equipment on credit, as the Soviet Union 
81can.
As late as 1972, the Soviet Union represented only
5,29 per cent of India’s imports and 15*24 per cent of 
8 2her exports. The Soviet Union is uncomfortably aware
of her modest place in the developing countries’ trade in
comparison with the West. A recent Soviet publication
mentions that many developing countries belong "to the
currency zones of the leading imperialist powers. Up to
now, trade with the Western countries still makes up three
8 1quarters of their foreign trade turnover."
Therefore, the Soviet spokesmen focus on such aspects
7 QM.K. Dhar, "Economic Relations with Moscow", The 
Overseas Hindustan Times, September 26, 1974. India 
seemed to have preferred United States civil aircraft*
In January 1974) the Indian Airlines secured a United 
States Export-Import Bank loan of 019*2 million to buy 
3 Boeing 737 jets, India News (London), February 2, 1974,
O r\
India News (London) February 2, 1974* See also 
M.K. Dhar, op* cit.
^^Ibida
Q 9
See the Table on p. 354 ,
8 3V. Arkhipov and A. Bykov, op* cit., p.130.
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of the developing countries’ trade with the West which
bring out, in contrast, the advantages of their (the
developing States’)trade with the Soviet Union, i.e.,
constant deficits in the developing States’ trade with the
developed states. For example, Benediktov wrote that
in "their trade with the Western countries, the developing
countries of ECAFE seem to be always in debt"; that their
losses are "especially great when trading with the USA,
Britain, and the Common Market markets"; that in 1964,
"trade with the USA was responsible for approximately
four-fifths of India’s balance of trade deficit"
For diplomatic reasons, the Soviet Union also
espouses the causes of the developing states at all
international economic gatherings. For instance, at the
UNCTAD meeting in Geneva in I968, the Soviet Union
proposed international agreements for stabilising commodity 
85prices. She and other East European countries joined
the developing states in proposing that interest rates on 
government credits to developing states should not be more 
than 3 per cent, and that funds received in repayment of 
credits to developing states should be used to buy goods 
in these countries, specially those produced by enterprises 
built with the c r e d i t s . T h e  USSR, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia also proposed that advanced countries should 
unilaterally grant certain advantages and privileges to
^^I.A. Benediktov, op.cit., p,44.
Or
V* Arkhipov and A. Bykov, op.cit., p.9*
o A
Prof. F. Bystrov, "Behind the Asian Bank", 
International Affairs (Moscow) No* 6, (I966), p*7ô
558 Q in
developing states to help them secure stable growth rates.
Then, the Soviet Union periodically makes pleasing
gestures, and melodramatic proposals. In I965 the Soviet
Union lifted all customs duties on goods imported or
8 8originating from developing states, Soviet economists
suggested that in the second decade of development, the 
"imperialist states" should give the developing countries 
between 032 to 36 billion a year in the first five years 
and 090 to 100 billion in the second five y e a r s , I n  
December 1964) Moscow also expressed its readiness to cut 
its defence budget by 10 to 15 per cent on a reciprocal 
basis for saving money which could be used to extend loans 
to developing states,
.! SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
CO-OPERATION
An Agreement on Cultural, Scientific and Technical 
Co-operation was signed by India and the Soviet Union in 
1960.^^ An "Atom for Peace" agreement was sigjied in 
Vienna on February 6, 1961, under which both countries
g —  . — — —  —
A, Arkhipov and A, Bykov, op,cit., p,52,
^^Ibid., p.136.
O  Q
Prof. S, Tikhvinsky, "Apropos of ’Partnership in 
Development’", International Affairs (Moscow), No, 10 
(1970)3 pp.56 and 60, Tikhvinsky’s argument was that \% 
of the G.N.P, of the developed states, which was the 
target for aid to developing states agreed at UNCTADI, 
would make only 023 billions available in 1975) whereas, 
according to United Nations estimates, by 1975 the 
developing states would have to pay between 010 to 11 
billions towards the annual loan instalment and their 
trade deficit would have gone up to 024 billions. In 
this context, he also mentioned that the USA spent 0130 
billions on the war in Vietnam, Ibid,
^^Prof. F« Bystrov, op,cit,, p.78,
^^Vladimir Kirillin, "Soviet-Indian Co-operation in 
Science and Technology", in Mission of Friendship, p.133.
agreed to co-operate in research on the uses of plutonium 
and uranium and an'exchange of scientists in the field 
The Soviet Union also agreed to supply uranium materials 
and where necessary to give technical assistance and
Q 2
equipment for exploration and mining of uranium in India.
In 1968, a Joint Indo-Soviet Committee on Scientific
Co-operation was set up to co-ordinate scientific
Q 3
activities between the two countries. In September
I97I) after Mrs, Gandhi's visit to Moscow, an Inter-
Governmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and
Technical Co-operation was set up.^^
In May 1972, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the
Indian Organisation on Space Research signed an agreement
on co-operation in outer space r e s e a r c h , U n d e r  this
agreement, an Indian-made 360-lcilogram satellite,
Aryabhatta, was launched by a Soviet rocket from a Soviet
Cosmodrome on April 20, 1975*^^
In October 1972, a bilateral governmental agreement
on co-operation in the field of applied sciences and
97technology was signed.
Over 150 Soviet specialists and instructors lecture 
at the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, established 
with Soviet assistance over 17 years ago. Autonomous
92P.J, Eldrige, op«, cit. , p.165.
^^Vladimir Kirillin, op,cit., pp.133-134.
^^Pravda, September 30, 1971.
^■^Vladimir Kirillin, op,cit. , p. 134.
9^The Guardian, April 21, 1975. Under another 
agreement made in September 1975j a second Indian 
satellite will be launched in late 1977 or early 1978 from 
a Soviet cosmodrome. The Guardian, September 15j 1975.
^^Vladimir Kirillin, dp,cit ,, p.134»
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faculties of geophysics at the Osmania University,
Hyderbad, of metallurgy at the Indian Institute of Techno­
logy, Kharagpur, and of aircraft construction at the 
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, are being 
established with Soviet co-operation. Scholarships 
have been offered to Indian students to study at Soviet 
higher educational institutions. In 197 35 there were 
450 Indian students studying in Russia, Every year, 20 
Russian students go to India to study languages, literature, 
history and economics.
Between 1956-I972, a research and practical paediatric 
centre, manned by Soviet paediatricians functioned in New 
Delhi. Between 1960-19735 the Soviet Union delivered 
1000 million doses of smallpox vaccine to India.
In 1956, the first state-owned mechanised farm at 
Suratgarh in the Rajasthan desert was set up.^^^ The 
Soviet Union gave agricultural machinery for the farm as 
a gift; the farm has an area of 30,000 a c r e s , I n  
1967, the Soviet Union provided machinery for setting up 
five mechanised seed farms, one each in the states of
Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Assam, and Tamil 
3 02Nadu, ■ These farms have an area of between 3000-4000
hectares each: the Soviet machinery for these farms was
^^V.P, Yelyutin, "Soviet Higher Schools and India", 
in Mission of Friendship, pp.143-145.
^^B.Vo Petrovsky, "Soviet-Indian Co-operation in 
the Field of Medicine and Health Services", in Mission 
of Friendship, pp.l60-l6l,
^^^R.N* Sidyak, "Soviet Indian Co-operation in 
Farming," in Mission of Friendship, p. 162.
^^■^l.A. Benediktov, op.cit., p,49« This farm was 
opened on August 15; 1955« Ibid.
10 2R.N. Sidyak, pp^cit_. , p. 162.
Ml
a In 1960 the Soviet Union gave India specimens
of her "best cattle and sheep breeds; between 1968-1973#
5*700 Grozny and Stavropol sheep breeds have been supplied!
In June 1971 an agreement was made for scientific and technical
105
CO opera tionain the field of agriculture.
At the end of Brezhnev * s visit to India 
in November 1975* ^  agreement was signed for cooperation 
between the Indian Planning Commission and the State Planning 
Committee of the USSR, GOSPLAN. This created a study Group 
consisting of the officials of Gosplan and the Indian Planning 
Commission and such others as may be deemed necessary by the 
Government of India from time to time. The main functions of 
the study Group will be to exchange experience and knowledge 
in economic forecasting, methodology of annual, medium and 
perspective planning formulation of projects and programmes, 
methods of monitoring and evaluation of planned programmes and 
projects, exchange of published reports and materials etc.
It is expected to meet not less than once a year alternatively 
in Moscow and in New Itelhi,^ ^^
105* I.A. Benediktov, op.oit.. P#50
104. R.N, Sidyak, on.cit.. P. I65
105. Ihid.
106. See the text of the agreement in Mission of Friendship. PP. 89*90
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T» sum up: the Soviet-aided projects in
India account for one third of entire steel production, 80 per
cent of matallurgical and 60 percent of electrical equipment
produced in the country, 55 per cent of oil extracted, 30 per
cent of oil refined, and 20 per cent of the electricity 
loi
generated. '
SOVIST AND BSTSRN AID; A COMPARISON
At this stage it is proper to compare 
Soviet aid to India with the aid she received from other 
countries. Table 2 on the following page gives a picture of 
aid that India received from different countries. (Aid includes 
grants, credits free of interest and credits with interest.)
loi* S. Skachkov, on. cl t.. PP. I47-I48, The source ; does not 
mention up to what year these percentages have been 
computed. Since the work was published in 1975* we have 
to assume, maybe, up to 1971«1972.
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TABLE 2
FOREIGN AID UTILISED FOR INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT FROM APRIL 1951
TO OCTOBER 1970
Amount authorised Amount utilised Share of total
Source' by aid providing 
source . 
crores of Rs.
by India 
crores of Rs.^
foreign aid 
utilised by India 
per cent
United States 7 , 1 8 4 6 , 7 8 4 56.5
World Bank & IDA 1 , 7 6 4 1,478 1 2 . 3
West Germany 1 , 0 0 4 907 7 . 6
Britain 849 715 6 . 0
USSR 1 , 0 3 1 670 5 . 6
Canada 648 532 4 . 4
Japan 372 328 2 . 7
Italy 184 132 1.1
France 181 102 0 . 9
Czechoslovakia 97 66 0.6
Australia 63 61 0 . 5
The Netherlands 76 55 0 . 5
Yugoslavia 29 29 0.2
Poland 57 28 0.2
Switzerland 36 26 0.2
Belgium 32 22 0.2
Austria 24 21 0 . 2
Sweden 26 14 0 . 1
Denmark 14 10 0 . 1
Norway 12 10 0 . 1
New Zealand 6 5 Less than 0 . 0 5
Hungary 13 - -
Bulgaria 11 - -
1, Aid providing sources ranked in order of amount of aid utilised by India.
2 , Includes bottt grants and loans. Rupee 
exchantro. A crore is Rs. 10 million.
oquivalent.s at current rate of
SOURCE : Fact Shcfjfc No,, 2 3 ; Un 1 ted St ates Econmnic Assistance to India 1 June 1951 ~
April 1 I 1 9 7 1, (New Du Ihi : Uriitud SL,-it.«n InCormation Service, n.d. ), p. 4 0 ,
(hcreinal1er referred to as Fact Sheet No, 2 3 ).
4^4-
As Table 2 shows^ the Soviet Union's chief rival in 
the Cold War^ the United States, contributed nearly seven 
times as much aid as the USSR; and India utilised ten 
times as much of the United States' aid as the Soviet aid. 
Approximately, Rs, 266o crores (one crore — Rs. 10 
million) out of the total United States aid of Rs.7,l84 
crores was provided in the shape of food supplies under 
the US Public Law 48O (PL 48O) agreements between 1956- 
1971. During this period India imported 60 million
tonnes of food grains, besides other agricultural
136conmiodities, under these agreements.
The only outright grants that the Soviet Union gave
India were the agricultural machinery she provided for the 
1 37State farms, and the money and equipment she donated for 
establishing the Indian Institute of Teschnology at
138
Bombay, ’ The United States on the other hand gave
1 3919.6 per cent of her total aid in the shape of grants.
The United States' total grants given to India is larger 
than the total Soviet aid.
Besides that, India used to pay for United States 
food supplies under PL 48O in rupees. By 197 Ij the total 
Indian currency in the American accounts in India was 
Rs, 2660 crores, 80,6 per cent of the rupee funds thus 
accruing to the United States was being returned to India
13 5For All The People; American Economic Co-operation 
With Indian Development (New Delhi: the United States
!!■■■■ II —  ■■■ ■ ■■ I I" '  I.* , I , , .«lin I I '
Information Service n,d, ), p.4 (hereinafter referred to 
as For All The People),
■^^^Fact Sheet No. 23, p,27,
13 7 -ISee pp, 240 - 41
1 38 ^
See p, 559
^^^See Fact Sheet No, 23, p. 1 ^ For the total United 
States aid, see Table 2o ■
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in grants and loans for economic development, 6,4 per 
cent was reserved for loans to private enterprise, and 
13 per cent was reserved for the United States government 
uses in I n d i a , B u t  this huge sum in rupees in the 
American accounts in India was causing tensions in Indo- 
American relations. Therefore, an agreement was signed 
between India and the United States of America on December 
13^ 1973; under which the United States gave away two- 
thirds of Rs, 2,660 crores (the total PL 48O funds under 
United States control) as a grant to India for economic 
development; the balance would be retained by the United 
States in her accounts in India, which bear no interest, 
This grant of Rs. 1,664 crores is also larger than the 
total Soviet aid to Indian
' American publications in India refer to a fact when
they mention that 90 per cent of the United States' aid
ihe. 142
to India has gone to^state sector, for big irrigation
and power projects, roads, railways, airlines, educational
institutions, which received United States aid are all
under State management. An estimated 2 3 per cent of all
public sector capital formation in the first four 5-year
plans came from the United S t a t e s , T h e  total
American aid given to private sector industries in India
from the PL 48O funds, under the Cooley Amendment,
^^^Fact Sheet No, 23, po4« 
l^^For All The People, pp.4-5. 
14%ibid,, p.4.
^^^See above, and also p, %
^Named after Harold D, Cooley, former Chairman of 
the Committee on Agriculture of the United States House of 
RepresentativeSo See F act Sheet No, 2 3, p.32,
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was only Rs, 1,262,630,100^^^ out of the total United
1 47States aid of Rs,7,1840,000,000 crores, i,e. only 1.76 
per cent. Even if the total aid to private sector 
industries is considered in the context of total PL 480 rupee 
funds, from which this aid was granted, it was only a 
fraction of the abount: Rs,126,26 crores out of Rs,2,660
crores, i,e, 4«7 5 per cent.
All that food aid most certainly saved India from 
politically explosive situations and at the same time 
enabled her to pursue her economic goals as she did not 
have to divert her scarce foreign exchange for importing 
food. Since it is politically risky to let the masses go 
hungry, successive Indian governments would have been 
forced to spend large sums of foreign exchange to import 
food if PL 480 food had not been available for rupee 
payments* Besides that, 80 per cent of the PL 480 
funds were made available to India as loans for economic 
development, and now two-thirds of the PL 48O money 
has been given away as a g r a n t , T h u s ,  PL 480 
agreements conferred multiple benefits on India,
The Soviet leaders and spokesmen are painfully aware 
of their country's comparatively modest contribution to 
the developing countries' aid receipts. Their defensive 
arguments used to take three forms: 1, to claim
vicarious benefits from Western aid; 2, to claim & 
qualitative difference for Soviet aidj and 3# to run down
^^ktaid., 35.
147 See Table 2,
 ^See pp. - 544 45
^ ^ ^ S e e  p, 545 .
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the American food aid.
The Soviet spokesmen used to claim vicarious bene­
fits from Western aid to the developing countries.
Khrushchev thought that the Western aid to the developing 
states "should also be viewed as a particular kind of 
Soviet aid to these states* If the Soviet Union did not 
exist is it likely that the monopolies of the imperialist
powers would aid the underdeveloped countries? Of course 
150not". The Soviet propaganda machinery does not have to
fabricate reports to substantiate such claims; all that 
it has to do is patiently to sift through the United 
States Congressional Coimnittee hearings and American 
newspaper reports and coiimients; this supplies enough 
material to use against the USA, Partly because of 
genuine fear, and partly as a means of inducing the Congress 
to pass foreign aid bills, the American Government spokes­
men, including Presidents, frequently used to mention, 
during the Cold War days, Soviet aid to developing 
countries as one of the justifications for American aid 151
150Quoted in Leo Tansky, op,cit., p.5* For similar 
claims in the context of Western aid to India, see V, 
Nikhamin, "India's Role in V/orld Affairs", I nt e r n at i on a 1 
Affairs (Moscow) No, 1, (1958), p.6o* and V,I, Pavlov, 
op, cit, , p,. 137.
151For Eisenhower's reference to Soviet aid, see 
Asha L, Datar, op,cit,, p.3; for Johnson's reference to 
Soviet aid, see Milton Kovner, "Soviet Aid Strategy in 
Develoijing Countries", Or bis, Vol* VIII, No. 3, (Fall, 
1964), p,624; for the testimony of the Director, the 
United States International Co-operation Administration, 
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1958, 
making similar reference to Soviet aid, see Leo Tansky, 
op,cito, p,5« See also V.I, Pavlov, op,cit,, p,184, for 
direct reference to the United States Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1957, which stated that the American aid would be 
available as long as the Communist threat continued.
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Soviet reference to these statements would sound
convincing in the Third World,
The Soviet Union also emphasises the qualitative
difference between the Soviet and Western aid to the Third
World, In an argument obviously directed at India,
Khrushchev sought to make up for Moscow's inability to
compete with Washington in the quantity,of aid rendered
to India by emphasising the quality of Soviet aid, i.e.,
the sacrifice involved in extending it* In a statement
in May I962, he said that the Soviet Union helped build
Bhilai "not because we had surpluses of equipment for such
mills" in the Soviet Union; "that machinery used in
Bhilai would have been very useful in our own national 
152economy".
Another qualitative difference claimed for Soviet
] c 3
aid is that it promotes self-reliance* In the context
of India where the Soviet Union has given substantial aid
1 54in establishing heavy and machine-building industries, 
this sounds credible.
There were clashes between India and the United 
States of America on questions like agriculture versus 
industry and private versus public sectors in the economy. 
There was and is enough justification for Indian attempts 
at industrialisation. There are millions of landless 
labourers in India and not enough land to go round; they 
are either underemployed or unemployed, when monsoons fail*
1 52(>uoted in Milton Kovner, op, cit, , p. 6 34. See 
also I,A* Benediktov, op.cit,, p,19«
‘^■^^See V,I, Pavlov, op, cit, , p,206,
154_ , 'See pp. 320 “ 352 '
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Unless this surplus rural labour is absorbed in industry
and their minimmu needs are taken care of, they would
become an explosive political factor. The Communists
in India did try to exploit peasant discontent when they
attempted insurrections in the Telapgana region of erst- '
while Hyderabad State in the late 1940s, and in West
1 5 6Bengal in the late iqôOs, The Indian leaders had been
aware of this problem, Nehru felt that political stability
depended on the speedy fulfilment of the masses* longings
He considered industrialisation necessary for this 
1^8purpose; he also thought that active state intervention
1 5Q
was necessary to industrialise the country,  ^ This was 
unacceptable to the United States, official as well as
. T l60non-otficial,
There were recurrent suggestions from the United 
States that India should give more importance to agriculture 
and leave industrialization to private enterprise. In what 
was considered an article announcing his candidature for 
the American Presidency, Nixon wrote: "India is both
challenging and frustrating: challenging because of its
IS^See Chapter III, p , 100
^^^See Chapter IX, 1, p* 287 *
157 =See p. 314
158=See p, '31 g
159
See Chapter 1%^  p, gg.
^^^In 1951 the National Foreign Trade Convention 
asked the United States Government to declare that the 
USA looks upon industrial development abroad as
the particular function of private enterprise ,,, until 
receptive and co-operative attitudes called for are 
shown" no United States aid would be given "except those 
of the most exigent military or humanitarian nature", 
Qpoted in David A* Baldwin, "Foreign Aid; Intervention 
Influence", World Politics , Vol* XXI, No,3; (April 19^9);
p, 4 31 •
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promise, frustrating because of its performance. It 
suffers from ..* too much emphasis on industrialisation 
and not enough on agriculture and from too doctrainaire 
a reliance on government enterprise. Many are deeply
161pessimistic about its future", He thought that the
USA should continue to aid India and persuade her "to 
shift its means and adjust its institutions ... drawing 
from the lessons not only of the United States but also of
162India's more successful neighbours, including Pakistan", 
This lecturing on relative merits of different 
economic strategies and the desirable priorities continued 
even in times of India's dire needs, like the Bihar famine 
in 1966, During that crisis. President Johnson slowed 
down food deliveries in order, among other things, "to
163persuade the Indians to do more for themselves ..*",
The Soviet Union tried to take advantage of these 
Indo-American differences. During his second visit to 
India in February I960, Khrushchev said in Bhilai that many 
Western economists claimed that it would be better for 
countries like India to concentrate on agriculture and 
individual types of mineral raw materials, exporting them 
at low prices and obtaining industrial products at 
exhorbitant prices. He warned that successful development
Richard M, Nixon, op.cit., pp.118-119.
162Ibid., p.120. Bhutto himself does not seem to 
share Nixon's flattering views on Pakistani economy. See 
President Bhutto's Address to the National Assembly, pp.
15"16.
163Lyndon B* Johnson, Vantage,Point ; Perspectives 
of the Presidency, 1963-1969; (London; Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1972), p*225.
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of the country was possible only through industrialisation,^^^ 
Since the Soviet aid to India was almost entirely given for 
the development of heavy industry, Moscow's spokesmen would 
claim that the USSR was helping India become self- 
reliant,
Obviously people do not eat steel and drink oil. 
Therefore, the United States' food supplies during India's 
perennial food crises would have a good impact on India, 
at least for the duration of the crises. In this field, 
the USSR's inability to help India is evident. Therefore, 
the Soviet spokesmen use the much-talked-of American 
practices, like keeping millions of acres of land fallow 
and, sometimes, destroying food to keep up prices, to run 
down food aid. Thus, a correspondent wrote in Pravda 
in June 19^5 that in the name of the Food for Peace 
Programme, the United States, in fact, sold surplus 
agricultural products, which had accumulated on the shelves 
and had found no markets, to the developing countries,
Sometimes, the Soviet Union takes resort to dramatic
^^^Pravda, February 15; I96O,
165V,I. Pavlov, op,cit., see pp.141 ; 172, 206 and 
212, See also below, p. 285.
Yakubov in Pravda, June 26, I965* For a 
similar conunent, see Pravda, August 7; 1966, and also 
Prof, S. Tikhvinsky, op.cit., p.6o.
Sometimes, comments in the USA provide justification 
for such Soviet propaganda. For example, when Dr.
Kissinger told the group dealing with the developments in 
the subcontinent during the Bangladesh crisis in December 
I97I; that President Nixon wanted the American aid to 
India to be suspended (See Chapter ' ' ), an
official present said that the price ot vegetable oil was 
weakening in the United States, and that cutting off this 
commodity to India could have repercussions on the 
domestic market* He asked if oil could be shipped to 
India in place of wheat. The New York Times, January
6, 1972.
552
gestures on the food front to compensate for her inability
to compete with the United States* In October 1973; at
a time when there was an acute food shortage in India, and
when PL 480 concessions were no longer available to import
16?food for rupee payment, the Soviet Union granted India 
a 2-million tonne wheat 1oan,^^^ just one and a half 
months before Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973. 
Such a gesture, against the background of large Soviet 
food imports from the United States and other countries 
in I97I-I972 was bound to be appreciated in India,
EVALUATION
The post-Stalin leadership's new diplomatic line of
competing with the United States for influence beyond the
confines of the Communist bloc^^^ necessitated the
extension of foreign aid to the developing countries* Of
necessity, an ideological justification was found for
foreign aid,^^^
India provided ideological justification of sorts
herself by adopting socialistic measures, either as goals
171or in practice. Therefore, the Soviet Union was
assured of popularity in India for her aid because it was 
in keeping with India's national aspirations and interests, 
as perceived and expressed by her leaders.
However, ideology was of minor importance in Soviet
16b,
167 =See p*544
See N, Patolichev, op.cit, See also Chapter 
III, p« 101
 ^ "'See Chapter III, pp. I03 - 105 
17 0See pp^.. 317 T. 20 and Chapter I, pp. 57 “ 60 
^See pp«: 515 -16, Chapter III, p, II4 and Chapter
VIII p* 245'
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foreign aid. This becomes evident from the fact that in
spite of the many doubts entertained in the Soviet Union
regarding the character of the Indian national 
172bourgeoisie, the Soviet Union decided to give India
171aid on a large scale, A further proof of this argument
is that in the 1950s and early 1900s Indian and Chinese
relative groifth was "widely regarded as a test between 
174-systems"* Though there is no direct evidence to relate
the two, it is significant that the Soviet Union aided 
India's heavy machine building industry and consented to 
set up a plant for the manufacture of MlG-21 planes in 
India after the Sino-Soviet rivalry began to surface in 
1959.
It is also possible that some economic considerations
. influenced the decision to extend foreign aid* Soviet
machinery and technology are considered poor in quality in 
175the West, Moscow could hardly hope to secure markets
for its machines and technology in the West* In view of 
Nehru's preference for heavy industry and machinery, he
17 2
See p, 318.
17 1To start with, even Soviet offers of aid were 
suspect, Khrushchev said in his memoirs that Afghanistan 
distrusted the Soviet offer of aid, "To his credit Nehru 
graciously accepted (the Soviet aid)"* See Strobe 
Talbott transi, and ed,, op,cit,, p,302.
174Alec Nove, Communist Economic Strategy; Soviet 
Gro^vth and Capability, p, 65* When Sino-Soviet relations 
became tense, an "Observer" wrote in Jen-min Jih-pao on 
July 16, 1963: "There is no reason for thinking that aid
rendered by a Socialist country to India will change its 
political orientation,,," Peking Review, No, 29; July
19; 19Ô3; pp,12-14.
17 ^ Even Khrushchev seemed to have concurred with this 
assessment. See his memoirs. Strobe Talbott transi, and 
ed., op.cit *. p, 304. To fight this complex, the Russians 
keep claiming that their technology is superior to the 
Western, See ibid,, pp,302-303 and Pravda, January 18,
1963.
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would be eagei^ to accept Soviet offers, thus making India 
a place to exhibit Soviet machines. Since the post-Stalin 
leadership began giving more importance to providing
176consumer goods to their people, they could import 
whatever India and other developing states could offer.
Thus the new policy would serve diplomatic and economic 
interests.
Like Nehru's foreign policy, his domestic economic 
policy, i.e. mixed economy with active state intervention 
for the industrialisation of the country^was not to the 
United States' liking. There were recurrent suggestions 
that India should learn the virtues of private enterprise
177and give more importance to agriculture. Unsolicited
advice, however well-intentioned, is not likely to be 
appreciated. The resultant tensions in Indo-American 
relations worked to the advantage of the USSR; Khrushchev 
tried to exploit these differences between India and the 
United States.
Soviet aid to India has been of substantial help in 
India's attempts at industrialisation, and in breaking the
foreign monopolies' hold on pharmaceutical and oil
, it ale
180
170 A:he
industries, Under^conditions of the Cold War, so
acted as a catalyst in bringing concessions from the West 
See Adam B, Ulam, op.cit., p.556.
1 7 7 c  ^See pp. 5 4 9  50
^^^See p. 350
179See pp. 320 -" 51
^^ *^ To start with. Western credits charged interest
at commercial rates. The Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, charged 2^ per cent interest on her credits, which 
brought down interest rates on Western credits. Asha L» 
Datar, op, cit., pp. 43 and 68. Britain and West Germany 
also iielped build steel mills and other industries in 
public sector after Moscow offered to help build Bhilai 
see P.J. Eldrige, op.cit.f p,14»
577
Soviet credits also helped utilise domestic capacity by 
specifically tying repayment to e x p o r t s . S o v i e t  aid 
to heavy industry has the added advantage of utilising 
India's machine-building industries' capacity* Bokafo 
gave "a tremendous stimulus to the country's engineering 
and refractory industries, some of which have been in a 
state of decline for lack of sufficient orders, ,*• it 
has also impelled them in developing the know-how for
182more sophisticated production in their fields"* It is
doubtful whether the United States would have consented to 
the use of machinery from Soviet-aided projects had 
Washington built Bokaro, Indian personnel's association 
with and the Indian machine-building industries' 
contribution to Soviet-aided projects in India gave her 
the satisfaction of marching towards sel-reliance.
Soviet long-range credit conmiitments are conducive 
to India's planned economy. The year-to-year basis of 
Western aid causes a lot of uncertainty in planning.
Because of the nature of the Soviet system of government,
-j Q  c
it is possible for Moscow to enter into such commitments.
181Asha L. Datar, op* cit *, p.47.
182Tribhuwan Nath in Bokaro, p,6l. See also above.
pp. 326 -> 327a
 ^ ‘^For instance, the Soviet Union made a preliminary 
offer to grant credits totalling 1,500,000,000 roubles in 
July 1959 for India's Third 5-year plan, Pravda, July 31; 
1959.
In July i960, Moscow also expressed its readiness 
to extend additional credits to the third plan to the 
tune of 500,000,000 roubles, Pravda, August 31; 19^0*
At the end of Brezhnev's visit to India in November 
197 3; a 15-year Agreement on Further Development of 
Economic and Trade Co-operation between the USSR and 
India was signed. Much of what is said in it is a rehash 
of earlier coimnitments. See the text in Mission of 
Friendship, pp.85-88.
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The Government of India also thinks that the long-term
trade agreements with the Soviet Union and other East
X 8 *4-European countries impart a welcome element of
18^stability to India's exports. These advantages from
Indo-Soviet economic collaboration have naturally been
popular in India,
However, the fact remains that the Soviet aid to
India is only 5*6 per cent of the total foreign aid
utilised by India as of October 1970; it ia only one tenth
of the United States' aid utilised by India in the same 
186period. The aid in the shape of grants made by the
United States is much larger than the total Soviet aid
187to India. And yet the Soviet Union received credit
beyond all proportion to her aid, the United States does
not seem to have received due credit for the impressive
quantum of aid rendered to India.
This seems to be due to: 1) Soviet aid being in
188keeping with India's national temper, 2) The indirect
result of certain United States' policies; and 3) the 
Soviet Union's special techniques to catch the imagination 
of the people of India,
^^^See pp. 532 - 55 •
^^^Êuoted in Christopher Davis, "Pacts with Soviet 
Bloc May Lose Their Gloss"- The Times' Supplement, Export 
Corridors of the World; India, August 15; 197 4. See also 
Patolichev, Izvestia, July 2, 19^5; for a similar
argument.
186See Table 2.^ It has to be mentioned that the 
high percentage of utilization of the United States' aid 
is, among other things, attributable to food supplies being 
a part of the aid. 37.02 per cent of all the United 
States' aid was in the shape of food. See Table 2 for 
total aid and p.544\ for total food aid,
 ^ A e e  pp.344 - 45 
See pp.314 “ î6
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The ever-present political tensions in Indo- 
American relations clouded the significance of American 
aid to India. The common man's interests and emotions 
are more likely to be aroused by problems like; Indian 
territory being claimed by some one (Kashmir), or Indian 
territory being held by some one (Goa), and so on, than 
by complicated questions like public vepsus private sector, 
or agriculture versus industry or the comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of the aid policies of 
different countries to India's balance of payments* 
Therefore, India's response to any other country's policies, 
including trade and aid, depends upon the impact which that 
country makes on the interests and emotions of the masses.
On issues of popular interest in India, Kashmir, Goa, 
Bangladesh etc., the United States adopted an unsympathetic 
attitude, and the Soviet Union, a sympathetic attitude.
On the other hand, hungry masses care more for food 
supplies than diplomatic support on political issues. The 
United States supplied massive quantities of food in times 
of India's dire n e e d s , W a s h i n g t o n  was popular in India 
during such crises. But popularity and unpopularity are 
not constant factors* They keep changing. While food 
crises occur every now and then, the problem of Kashmir 
has been with India since her independence. The 
nationalist backlash against the United States' unsympath­
etic attitude on Kashmir affected the political
^^^See Chapters .V, Viand IX.
^^^See p, 344
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effectiveness of her aid policies in India. The Soviet 
Union was at an advantage on this count.
The United States exhibited a knack for both giving 
away huge sums of money to, as well as losing influence 
in India by her rigid stand on the virtues of free
enterprise. Only a fraction of the total United States'
191aid to India was given to private enterprise ; and yet,
Washington managed to get the reputation more of. trying to
192sustain capitalism in India than helping her.
The United States has not been averse to using
economic pressure on India, when Washington considered it
necessary. The United States suspended arms aid to India 
193in 1965, slowed down food deliveries during the Bihar
famine in 1966 ,^ '^^  and suspended economic aid during the
1 Q c
Bangladesh crisis.
The Soviet Union did not hesitate to use such
^^^See p, 346 
^^^See p. 324 >
193
See Chapter .V, p. '17^ 4
^■^^See p. 350 Chester Bowles wrote that President 
Johnson did that "to persuade India to take a more 
tolerant view of ... the United States military activities 
in Vietnam". "America and Russia in India", p,647,
^^^See Chapter %% p« 2^ 0 * For a Soviet critical 
comment on the suspension of axd to India by the United 
States, see Izvestia, December 12, 1971. See also ibid,, 
July 21, 1965; for a critical comment on President Johnson's 
letter to President Ayub Khan expressing Wasliingkon' s 
inability to give ^500,000,000 aid to Pakistan's third 
5-year plan since the Congress did not sanction it. For 
Mrs. Gandhi's implied criticism of the suspension of aid 
to India by the United States in 1971; see "India and the 
World", Foreijsai Affairs, Vol. LI, No, 1, (October 1972),
pp.67-6 8 .
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pressure elsewhere; but in the oase of India, Moscow lid not
e
use économie pressure in spite of New Bslhi disagre'ing with the
197
USSR *n #{%8sues important to her interests This, in 
India's view, makes the Soviet aid reliable.
Other j^ssible reasons for the dispropor­
tionate credit earned by Soviet aid in India is the special 
techniques adopted by Soviet economic diplomacy, The Soviet
Union's strong espousal of the developdblSf countries* causes
198is likely to appeal to them. If such Soviet proposals were 
accepted by the West, Moscow would have got the credit for 
supporting the developing states' causes, and at the same 
time no additional burden would have to be borne by the 
USSR since all those concessions proposed by her had
196. When tensions reappeared in Soviet-Yi^oslav relations in 
1957"1958f Moscow told Belgrade in I<fey 1958 that, in view 
of the needs of Soviet chemical industry, it was postponing 
for 5 years Soviet credits to Yugoslavia totalling t 285 
million, agreed to by the Soviet IMion in January 1956: Robert 
Bass and Elizabeth îtobury, éd., -Ihe Soviet Yogoslav Gontro- 
versv. 1946-1958: A documentary Record ( New York; Krospects 
Books, 1959)f P. 189-190
197$ See Chapter III, P. Ti4 Conclusions, PP, 415 ” 1G Mrs. Gandhi
wrote: " Aid is effective only if it is guided by considerations 
of development and vhen there is assurance of its continuity and 
not when it can be suspended or withdrawn abruptly’* op.cit..
PP. 67-68
198, See PP. 337 “ 38
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al.ready been extended by her to the developing states;
and if the West could not follow Moscow's lead, as when
it abolished customs'duties on the goods from developing
states in 1965^^^ for reasons of lobby pressure or
revenues, the West would get the blame,
Moscow makes a strong bid to meet the psychological
needs of developing states. To be constantly at the
receiving end is not appealing to the national egoes of
the developing states. It is almost a decade since
Moscow has been laying more stress on mutual benefits from
201trade with and aid to developing states, Soviet
publications in India make it a point to emphasise the
"mutually advantageous" nature of Indo-Soviet economic
. . 202txesr
20The Soviet Union's buying of Indian manufactures 
also gives India a sense of achievement. Because of the 
nature of the American markets and the system of 
government, it will not be possible for the United States 
government to buy Indian manfactures unless they are 
competitive.
The constant publicity given to Soviet-aided projects 
also, probably, contributed to the success of Soviet aid
^^*^See p, 338 
9 n 1
Milton Kovner thinks that it was to mollify the 
anti-aid sentiment in the USSR that Pravda told its 
readers in June 1963 that Soviet credits bring in 
repayment to the USSR commodities traditionally exported 
by developing states which are used to satisfy the needs 
of the Soviet consumers. Op,cit,, p,634.
202*"See S, Skachkov, op, cit, , p, 149^ For similar 
expressions, see Pravda, July 28, 1965; and V, Arkhipov 
and A, Bykov, op,cit,, p.34. See also R.Ko Karanjia,
"Hiridi-Roosi Bhai-Bliaism" , Illustrated Weekly of India 
Volo XCIII, No,24 (June 11, 1972), p,13.
2 0 3 c  . ■See p.335
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in impressing India. Prestige Soviet projects in India 
repeatedly appear in Indo-Soviet communiques, thus enabling 
the people of India to hear about them many times.
The Soviet aid also has what has been described'as 
205'"impact value". Moscow-financed projects stand out as
clearly identifiable symbols of Soviet aid. These giant 
industries are a novelty in India, and have had 
considerable impact on the people, more so because of the 
popularity of machines with the contemporary masses,
Large as the American aid to India has been, it has not 
created many such sjnnbols. It is probable that that is 
why the Soviet Union prefers direct contribution to 
projects which she can help create; Moscow does not seem 
to like the idea of multilateral contribution to help 
developing countries. It may be because in such arrange­
ments the distinctiveness of Soviet contribution is lost; 
and In comparison with the United States, Soviet 
contribution would also look insignificant.
It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union was missing 
from the list of countries which financed the huge bill
2  OilFor example, a protocol, signed by India and 
the Soviet Union in February 197 3; envisaged the 
•expansion of the capacities of the Soviet-aided steel 
mills in Bhilai and Bokaro to 7 and 10 million tonnes 
respectively (see PP»*322 j these two projects and a
refinery at Mathura with 6 million tonnes capacity, a 
copper mining and dressing complex at Malanjkhand and an 
underground railway line in Calcutta were mentioned, 
Besides enumerating all prestige projects built with 
Soviet assistance until then, in the Indo-Soviet Joint 
Declaration issued on November 29, 197 3 (sec Mission of 
Friendship, p.83)j the Agreement on Further Development 
of Economic and Trade Co-operation repeated all these 
projects; but this was not final; the Agreement left 
details of credits etc. to be "settled by separate 
.agreements" , (See Mission of Friendship, pp, 85-86).
‘^^ ■^.P., J., Eldrige, op. cit, , p. 19»
;>o^;
for the settlement of one of the two explosive disputes 
between India and Pakistan, viz., the Indus river dispute, 
which was solved in i960 under the aegis of the World 
Bank. It is possible that the above considerations kept 
the USSR away from the World Bank-sponsored group in the 
settlement of the Indus dispute. This is not an 
unreasonable interpretation considering the fact that here 
was an opportunity for the Soviet Union to demonstrate that 
she was interested in co-operating with other developed 
states in the peaceful and constructive settlement of 
disputes involving the developing countries and not in 
competition for influence and confrontation. Since the 
XXth Congress, the Soviet Union has been declaring her 
faith in peaceful c o - e x i s t e n c e , O n e  of the factors 
that contributes to peaceful co-existence is trust. A 
Soviet gesture like joining other nations in financing 
the expensive Indus dispute settlement would have 
contributed to mutual trust. It cannot be said that the 
Soviet absence from the list of donors was due to 
financial stringency. It was only in July i960 that
207Moscow offered additional credits to India's third plan. 
However popular Soviet aid has been in India, its 
impact on the country's socio-economic structure should not
See Appendix II.
^^^See Chapter I, pp. 55 and also Chapter V, p, 144 
207See p, 355 e Another example of Soviet 
preference for direct aid for development of the Third 
World countries rather than through associations is 
provided by Moscow's opposition to the Asian
Development Bank established in 1965. See Izvestia, 
December 3, 1965, and Prof. F. Bystrov., op.cite, p,77»
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be exaggerated. The Socialist leanings of India's 
leadership were born out of their convictions; the
208Socialistic-sounding Chapter IV of India's Constitution 
was included long before the Soviet Union began her aid 
programmes* The Soviet-aided Suratgarh State -farm^^^ did 
not lead to collectivisation of agriculture, nor did the
qv\c. V^ie.
expansion of public sector destroy private sector in
A  ^ ^
India, The private sector in India continues to grow.
The total assets of the private corporate sector stood
at Rs, 80,000 million in 1972, of which the assets of
foreign companies in India were of the order of Rs,24,155 
210million; by March 1968, the overall total outstanding
211foreign private investment stood at Rs,15,420 million;
as against Rs,600 mi 1.1 ion average annual inflow of foreign
capital envisaged during the fourth plan period, in
1969-1970 there was a gross foreign investment of Rs,810
m i l l i o n ; i n  1968-I969 the public sector in India
contributed only 14 per cent to the Gross domestic product;'
foreign companies in India contributed 33 per cent of the
214total production of the entire private sector; even in 
an important sector like pharmaceutical industry, a field 
in which the Soviet Union helped India set up plants in
^^^See p. 315
209aSee p, 340
9 10The Times of India Directory and Year Book,1972,
p.308.
^^^Ibid., p.309.
^^hbid.
1&,
^^^Ibid. p.316. 
^^t b i d . . p. 308
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21 Sthe public sector, multi-national companies account
216for 6o per cent of the total production even now;- and
the total profit remittances by foreign companies from
India amounted to Rs,5%0 million in 1970-1971*^^^
In the field of trade, there has been a big increase
in Indo-Soviet trade turnover. It looks more
spectacular in comparison with other countries? figures
for trade with India because Indo-Soviet trade began
from a very low level. In 1953, when the first Indo-
218Soviet long-term trade agreement was signed, the total
turnover of their trade was only Rs,17«5 millions; it was
Rs.1,717*2 millions for Indo-American, and Rs,2,950*6
21Qmillion for the Indo-British trade turnovers; in 1972,
the figures were Rs,3,636,7, Rs.5,226,3 and R s , 3,905*7
'2 20
million respectively* While in 1953, the USSR supplied
0,1 per cent of India's imports and took 0,22 per cent of
her exports, the United States supplied 13*99 per cent and
took 17*43 per cent, and Britain, 25*34 per cent and
22128,54 per cent respectively. However, even in 1972,
the Soviet Union supplied only 5*29 per cent of Indians 
imports and took 15*24 per cent of her exports, while the 
United States supplied 14*65 per cent of her imports and 
took 15*37 per cent of her exports, and Britain, 12,63 per
215cSee p, 529
^^^The Overseas Hindustan Times, June 12, 1975*
^^^The Times of India Directory and Year Book, 1972, 
P* 308,rt.,Q
21%See p. 332 
219The United Nations Year Book of International 
Trade Statistics, 1954, 0 ,267*
^^^^See Table 1.
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The United Nations Year Book of International 
Trade Statistics, 1954, po2ô7 „
222cent and 9,89 per cent respectively*
Without any long-term trade agreemenbs and the
attendant publicity,•Indo-American trade turnover
registered a good increase. Obviously, Indo-British"
trade declined over the years* This is attributable to
Indians needs for credits to finance her imports for
development and Britain ? s inability to extend them to the
extent of her (Indians) needs* Besides that, the Soviet
Union agreed to accept Indian goods in repayment of her
credits; therefore, of necessity, India had to export
more to the USSR, The momentum thus generated in Indo-
Soviet trade still continues. Nevertheless, it was not
until 1968 that the Soviet Union began overtaking Britain
in either supplying more of Indians imports or taking more
22 3of her exports.
But what of prospects for Indo-Soviet economic 
collaboration? There are some favourable factors for the 
further strengthening of Indo-Soviet economic relations, 
India's failure to attain the much-hoped-for take-off 
stage finds her in a desperate balance of payments
224position," Therefore, India has to expand her trade
with and secure aid from as many quarters as possible. 
Besides that, the Planning Commission of India feels that, 
in view of the development of a good base for the
2^%See Table
^^^see Table 1*
2 24According to the World Bank's estimates, India's 
import bill in 1974" 1975 <^^ as to be 05,000 million while 
her exports were estimated at 03,200 million; she also 
had a debt servicing liability of 0700 million per annum, 
this left her with a deficit of 02,500 million. See The 
Times (Supplement), August IS, 1974, p*XII,
manufacture of indigenous equipment, India should buy
know-how abroad without its being tied to the purchase 
22 Sof equipment* This is not an alluring business
prospect for Western companies. The Soviet Union, oh the
other hand, would not be averse to entering into such
deals with India, more so because much of her machine-
building industry was built with Soviet assistance.
But there are stronger logical and economic factors
which suggest that the past dramatic expansion in Indo-
Soviet economic relations is not likely to be repeated*
Until recently, 6o per cent of Indian imports from the
2 9 dSoviet Union used to be machinery and equipment, " But
2 27now India has a good machine-building capacity. This
does not mean that India does not need any import of
machinery. However, the type of machinery needed by
India, which the Soviet Union is able to provide, can in
most cases be produced by India herself. Thus, it looks
as though the much-advertised quality of Soviet aid, viz,,
promotion of self-reliance, is itself going to be a
constraint on further expansion of Indo-Soviet trade.
That explains why by October 1970, Rs,36l crores out of
Rs*1,031 crores authorised by the Soviet Union remained 
228unutilised* India's inability to utilise Soviet-
20 c
" India News (London), February 9? 1974*
226N* P.atolichev, on.cit,
2 27
The Economic Survey Report for 1969-197 0, pointed 
out: "The Indian economy has now developed to a stage at 
which a considerable part of the capital equipment required 
not only by industry but also by power, transport, 
communication, agriculture and other sectors can be 
fabricated within the country with import only of components 
and raw materials", Quoted in Asha L, Datar, op,cit*, p.74* 
228See Table 2* At the first meeting of Inter- 
Governmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and Techn­
ical Co-operation in February 1973, the then Indian Minister 
for Planning, D,P, Dhar, said that even in 197 3 there were 
considerable unutilised Soviet credits available to India* 
The Hindustan Times, February I8, 1973*
20 f
authorised aid suggests that she has narrow options of
equipment and commodities to buy in Soviet markets. This
becomes clear from a look at Tables 1 and 2 for figures
for Indian imports from Britain and the British aid
utilised by India, Britain overtook the Soviet Union
in supplying more of India's imports within 3 years of
the USSR overtaking B r i t a i n * S i m i l a r l y ,  by October
1970, Rs,715 crores out of Rs,849 crores authorised by
2 30Britain was utilised by India, Now, Britain is not
a food exporting country. Therefore, high Indian imports
from Britain and high utilisation of British aid by India
suggests that India has more options in British markets.
Therefore, further expansion of Indo-Soviet trade
will have problems for India, Under the Indo-Soviet
trade agreements, the partners have to spend their export
earnings in each other's markets. But with increasingly
narrow options open to India, that may not be possible.
A look at Table 1 shows that except for the year I968,
India has been consistently having trade surpluses with
2 31the Soviet Union since I964. Since India's export
earnings in the Soviet Union are not useful elsewhere, 
payments being made in local currencies under Indo-Soviet 
agreements, she may not have the necessary incentive to 
export more.
As has already been pointed out, many attempts at
232increasing Indo-Soviet trade have run into difficulties.
^^"^See Table 1,
230see Table 2* 
2 31
 ^See Table 1»
5b8
Indo-Soviet trade can still be increased considerably if
either the Soviet Union is ready to sell India commodities
like oil, newsprint, fertilisers etc, or buy more and
more manufactures from India, These two may not be very
attractive to the Soviet Union, She can earn hard
currency by exporting commodities like oil to the West.
Detente has made expansion of trade with the West possible.
Therefore, the Soviet Union may be more interested in
buying Western manufactures than Indian because of the
reputation of Western manufactures for quality.
Since India has to earn more hard currency to solve
2 33her balance of payments problems, she cannot export
more of her traditional exports, tea, jute, cashew nuts
etc*, to the Soviet Union by diverting them from Western
markets. Besides that the Soviet Union has been adopting
increasingly tough commercial practices with India, as
when, in March 1975, Moscow unilaterally revalued India's
debt to Moscow in accordance with the declining value of
the rupee in relation to world currencies: this added
£200 million to the present bill for repayment of the
2 34existing Soviet credits. Her need for more hard
currency, tough Soviet commercial practices and other
2 3 3According to the Federation of Indian Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, 25% of India's export earnings 
go towards foreign debt-servicing. The Overseas Hindustan 
Times  ^ June 19, 1975* See also footnote 224,
^^^The Guardian, March 18, 1975. India objected 
to this; in April 1975, a Soviet team arrived in India 
for talks; the talks failed because both sides stuck to 
their points. The Overseas Hindustan Times, April 17, 
1975. See also The Overseas Hindustan Times, June 19, 
1975, for a report on hard Soviet bargains with India in 
trade deals.
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reasons discussed above make it necessary for India to
2 35expand her trade with the West, " Therefore, expansion
of Indo-Soviet trade as envisaged during Brezhnev's visit
236to India in November 197 3, seems too ambitious*
See Michael Lipton and Peter Tulloch, "India and 
the Enlarged EEC", International Affairs (London), Vol.L, 
No, 1, (January 1974), pp*J2 and 60, for India's attempts 
to secure concessions from EEC and certain concessions 
granted by it.
An agreement signed by India with EEC in December 
1973 also referred to joint investment policy and the 
transfer of technology. See The Times (Supplement), 
August IS, 1974, p.II,
p. 335.
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C H ^ a R  XI
mnxsoviBT miiiItary hbmtions
Vhen the In#f"Soviet %eaty wa« eignedf the Indian
ItLnietxsr o f Internal ^ falva asserted that it was not a military
'<1 '
allianoe* Hevever# over the year» vidoTanglng oo^operatlon 
developed he tureen India and the Soviet Uhlon In the field of 
arm» and amoamition## Ihdia has been heying Soviet military 
equipment on a large scale since the 1960s* On nuclear non-* 
proliferation# India and the Soviet Ohion adopted policies ehich 
sere at variance with ea;ch other*» preferences* On the question 
of turning the Indian Ocean into a Zone of peace# there Is apparent 
agreement between Motcow and Hew Delhi# ^ s  Chapter analyses 
how India aiid the Soviet Dhion managed their military relations 
both wtien their views were in harmohv as well as In disharmony#
Britain accounted for 90 per cent of Indian defence
‘ g
requirements and stores in 1950, India had Britons as Chiefs of 
her Mavy until 1958# Until the Sino^Indian war of 1962# Ihdia was 
unwilling to accept military aid! Hshru said at a press conference 
in April# 1956# that the Indian forces had in the past been developed 
largely on the basis of British equipment and for practical reasons 
it was convenient# other things being equal# to continue on tha^basiS,
I.See Chapter VIlI# 1?* 258 
2* Iiorne J# Kavio, oo.oit.* B* 129#
5# 119
4* See Chapter HI, P, 102 and Chapter V# 152 - 55 
5* Quoted in horne J, Khvio, pp.cit*# P* I50
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It was reported that in the m l M  950s# when India was oonsidering
the question of buying British military aircraft# Hunters and
Canberrasà the Soviet Uhlon offered, at bargaiï^  price# MiC 17»
Band 111 * 28s f but this offer was turned down by Hew Delhi»
îb 1959 shooting had begun on the Sino^Indian
border; ltdcistan reiaained as hostile as ever# with considerable
Ohlted States war equipment at her disposal* In view of his
oomaltaent to non-alignment# Hehru would not accept gifts of arms
from any bloc before the 1962 war with China» When jfodia felt the
need for acquiring some sophisticated equipment on a commercial
basis# Hew !^lhi requsted tïie Bolted States to sell some Sidewinder
ài|^ tc-»air missiles in I960 and 1961. It was considered in Hew Delhi
that the addition of these missiles to the Indian Air Bbrce*s subsonic
filters would be an economical substitute for the lack of supersonic
capability# But the Baited States Cmvernment refused to sell the 
7missiles»'
It was in i960 that the first arms supply agreement
a
was made between the ÜSSR and India* Ihdla acquired transport planes
Q
and helicopters for use In the Himalayas# tmder t^s deal* However 
Britain remained the primary military supplier to India until I962*
6* Sis Arms Æcade With third Wor^ Ld (Stockholm; Stockholm &%tematimnal 
Peace %searw 1 ^1')'# P. 481 (hereinafter referred to as The Arms 
Ikade W  th Ihe Ihlrd #rld)»
7* borne J. Bavio# pp.clt»* PP* 105*106» Khvio quoted Ihe, Hey York 
Jhne 11# I960, to establish the Indian request in that year 
and its rejection by the Chi ted States*
8# Ihe Arms Trade ^ th %e %lrd %rld* P# 205 
9» Ibid#, P» 476
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The fall in the Sritieh there of Ihdien anui purohasee warn
10attributable to bondon*» inability to «vîbeidlee its «^rts*
Britain also helped India in setting up some isgwrtant defehoe
industries* Per example# HAb/HS 7d8 transport planes are being
manufactured in 35adia under British licence since 19591 India
11
making YiJayanta tanks under a British licence# Since 1961*
In 1962 India decided to acquire som supersonic 
aircraft* Since the \festom attitude was lukewarm# Ih<%ia inevitably 
turned to tJie Soviet Uhlon to buy the aircraft# On May 25# 1962# 
V*K*K* Menon# the then Defence Minister# announced in Itwliament 
the Dido-Sovict MiG^ 21 dealt^ This caused misgivings in Britain and 
the Uhited States*
The former Baited State ambassador to India# Galbraith#
noted in his memoirs t '*Bveiyon^ ^^  or nearly everyone agrees that the
Soviets should not become t}ie main suppliers of the Indian defence
foroesp^^ Ih May# 1962# the ttrlted State Sénats out aid to India
14.
by 25 per cent; this was later restored* " The Senators thought
that #is MiG purchase was a reaction to the out* The Indians thought
IS
the cut was punishment for the MIG deal**
10. Ibid.* p* 217
11* yfarjid Armament and BLesraameati SIPRX Year**Book 1972 (Stockholm; 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* 1972)# P* 135 
(hereinafter referred to as 3IPRI Year-Book 1972).
12# Tlie Arms Tmde With the Third %)rtd* P* 402 
13* John 3C. Galbraith# ofiaSMas 578
14* jE6ââa
15* Ibid.. P# 376
Ç 375
Galbraith worked but a deal with the British
government in May^lune# 1962, to counter the Soviet M G  offer*
Ohder it* British Lightnings would be offered to India at
16concessional rates* The Uhited States would underwrite part of ;
the cost of #ie British fighters and the development of an engine
17for the Ihdisn supersonic fighter* But Kennedy disliked the idea# 
In the words of Galbraith# the President said on the phone* " why
should we spend %0 million to save the Indians from a foolish
A . .  . . ■'
j^ rgaint** Later# at a Vhite House meeting# it was decided to
19offer India fewer fighter planes and mare heavy transport planes*
^  June# 1962# the then British Minister for Common­
wealth Relations# Duncan Sand^ ys# visited Kew Delhi to talk# according 
to Galbraith# about the Common Iferket and to try  to stop the M G  
dealf^
Galbraith saw Hehru on June 21# 1962# and told him 
that in the TJhited States "#ie worft M G  has become a highly evocative 
term like %Hk>at and thus especially likely to arouse emotions"*^
Thé ambaseador theiï put forward the British alternative* ”lh tlie
end he \ Hehru | said xm decision was imdnent and the British
«22
alternative would be considered*
At first the British were reluctant to go through 
with #»e deal because of the cost involved# but later they rèlente^^
16* 3Mââ> P# 370
17* Ibid.* P* 333
20* m d w  H?, Ü84-385
21. Ibid.. 366
22. m a t
25. M A» ?. 385
Un the m m Um X W m W  wm discussed in the Ssourlty Council and
the West took its usual standi^ JUns# 1962# WShru ^ k e  in
Parliament suggesting that the %st ess invariably unlkiistdly to
indis on the Kashmir dispute end also oo#lained of pressura on the
25 ■
M G  deal; President Kemwdy mas unhappy with the #eeoh# And for 
some reason the State Department sent a telegram# on Jbly IS, 1962# 
to tins Dhited States sWbaesador in India oinoelling the deal under 
shioh India was to be given fewer fighter lAanes and more heavy 
transport planes as a substitute for MG#$ And m% JUly 31# 1962# 
an mdlsn delegation went to Mosoow and finally oonoludad the 
agreeraent for the purohase of 12 MG*21s and for Gsviet taohnioal 
aid in establishing production faoilitiesF
3h his memoirs# iGmudiohev told us bby the Soviet 
W o n  mads the deal# He wrote 3Mla wanted MG-21 planes and 
lloenoe to mmufaoture them in %odia* Thsre were forces in 3Wia 
opposing th# dealt they mnted Ameriosn planes; and the W t e d  
States had ** alrei?dy agreed to turn over the blueprints for its 
jet fighter to Indi*# Thus we had a ohoioei we mould seH our 
planes to the Indians or sit by ai^ d #&toh them be tied to the
29
Amsrioan airoraft indastsy#**
It has already been mentioned that the Soviet W o n  
hesitated to i#^lemnt the deal for some time during and after the 
Slao-mdian war of 1962; but later respsoted Itf^
24, See Chapter V# ??#146
25,#'John K# Galbmith# op,oit*# P# 5 #
26, ?# 399 ^
27# imm J# mvio# pw&k# 1#
26# Strobe SMbott# transi, and ed## op.mi^ P# 510 
29# Soe Chapter Vit# PP# 227 & 230
375^
Du August# 1963# the Soviet W o n  proialeed to provide
alr-tc*air mleellee for the M G  fighter»# At the end of the year
Moscow agreed to establish in Ihdia a 42 million 2 anti-aircraft
30
miCsile complex# and a missile technology school to serve it#
3h HOvember# 1964# the then Ihdian Defence Minister# 
T«B« Chavan# visited Britain# During this Visit# Britain offered a 
credit of f 4*700#Q00 to cover the asternal cost# over the succeeding 
four years for the construction of the IsandtiÇ^las» frigates;
Britain also gave technical assistance to build this class of 
frigates in BoMbsy# Chavsn also asked for a British loan of three 
mring^^lass destroyers $ London offered three destroyers
instead# which Ihdia declined^ Ginoe the W t e d  States was 
unresponsive to an Badisn request for replacement of three destx^yers# 
Hew Delhi accepted the Soviet offer of frigates in 1963P
The W t e d  States gave Pakistan her first sWMsarine 
in 1964M  W i a  did not have any until late in 1965* Therefore# it 
was natural for %dia to try to secure some submarines herself* When 
3hdia approached Britain for a loan of fi 4 million to buy a submarine, 
she erjpressed her inabilily to lend the sum; The united States’ view 
was that Ihiia did not need s#wrines; that she was indulging in
30* The Arms Tcade With the Third World# P* 484^
51* lome J* Ksvio# op#oit#« P* 201
32*
53.
34* The Hindu* August 12# 1965*
35; mid#* August T# 1965*
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ove»-T?r«par«dnei» % W W ,  therefore# turned to the Soviet
On September 6# 1965, the BuUen Defence Mnieter declared
57
that Hew Delhi placed an order for few Soviet eubnmrinee*
The Soviet W e n  alec granted licence to produce
mieeilee in IhdiaP After 1962# Soviet arme delivery to Indio
became eignificant; between 1965**69# the USSR accounted for 80 per
59
cent of all major weapon# delivered to W i n #
...
Soviet atte#te to improve relation# w## Mciatan in• I ,
the mi<M960# have been mentioned earlier#^ Bakietan was equally
intereeted in improvh^ her relation# with the USSR to have more
diplomatie tn JWly# 1968# M 4 otan aeked the Dbited
i1
State# to dismantle h w  base in Boshawar* It has also been mentioned 
t^ iat in spite of vehement Indian opposition# the Soviet W o n  made an 
arms deal with Hikiatan in 1968^  The details of the WMoviet arms 
deal were not made p#lio# But WdLstan was reported to have received
36# August 12# 1965*
\tnm 3Mia smt a delegation to Mssoow for negotiations to 
buy four submarines# a British Commonwealth Relations Office 
Spokesman hoped that no agreement would be reached ehich would 
put the close links between the Royal Hsvy and the Indian Mvy 
at risk *** iMdt.f August 6# 1965*
37# 484#
58» aUwL P, ’83186
59, m k *  #* 204
40* Sa* Chaptae V* BP. 153 " 39
41. » ,  1968
42# See Chapter V# PP*16i - 64
IT 54/53 tanks, 130 ten* a rtille ry  guns# and spares for MS aircraft 
and tanks acquired from China in 1965*^
Thot#% the Soviet share of Ihdisn arms, imports
increased over the years, the West continued to supply some arms
to India# I t  has been mentioned elsvhere that the British and
Amerioan governments banned m ilitary supplies to Ihdia and
Pakistan during the war In 1965#  ^ The tftiited States lifte d  the
embargo in  February, 1966# for cash or credit purchases of non-
lethal weapons and, in  April, 1967# for cash or credit purchases
of spares for lethal equipmsnt* Britain lifte d  the embargo in
early 1966#^  After liftin g  the eWwrgo in April# 196?* the Dhited
States provided a $ 17 million loan to Ihdla to complete the a ir
warning system, the work on which was begun after the Ihdia-China 
46m e  of 1962“ Prance granted a licence to produce Aerosoatiale 
Hewpon S-S missiles in India in  April# 1969*^
4P* The Arms Trade With The Third World# PP. 204 & 499*
44. See Chapter V# J^# 174 ......
45. Arms. Trade With ^ e  Third World# P. 485
46. m & L
47* m m :  Ibar Bopk 1972. K  155
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The following tables^ give the pattern of major weapon eupplies 
to ïhdia and Bslctetan between 1958 **69#
Btgures at 1968 prioea
t V m z  A
\
# * , # * » « #  «# «# j||» >.*K
S«wpU« 11958 I '591 *60 1*61
• I I I
’62
■n* - T
•65 *65 *66 ’67 ; *68” 69 ,
m 4 !3 Î4 ,4
I
1 *
f
- -.u
I
I
I
USA
f
»
! 1
t
li
ff
;2
Lu
m m
USSR
*t
I
|2 '2 2
KtMSCB!
#*«#««*
5 !-tt«# w 4»
I-I
L *.
!
*2
tm \ tit ■ %» «*#•«**
-  ’  1 
I
I
» 1
*» m #1» '#*
t
1'
I
## #»
stvpllw ' 1958
I
me I 2
<##*## mt Di^ m *t» 
m iJ m» m
USA
♦59
P A K 1 S T A B
#, ÿw 4* 4^ *»
•60, '61 
I
«, « «à
I  :'.wa #### *#
2 ’ 1
f
*62
2
♦64 ’65 ♦66
^ r* n
♦671’6 8 !
« «
«* M* ^  .aw
1 ’ 1 ’
♦ •
•* **
1 t a. f
• t
r
#
♦69
I
ww ** Iw»
f
* » ^ 
aw W* tiM
1
- t
- - m
t .
1 ,USSR
f
« !-u w.
1 m Leee than 1 10 million*, 2 w 10 - 50 million;
5 * 150 - 100 million# 4 # more than $ 100 million#
T!hrougd%out the 1950* Britdin provided more than 50 per oent 
of 3b%dla’e arm* and ammMnitloni|* a»at #f the remaining need te be
48# Jllie Arme Tbade with the Third Iforld, P. 468* See aieo' Chapter V, 
^ 1 5 3  f foot note‘55
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Imported from other Western so woes too*
In 197071, the USSR delivered to Ihdia fifty M A o i  Su-7 
fig^ter/bosber airoraft, fifty SA-2 ’Chaidelino* missiles, one A  
olaes submarine, one ’I^lya’ olaas frigate, six ’Osa* dass torpedo 
heats, 450 054/055 main battle tanks and 150 P076 amphibious 
tanke»^
During the Kime period, Didia also acquired twelve
Qaqjborra B.MK. 15 and 16 bostoers and six mstlanl 8sa Kin<^  A8W
helicopters from Britain, twenty Alouette Ilf helicopters from
3kanoe and ten Canberra B ( 1 ) 12 bombers from Hew Zealand,
Alouette III helicopters are also beix^ produced in India under
52
a Branch licence since 1970*
49. Ibid., P. 470.
50, s m i  Year-Book 1972, P, 154 
51* Ibid. , P. 155
52. M â a
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m  SOVIET UNION AND 
INDEA’S NWima POLICY
R/en wMle developing her own nuolear weapons, the 
Soviet Union launched a peaoe offensive in the late 1940s tdiioh
reached its climax in the Stockholm 4ppeal for the prohibition
53of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuolear war# Stalin 
probably hoped that such aotivity on the part of the comswnist 
movenient would boost xnp Soviet moral image# Bat more than winnix^ 
moral points over his rivals, he needed time to .oatoh, up with 
the Dhited States in the nuolear field# %  exploiting the war* 
weariness of Europe and North America, throufÿh the peace offensive, 
he ^^4ld gain time#
The B?St*Stalin leaders kept repeating their opposition 
to nuclear weapons; they also sought to win moral points over the 
West by steps like unilateral cessation of nuclear tests# In a 
letter to the Indian statesman, Bajaji?^ on December 31, 1957, 
Khrushchev referred to Nehrufs appeal of December 10, 1%7# to the 
Dhited States and USSR to end nuclear tests and said tl^iat his 
Country would not conduct any nuclear tests with effect from 
January 1, 1938, if the Dbited States and Britain did likewise#^ 
There was no response from Britain and the Dhited States#
On Sferch 31, 1958, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 
adopted a decree on unilateral cessation of atomic tests* The 
deoreo declared that if the Dhited States and Britain would not
53# Adam B# Ulam, oo.oit.# P# 450. It v/as made in 1950. Ibid. 
54, See Chapter III,
53* jhtemational Affairy ( Ifosoow ), No#2 (1958), B. 13
follow the Soviet example# Soviet Uhlon would, when she 
resumed the tests, oonduot^exploslons until the wWber of such 
explosions equalled those of the British and Amerioan explosions 
since March 31, 1938# the day the Soviet Uhfon stopped the teets#^
Soviet fear and dislike of nuolear proliferation baoomes 
evident from her unilateral scrapping of the agreements in 1959? 
wi# China to give her technical data to enable her to make nuclear 
bombs*'
India has had the soientifio and teohnblogioal capability
36to make a plutonium device since 19o4« She expressed her natural 
concern when China exploded her first nuclear desioe in 1964#^
And tiiere were demands from some opposition parties, and even 
some members of the rulix^ p Congress party, that India should 
acquire nuclear weapons too. Mbscow took notice of those develop­
ments* A commentator wrote in Reavda that ” reactionary" Swatantra
36. See tlie statement made by Gromyko in the Supreme Soviet on 
December 25, 1958* B^da, December 26, 1938* See Ci3QP, Yol.XX,
No. 3
The Soviet Unie# resumed testing in November,1938, just 
as the WLted States and Britain decided to stop testing#
S W b e  Ttelbott, transi* & éd., op.cit,# P# 69*
37. See Chapter VII# ?* 2212
58# The Overseas Hindustan Tiaras. May 30, 1974#
59# See Chapter V# B# 147
:>ü^
and Jan Sangh parties ** have started a broad oo#aign for arming
of Ihdla with nuolear weapons"^ Referring to an unsuooeeeful bid
within the ruling oongress party to force the government to go in
for nuolear weapons, the commentator said that the atte#t failed
because the parly was "aware that the broad masses of Indian
people would not approve of this stepij^ which is graugdit with dangerous
61
consequences for the country". The commentator applauded Shaetri,
62
the then Prime Mnister, for his role in defeating the move. It 
was obvious from such comments that Moscow was opposed to India 
arming herself with nuclear weapons.
However, India continued to develop her nuolear 
technology. She refused to sign the nuclear Hbn-Proliferation 
Treaty (HPT) of 1968 on the ground that it was unfair to non­
nuclear powers on account of the prohibition of peaceful nuolear
65explosions by countries other than the nuclear weapon countries*
The Soviet government, however, did not make any direct comment
on India’s refusal to sign the HPT* In his report to the Supreme
the Soviet Minister of Poreign Affairs, (beonyko, made a
general and indirect comment «hen he said#
We should like to express the hope that those 
countries in which the question ofadhering to the treaty 
is still under discussion will arive at theonly correot 
conclusion, that it is necessary to sign and ra^ tfy«^ t4«
60* A. ivKutsenko in Aravda. HCvember 14, 1964. See CDSP.Vol.XVI, 
HC.46, p. 19
61. Ibid.
62. Mâfi
63. The overseas Hindustan Tlmss. May 30, 1974*
64. Peavda. July 11, 1969. See CDSP, Vol XXI, Ho.28, P.9
In his speech at the Thirty First Session of the UH 
General Assembly on September 28, 1976, Grosyko said that more 
"effortmust be made to ensure that the Treaiy on the non­
proliferation of this weapon becomm truly universal, that all 
states without exception sign it*. Maaoow Hews. Supplement to 
issue Hb. 40 ( 1976 ), P. 4
Instead, India oonduoted an underground nuolear 
explosion on Nay 18, 1974* She, however, deolared that It was 
an explosion for peaceful purposes and that she would not make 
nuolear weapons*
The Soviet Bilon and the West held id^tioal views 
oh the need for all non-nuclear states subscribing to the HPT*
But their reaction to India’s nuolear explosion was a study 
in contrast*
The Soviet press made a faotual report without
66comment. If anything could be interpreted as an indirect
Soviet expression of disapproval of India’s action, it was
the speech of the Soviet delegate at the meeting of the m
Disarmament Committee held in Geneva a few days after the event*
The Soviet representative called for a total ban on nuolear
67testing, including underground testing. Bhutto, the then
Prime Minister of Pakistan, who visited Ncscow to discuss the
68effects of India’s e^losion on Mkistan, drew a blank* Hhile 
nothing can be said about the discussions behind the scene, the 
Soviet leaders were not prepared to say anything about India’s
explosion openly; the Soviet-PUkistani Joint Statement was
■ 69silent on the issue.
The reaction in the West was 8haa?p. Britain exploded
a nuclear device at the underground testing site in Nevada on June 
70
24, 1974* But the British Minister of State at the Foreign Office,
65. The Guardian. May 19, 1974
66. See Bcavda and Isvestia^ M y  19, 1974* See below PP. ^99 -  400
67. Lsveetia. Nay 26, 1974#
68* See Qhapter IX, P. 309
69* ÿvestia. October 27, 1974*
70* The Guardian. June 25, 1974
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David ShnaXs, could not hide British government’s "deep concern" 
and "disappointment" with the Ihdian aotion*^^ The Anglo-American 
press made very harsh oomments#^^
Recent disclosures have shown that with all the 
recurrent tensions and bitterness in Ihdo-Amerioan relations, 
there h/as been closer oopperation between the CIA and the 
Indian intelligence bureau, the CBI (Central Bureau of Investi­
gation), in sensitive fields like monitoring the Chinese nuclear 
tests and missile launchings at a time when tiie spy satellite
71* The Guardian. July 10, 1974.
72# The He Xbrk %mes. May 20, 1974, called the Ihdisn explosion 
"another monument to human folly" and sarcastically commented 
that the " sixth member of the nuolear club may be passing 
the begging bowl before the year #  out###*."
The Daily Telegra%d%# May 20, 1974, commented that somehow 
"India succeeds in maintaining a peaceable mien, even when 
well armed with conventional weapons. The addition of a nuclear 
boiM to her arsenal marked "Made in Jhdia" will not alter that 
benign posture# " But the editoral felt that the new weapon 
would lessen India’s fear of China "and possibly reduce her 
milltaxy dependence on the Soviet Uhion".
The Times; M y  20, 1974, wrote that the news will be 
"received with little pleasure by those isho are called upon 
to pay for India’s inability to solve her appalling internal 
problems". Beferrint to the political reaction in ladia, 
the editorial said it looks as though " Ihdia needed influence 
more than food."
The Guardian. May20, 1974 conceded that the nuclear powers 
could not " without hypocrisy condemn the ladlans for joining 
their club". But felt that one easily foreseeable"temtation 
for any Indian Brime Minister would be to embark on a foreign 
adventure «diich, with a bomb would be bound to succeed in order 
to distract attention from the problems crowding in at home, of 
which India has more than her share"*
3W5
was not adequately developed* This well-kept secret was
revealed by an American joumaliet# M* Howard Kbhn, in a
73television Interview* ■ mien the issue was raised In 
parliament. Brims Minister Desai .told the menîbers that in 
1963 the Ihdian and American gcvemmonts decided at the 
highest level to install remote sensing device with a nuclear 
power pack near the highest point of Manda Devi peak in the 
Himalayas with the object of securing information about Chinese 
missile developments* Vhen the expedition was approaching the 
summit, it was overtaken by a blizsard and was forced to 
retreat to the lower canq»* In the presipitate descent under 
very trying and exacting oonditions, they had to leave the 
pack eeourely cached* An attempt was made to retrieve and 
install the device in %y, 1966* But it was discovered that 
a major avalanche had oooured around the area and the device 
could not be located# Another device was installed in the 
same area in I967* It functioned normally until It was removed 
and returned to the Uhited States in 1968%^
%en in the field of organisation and training of 
Indian intelligence agencies, there was close cooperation between 
the Uhited States and India, After the trauma of the Chinese 
attack in 1962, the government of Ihdia let in the American 
intelligence experts to help reorganise, expand and modernise the 
Indian agencies to cope with new challenges# A large number of 
Indian operatives and specialists were sent to the Uhited States
75. The Hindu*, ApXil 14, 1978*
74. Ibid*, April 18, 1978
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for advanoed training at the CIA establishments; there were
Amerioan personnel at the Indian establishments for training
Indians# Dneing the late 1960s, the Amerioan presence in 3^dla
was curtailed considerably and reduced to the bare minitauCT after
the Bangladesh war. The Indian intelligence personnel continued
to be sent to the TMted States even after Mrs, Gandhi started
fiercely denouncing the CIA for its alleged attempts to destabîÜ^
75the govemasnta of the Third World oouhtriesi
Whatever might have been the nature of cooperation
between India and the Uhited States in sensitive fields and
whether the Ihdian nuclear explosion was bitterly denounced or gently
disapproved, there seems to be perfect agreement between what came
76to be known as nuolear " suppliers group "* and, more particularly, 
75* M â t A  April 15, 1978
76, The united States, USSR, Britain, France, Japan, #st Germany, 
China, Canada, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Boland, Czechoslovakia, 
Sweden and Switzerland constitué this group. At a secret 
meeting in London In September, 1977, the group made an agreement 
which specifies that the signatories will apply a list of 
safeguards in all sales of nuclear technology# The code is not 
retroactive. The safeguards clause that the government 
of exporter countries must give, assiuyances that the supplies 
will not contribute to the production of weapons; that third 
supplied countries will not intervene by offering their own 
exports in the event of dULsagreement in regctiations on a 
eontrWt bétTmèn any ingiorting country and one of the suppliers 
grotq>; that suppliers will sell nuclear material only to those 
states pledged to accept international safeguards such as periodic 
inspection of production sites ; and that buyers must agree to 
reject all international md^guards in the event of the resale 
of installations to third ooiktries* See Cometition Success 
-Review, Vo, XIV, No, 9 (March, 1978), B?, 25 - 26
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between the Utoited States and the USSR to ooeroe near-nuoXear 
powers like India to sign the HPT, Canada ended her cooperation 
with India in the nuclear field after the latter conducted an 
explosion in 1974* Ottawa also cancelled heavy water exports to 
India in 1976# pending nuclear contract with herZ^
During his visit to India in January, 1978, Bcesident 
Carter of the Dhited States insisted on Ihdian acceptance of full 
scope safeguards for all the Indian nuolear installations | Bcine 
Minister Desai firaûy resisted the demsndl^
The Uhited States Nuclear Regulatory Cosnsission
rejected an Ihdian application for the release of a shipment of
7*6 tonnes of uranium in spite of strong Presidential recommendation
79that it be released* This uranium was intended for use in Thrapur
power plant; the Uhited States has contractual obligations to supply
The Coiamlssioni^^^®’*' 4cm the Indian application "in the spirit"
d1of the KUclear Mbn-prollferation Act* This Act, however, comes into 
force in late 1979# bhen it comes into force, uranium shipments
77* Ashok Khpur, "Indo-Soviet Military'' Relations i Dependency,
mter-dependency and mcertaintiesÿ India Quarterly. Vol. XXXIII, 
Ho, 5 ( jniy-SepteWber, 1977 ), F* 279
78* # 0  Hindu. January 3, 1978* The Dhlted States television teams, 
aoooxpanyii^ the B?esident, operating with hi^üy so^sticated 
equipment, picked up President Carter’s private remarks to the 
Secretary of State, Vance* 9he Bcesident said# " Nhen we get 
back, I think we ought to write" him { Desai { another letter, 
just cold end very blunt"* This leak embarrassed the President*
M A %
79* Xbi4** April 22, 1978 
80* Ibid*,
81* Ibid*
82* Ibid*
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to K U  countries would be automatically terminated unless they
83accept "fullscope" safeguards*^ And yet, certain nuolear 
materials were hastily cleared for dispatch to friendly developed 
European countries by the same Commission only a few days 
before rejecting the Ihdian application^
The Soviet Uhion stg>plies most of the heavy water
imported by Ihdia# Uhder a contract signed by Xhdia and the
Soviet %iion in September, 1976, Moscow would export 200 tonnes
of heavy water to India in a phased manner, the last consignment
83
being sent in 1978* The entire quantity supplied by the Soviet
union was required to be placed under International Atomic Biergy 
86Agency safeguards* Thus,the Soviet W o n  is not a*y more 
lenient to Ihdia than the West*
S3*
84* Ibid, Uhder the law, the President can overrule the Commission 
and the Congress will have sixty working days within which it 
could either approve or reject the action of the President*
The Bresident overruled the Commission on April 27, 1978*
The Hindu. April 28, 1978
85* Ibid*. April 20, 1978
86. I61A.
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In the %K>8t~Cuhan alealle# oriei^^perlbdf the 
Xhdlan Ooean littoral etate#, partloularly the nonralignei, 
began calling for turning the Ihdian Ooean Into a sone of peace* 
probably to keep any future olaeh of the giants aeay from their 
region*
Sri lahka ( Gega.on ) first proposed the zone of
Qg
peace idea êt the Cairo lhOR**aligned Suonit of 1964#
Since Stalin's time* the Soviet tmion was aware of 
her naval inferiority?^ Soviet naval expansion began since 19^4?^ 
M  aspite of all the recent expansion* the Soviet navy seems to lack 
offensive capability*^ Soviet Admiral* Cforshkov* pleaded for 
forging the Soviet ïüswy into an instrument "without equal" in a 
•esiea of artlolo# la 19?2 and, 1973#**
Demonstration of Soviet power becomes necessary 
in Moscow's competition with #shington for influence. Therefore* 
just as tlie littoral states began calling for tumihg the Indien 
Ocean into a zone of peace* the Soviet Mavy began making its 
appeaxttnoe in the Ocean*
ar. See Chapter VII* n \. 220' - 21. ‘
88* Martin Zbollaoott* " 'Zone of Psaoe' Plan in Troubled Waters %
% e  Guardian. September 10* 1975*
89# See Chapter I* P* 68 for Stalin's awareness of it#
90# Hannes Adomeit* mi, 9Pi*l# fcMyjPUmi i&fiflU
Confjpontation to Coexistence^ (Adeli^ Papers Bb* Id) (Londont
% s  ^ tme^t!^^ Institute Pbr Strategic Studies* 1975)* P# 26 
91# P* 27
92# m d a
As the Afro^Asisn states' demands for the removal
of the big power navies beesme fVequent* the Soviet IMon began
supporting the demand and expressing her readiness to disouss
Éwith other oonoerned powers and find a solution* If the Dhited
States removes her navy* Mbsoow would not lose face in withdrawing
its* In any case* Soviet navy does not enjoy parity with that
of the Shi ted States* Any " attempt to achieve parity with the
adversary super**power on all levels would require a vast effort
and even greater proportions of the Soviet economy for defence#
95and would pro]^bly take a long time? If a mutually acceptable 
solution to the problem mould be foun<^ wlth the Dbited States# the 
ÜS3H would be spared of the effort and money*
m  June# 1971» Brezhnev himself proposed to 
mshington "mutual naval restraint"* The Dhited States sought 
but " received no further olsrificaticn of what the SSSB omy 
have had in mind nor any indication that they had an interest 
in pursuing this subject further"#^^ The Dhited States expressed 
interest in the idea " perhaps in the form of explicit under* 
standings to avoid competition while safeguarding our respective 
interests in the Indien Ocean*'* ^
* > »||^I<||| I III I ; lui , # 1 , * 1 1, ; , I # # # w m ' i i ,  11 « » # * # # «W IH W W
95* Hannes Adomeit# op^clt#^ P. 27
94* Quoted in K*P* Mlshra# "Indien Ocean as a Zone of Peace t 
The Concept and Alternatives"# Ihdla Qusrterlv. Vol* XXXIII#
1 ( JtaBuMy-ltwfBh, 1977 )* P. 27
95. Qiuotad. ftld. 3ae Twlow. P. 401 
96* M A t
Again# in September# 1971# Soviet tbiien eapressed 
her readinesa te examine and eelve the prebXem ef turning the
Indien Ooean into a zene ef peace together with other powers
97on an equal basis* ' This was repeated in the Joint Declaration 
issued at the end of Brezhnev's visit to India in November# 1973?^
In the meantime# Sri Lanka moved a resolution in the 
tbiited Nations General Assembly in October# 1971 ; this was adopted 
or* December 16# 1971 * The resolution urged the great powers to 
consult the littoral countries with a view to reducing or scaling 
dswn their oon^tition and contention# military or stherwiee# in 
the area* It called for a halt to the "escalation and expansion 
of their military presence" and demanded that the great powers 
should withdraw Arom all their military bases and installations# 
remove all nuclear weapons and terminate all manifestations of 
great power rivalry in the area* It declared that " thelright
to free and unimpeded use ef the zone by the vessels ef all
99
nations is unaffected "•
Even Wiile floating the ideas like "mutual navel 
restraint" and making promises to study the question of turning 
the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace# the Soviet Dhion continued
the periodic visits of Soviet ships to the Indian Ocean* One such
100visit ocoured during the BangladeWi war in December, 1971* The 
Soviet Dhion dispatched two "task groups" of four combatants each 
to the Indian Ocean* The first was reported to have left on
97# 3Wvda. September 30# 1971
98* See Mission of Rriendehip# P* 61 • Moscow also supported the 
idea during Mrs* Gandhi's visit to the USSR in 1976 and Desai's 
visit in 1977* See Moscow News# Supplement to iasueNo* 25 
( 1976 ) and Saylet Land. H», 22 ( Mèveabar 1977 )
99. See P.K. D*o.A/Re«/28?2. Ibaeimber 16, 1971»
100# See Chapter IX*
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DeoeWber 6*7# 1971 * A few day* after the united State# ehip
*t 01
Enterpgiae was asked to mve into the Indian Ooean# seoond
Soviet 'taak group'! was dispatohed# The first Soviet group
arrived In the 5%dlbn Ooean on Deoember 18# 19711 two day# after 
102the war ended*
This was probably a ooinoidehoe* It isinoonaeivable 
that the Soviet Uhion would deepen the oriiii by challenging the 
united States* As; it was# on the Bangla issue# the Isolation of 
the Soviet union ht ths Waited Nations was ooqplete#^^ Therefore# 
Ibsoow would not ley itself open to charges of indulging in gunr-boat 
diplomaoy* Even assuming that Ibsoow intended to demonstrate its 
solidarity with 3^dla by the dispatch of ships# certainly it could 
not have been as ignorant as not to know the dL stance tîiat the 
vessels had to cover and the time it would take to reach the 
Indian Ocean# whether the units involved were part of its 
% r  Eastern fleet or the Baltio or the Hack 3ea fleets* Ifosoow 
could not have been pnaware of the limited capability of Ihklstan 
to continue the war for any length of time in view of tlie great 
strategic disadvantage she suffered fpom • her then eastern wing
i
being separated 'from the væstem wing by a stretch of one thousand 
miles of Hadian ! territory* Moscow could not even hope to get
tot* Jbiâij^  P* 290
102* Pbr a discussion of this naval diplomacy# see Jamas N* MoConnell 
and Anne M* Kelly# "Super-Bcwor #val Diplomacyi Lessons of the 
Indo - Bakistcmi Crisis SmXxaX» Vol* XT# No* 6
( mvexËber December# 1975 )# ... ^
103. Sea Chapter IX# %  297 - 99
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the credit for having expreased its aolidarily with India 
if her Wiip# arrived after the end of the war* Therefore# 
it would not be unreasonable to argue that the dlspatbh of 
the Soviet ships during the Bangla war was a part of the 
routine visits of the ^viet vessels to the Indian Ocean*
The Anglo American government did not exhibit 
the kn^ok the Soviet government did# that is# serving their 
interests even while appearing to be #nsiderate to the feelings 
of the littoral states* m  spite of the opposition Of the littoral 
states# #ie Congressional opposition in the United States^  ^  and 
even after# a group of US Congressmen# invited to inspect the 
^erbera ibrt in Somalia# where the Soviet tM.021 was alleged
104# On Mar oh 19# 1974# The Kennedy Bell resolution was
introduced in the Senate opposing the Diego Garcia base# 
K.P* MLsra# ^p*oitA* B* 29
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to have eetabliehecl a base# reported in 1975 that there were
105
no Soviet military installations in the port# Britain and the
tbited States made an agreement on the eaQjansion of the naval
106facilities in the Indian Ooean Island of Diego Qaroia, Thus# 
Britain and the Dhited States give tlie impression of being i*** 
considerate while the Soviet Uhlon seems to be considerate to the 
feelings of the Indian Ocean littoral States*
I,w e,w we I
105* Vijaya Gupta# Thp Etl^ ooia"*Somalia Confltot and the Hole of
•gie External Ibîî^a Y ]&eiiw Affairs Reports# 7ol#XXVII# No*#)# 
(Nm Dslhi#^  Council of #rld Affairs# 1970)# B* 41
Somalia became independent in i960* Thmediately 
thereafter# she began making irredentist claims first on 
Ethiopia and later on Ken/a* In October# 1965# Somalia 
accepted Soviet milttary aid* After a coup in 1969# a 
socialietical3y*minded government came to power in the 
country* Isi 1974 %peror Haile Selassie was overthrown 
in Ethiopia and a Itwxist*I»eninist government was formed#
Somalia and tJie Soviet Union Signed a Treaty of friendship 
and cooperation in the same year# In the meantime# American-* 
Etlïiopan relatione deteriorated* Bm Western and Arab countries 
were reported to have passed on huge sums of money to the 
Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia* In the wake of Üie revolution 
in Ethiopia#, there was a steady improvement in Soviet-%iiopian 
relations and Moscow refused to support Somalian territorial 
claims on Ethiopia* Somalia terminated the friendship Treaty 
on November 13# 1977* See# Ibid** BF* 41 ^ 47#
106* K#P* jMdsra# op*cit*# P* 25
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EVALUATION
Jxi the 1950» India's dependence on the West for 
aapme and ammunition was total | Britain held a dominant position 
among the suppliers of arms# Di the mid-1950s Nehru held the
view that# other things being equal# Indian armed forces would
riv« 
108
107continue to be based largely on British equipment* fo r f e
years after the Soviet entry into the world armament market#
India had not bought any equipment from the Soviet Uhion# Even
109
her offer of airoraft at bargain prices was not accepted*
But by the late 1950s India perceived greater danger
to her security* Pakistan ceased to be the only sevurity problem;
110China began making menanoing Irredentist claims on India*
R&kistan acquired considerable quantity of weapons from the 
111tkiited States* Britain was either unable to subsidise her
defence exports to India or unwilling to give what she asked for#
The Ubited States chose to decide what was necessary for India and 
113what was not* But this was not likely to inspire confidence in 
India in view of Vfesîiington's treaty obligations with ïWctstan# 
This gave the Soviet Uhion an opportunity to become an in^ portant 
supplier of arms to Ihdia*
107. See P* 570
108* The Soviet Union entered thé market Using Czechoslovakia as her 
surrogate in the EgyptianrCzechoslovak anas deal in 1955# 8ee 
David J. lailin# qp.olt.f P. 394 
109* See* P* 371 
110* See Chapter VII#
111. Sae p. 378 and Chapter V, P. 153 , footnote 35,
112. See P. 372 & 375
113. See P. 375 ?76
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India ôould hope to derive the following benefits 
fkom her arms deals with the Soviet Uoioni l) Since the Soviet 
Union aooepted the rupee as the unit of aooount in trade with ' 
Thdia# arms deals with Moscow would save foreign #ehangs*
2) India oould hope to put pressure on Britain and the Uhited 
States to respond favourably to Ibdian requests for weapons of 
her ohoioe and to go slow on arming lUkistan - not an unjustified 
hope in conditions of the Cold #%r# 3) She could hope to reap 
diplomatic benefits from such deals in view ofthe increasing 
tensions on the Sino-Indlan border# arming of India by the Soviet 
union against another communist country, China, could be of 
considerable diplomatic advantage to New Delhi# 4) Biere were 
obvious military benefits# India's Soviet arms would neutralise 
Baklstan's Amsrloan arms; and since much of the Chinese military 
hardware in those days was of Soviet origin, possession of 
similar type of equipment would foster confidence in the Indian 
military leadership*
The Soviet Dhion did vasoillate on theJltifcSI dealP^ 
But Moscow's hesitant sale and licencing to manufacture certain 
items of military hmdmre would be preferable to India than 
Anglo-American unwillingness to give her what she needed.
*    ; —
114* See Chapter X, B* 332 
115* See Chapter VII, B* 230
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However, it ha# to be borne in mind that India
approadhed the Meet first every time she decided on acquiring
new weaponel^^ Only iStien either the weapons offered were not
of her ohoioe or when she met with an outright refusal diid she 
117turn to Moscow*
Besides, Britain and the Uhited States proved to be
11Ô
undependable in times of &idia:# dire seourity needs* The Soviet 
union continued arms s%plies to India even idien she reappraised 
her South Asia policy in the aid-1960s*^ ^
At a time when the Soviet Ubicn was oo#etlng with 
the united States for influence in all fields, the promotion of 
sales of Soviet military equipment in the Third World countries 
could not be ignored both for reasons of prestige as well as 
commercial benefits* Moscow would have the satisfaction of having 
broken the Western monopoly over the supply of arms to the Third 
#rld; it would reSelve due credit from the new nations, particularly 
the nonndigned, for providing them with enoug^ msnoeuvrability 
in arms purchases.
116* W i a  is now Seriously oonsiderit^  the question of acquiring v . d 
and manufacturing under licence Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft 
(UPSA)* The three aircraft being considered are: the British- 
Brench twinrergined Jaguar* the Ikenoh-bUilt l^ lrege JB and the 
the Swedish ïâfiSSBl* %iw time, all three are eager to clinch 
'ttie deal* See the Hindu* February, 10, March 22, 26, and 
April 8, 1978.
117* Ih an interview granted to the HasCburg magazine, Her Spsgel in 
M»y, 1977# Brims Minister Dssai blamed the united States for 
Indians dependence on Soviet arms* See the Statesmen* May 30,1977 
118* See mrnpter T, P. 1 7 4
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Arms sales to India, as also to other Third World oountrles, 
would have other advantages too t the opportunities they provide for 
develo^i0^%uontaots with the military personnel in the course of 
training them in the Use of Soviet equipment* The Soviet Uhion was 
mware of the frequent coups and the political roles played by the 
military forces in almost all the Third World countries* In case 
the Indian Bsrliamentary democracy fails to solve the people's socio­
economic problems and there is chaos in the country# Moscow probably 
hoped that the military would intervene in the fashion of military 
forces in other Third World countries* Therefore, if possible, the 
Soviet union oould use her contacts with the Indian defence personnel 
to build \xp a friendly group in the arnied forces* Even if Indian 
Ij^liamentsxy dsmocraoy proves resilient enough# as it appears to be, to 
survive, the contacts that Moscow would develop with the Indian defence 
persoimèl would be useful at least for gathering intelligence*
However, it has to be mentioned that India was cautious
in her military deals with the Soviet Uhion* She has, at least by 4
implication, shown her preference for and trust in the West* Theref^  ^3 :
120
were British Chiefs for die Indian Kavy until 1953# The Indian Air
121 •Force held joint exercises with the British and American Air Forces*
Ihdia and the Ukdted States cooperated in monitoring the Chinese
122
nuclear tests and missile launchings* The Soviet Union would have 
been equally interested in such joint enterprises in view of the 
State of Slno-Soviet relations* The faot that nothing of the sort
120* See above 370
121* See Chapter VII, P* 239
122* See P*P<, 384-85
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had happended speaks for the caution that India practised in her
relations with Moscow* Similarly, Indian intelligence personnel
125went to ; the CIA establishments for training; no such instances 
of cooperation between the D^dian and Soviet intelligence organisa­
tions have been reported*
# n  India's nuclear policy, the Western attitude was
brusque* It is evident that the Soviet Union is not less committed
than the West to making the NPT truly universal*^ However, Moscow
did not make any direct comments on India's nuclear explosion in 
125
May 1974* The achievement of the nuclear scientists caused great
excitement in India* Under Such conditions, Moscow's silence would
126be more pleasing to ^dla than jarring WiStem comments*
Bcobably, her experience with China oonvinoed the Soviet 
union of the futility of trying to deflect a determined nation from 
Its chosen path; the more applied on China
the more relentleesly|?Siklng drove towards achieving
123* See B*386
124* See B. 382
125* See P . 3 8 5
126* See P*
3 8 4
, foot note 72
"400
127
in nuclear tesMnclegy. Thu#, Moscow seemed to have become^aVare of 
the limits on its power to influence o, .ther countries* MoWng 
would have been gained by Moscow's harsh criticism of Indis; all 
the good impact that Soviet diplomacy had made on Lodisn pKblic
4 28
opinion would have been lost# It is also possible that Moscow
considers India "as a partial balance to the political influence
120
and potential military weight of China",  ^ Therefore, it would 
be unwise to introduce bitterness into IndovSoviet relations*
Anyway, the Vhst was performing the unpleasant task of pressurising 
%idia. If the West had succeeded, Soviet purpose would be served 
too; if it had failed, It would be imprudent for Moscow to try the 
same tactios, Mescow chose prudence and remained silent#
127, fact Western pjpessure on India has similar effects* Hth 
the infrastructure available at the Bharat Heavy Electricals 
and in Some other enterprise#, the Indian nuclear scientists 
have developed an impressive expertise to fabricate an indigenous 
nuclear power plant* IT* Bamanna, the SoientiÜo Adviser to the 
Ministry of Defence, forcefully advocates the manufacture of 
indigenous fuel by mixing natural uranium with plutonium, see 
The Hlndn# March 25, 1978
Construction of four heavy water plants has been undertaken # 
at Kota, bppoda, Tuticorin and Thlchar with a total production 
capacity of 500 tonnes per year* 1üi two years time, Ladia will
bo self^aliant in heavy water* The Hindu* April 20, 1978
128* See Cliapter VIII, P* 274 f footnotes 101 and 105#
129# Ibid*, P* 273 , foot note 100*
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O n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t u r n i n g  tîie I n d i a n .  O c e a n  i n t o  a
z o n e  o f  p e a c Q A i  t o o ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  f o l l o w e d  t h e  s a m e  t a c t i c s :
\
q u i e t l y  s e r v i n g  h e r  i n t e r e s t s  w h i l e  a p p e a r i n g  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r a t e  
t o  "bhe f e e l i n g s  o f  t h e  l i t t o r a l  s t a t e s .  A n g l o - A m e r i c a n  p o l â ô i e s  
g i v e  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  o f  b e i n g  i n s e n t i v e  t o  t h e  f e e l i n g s  o f  t h e  
l i t t o r a l  s t a t e s l ^ ^  ^ % e n  t h e i r  d e m a n d  f o r  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  b i g  
p o w e r  n a v i e s  b e c o , m e  i n s i s t e n t ,  A n g ' l o - * A m e r i c a n  d e c i s i o n  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
a  b a s e  i n  D i e g o  G a r c i a  wa-s a p p o t m c e d .
T h e  S o v i e t  s t r a t e g y  s e e m s  t o  b e  t o  h o l d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  d e a d l o c k  o n  t h e  i s s u e .  I t  i s  c u r i o u s  w h y  h a v i n g
h i m s e l f  p r o p o s e d  " m u t u a l  n a v a l  r e s t r a i n t " ,  B r e z h n e v  d i d  n o t  s h o w
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m u c h  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  i d e a .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
v/as h o p e f u l  o f  s e c u r i n g  a  b a s e  i n  S o m a l i a  i n  t h e  i v a k e  o f  t h e  c o u p  
i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  a n d  i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  S o v i e t  -  S o m a l i a  r e l a t i o n s
135
f o r  a  w h i l e .  O n c e  t h e  S o v i e t  U h i o n  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  i t  i,?a8 u n l i k e l y
t o  g e t  a  b a s e  i n  t h e  r e g i o n ,  s h e  b a g e . n  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  " k e y
q u e s t i o n "  h e r e  Indian Ooean) i s  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  " f o r e i g n
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m i l i t a r y  b a s e s " ,  M o s o o v f  n o w  s a y s  t h a t  i t "  i s  p r e p a r e d  j o i n t l y
1 3 0 ,  T i e  b i g g e s t  n a v y  i n  t h e  I n d i a n  O c e a n  i s  t h a t  o f  I n d i a ,  a n d  t h e
m o s t  m o d e r n  a n d  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  n a v y  i s  t h a t  o f  I r a n ,  S e e  & % i r t i n
W o o l l a c o t t ,  o n , c i t .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e s e  t w o  p o w e r s  a r e  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  n a v i e s  o f  t h e  g r e a t  p o w e r s  f r o m  
t h e  O c e a n  a l s o  f o r  r e a s o n s  o f  t h e  p r o m i n e n c e  t h a t  t h e i r  n a v i e s  
w o u l d  e n j o y  a f t e r  t h e i r  ( b i g  p o w e r  n a v i e s )  e x i t ,
131 , S e e  P ,  394
132* S e e  a b o v e ,  P .  390
133# S e e  a b o v e ,  P, 394» ^oot n o t e  105
1 3 4 « G r o n y k o * s  s p e e c h  t o  t h e  T h i r t y  F i r s t  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  U U  G e n e r a l
A s s e m b l y  o n  S e p t e m b e r  2 8 ,  1 9 7 ^ *  S e e  M o s c o w  N e w s  S u p p l é m e n t  t o
i s s u e  H o ,  40 ( 1976 ), P, 4
• ,.;1402.
with other powers to seek ways of reducing# on a reolprooal basis# 
ths military aotivity of nott^ ooastal w t a t s s * I f  Soviet 
proposal is aooepted# Mcsoow will again something* removal of the 
existing Uhlted States bases in the Indian Ooean* Then# it agrees 
to *b%duoing# on a i^oiprooal basis# the military activityIn so 
doing# the Soviet Uhion will not lose anything# In the meantime# the 
Anglo-Am^ioan base at Diego Oarola is held responsible for the 
stalemate#
It is noteworthy that the Soviet Uhion talks only of 
*h?edutoing" the naval aotivily in the Ooean and not of its total 
elimination# It is possible that the Soviet Uhion wants to
maintain her present praotloe of periodically sending its vessels
156
to the Ooean to oounter Chinese influenoe# Baking's navy is 
not big endughto enable it to dispatoh its ships to the four corners 
of the world* This is a field where the Soviet Uhion can demonstrate 
her power unmatohed by China* It is also slgnifloant that Mosoow 
does not indulge in sensational diplomatlo aots like unilateral 
cessation of its naval aotivity in the Ocean# as it did with 
nuoXear testing in the late 1950s#^  ^
Thus# Indo-Soviet militaay relations were confined to 
puKfohaseS of Soviet weapons on oonweroial basis*, %  in^lloation# 
%idia shoved her preference to the West# Yet# the West was not 
oohsideratll té^ ïhsTi^  ^ treated her with due oonsidsratwess#
thereby demonstrating the ia#ortanos it att aches to India as an 
indepent political actor# unlike the West #ioh gave the ioqiiression 
of treating her as no more than ah chjeot of their policies#
155# MAa
156# 8ee Martin Waolacott# ■Op.çitif See #lso conclusions# P# 
157# See B# 380 ,
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C O N C L U S I O N S
The Soviet l&iion began exhibiting friendliness towards
India# as to other newly independent states# only in the post-
Stalin eva#^  A desire for some relaxation in the Soviet Uhion
itself after deoades of terror# the confidence fostered by the
Western failure to intervene in the East German workers' revolt
2
in 1953 and the Hungarian revolt in 1956# the rapid disappearance 
of colonial empires and the refusal of most of the new nations 
to toe the Western line in the Gold % r  must have convinced the 
new Soviet leadership of the need for a change in Soviet policy.
Notwithstanding the mutual threatening declarations 
by both blocs# maintenance of the status quo was the primary 
aim of the Cold War: the Soviet Uhion would not give up her 
hegemony in Eastern Europe ; she would not# at the same time# 
risk a war In trying to i#ose Communism on other states.^
The Uhited States would not tolerate the imposition of Communism 
on other states by the Soviet Union; but# she would not risk 
a war to free Eastern Europe from Soviet control either. The 
build-up of formidable military machines by both aides was a 
deterrent against any disturbance being caused to this status quo 
by eitlier side. Since war between the two euper-powere is 
destruotive of both# they resorted to diplomatic means to neutralise 
eaçh other in the Cold war.
1. See Chapter I# PP. 53 - 62 and Chapter III, PP. 101 - 105
2. See Chapter I. P. 48 # and Chapter III# P. 101
5. See Chapter I# P. 53
There «ae no ohance of ibsoow successfully persuading 
the newly liberated states to join In a military alliance against 
the West# But there was hope for the Soviet Uhion in the new 
developments! the refusal of most of the Afro-Asian States to 
join the Western alliances against the Soviet Uhion# The West#
which used to decide the fate of most Afro-Asian countries while
\
they were under colonial bondage considered this a loss; Moscow 
considered noxr-allgnment a gain inasmuch as the West considered it 
a loss and began cultivating the friendship of the Third World#
The Soviet Uhion's attests at currying the favour of the 
Socialist parties of Western Europe and dividing the West ixaving 
failed#^ Moscow began cultivating the goodwill of the Third l^forld#
Ç
There were hardly any ideological oonslderatioxui behind these moves;
The secondary importance of ideology in Soviet foreign policy
considerations comes out clearly when we consider Ihdo-Sovlet relations
in the context of the oonoept of national-democratic state evolved
6
at tîie conference of internatlomlCïoCommunist Parties in 1960.
7
Neither India was a national democratic state# nor the Congress
Party a revolutlonaiy democratic party# an appellation given to
the ruling parties of national democratic states#^ Yet# the Soviet
Uhion developed very close relations with Hidia and invested
9considerably in Bidia's economic development# Only In the 
last years of Mes* Gandhi's regime did Brezhnev begin
4# See Chapter I, B# 52 
Ibid## BP# Rx 62
0. See Chapter I#, 57 - 53
7# See Chapter# I# P* 58 
8. See Chapter I# B. 61 
9# See Chapter X,
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10an attendit to woo the Congrese Party. This st^ g^estes that 
Mosoow paid more attention to diplomatic expedienoy than 
ideological consistency.
one of the iugportant factors responsible for the 
suooess of Soviet diplomacy in India is the tempperamental 
IncoBpatibility between India and the Wsst# The West should 
have realised that nations in general# and those recently haying 
acquired sovereign status in particular# tend to resent unsollolted 
advice# The West# the TMited States in particular# sought to tell 
India what was good for her and udiat was not; this was unacceptable 
to India.
As a large and ancient country# India has her own 
11hopes and ambitions# She naturally wanted to chart her own 
course in international affairs | this was not to the liking of 
Western policy-makers# who wanted the new nations to throw in 
their lot with the v;est. Besides this# India's national interests 
clashed with tlie American global interests in Pakistan#^^ Goa#^^ 
Bangladesh^  ^ and on colonial and racial issues.^  ^ For reasons of
10* S.B. Sharma# then President of the Congress îhpty# was Invited 
to pay a visit to the Soviet Uhion# which he did in July 1973« 
Izvestia. July 4# 1975* Ajring his visit to India# Brezhnev 
discussed with the Congress President issues relating to contacts 
between the Congress and the CPSÜ. The Times of India. November 
29» 1975.
But there was strong opposition within the Congress even 
to cooperation between the Congress and the CPI. Mrs. Gandhi took 
the view that the Congress did'Not need Communist support, but it 
could not spurn offers of cooperation from the CPI on the basis of 
its policies and programmes. See The Overseas Hindustan Time a. 
February 15# 1975.
11 # See Chapter II# PP. 35 « 88 
12. See Chapter V#
15. See Chapter VI 
14# See Chapter XX 
15# See Chapter IV
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their national Interests and# probably also# as a means of 
pressure# Britain and the Uhited States adopted an unfriendly 
stand on most issues vital to Indian interests; and precisely for 
the same reasons# &idia looked to Mosoow for support.^  ^
The Anglo-American press# which disagrees with 
their governments frequently on many issues# invariably 
reflected their governments* stand on issues vital to India's
interests; on Kashmir their comments have always been pro-
17 IQ 10
Pakistani# on Goa# they were pro-Portugueses; on Sikkim
20their comments almost reflected the Ohlnese stand; on India's
21nuclear explosion# their comments were harsh# This general phenomenon
22
was resented by Nehru as early as 1948# Thus# at both the official
16# Long before independence# Nehru considered Soviet power necessary 
to control Western power# See Chapter IX# P# 85 
17. See# for exangple, The Sunday Express. January 6# 1957# The Daily 
Express. January 6# 1957# and January 50# 1957# The Time and Tide. 
February 2, 1957# The Times. September 7# 1965
18# See Chapter VI# P# 184
19* Sikkim used to be an Indian protectorate (See Capter VII# P* 19a) 
which became a full-fledged state of India In April 1975*
20. See the editorial in The New York Times# "Imperial India"# April 21# 
1975; The observer also commented on the issue under the caption 
"Inç»erial India”# April 20# 19751 The Guardian commented under the
caption " The Swallowing of Sikkim"# April 25# 1975# Some Indian 
newspapers criticised the action too# See The Overeeas Hindustan 
Tinps# Ifeyl # 1975» ^ioh commented under the caption# "A Merger 
isiVArranged?
21. See Chapter XI# P* 504 See also Chapter XV# Xx # and Chapter 
IX.
22. Nehru said on March 8# 1943: "It is amazing how a certain section
of the press# say# in tlie United Kingdom# deliberately and offensive­
ly misrepresents urn* India's Foreign Policy. PP. 55^ 56. This 
resentment is not peouliar to India. The Amrioan media's oriticlsm 
of Heath# when he was the Prime Minister, their writing off of 
Britain was recently resented in BxdtAln# See he Times. January 1 # 
1974# and the editorial in The Guardian, on May 9# 1975*
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at well aa the non-offioial level there were tentions In 
mdo-Amerioan and Indo-Brltlsh relations; Indo-American 
relations have been often tense because of Washington's 
alliances with and arms supplies to Pakistan.
Such tensions in Dido-Amerloan relations could not 
have been Ignored by the Soviet leadership# the more so
25because the Uhited States was the chief rival of the USSR,
The Soviet policy towards India evolved gradually over the 
years. Stalin hardly evinced any interest in exploiting the 
tensions between India and the Weat.^^ Wlien the post-Stalin 
leadership changed- the tactics of Soviet foreign policy# they
established a business-like relationship with India; they
25
never shunned Pakistan oon^letely. One thing that stands out 
clearly in Indo-Soviet relations ith&t Soviet support to 
India has been consistent and outspoken only on colonial and 
racial issues# i.e.# issues on which the Uhited States oould 
not take an outright stand for reasons of Western alliance
26management. On Kashmir# the Soviet policy changed many times;
and, on theSlno-Ihdian border dispute# the Soviet stand has been 
2?
equivocal. The strong Soviet support to Ihdla on Bangladesh
was extended because of the apprehensions caused in Moscow in
28the wake of sudden improvement in Sino-Amerloan relations.
25, See Chapter I# P. 58
24, See Chapter III# PP.04 - 101 
2ft. See Chapter III# ^P«io6
26, See Chapter III# PP.-i 05-09 Chapter V,
27, See Chapter VII# PP.216 - 228
28, See Chapters VlII and IX
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Soviet eoonomlo aid to India has remained reliable# i.e.# 
it was not subject to sudden suspensions as the United States' 
aid was.^^
' Onoe the USSR decided to cultivate the friendship of
the new nations# she skilfully exploited the teogxeramental
differences between them and Washington* %hils the Uhited
States gave the impression of deinanding cooperation from the
30Third World on her own terms# the Soviet Uhion would care­
fully maintain the image of a super-power which treats the new
31nations on a footing of equality.
In its dealings witî'i India the Soviet %ion appears to have
32given due consideration to her size end potential,*' Mbscow 
never suspended aid to Ihdia to pressure her into ohangiïig her 
policies as tlie United States dld»^^
29. See Chapter X# BP, 290 & 358 - 59
30. The Uhited States would not countenance non-alignment for a long 
time (see Chapter III# P, H O  ) and would not support the Third 
World on colonial and racial issues (see Chapter IV) and yet 
expected them to support her policies in the Cold War,
31. For instance# in his Report to the XXIInd Congress of the OPSU 
in 1961# Khrushchev said that " t^ie basic Issues of world 
politics can no longer be settled without due regards for their
j the newly liberated couritries* ( interests”. See The Road to 
Communism. P# 4I
32. See Chapter Ifl# P. 104
33. See Chapter %  IP. 358 - 59
Khrushchev mentioned In his memoirs that in '^a very cautious 
way"# the Soviet tkiion asked Nkrumsh to get rid of the British 
officers from the Qhanian amy. See Strobe Talbott transi, and 
ed,# OP.Pit,. P. 354# Nkrumah did that in 1961 on return from 
a 9^ 7f@ek trip to thé USSR# Eastern Europe and China. See Ernest 
W. Lefever# "Nehru# Nasser and. Kkrumoh" in lauranoe W. Martin 
ed,# OP.cit.. P. 115. India hc^ d Britans as chiefs of her navy 
until 1958 (see Chapter XI# |'.370 )j the Soviet Union did not 
seem to have given such suggestions to her.
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On thei question of turning the Indian Ocean into a
zone of peace# the United States and Britain gave the inqwesslon
of being insensitive to the demands of the littoral states#
Even #ile not being fully in tune with the mood of the littoral
states# the Soviet Uhion managed to get the credit for being
responsive to the demands of the littoral states by repeatedly
34subscribing to the concept in Ihdo-Sovlet joint communiques#
Such Soviet considerateness towards India is not 
surprising in view of the convergence of Indo-Soviet interests 
first on the issue of Pakistan and later# on China# But in 
spite of this convergence of interests# there was hardly any 
military cooperation betvmen India and tlie Soviet Uhion# apart 
from Indian purchases of Soviet weapons on commercial terms.
The Indian Air Farce held Joint exercises with the British 
and American Air Forces after the Slno-Didian border war of
xe
1962; there was no similar cooperation between any wing of 
tlie IDidian armed forces and its Soviet oountorpart. Recent 
disclosures suggest tliat# even without entering into any formal 
alliances# India iiad been cooperating with tlie United States
34. See Cîmpter XI# PP. 391
35* See Chapter VII# P, 239 » See also above footnote 33*
1 !
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In sensitive fields in the 1960s*
As a large country# India may like to emerge as a power
in her own right. The Soviet Uhion is oarefu^inot to give the
in^ession of coming in the way of Indian national ambitions.
The Soviet leaders and spokesmen say things soothing to IhdlAjt#
57national ego# While the Western press concentrâtes on poverty
in India all the time# Soviet leaders psy tributes to the signi­
ng
fioant progress made by l^dia since independence $ simultaneously# 
Soviet spokesmen also try to please the Indian intelligentsia by 
expressing their "great respect for Indian scientists" for their 
contribution in various fields#'^  This atteiigpt to please India 
has gone to the extent of entertaining the Indian Guru of the 
Hare Krishna cult#sofamiliar in some big Woçtern cities.^
56. See Chapter XI# PP. 504 « 36
57* Thus# Brezhnev told the Indian Parliament on November 29# 1973 
that in t "India's growing international role we see a oonvinr 
clng iflemlfestation of the current procoes of deep démocrati­
sation of international relations.... He also said some 
countries do not like tliie; but tho Goviet Iftiion welcomes it. 
See Mission of Friendship. P. 61. See also Chapter III# P. 104
38* Brezluaov's speech at a civic reception on November 27# 1973# 
See Mission of Friendship. P. 24
39. See Vladimir Kirillin# ou.oit.. PP. 133 and I56# R.N. Sidyok# 
op#oit*. P. 164» tnie Hindustan Times. February 18# 1973# and 
The Overseas Hindustan Times. Mtayl # 1975*
40. In 1974# the Guru visited Moscow to introduce the philosoiAy 
of Krishna consciousness.
See The Bhavan's Journal# Bombay# Vol. XXI# No. 6 
(November 10# 1974)# PP. 62-67*
41(1
Even when Mosoow does not lik e  certain Indian 
policies, lik e  her nuclear explosion in  May 1974# i t  adopts 
a policy of restraint» Ikilike the harsh criticism  of India 
in  the West on this count# the Soviet Uhion only expressed 
her opposition to Indian action indireotly»^^
The Soviet Uhion exhibits the inportance she attaches
to India through the exchange of periodic v is its  between the
Indian and Soviet leaders. Almost a ll the heads of State and
government of the USSR and Didia have visited each other's
*
countries one or more times. On the other hand# the exchanges 
of v is its  between India and the United States are few. 1# iile  
Nehru paid State v is its  to the United States of^##^i'9a three 
times^^ and Mrs. Gandhi t w i c e # o f  the seven Presidents that the 
tkiited States has had since since India's independence# only 
three# Eisenhower# Nixon and Carter paid b rie f v is its  to India. 
Président Johnson unceremoniously asked Prime M inister Shastri
45to postpone his v is it to the Uhited States of America in  1965#
41. See Chapter XI, |T>. 383 
, *  See Appendix IV
42. See Chapter II#  PP. 35^90 aàd Chapter VI# P. 183
43# For the f irs t v is it#  See lyndon B» Johnson# on. c it .. P. 227 
and the second vis it#  Chapter IX, P. 289
44# For Eisenhower's v is it#  see Chapter IV , P. 67 » fo r Nixon's
vis it#  see Chapter V III#  P. 244 snd fo r Carter's v is it#  
see The Hindu. January 2, 1978
45# See chapter V# PP.175 -  74 # See also Pravda. April 22# I 965# 
for a c ritic a l comment on Johnson's action.
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There is an element of oondesoansion in the American
treatment of india.^^ In the aaseaement of American foreign
47poliKqr-makers# India hardly ever figured iaiportantly. On the 
other hand# the Soviet Uhion'e treatment of India has been appealing 
to India most of the time. American attempts to pressure 
mdia into changing her policies proved counter-productive ; the 
care that the Soviet Uhion took in not applying pressure to India
46. An editorial in The New York Times# Daoember 6# 1972# welcomed 
the then Indian Minister for External Affairs# Sink's statement# 
calling for renewed "friendly and cooperative ties" between India 
and tlie Uhited States# badly bruised during the Bangladesh war# 
and commented: "The sober seoondthoughts reflected in Singh^ As 
friendly overtures may have been induced by a serious crop 
failure in India which requires the Indians to seek grain 
inqwrta that only the Uhited States can provide",
47, See Chapter II# P. 92 and Chapter VIII# 273 * President 
Nixon stated in his Foreign Policy Report in 1973* "India is 
a major country# her actions on tlie world stage necessarily 
affect us andour interests*...we have natural concern that 
India not be locked into exolusive ties with major countries 
directed against us or against other countries with idiom we 
have relationships #iioh we value". See Foreign Policy Report. 
May 3# 1973 (Uhited States Information Service (iftmsofipraphed)#
P. 148* Yet, he and his advisers ignored Mrs. Gandhi's statement 
expressing the hope that the Indo-Soviet "treaty will pave the 
way for other friendly countries to have similar friendly pacts 
with us". See the Hindu. Aumiet 10# 1971 # If the TMted States 
was concerned with the increasing Soviet influence in Inda# 
she should have signed a treaty with India to all# her fears 
about the sudden warmth in Sino-American relations and to 
neutralise the effects of the Indo-Soviet treaty on the Indian 
people. See below# P. 424,
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won laurals for her,^
IWLm derived benefits from Soviet diplomatic
support on many iseuoe vital to he^in teres te* Even in domestic
affairs# India's cordial relations with Moscow had some beneficial
effects I in the industrialisation of India under public osnersliip^ ^
50
and in taming the CPI*
A determined minority like the CPI can create much
trouble in conditions of poverty and unemployment prevailing in
51
India* The CPI progressively increased Its share of votes|
52
and# before the split in 1964# it had a considerable following 
in volatile states like %%st Bengal and Kerala* The cordial 
relations between Moscow and New Delhi have turned the CPI into an
48* At a civic reoef%ion to Brezlmev# on November 27, 19T3# the then 
3?rime I^ inlster of India^ Jbro* Gandhi# «aid that "the Soviet Uriion 
W s  not# during so many years of friendship# ever put pressure on 
us or told us what to do or what not to do"* See the Mission of 
P. y>
49* See Chapter X
5 0 , See Chapter III# PP. 112 - 13.
51, It polled 3*3 per cent of votes in the first general elections in 
1952# 8*92 per cent in 1957 and 9*94 per cent in 1962. %  1967# the 
two factions of the CPI emerged as two parties# the CPI and the
CPI (Marxist); they polled 4.SO per cent and 4*28 per cent 
respectively in the elections in 1967* In tlie elections in 1971# 
the CPI won 23 seats in the Lok Sabha# andthe CPI (%r%lst)# 25 
seats* The total mMbersliip of the House is 522* See B,L# Sukhwal# 
pp.pi%,. PP. 137-138 and 216* See below# P* 422,
52, See Chapter VII# P* 211
53* After tlie split# the CPI (gWxist) emerged dominant in these 
states*
ally o f Mra# GeAdhl, v^en she was in power*
V
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Since Soviet dlplomatlo support on issues vital to 
]hiian interests 'beoame neoessary in view of hostile Anglo* 
American attitudes, 3hdia adopted a less than righteous stand 
on the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia; after 
all the Chi ted States and Britain did not always adopt a 
principled stand either* Such mutual concessions promoted 
cordiality in Dido*%viet relations.
54* At its Xth Congress in ïteTaruary 1975t the CPI visualised its 
road to power by a combination of consolidation with the 
leftists inside the Congress, and critical sniping at the 
Congress rightists* See % e Overseas Hindustan Times* February
13f 1975.
At this Congress, the CPI criticised the Indian government 
for the increasing concessions to monopolies and the use of jChfence 
of India Buies ( BtH ) and the Ifeintenatice of Internal Security 
Act (MISA), rbid*,
mSA was further tightened in the wake of tlie imposition of 
emergency in June 1975# Yet the CPI was the only opposition party 
to have welcomed the emergency; none of the loaders of the CPI 
was imprisoned after the declaration of emergency- the only party 
to have enjoyed such a concession# See She Guardian* June 27,
28, 29 and 50, 1975# See also above, footnote 10*.•
©10 Central Bxeoutive Committee of the CPI, in its resolu­
tion on the emergency said?
ühe present offensive of ri^t reaction Inside the country 
fully corresponds to the policy of destabllsation idiloh US 
imperialism and the CIA have set as their goal in respect 
to all regimes in #10 !Biird World pursuing the policies of 
anti^imperialism, non-alignment, peace and cooperation with 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries*
See National Bmergenoy and Our %sks
( C o m m u n i s t lübïioation, Ifo, 227 (New Dalhit New Age Printing
Kmbs, 1975). p. 5.
%e Party declared that ”#•*• the sWift and stem measures” taken 
by the Ppime Minister and the government 'gainst the right 
reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces were necessary 
and justified”* Ibid*. P* 4
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However, this narration of Identity of interests 
and raatual regard for each other*s feelings should not he 
carried too far* India and the Soviet lM.on have had their
55 N
differences and kept their distance*
On certain issues vital to Soviet Interests, India
did not yield her judgment# India was not ready to accept the
concept of two Qeraanies until 1961 ; hut even then Nehru did
not suhsorihe to Khrushchev's plan for turning West Berlin into a
56demilitarised free oity; this refusal to support tlie Soviet
57plan for West Berlin continued in the post-Neïmi era too; even
after the acceptance of two German States, India did not even have
consular relations with East Germany until Ai^st 1970,^^ end full
59diplomatic relatione, until October 19?2; Nehru oi>posed
55* At a ICcemlln rally in honour of Mrs* ^ndht on July 14, 1966#
Kosygin publicly admitted there were some differences between 
Ïïidia ai'id tho Soviet l^ion* ^avda, July 15, 1966
56* See Chapter V, P* 168
57# See the Indo-Soviet JointComnwnique of September 19, 1964, issued 
at the end of President Nadhakrishnan's visit to the Soviet Uhion 
Ihreign^lioy of India t ,%»am@i^ ..l3.47rl 9,64, P. 315, the
the Indo-Soviet Joint Communiqua ieeued at the end of Prime Minister 
Shaotrl's visit to Moscow in %av(%a. 5fey 21, 1965 and also the 
Indo-Sovlet Joint Statement issued at the end of Mrs* Gandhi's 
visit to the Soviet %%ion in July 1966 in jStor Peace and Progress 
(New Delhi; Publications ^vision, Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, Government of India, 1966), P. 60
53# Keesing'is Contemporary Archives, 1969*^ 1970, P# 24150#
59* Ibidjj^  1971-1972, P# 24813
\Khrushohev's troika plan for the UN Secretariat^ on the grounds 
that the executive would "not be able to function adequately or 
with speed;idiile the Soviet Union was interested in getting 
the Uhited Nations out of the Congo,Nehru considered its 
effective presence necessary to prevent civil war and large-scale
65foreign intervention; while Khrushchev liad tried to exploit
colonial issues for Soviet diplomatic benefit by his resolution
in the General Assembly in 1960,^* Nehru had declared the "@ra
of colonialism Ï as j[ being dead”^ |^ and, Nehru did not hesitate to
establish friendly relations with Malaysia in spite of the knowledge
66
of Soviet opposition to the formation of Iklaysia#
60. Khrushchev presented his troika plan under wiiich the UÎT Secretariat 
T/ould be headed by three Seoretaries-General, one each from the 
Western, Communist and neutral groups, in liis speech to the UN 
General Assembly on September 23, 1960. See Ibid*. I96I-I962,
?# 17875*
61. India's UbreiUm Bolitw. P, 225,
62. See Robert 0, Good, "The Congo Crisis; A Study of Post-Colonial 
Politics” in lAurenoe W* Martin ed,, ou.olt.. P* 45, end Francis 
0.Wilcoxf ”9he Non-aligned States and the ÏÏJiited Nations”,
155
63* India's Foreign Policy, P* 525*
64* See Chapter IV, PP,129 “ 30*
65# He said this at the conference of the non-aligned states in 
Belgrade* 8ee %e ^jmes, September 5, 1961 *
66* See lavestia* April 2, 1965, for Soviet opposition to tiie 
formation of Jtileysia*
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India never hesitated to aot against Soviet
agents in India or take other neoessary steps in defence of
Indian state interests. It was rumoured in I96O that Efimov,
67
a GRÜ colonel, idio was functioning as a cultural attache in 
India, was declared persona non grata by the government for 
espionage activities Nehru told a parliamentarian in I96I 
that adequate precaution had been taken to see that no secret 
information would leak out to Soviet pilots training the Indian
69pilots in Ladakh in the use of the Soviet transport planes, AN^ 12;
in November 1962, Bidia confiscated copies of the Russian atlas
showing the Sino-Indian border alignments along #%e linos claimed 
70
by China; between mld-1962 and midri 965, six Soviet experts
were withdrawn from Bhilai and sent back to the Soviet Union
71for their propagandistio work; and, as recently as iferoh 1975#
an Indian Air Force officer was cashiered and imprisoned for
"conduct unbecoming of an officer" and the Soviet officers vho
72had dealings with him were turned out of tl-ie country.
67* Glavnoÿ’e Hazvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie, ie,^ Central Administration 
for Intelligence Servioes, (Ptreotorate of Soviet Military 
Intelligence)
68. Peter Sager, pp.oit.. P. 55
69. Arthur Stein, 199.
70. %e Hindu, November 16, 1962,
71# Fetor Sager, op.oit#, P, 148
72* *fhe Overseas Hindustan Times. l>5?.roh 27, 1975* %e Soviet officials 
were trying to collect defence information from the Indian 
officer. Ibid.
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On her part the Soviet Uhion had not always shown 
oonpem for the feelings of |^e Ühird World, Probably because 
of her pique with the Hhird World's failure to support her on 
the Congo and troika plan, the Soviet Uhion showed utter disregard 
for neutralist opinion by announcing her intention to resume 
nuclear testing on the eve of the opening of the conference of 
non-aligned countries in Belgrade in September 19611 she carried 
out the first test on the day the Conference began (September 1,
1961 ) I for tactical reasons, the Soviet Iftilon voted against the
74.Afro-Asian proposal to expand the Uhited Nations' bodies in 1965;
Soviet atlases continue to show Chinese versions of the Sino-Indian 
75border; and the Soviet Union charged her Kashmir policy when
76
her diplomatic interests called for it in the mid-1960s,
Thus, a spirit of realism permeates Zndo-Soviet 
relations, When Ihdia and the Soviet Uhion differed, as they did 
mauy times, Moscow and New 3klhi managed quickly and quietly to 
forget the events and continue their relations on a realistic 
basis, Ttils spirit of ; mutual adjustment was sadly lacking in 
Zndo-Amerioan relations; clashes of interests and differences 
of opinion between India and the Uhited States always resulted in 
prolonged spells of ohill and spite in their relations,
!Kê"'%masT Seotambar 1 ^and"
74, See Chapter VII, # ;  228-29
75, Ibid,, P. 242
76, See Chapter V, PP,ig$ - 61.
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However, in the realtione between two political 
entities, thsre is never a dearth of factors which are likely to 
ooBq»lioate them. If coincidence of interests has contributed 
to cordiality in Indo-Soviet relations, divergence of interests 
will naturally introduce discord into them. National interests 
of states need not necessarily coincide over a long period of time. 
Therefore, any change in one party's perception of the means of 
serving its interests which runs counter to #ie other party's 
perception of its interests is likely to oooqilioate their 
bilateral relations,
Indian leaders' view of Indo-Soviet relations is 
practical. They think that countries "help one another because 
they need one another. Obviously, countries are not disinterested 
when they help one another”. Ihe record shows ttiat in India, there 
is no "inclination to display tangible gratitude” to the Soviet 
tbion,^ ^
Another Important factor that is periodically likely 
to complicate Ihdo-Soviet relations is the institutional differences 
between them, Ihe English language plays a dominant role in the 
intellectual life of India,^^ Liberal institutions, which have
77, î*brs, Gandhi said this in an interview granted to C,L« Sulzberger, 
See The New York Times, February 17# 1972. The correspondent 
asked her if India felt obligated to demonstrate gratitude to 
the Soviet Uhlon*
78, Nehru thought that English "ties us j( Indians { mentally or 
otherwise to the Anglo-American bloc, Riereis nothing that ties 
us more closely to that bloc than the Englisli language, which 
inevitably brings the people of India nearer to its thoughts, 
amtivlties, books, and cultural standards tlian those of the 
rest of the world from which Ihdians are llnguistloal3y out 
off”. Time and Tide, January 10, 1955» as quoted in Karunakara 
Gupta, op.clt,, P, IV,
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«uooesafully worked in India for theirty years, are popular with 
the intelligentsia. As opposed to suoh preponderant Anglo-
American cultural influences in India, the Soviet Ibion has only
79diplomatic influence; and diplomatic fortunes change from time
to time. Periodically, the institutional differences between
the two countries presented problems to those in charge of mana-
80ging £ado-Soviet relations in both countries. The Soviet Uhlon
visibly exhibited her irritations with the Indian press* criticism
81of Soviet institutions and policies.
79# It was not until 1963 that an Institute of Russian Research was 
founded in New Delhi for the study of Russian language and 
literature. Sea I.A, Benediktov, op.cit.. P. 59*
80* During his visit to India in November-December 1955» the Indian 
correspondents asked Bulganin why there were no other political 
parties in the ÜSSH. See the Supplement. P. 219 and for more 
recent Instances, The Hindustan Times. February 18, 1975»
The Times of India. November 50, 1975#
The Indian press widely reported the expulsion of 
Solzhenitzyn and made critical comments. See The Statesman. 
February 15» 14» and 15* 1974» Hindu# February 15 and 14 
and 15* 1974» The Times of India. February 15* and 14, 1974»
The Hindustan Times. February 15 and 16, 1974» The Indian 
Express, February 15 and 14* 1974#
81. See Chapter V, 9P* 163
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Bd0i.(les that, the Soviet Ubion is a global power 
and India, a regional power. Ifoscow's global interests are
82likely to olabh with Lidia's regional interests in due oouree.
Waen tliat happens, even a small issue like tlie Soviet atlases
83
refleoting the Chinese version of the Sino-Ihdian border, ^ will 
beoome an explosive issue t in times of flared tenq^ ers any issue 
can assume an explosive nature.
The Soviet leaders do not soem to liave leamt any 
lessons from the reverses in Qiiana, Egypt and Indonesia, where 
tîiey identified themselves with the strorig man of the hour 
idiose oaprioe or fall or death affected the fortunes of Soviet 
polioy in the oonoemed oountvy.
In the recent past, tJie Soviet policy in India was 
centred on Mrs# Gandhi# The way Mrs# Ga^ ridhi was showered with
Q J
flattery by Moscow supports this argument# And when she
82* See Chapter VIII, ?P# 282
85. See Chapter VII, P# 242
Xhring his recent visit to the Soviet Union, the Ihdian 
Frime Minister, lesal, did some' plain talking to Brezhnev on 
tlieae Soviet atlases. The Hindu. October 27, 1977.
84. Brezhnev described Mrs, Gandhi as "an outotonding leader of 
of the Indian people" at the 15th Soviet Trade Riion Congress 
in Iferoh 1972. See fravda. Itoch 21, 1972. Complete text in 
CD6P, Vol. XXIV, No# 12, H»# 7-8# He repeated this vAlle he was 
in New Dellîi in November 1975* See Mjlaaicm of Friendship. P. 15 
The Soviet leader aXeo presented to Mrs# Gandhi her life-size 
portrait painted by a Soviet artist# Ibid.. see pictures 
following P. 88# A Soviet Historian and orientalist wrote that 
Mrrs. Gandhi's period of power made an "eventful and historically- 
iiïç»rtftnt intact" on India. He also tlxn#it tlmt her speeches 
and writings reveal "the penetrating intellect of a real thinker 
and scholar"# See Babojan Gafurov, l^ nt Ancient History to 
Contemporary Times (Delhi 1 Nsvyug Publishers, 1975)* 85 & 99
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subverted the constitution, at least in spirit, by in^sing
emergenoy in June 1975* the Soviet press and government extended
85
strong support to her,,
It is evidentthat the Soviet stand v/ae not appre­
ciated by the Indian Public opinion. When the emergency was 
lifted, and general elections were held the "outstanding leader"
was defeated in her own conatltuenoy, her party swept out of power
86and the CPI was humiliated. This shortsi^ted Soviet policy has 
ignored the view expressed by unoffioal India that Indo-Soviet 
friendship is not a partisan issue in Indlagy Tb that extent,
85. The day the Allahabad High Court declared Mrs. Gandhi's 
election invalid, Thss sent a report from New Delhi saying 
that during the trial "Indira Gandhi demonstrated the 
groundlessness of the Opposition's conjectures. Nevertheless, 
under pressure from reactionary forces, the juâge ruled
in favour of the ri^t-wing parties". Rcavda. June 15* 1975. 
Cbo^lete text in CD6P, Vol.^OCVIX, No. 24, P. 12. See also 
Pravda. July 4* 1975, See àlso Epilogue, P. 432
86. Some of the most prominent parliamentary leaders of the party 
were defeated. The Party could seoure only seven seats as 
against its rival^ , CPI (M )*s 22 in the lower house of 
Ibrliament. The Statesman. îferoh 25# 1977. For its performance 
in the lalections in 1971,, See above, P. 413
87. See Chapter VIII, P. 274,
:
Moscow alienated large sections of public openlon.
 ^ Tho new leaders of #ie government of India have exhibited
statesmanship in not allowing the past Soviet abuses heaped upon 
them to corns in the way of Indo-Soviet relatione. Moscow also
83
adjusted itself, aa it has to, to tlie political changes in India*
But more important to the ftture of Lido-Soviet relations 
is the attitude to Lidia oftthe Uhited States, China and Bikistan* 
The cordiality that now prevails in Lido-Soviet relations is the 
indirect result of their policies*
Whatever clashes of inter eats there were between Lidia and 
the United States were attributable to America's Cold War fears of 
the Soviet Union and China and her dislike of Lidia's efforts to 
develop friendly relations with them. Now that Sino-Amerioan and 
Soviet-Amorioan relations are in^ woving, there is no reason vAy 
Lido-American relations should not improve also. America's support
to Pakistan during the Cold War was beoaueq omer usefulness as a
■ ' '
military base against the rival oanq>i that faoillty is no longer 
available to the Uhited States.®^ ®ierefore, It should not be 
difficult for the Uhited States to change her South Asia policy.
•of
Li view of the state relations between Lidia and China,
the extraordinary attempts made by the Uilted States to appease
90China caused misgivings In India. If tlie lïhlted States
88. See 1=^.3 Epilogue, PF. 435 - 31 
89* See Chapter, XI, P. 376
90. See Mrs. Gandhi's statement which conveys this feeling in 
m e  Times. JUlr 21. 1979
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allays India's fears in this regard, Indo-Amerlcan relations
oan improve. There are signs of change in the styles of
Uhited States' foreign policy, particularly after Carter
assumed office, which are likely to have good effect on
91Lido-American relations.
91. Even during President Nixon's second term this trend was 
visible. He said in his second inaugural address that 
time has passed when the Uhited States will "presutae to 
tell the people of other nations how to manage their own 
affairs". See The Sunday Times. January 21, 1975* During 
Jk* Kissinger's visit to Lidia in Ootober-November 1974» 
the Uiited States agreed, in the Xndo-American Joint 
communique, that there should be no intervention by outside 
powers in the affairs of Soualh Asia* See The Overseas 
Hindustan Times. November 7» 1974* These two commitments are 
very much in tune with India's wishes. IT. Kissinger also 
described Lidia as a "major power" and the Uhited States aid 
to her an expression of "our mutual interests". Ibid.. 
Earlier in the year 1974» the then US ambassador to India, 
Nbynihan, said "Lidia's destiny is to be a world power".
See For All the People, PP. 42-45* Suoh adjustments in 
the Uhited States policy in South Asia and such flattery 
of Lidia would go a long way in ingwoving Lido-Amerioan 
relations*
After the assumption of office by President Carter 
and the formation of the Janata government in India, there 
are clear signs of improvement in Lido-American relations. 
Prime Minister Desai is the only Third World leader among 
the world leaders with idiom Aresident Carter periodioally 
exchanges views, on global problems, through letters.
(The Hindu. May 11, 1977) Carter visited India in January 
197s* He and the Indian Prime Minister l^fd stress on 
shared ideals, democracy and basic human rights ( See 
The Hindu. January 2,5,4» 1978) Uesai paid a visit to the 
United States in June, 1978. While he stuck to the policy 
of not signing the NPT, he gave an assuranoethat Lidia 
would not even conduct underground nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes ( See The Indian Express. June 14» 15, 16, 
1978) See also Chapter XI, PP. 58I - 84.
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It Is also likely timt in view of BaJdstah's 
Inability to take Kashmir ty force, and the tihiikelJ^ bod 
of either China or the IMted States using foree a^ a^inst 
Lidia to g)t Kashmir for Pakistan, Islamabad would agree
to find a solution to the dispute on the basis of the
of 
95
09
status QUO. There have been encouraging signs Improvement
in Lido-lhkistanl relations in the recent past.
China is also in a mood to compose her differences 
with Lidia, Her dislike of %rs* Gandhi was strong because she 
had made Lidia an ally of the Soviet,^ But China does not 
have to fear Lidia as much as i^ e has to fear the Soviet Uiion#
92, It sis significant #mt P&kistan had not raised the Kashmiriissue wher 
leader, Shei&h Abdullah, signed an agreement with the Government 
of Lidia accepting Jammu and Kashmir as a constituent part of 
Lidia, See the Hindustan Times. November 14» 1974#
95* Li Jhne, 1976, Lidia and Bddstan restored diplomatic relations, 
which were snapped during the Bangladesh War in 1971 (The Hindu,
June 22, 1976), Li JUne, 1976, trade by private sector was allowed. 
(The Hindu, Jhne 24, 1976)* Li July, I976 rail and air links were 
restored ( rail links were out during the Lido-Bakistani war of 1965) 
(The Hindu, JOly 18, 1976)* Li February, 1978, the new Indian 
Minister of External Affairs, A«B, Vajpayee, visited Pakistan and 
concluded agreements for liberalising visa procedures, and stationing 
correspondents in each other's country, (The Hind% February 8, 1978)
94# Sea Peking Review, No, 27 (July 4, 1975) for the Chinese reaction 
to Mrs, Gandhi's imposition of emergency,
#en Mrs, Gandhi was defeated in the elections in March,1977# 
The People's Daily. ifec?oh 30, 1977# commented that her downfall was 
a heavy blow to Soviet expansionism in South Asia, Quoted in the 
Times of Lidia^  Nkr 27, 1977
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Xf Peking could eatabllsh friendly relations with the Uilted
States and other countries, to which it exhihltted relentless
hostility once, in order to strengthen itself diplomatically
against Moscow# there Is no reason why it cannot take the
initiative for mending its relations with India to loosen her
ties with Moscow, In so doing, China would not lose face
because she was the victor in the war with India in I962. On
the Sinorlndlan border# China has under its control what
95she wants - Aksai Chin, There is no hope of India wresting 
it from China by force. Therefore, if China makes any proposals, 
which would not entail loss of face for India, for the settlement 
of the border dispute, there would be a favourable response
95. See Chapter VII, P.242.
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from India, There are already eigne of thaw in Sino-Lidian 
96relatione too.
96, In July, 1976, tlie Indian ambassador to Baking, K,R. Narayanan, 
started funotioning. It is for the first time since the 1962 
war that Lidia is being represented in Peking by an ambassador 
(ailBn.riindttf July 25, 1976). m  September, 1976, China sent 
its ambassador, Chen Chao-yuan, to New Delhi, He spoke of 
profound friendship between Lidia and China since anoient 
times. He referred to the unfortunate "set-backs" and asked 
for the Indian government's ooopera.tion for strengthening 
the ties, (The Hindu, September 21, 1976)* In 1977# 
the first trade agreement since I962 war made ( The Hindu,
*fay 5* 1977)* Li February 1978# the Chinese Deputy Prime 
Minister, Teng Hsia-ping, said, while on a visit to Nepal, 
that China was "eager" to improve relations with India 
(The Hindu. February 5, 1978). The Lidian Prime Minister,
Dssai, also expressed Lidia's readiness to hold discussions 
with China to settle the difference ( The Hindu, February, 8, 
1978) A 16-member Chinese Tirade Delegation arrived in Lidia 
in th^same month (The Hindu. February 10, 1978),
Li %roh, 1978, a Goodwill Mission arrived on a 
2-week tour. This was led by %1suig Hn-nan, President of the 
Chinese Peoples' Association for Friendship with Foreign 
countries. He said that in 1971 Mao said that India is "a great 
nation" and the qQuntriqs of India and ®hina are bound to be 
friendly", (The Hindu, Iferoh 8, 1978 ), Wang invited Vajpayee, 
India's Minister for External Affairs, to visit China, The invi­
tation was accepted in principle ( Tlie Hindu, March 9# 1978), 
n^ang also met the Lidian Prime Nixiister and spoke of the age-old 
ties between Lidia and China,
4^ v
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The other issues which the Soviet Union exploited 
for her benefit *- Soviet aid for Lidia's industrialisation under 
state sponsorship and colonial and racial issues? have almost lost 
their usefulness now; the former because of India's near-self-
07
sufficiency in certain branches of machine-building, ^ ' and the 
latter because of the practical disappearance of colonialism 
and some signs of change being exhibited by South Africa on racial 
segregation, t^ was tlie inability or unwillingness of the Uhited 
States to take a strong stand against colonial and racial issues 
that played into the hands of the Soviet foreign policy makers.
Since his inauguration, ITesident Carter of the Uhited States
?iv€
99
98has been taking a strong line, vhich will depr e Moscow of
the special advantage it enjoyed all these y^ars.
97, See Chapter X,
98* During his visit to Nigeria and Liberia in Aprili, 197®» President 
Carter dlscribed apartheid as an "evil and oppressive system".
He warned the viraoist regimes that time was running out for 
peaceful solutions leading to black majority rule in Rhodesia 
and N&mibia, He also told Sourth Africa that elections in 
Namibia should be held under the UN supervision and that the 
South West African peoples Organisation ( SîVAPD ), banned by 
South Africa, should be allowed to participate in the elections 
too. See The Hindu, April 4*5# 197®#
99* See Chapter IV.
Thus, the study of Indian-Soviet relations under­
taken in this thesis suggests; the Cold War had begun before 
the West made neoessaiy adjustments to the post-oolonial world 
that began emerging after World Vfetr II; the West wanted the 
new nations to support it in the Cold War without making 
necessary concessions to them, as, for instance, being considerate 
to their feelings taking a forthright stand against the remnants 
of colonialism and racialism. The Western policies gave the 
appearance of being geared to u#iolding the status quo: this was 
unacceptable to the emerging world before colonialism and racial 
discrimination* had been completely abolished. The new nations 
wore interested in achieving quick economic development; most 
of them preferred socialism of sorts; and, theywere also eager 
to accept aid from any quarter* The West, the Ibiited States in 
particular, preferred free enterprise* There were, thus, clashes 
of interest and tengperament between the new nations and the West; 
the Soviet Union would not incur any loss by extending support 
to new nations on all these issues; so, she did*
: India emerging into Independent nationhood with
pride in her anoient history and culture, conscious of her size 
and potential, naturally wanted to chart an Independent course in 
world affairs* Her foreign policy was naturally conditioned ty 
her past experiences, her ambitions and needs and her own brand 
of messianio zeal, These claalied with the interests of the West 
in the subcontinent* Thisolash of interests between Lidia and 
tl^ie West worked to the advantage of Soviet diplomacy*
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The future of Indian-Soviet relations depends
upon the attitudes of tlie United States, China and Baklstan
towards India# There are already signs of change in the
attitudes of these countries towrds Ihdia# in^rovement
in their relations v/ith India, in addition to the self-confidence
she has gained after her recent emergence as a dominant power on
1CX)the subcontinent f perceptible improvement in her economy and 
the technological breoktïiroughs ahe achieved in the nuclear and 
space fields, will make it unnecessary for Lidia to be dependent 
upon Soviet diplomatic support for promoting her interests.
If the spirit of realism lhat prevailed in Lido- 
Soviet relations all these years continues, Indian-Soviet 
relations are likely to continue on friendly terms since there 
are no disputes directly involving India and the Soviet Union.
If I however, there Is an improvement in Sino-Lidian relations and 
If Mbscow considers suoh on improvement, before itu relations 
with Peking ingxrove, an unfriendly act ant^ üxhibits its pique 
with Lidia by taking retaliatory measures, tensions in Indian- 
Soviet relations are likely to appear.
100. Lidia now enjoys a very comfortable balance of payments
position. As on Dsoomber 16, 1977# Lidias foreign exchange 
reserves, stood at five billion dollars. She also has 
food reserves to the tune of 20 million tonnes.
See the Hindu. January 10, 11, 197®*
n Î-»
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E P I L O G U E
It has already been mentioned that the Soviet Utiicm 
supported the ispoeition of emergency tgr Mrs. Gandhi.^ Once she 
silenced the press and the opposition, she came out in her true 
colours. Bftrs* Gandhi, idio always used socialist rhetoric to serv# 
her political ends, declared at the annual session of t)ie Congress 
in 1975* " I do not believe in the right or the left.**^
Obviously, the Soviet leaders were convinced tiiat 
Mrs* Gandhi was the unquestioned leader of India, She was 
invited to pay a visit to the Soviet Union in JUne, 1976, wlien 
she appeared to be at the pinnacle of power having imprisoned 
all tlie opposition leaders. Her second son, Sanjey Gandhi, who 
was described as the " rising sun of India " by Mrs. Gandhi's 
sycophants, was also Invited, as also her first son and her two 
daughters-ln-law. Sanjfiqr who Is anti-oonnunlst, preceded his 
mother. He was already in Moscow, having first visited Soviet 
Central Asia, when his mother arrived. As usual, on June 8, 1976, 
Mrs. Gandhi was received at the airport by Brezhnev, Kosygin and 
Gronyko, among others.^ As Mere. Gandhi came down the plane, 
Brezhnev greeted her and then told her that he was already 
acquainted with her son, Sanjay Gandhi, whereupon she introduced
1, See P.422 sea also below P. 432
2. The Hindu. Bsoeniber 31, 1975
3# The Hindu. JUne 9, 1976. Jhst before her arrival, M. Menshikov, 
a former Soviet ambassador to India wrote that over the last 
few years Bfes. Gandhi had managed to free the Indian National 
Congress from right-wing people, althot^h the struggle was stiU 
oontlnulns, Sse Mpnaow. M m , No. 25 ( 1976 ).
her first ion#^ Soviet teXivieion which teleoast the airport 
reception etc*, deeoribed Sanjey Gandhi as * " well-known public 
figure " in Ihdia. ^
At/ithe dinner on JUne 8, 1976, Brezhnev said #iat, life 
had confirmed the farsightedness of the Indian National Congress*
policy of industrialising the country, of building an indepemdent
6economy and of forming a powerful state sector.
In on obvious reference to the imposition of emergency,
he said:
The action your government has taken against 
Internal and external reactionaries has been fully 
understood in the USSR. Their attempts to take 
tJie offensive have been firmjy rebuffed by all 
Indian democratic forces.^
MTs. Gandhi spoke of India's "determination to be
8
ourselves and to preserve our identity**.##"
Sn Dftoejtber, 1976, Mes* Gandhi said tlrnt CBI ” did 
collaborate with tlie British against the Congress and those
9
fighting in the Quit Lidia Movement This conveyed the 
meaning that the Indian communists are traitors * Mrs. Gandhi, 
however, softened her statement three days later and 8%id that 
tliey wore not enemies of the country - some gesture to Moscow 
for its mxppovt to her on emergency.
4. Ibi(%,
5. Ibid^
6* Moscow News. No. 24, ( 1976 ), P. 8
7. Ibid#
8, Jtoa 9* 1976,
9* % »  Hindu, iBoenibei? 25, 1976, Sse Chapter I, P,P. 40 - 42
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In  Jantway, 1977 Mrs. Gandhi announotd her decision to
seek people's mandate. The Soviet Itoion kept up its  support to
her. In February, 1977# Koeygiu expressed to Jsgat Mehta,
Seoretaxy to the Ihdian M inistry of HxtemdX A ffa irs , his and
his country's admiration fo r Mrs. Gandhi under whose stewardsMp
10India had made tremendous progress in  recent years.
And the Soviet press wrote along sim ilar lin es . IPravda
wrote in  March that #ie unity of India's democratic forces, in  the
fir s t  place of the OBI and tho Congress, had boon able to wrack
11the rig h t reaotion's designs in  the summer o f 1975#
12Tile Janata Party, Eravda wrote#
Stands out as the direct tool o f extreme reaction, 
defender of the interests of landowners, usurers, 
local and foreign monopolies.
On foreign policy, the paper continued, the Janata party's 
opposition to the country*s trad itional peace course and " such 
significant achievements as friendship and cooperation of India 
with #ie Soviet %ion and other socialist countries " was 
brought out in  bold re lie f.
10. The Times o f Lidia. February 6, 1977
11. Bravda. March 12. 1977.
12. This was formed on Januaxy 20, 1977. F)ur opposition parties 
coalesced to fig ^ t Mrs. Gandhi's authoritarian regime. Sec 
The Hindu. January 21, 1977
15. Bpavda. March 12, 1977
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Bcavdft also wrote on %roh 15, 1977# that tlio Oongresm 
party was baslz^ Its e lf on Impressive successeè'^ scored by India 
since independence  ^particu larly in  recent times" -  a reference to 
Mrs. Gandhi's regime* A summarised version o f th is a rtic le  was 
distributed by the Soviet Waasey in  Hew Delhi#
A pre-election survey Hew Tlmea^  deferred to the
Congress* impressive record of achievements which no "unbiased
observer disputes"* The survey lis te d  tïie party's achievements
over Üîe years particu larly " a fte r tlie introduction o f the state
of emergency in  June 1975 "* The a rtic le  decried the Janata parly#
The survey also fe lt  that the youth congress' oaugpaign against the
17.# H  evoked a negative reaction feom the general public#
' ' ' 4 0Tlie results o f the elections in  March, 1977 were starting*
I t  must have been a rude shook to the Soviet leaders, fo r the leaders
whom th e ir media have been denouncing as rigdit reactionaries opposed
19to Ihdo-Sovlet friendship wore returned to power*
14. lfo.1l» Ifcwoh ( 1977 ) , PP. 13-14.
15. Ib id .
16. Ib id .
17# Ib id . The Congress refused to moke an eleotral alliamnOé?iv/xth the 
CPI on A ll-In d ia  basis. Only some local adjustmants were made* 
see also Hew Times. Ho. 11 (itooh, 1977) fo r more criticism  of the 
Janata party*
10. See the Hindu. March 21,22, 23, 1977.
19. For instance, pxav#. JUly 29, I960, wrote tliu t ^ e  Jan Sangdi 
and Swatantra parties did not lik e  Indo-Soviet friendship*
V, Ihviovsky wrote in  L^temational A ffaire (?losoow) Ito.l (1970) 
that the Jan Sangh and Sweitontra were opposed to non-alignment; 
they weï?e in  favour of putting the country on a pro-Westom track.
A former Jan Sangh leader, A.B. Vajpsyeo, is  now Ihdios 
Minister fo r lactemal A ffa irs .
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The Soviet leaOere quietly adjusted themselves to 
the political oiianges in India, Igvestja wrote on Maroh 22,
1977, quoting local observeà#^  that Mrs, Gandhi lost because 
of the mistakes made and excesses committed during the emergency, 
The paper also felt that the Congress party's refusal to cooperate 
#ith out CPI played into the hands of the Janata party#
Ctoomvko paid « visit to India a month after assumption
of office by the new Janata government, hiring this visit, the
Soviet Foreign Minister made aid commitments to tlie tune of
250 million roubles# The Joint Statement issued at tiie end of
his visit said that the position of both countries on many
issue was either "Identical or close", The Prime Minister of
India, iDesal, and the Minister for External Affairs, Vajpayee,
21were invited to pay a visit to the Soviet Uhion, Grosyko's 
visit seeiasd to have reassured the Soviet government that the
new Ltdian government was not likely to oiiange the country's
23
foreign policy*
Prime Minister Desai visited Moscow In October, 1977 
He was also received at the airport by Brezhnev, Koiygin, Gromyko 
and others# large crowds turned up to greet the Lidian leader#
At a state banquet, Desoi said tliat tiio peaceful
revolution that occured In India In Mhrdi, 1977 was "a warning
2dto any leader Ytho presumes to take idle people for granted# "
20. See the Hindu, April, 26, 27, 1977
21. Ibid.. April 27, 1977
22. See Igyeatia# April 29, 1977 and May 11, 1977 which
convey this feeling.
23. The Hindu, October 22, 1977
24. The Hindu, October 25, 1977
436'
He Also «aid mmt the mutual desire to etrengthsiîi ïhdo- 
Sovlet relatione shows tliat It Is not based on personalities or
ideologies but on equality, national interests and enlightened
bio:
26
25
common purpose* He said that during the elect ns in India
non-alighment " was never a subjeot of debate "•
The Indian BrimI Minister gratefully aoknowledged Soviet
help which he said, enabled Ihdia to emerge as one of the more
na
20
27important industrial tions* Dssai also addreeeed the Soviet
people on television*
When the Joint Déclaration was signed by Brezhnev and
Basai, all tlie members of the politbureau of the CPSU ware preaent*^^ 
The Soviet leaders seemed to have realised tîie risks involved in
identifying tlieuwelves with any particular leader or grotgp in
**bourgeois" democratic countries like Lidia, with whidi tlie
Soviet %ion developed friendly relations over tho years# This
view is strengthened by the way the Joint îbclarcition waa drafted#
It oald that tîie Indian Brime Minister explained to the Soviet leaders
25# m & L
26. m & L
27. ma..
88. Ibid.. Ootobep 26, 1977 
29. October 27, 1977
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leaders " the latest events in India loading to the formation of 
a new government in acoordanoe with the will expressed ty tlie
30jndtsn people and of its politioaX, sooial and eoonomlo programmes# 
The Soviet side neither welcomed nor associated #tself with 
tlie changes#
The new government's economic programmes are not likely
51to appeal to the Soviet leaders* Any expression of disapproval 
of the new government's poloies would introduce unnecessary 
tensions into Indian Soviet relations. Since the the new government
50. Soviet land. Ho. 22 ( November, 1977 )» F. 14
31. In may, 1977» a 10-year Plan, e#loyment and faster economic 
growth oriented, was released by the Indioa Finance Minister, 
H.M. Patel, for public discussion. This document was i>repared 
by the Indian Renaissance Institute, founded by tlie late 
M.H. Boy. Lie Document calls for a shift in emphasis from 
direct state involvement in industrial growth to provision 
of services and and public utilities# It calls for importance 
beii% given to small Industries^Hind^ I1ay18, 1977
In December, 1977, the Janata announced its new industrial 
policy which lays stress on cottage and small-scale industries, 
wiiioii would be widely dispersed in rural areas. #iatever can 
bo produced by small and cottage industries must be so produced. 
The items reeervad for small-scale industries were increased 
to 500 from 100. See the Hindu* %oember 23, 1977#
The CPI NO-ticnal Council, at its meeting in December 
24 - 28, 1977 declared that tho Janata government was bent 
on reversing the nationally accepted progressive policies 
and replaoi%% tliem by reactionary polctcies. The Hindu# 
moernber 31# 1977 '
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Is interested in maintaining friendly relations, it would be 
unwise for the Soviet govemmsnt to introduce strains into 
the relations# Mosoo#'s identifioation with Mrs, Gandhi was 
resented by India# The new leaders have shown statesmanship 
in ignoring abuses heaped upon them by the Soviet media while 
they were in opposition#
Certain policies of the new government are likely to
' i 
35
32clash with Soviet interests* After all in the past too Lidla
had not to^ the Soviet line#
It was not Mrs, Gandhi or her pssudo-radicalism^ that
have contributed to cordiality in Indian-Soviet relations# The
33quiet Soviet acceptance of her attacks on the CPI, and her 
pro-capitalist policies during the emergency prove that there
32, For instance the Joint communique issued at the end of Arime 
Minister IS sal's visit to the Uhited States says ttiat the 
African problems should be solved "without outside intervention 
idiloh oan sg^i^yate regional conflicts and inhibit their 
resolution", ^e the Indian Express. Jhne 16, 1978. This is 
evidently a reference to Cuban-Soviet interventlws in Africa's 
mini-wars#
35$ See PP. 415 “ 16
34* The CPI which svgpported the imposition of emergency (See P»414 ) 
demanded the nationalisation of sugar, textile, jute and 
automobile industries and foreign drug cotbpanlee. Instead,
Mrs. Gandhi granted the industrialists a number of conoeasions, 
banned strikes and abolished bonus.
Recently, the CPI expressed repentance for supporting her. 
Its National Council thought tïmt one of he#ims in imposing the 
emergency was solving the c^ apitailst crisis^  at the expense of 
the common man. See The Hindu. December 31* 1977
35* See above, P. 432,
459
word no idooXosloaX oonolderationo behind Ihdo^Soviet friendship*
% e  way Nasoow shunned Mrs* Qandhi after her defeat shows how
intensely pa^ i^ psatlo its policy Is* Brltishpand even Chinese»
showed her oourteey# 3ut ChTonyko had not even called on her
idien he was In Hew belM In May» 1977* Realism permeated
57Indian-Soviet relations In the past* If the same spirit of 
accomodation continues» there Is no reason why IndlsnrSovlet 
relations should not be smooth in spite of the change of 
government in India*
36* The British Rclme Minister» CalXa^ u^tn» sent her his good 
wishes after her defeat ( %^e Hindu* March 27» 1977 /* He 
received her when he visited India ( Xhe Hindu* January 10* 
1976 )« üie Chinese Bo&baesy in Raw Delhi invited her to a 
reoeptlon In honour of the visiting Chinese Coodwill Mission 
and arranged for a meeting between the leaders of tlie group 
and #s* Candhl* (Tl^ e Hindu* Itooh 15* 1976 )#
57. See P. 418.
APPENDIX I
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation 
Between, the Republic of India and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed on 
August 9, 1971.
DESIROUS of expanding and consolidating the existing 
relations of sincere friendship between them,
BELIEVING that the further development of friendship 
and co-operation meets the basic national interests of 
both the States as well as the interests of lasting 
peace in Asia and the world,
DETERMINED to promote the consolidation of universal 
peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the 
relaxation of international tensions and the final 
elimination of the remnants of colonialism,
UPHOLDING their firm faith in the principles of 
peaceful co-existence and co-operation between States 
with different political and social systems,
CONVINCED that in the world today international 
problems can only be solved by co-operation and not by 
conflict,
REAFFIRMING their determination to abide by the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,
The Republic of India on the one side, and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side,
HAVE decided to conclude the present Treaty, for 
which purpose the following Plenipotentiaries have been 
appointed:
On behalf of the Republic of India:
Sardar Swaran Singh,
Minister of External Affairs
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On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics:
Mr. A.A. Gromyko,
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
who, having each presented their Credentials, which are 
found to be in proper form and due order,
HAVE AGREED as follows:
ARTICLE I
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that 
enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the 
two countries and their peoples. Each Party shall respect 
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the other Party and refrain from interfering in the 
other's internal affairs. The High Contracting Parties 
shall continue to develop and consolidate the relations of 
a sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and 
comprehensive co-operation existing between them on the 
basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of 
equality and mutual benefit.
ARTICLE II
Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible 
way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, 
the High Contracting Parties declare their determination 
to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen 
peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms 
race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, 
including both nuclear and conventional, under effective 
international control.
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ARTICLE III
Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of 
equality of all peoples and Nations, irrespective of race 
or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn 
colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, 
and reaffirm their determination to strive for their 
final and complete elimination.
The High Contracting Parties shall co-operate with 
other States to achieve these aims and to support the 
just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against 
colonialism and racial discrimination,
ARTICLE IV
The Republic of India respects the peace loving 
policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at 
strengthening friendship and co-operation with all nations.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects 
India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this 
policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance 
of universal peace and international security and in the 
lessening of tensions in the world,
ARTICLE V
Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and 
security, attaching great importance to their mutual 
co-operation in the international field for achieving 
those aims, the High Contracting Parties will maintain 
regular contacts with each other on major international 
problems affecting the interests of both the States by 
means of meetings and exchanges of views between their 
leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and
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special envoys of the two Governments, and through 
diplomatic channels.
ARTICLE VI
Attaching great importance to economic, scientific, 
and technological co-operation between them, the High 
Contracting Parties «will continue to consolidate and 
expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation 
in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and 
communications between them on the basis of the principles 
of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation 
treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the 
special arrangements with contiguous countries as 
specified in the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement of December
26, 1970.
ARTICLE VII
The High Contracting Parties shall promote further 
development of ties and contacts between them in the 
fields of science, art, literature, education, public 
health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and 
sports.
ARTICLE VIII
In accordance with the traditional friendship 
established between the two countries, each of the High 
Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not 
enter into or participate in any military alliance 
directed against the other party*
Each High Contracting party undertakes to abstain
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from any aggression against the other Party and to prevent 
the use of its territory for the commission of any act 
which might inflict military damage on the other High 
Contracting Party*
ARTICLE IX
Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain 
from providing any assistance to any third party that 
engages in armed conflict with the other Party, In the 
event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a 
threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall 
immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to 
remove such threat and to take appropriate effective 
measures to ensure peace and the security of their 
countries »
ARTICLE X
Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that 
it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, 
with one or more States: which is incompatible with this
Treaty, Each High Contracting Party further declares that 
no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered 
into, between itself and any other State or States, which 
might cause military damage to the other Party*
ARTICLE XI
This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty 
years and will be automatically extended for each 
successive period of five years unless either High 
Contracting Party declares its desire to terminate it by 
giving notice to the other High Contracting Party twelve
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months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The 
Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come 
into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of 
Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one 
month of the signing of this Treaty,
ARTICLE XII
Any difference of interpretation of any Article or 
Articles of this Treaty which may arise between the High 
Contracting Parties will be settled bilaterally by 
peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and 
understanding.
The said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present 
Treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being 
equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in the 
year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one
On behalf of the On behalf of the
Republic of India Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
(Sd,) Swaran Singh (Sd.) A.A* Gromyko
Minister of External Affairs Minister of Foreign Affairs
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APPENDIX II
The Indus Waters Agreement was signed in Karachi 
by Nehru and Ayub Khan on September 19  ^ I96O, (The -
Times, September 20, I960)*
Under the Agreement, the three eastern tributaries 
of the Indus, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, were allocated to 
India; Pakistan would have the Indus and its two other 
tributaries, Jhelum and Chenab (The Times, September 19j
i960).
But since Pakistan was getting water from the rivers 
allocated to India since pre-partition days, India 
committed herself to continue to supply water for a 
transitional period of the succeeding 10 years; which 
could be extended by 3 years on Pakistan's request (The 
Times, September 5, IÇbO)*
In the. meantime Pakistan was expected to make 
alternate arrangements from her own rivers which required 
the building of an irrigation complex at a cost of 0900 
million (The Times, September 19, 19&0).
It was here that the World Bank played a useful role. 
It and Australia, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, the 
United States, and Britain footed the bill for the 
construction of the irrigation complex (The Times, September
20, i960)*
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APPENDIX III
The following conmiuniques contain such references:
1. The Afro-Asian Communique at the end of Bandung 
Conference, April 24; 1955. Foreign Policy of India, 
Texts of Documents 1947-1964; p.530.
2. The Communique of Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned 
Nations. The Hindu, September 7> I96I.
3. The Soviet-Indian Communique at the end of Nehru's 
second visit to the Soviet Union. Pravda, September
11, 1961.
4. The Communique of the Cairo Conference of Non-aligned 
Nations in 1964. See Pran Chopra, Before and After 
the Indo-Soviet Treaty, p.35.
5. The Soviet-Indian Communique issued at the end of 
President Radhakrishnan's visit to the Soviet Union, 
September 19; I964. Foreign Policy of India, Texts 
of Documents 1947-1964; p.514.
6. The Soviet-Indian Communique at the end of Prime 
Minister L.B, Shastri's visit to the Soviet Union.
Pravda, May 20, 1965.
7. The India-UAR-Yugoslavia communique issued at the end
of the Conference of their heads of government, India-
UAR-Yugoslavia Conference, New Delhi, October 21-24, 
19663 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
1966, p.29,
8. The Soviet-Indian Communique at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's
visit to the Soviet Union, July 16, I966. For Peace
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and Progress3 Publications Division, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, I966,
p.61.
9. Joint statement at the end of External Affairs Minister 
Dinesh Singh's visit to the Soviet Union, September 15, 
1969, Pravda, September 20, 1969.
10. The Soviet-India Communique at the end of Mrs, Gandhi's 
visit to the Soviet Union. Pravda, September 26,
1971.
11. The Communique issued at the end of the Non-aligned 
Conference in Algeirs, Pravda, September 13, 1973.
12. The Joint Declaration at the end of Brezhnev's visit 
to India, November 30, 1973. The Mission of Friend­
ship, p. 82.
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A M m m x  IV
Kehru visited the Soviet Ibdon twice ( See Chapter III,
P# 105 and Chapter V, P# 168), the first three Presidents of 
India visited tlie Soviet Iftiion one time eaoh ( for a?# Rajendra 
Apasad^s visit to the Soviet Dblon see Pravda. June 22, I96O;) 
for It* S. Radhakrishnan* s visit in the oapaoity of vioe-Aresident 
see Chapter III, P# 114, and for his visit in the oapaoity of 
the President, see Poreign Pcliov of India t Texts of Doouments.
1947**1964. P. 515l for Dr# Zakir Hussain*s visit to Moscow 
(see Chapter V, P. 163)| Arime Minister Shastrl visited the 
Soviet Dhion onoe (see Chapter V, P« 139) I Mrs. Qandhi visited 
onoe as Minister for information and Broadcasting and thrioe as 
Prime Minister (see Chapter V, P* I60, Chapter VII, P. 231, 
Chapter IX, P, 295, and P. 431) I see above P* 405 for the 
Congress Party's A^esident's visit to Hosoow.
Bulganin visited India onoe and Xhrushohav, twioe 
(see Chapter III, P. I04 and Pravda, February 12, I960); Kosygin 
visited Lidia thrice, once before beoomlng the Arime Minister 
(Pravda. February 22, I96I, see Chapter V, P. 159 and the ^ iyidu 
February 1, I968); Voroshilov, onoe (Pravda. January 21, I96O) 
and Brezhnev, twice onoe as the President of the Aresidlum of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR (see Chapter VI, P. 186) and the 
^second time as the General Secretary of the CPSU (see Mission 
of Friendship. PP. 75-84)*
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